



UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

PREVENTION

PREVENTION NEWSLETTER

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MISSION

The USIP's Center for Conflict Management (CCM) designs and manages the Institute's efforts to *prevent* the initial outbreak of violent conflict, *resolve* ongoing conflicts, and *stabilize* areas emerging from conflict. The Center also conducts research, identifies best practices, and develops new tools for conflict prevention, management, and resolution.

CALENDAR

June 23–July 1: African Union Summit, Malabo, Equatorial Guinea

July–August: General Assembly Interactive Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect (TBC)

July 9: Independence of South Sudan

July 19: USIP Korea Working Group convenes an international conference on "Informal Markets and Peacebuilding in North Korea."

July 24: Legislative Elections in Tunisia (TBC)

July 31: The mandate of the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire expires

August 23: Liberian Constitutional Referendum

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Dear Colleagues,

On June 1, about 200 experts, scholars and policymakers participated in USIP's Second Annual Conference on Preventing Violent Conflict at our new permanent headquarters on the National Mall. The keynote speaker was Gareth Evans who focused on some of the important lessons we have learned about conflict prevention in the last decade. He reminded participants that: "Conflict Prevention is not a business for the faint of heart, those looking for quick returns, or congenital pessimists."

The first Panel on "Regional Challenges" included Jendayi Frazer (Africa), Daniel Kurtzer (Middle East), John Park (Northeast Asia), and Tom Pickering (South Asia), and Pauline Baker (moderator). One of the key issues the panelists addressed was the particular challenges to effective conflict prevention within each geographic region. The second Panel on "Global Conflict Prevention Initiatives" featured Maria Otero (U.S. State Department), Nancy Lindborg (USAID), Jordan Ryan (UNDP), Mark Schneider (ICG), and Paula Dobriansky (moderator). In particular, the panelists considered how to maximize the collective impact of conflict prevention efforts by the U.S. government, the UN, and civil society organizations.

Our new building made it possible for us to hold four interactive Break-Out Sessions this year on Preventing Electoral Violence, Women and Conflict, Making the Case for Prevention to Congress, and the Conflict Prevention Toolbox. The Sessions identified useful priority areas for USIP's future work on conflict prevention.

We received positive feedback from participants about the quality of the presentations and discussions, and are looking forward to your participation in our Third Annual Conference next year.

The video of the panel discussions has been posted on the conference page. The conference report will soon be available on USIP.org as well.

Abiodun Williams

Vice President

Center for Conflict Management



SPOTLIGHT

Pakistan



Source: Jinnah Institute.
<http://www.jinnah-institute.org/publications>

“The U.S. should see this extremely difficult moment as an opportunity to strengthen the bilateral relationship.”

The discovery and killing of Osama Bin Laden in a Pakistani garrison town on the night of May 1, 2011, may well prove to be transformational for the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. The episode raised fresh concerns about Pakistan's reliability as a partner within the United States, and prompted criticisms of the U.S. within Pakistan for breaching the country's sovereignty. The ensuing tensions have led to talk of “resetting” the relationship. While it is too soon to guess what this may entail, the U.S. is likely to focus on convincing Pakistan of the merit in taking action against the Afghan insurgent groups situated on its territory and to rethink its regional strategic calculus. The Pakistani military, as wary as it remains of U.S. presence, is under tremendous pressure not only from the international community but also within Pakistan and may find it difficult to resist demands for rethinking its strategic outlook.

Notwithstanding the fact that patience with Pakistan is wearing thin in some influential quarters in Washington, the U.S. should see this extremely difficult moment as an opportunity to strengthen the bilateral relationship. A demonstration of U.S. resolve to persist with Pakistan even after Bin Laden's death can serve as an extremely positive message to the Pakistani leadership and people. Downgrading ties may prove to be counterproductive and will likely undermine U.S. interests in the region in the medium term.

There have been recent positive developments on another front central to Pakistan's strategic mindset. Arch rivals Pakistan and India, South Asia's two nuclear powers, have reengaged after the prolonged hiatus following the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Secretary level talks are ongoing on key contentious issues. The signals from both sides have been generally positive; both have been candid in their admission that India-Pakistan normalization is critical to their interests and for peace in the South Asian region.

USIP's Pakistan program continues to address the critical importance of Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan and India for U.S. interests in South Asia. Of note is an ongoing policy-oriented exercise aimed at better understanding the perceptions of the Pakistani foreign policy elite on their country's interests in Afghanistan, and how this is linked to U.S. goals and strategy towards the region. Conducted in collaboration with a prominent local partner, the Jinnah Institute, this project brings together over fifty Pakistani opinion and decision makers, capturing a wide range of views on the subject. The project aims to inform policy makers in Washington on how Pakistanis are viewing the situation in Afghanistan and what role Islamabad can be expected to play in the 'end-game' in Afghanistan.

USIP is also utilizing its expertise in action-oriented policy and programmatic activities by supporting two prominent track-II dialogues between Pakistan and India. The dialogues involving senior ex-officials and experts continued to provide feedback to Islamabad and New Delhi when official talks had broken down post-Mumbai. They will now play a key role in complementing track-I efforts that are again underway.

OVER THE HORIZON— HIGHLIGHTS

Internal Tensions in Iran

There are signs that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei reduced his support for President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The political drama began on April 17, when the Supreme Leader overruled the president's decision to dismiss Intelligence Minister Heidar Moslehi. Numerous Iranian officials and media outlets identified Ahmadinejad's Chief of Staff, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, as influencing the politically motivated dismissal. The incident ultimately led to Ahmadinejad's 11-day absence from the political scene, allegations including embezzlement against some of Mashaei's allies, and the arrest of several of them. The evolving episode highlighted the increasingly tense relationship between the president and the Supreme Leader. Khamanei—who had endorsed Ahmadinejad's contentious presidential victory in 2009 and later protected him from challenges from the parliament—was seen as distancing himself from the president, leaving Ahmadinejad susceptible—at least for the time being—to parliamentary and judicial challenges regarding the conduct of his office. The conduct of President Ahmadinejad and his allies is an especially critical issue in the light of upcoming parliamentary elections in March 2012 and the presidential election in 2013.


Secret Talks on the Korean Peninsula

On June 3, North Korea revealed that it had been engaged in South Korea-initiated secret talks. South Korea acknowledged that these talks had taken place in Beijing, but denied North Korea's claim that South Korean officials had offered bribes for an inter-Korean summit. North Korea declared that it would not deal with the Lee Myung-bak administration for the remainder of its term. The significance of this development is that it derails Beijing's three-stage proposal for resuming the stalled Six-Party Talks. Stage one called for an improvement in inter-Korean relations. Stage two set out U.S.-North Korea talks. Stage three envisioned the culmination of this process with a restart of the Six-Party Talks. While this is a disappointment for Seoul in its efforts to improve inter-Korean ties, this is also a major setback for Beijing's plan to facilitate a resumption of the Six-Party Talks. Chinese leaders are concerned that if they remain deadlocked, the region will become more unstable, particularly in light of the North Korean provocations against the South last year.

The Cabinet Formation in Lebanon

Following a five-month long political stalemate, Lebanon's new Prime Minister Najib Miqati announced the formation of a new government on June 13. The Hezbollah-allied March 8th coalition dominates the cabinet, with 18 of the 30 cabinet seats. Independents representing the president and the prime minister hold the remaining 12 portfolios, allowing them a potential veto over the new cabinet. Hezbollah holds the same two minor portfolios it had in the previous government led by the March 14th alliance. For its part, March 14th, led by former Prime Minister Saad Hariri, has opted to remain in the opposition rather than participate in a consensus government. The new cabinet has 30 days to produce a Policy Statement which is submitted to the parliament for approval. Key contentious issues in the Policy Statement include Lebanon's position on the United Nations Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) and its commitment to other international agreements such as UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which calls for the

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Six-Party talks.

Source: Wikimedia Commons (Denelson83).

http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Table_layout_of_Six-Party_Talks.svg



disarmament of all militias (read Hezbollah) in Lebanon. Despite the announced new government, Lebanon remains tense as the violent uprising in neighboring Syria worsens. Sectarian violence flared on June 17 in the northern city of Tripoli as pro-Syrian Alawites clashed with Sunnis who were demonstrating against the Assad regime, leaving seven dead. The Lebanese army mobilized to restore calm and is attempting to better secure Lebanon's northern border with Syria. An estimated 6,000 Syrian refugees have fled the violence into northern Lebanon, according to United Nations estimates. While many have since returned to Syria, a renewed influx of refugees could occur should violence in Syria continue to escalate. The refugee flows could disrupt Lebanon's delicate sectarian balance, particularly in the northern city of Tripoli. Lebanon's volatile border with Israel has also witnessed violence. On May 15, hundreds of Palestinians and Lebanese breached the border with Israel. Ten were killed when Israeli troops opened fire, marking the most significant incidence of violence at the border since the summer 2006 war. A June 5th attempt to repeat the border breach was blocked by the Lebanese army, provoking protests in some Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.

The Responsibility to Protect

Later this summer, the United Nations General Assembly will hold an Interactive Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). This is the third year in a row that the General Assembly will debate the concept, which some suggest is evidence of member states' growing acceptance of R2P. This year's dialogue will focus on the role of regional and subregional arrangements in implementing the R2P. Recent UN Security Council actions regarding Libya and Côte d'Ivoire, both of which followed actions by regional or subregional organizations, underscore the relevance of this subject. The Secretary-General is expected to release a report in the coming weeks to help frame the discussions in the General Assembly. Many questions remain about the respective roles and responsibilities of the UN and regional organizations concerning R2P, not least about the proper authority for sanctioning military intervention when a state is "manifestly failing" to protect its populations.

Reform in Kenya

Some progress has been made in implementing the reforms called for in the new constitution. The nomination and vetting of new Supreme Court justices by the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) took place in early June, as called for in the new constitution. In the past justices had simply been nominated by the president. Reform of the judiciary is an important component of breaking the cycle of ethnic and electoral violence in Kenya, as politicians must have incentives to use existing institutions to seek redress, rather than issuing calls for street protests. In a related development, the International Criminal Court rejected Kenya's petition to hold the trial of the "Ocampo Six" in Kenya; the Ocampo Six were indicted for their role in fomenting postelection violence. Other key reforms, such as the passage of the independent electoral and boundaries commission—meant to restore credibility to the electoral process—and a salaries and remuneration bill—meant to provide more accountability to public servants' salaries, are pending. Credible, irreversible evidence of reform would be an important step towards reducing the possibility of electoral violence in the 2012 elections.

Reconciliation in Côte d'Ivoire

The swearing in of Alassane Ouattara as President on May 21 officially ended the political crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, which began in November 2010, when incumbent president, Laurent Gbagbo, refused to accept defeat. However, as emphasized in a USIP public event on April



UN Headquarters in New York.

Source: U.S. Department of Transportation. <http://fastlane.dot.gov/2010/05/call-to-end-distracted-driving-goes-global-online-campaign-supports-un-event.html>

“Credible, irreversible evidence of reform would be an important step towards reducing the possibility of electoral violence in the 2012 elections.”

29, the way forward in Côte d'Ivoire will be very difficult. Social and political reconciliation are two of the top priorities in building peace after nearly five months of violence. Human rights organizations have documented extensive abuses committed by both pro-Gbagbo forces and pro-Ouattara forces. As such, social and political reconciliation must acknowledge the atrocities committed by both sides, in order to reduce the likelihood of future violence. Furthermore, the structure, purpose, and members of the truth and reconciliation commission promised by Ouattara must carefully consider the ethnic nature of the violence carried out by both sides. The USIP event emphasized that the lack of clarity over land tenure, poor ethnic relations, security sector indiscipline, the lack of economic diversification, and poor political party development, which have played a significant role in fueling political, regional, and religious divisions, must be addressed in order for Côte d'Ivoire to effectively emerge from the cycle of violence that has gripped the nation since 1999.

WORKING GROUPS

- The **Korea Working Group (KWG)** co-convened its 1st Seoul Nuclear Security Summit Study Group (SNS3G) workshop in Seoul on May 12–13, 2011. Participants included the South Korean Sherpa and Sous-Sherpa for the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. The 2nd SNS3G workshop will take place in the autumn in Seoul. In May and June, USIP conducted KWG briefings on the Hill, as well as at the State Department and the Pentagon. These briefings focused on deliberations in Seoul and Washington on the North Korean food aid issue, the implications of Kim Jong-il's trip to China on the U.S.' North Korea policy, and the consequences of Pyongyang's revelation of Seoul's failed secret efforts to arrange an inter-Korean summit. During June 13–15, the KWG co-organized panels at the Asan Plenum in Seoul on the theme of "Our Nuclear Future." Participants at this international conference included current and former government officials, policy experts, and leading academics.
- On May 10, the **Lebanon Working Group (LWG)** sponsored a public Congressional Newsmakers event with Congressman Charles Boustany. Congressman Boustany spoke on "Lebanon and the Arab Spring: A Congressional View of Lebanon's Role Amidst Historic Change in the Region." The Working Group also hosted a visiting delegation from the American University of Beirut on May 16.
- The **Kenya Working Group** held two meetings in the last two months. On May 4, the Working Group discussed the work of the International Criminal Court, as well as transitional justice issues and constitutional reforms. On June 17, the Group discussed measures to address the needs of Kenya's internally displaced.

PUBLICATIONS

- "Even If Bashar Wins, He has Already Lost." *ForeignPolicy.com Article* by Mona Yacoubian, 3 May 2011.
- "The Syrian Uprising's Impact on Lebanon." *USIP On the Issues* by Mona Yacoubian, 9 May 2011.
- "President Obama's Speech an 'Evolution' for US Policy." *USIP News Feature* by Daniel Brumberg, 20 May 2011.
- "The Silver Bullet: India-Pakistan Normalization," *USIP News Feature* by Moeed Yusuf, 23 May 2011.
- "EU Conflict Prevention Revisited," *USIP Peace Brief* by Jonas Claes, 26 May 2011.
- "Conflict Assessment and Intelligence Analysis: Commonality, Convergence, and Complementarity." *USIP Special Report* by Lawrence Woocher, June 2011.
- "China and the United States: Core Interests, Common Interests, and Partnership." *USIP Special Report* by Wu Xinbo, June 2011.
- "China's North Korea Policy: Assessing Interests and Influences." *USIP Special Report* by Bates Gill, June 2011.
- "Vulnerability to Intrastate Conflict," *USIP Peaceworks* by Barry B. Hughes, Jonathan Moyer, and Timothy D. Sisk, June 2011.
- "New Government Announced in Lebanon," *USIP On the Issues* by Mona Yacoubian, 15 June 2011.



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