Nonviolent Action and Transitions to Democracy
THE IMPACT OF INCLUSIVE DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION
By Véronique Dudouet and Jonathan Pinckney
ABOUT THE REPORT

This report examines how inclusive dialogue and negotiation processes can help facilitate peaceful democratic transitions after nonviolent action campaigns. The findings are based on a statistical study of all political transitions after nonviolent action campaigns and three in-depth case studies of transitions in Egypt, Tunisia, and Ukraine. The project was funded by the Nonviolent Action and Inclusive Peace Processes programs at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP).

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Contents

3 Introduction

5 Current Insights

8 Multicountry Statistical Analysis

14 Tunisia (2010–2014)

19 Egypt (2011–2013)


28 Conclusion and Recommendations
Summary

Nonviolent action is a potent tool for peaceful political transformation. Transitions initiated through nonviolent action are roughly three times as likely to end in democracy as other forms of transition. Yet many transitions initiated through nonviolent action fail to achieve democratization, a puzzling outcome for which few explanations are satisfying. One factor is the dialogue and negotiation processes that set up post-transition political institutions. Existing literature on dialogue in the context of armed conflict suggests that the level of inclusiveness in dialogue and negotiation processes will likely affect whether transitions end in democracy.

This report presents statistical analysis of 119 dialogue and negotiation processes (DNPs) in transitions initiated through nonviolent action, systematically mapping their levels of inclusiveness along several relevant dimensions, including the participation of women, presence of civil society actors at the negotiating table, and decision-making mechanisms. Inclusion built not just on participation at the negotiation table but also on the presence of mechanisms to make that participation meaningful through equitable selection, a broad mandate, and a relatively even balance of power between old elites and new forces has a significant positive impact on future democracy. Women’s participation at the negotiation table appears to have a particularly strong impact on democratization.

The importance of broad, comprehensive inclusion is reinforced by the findings from three in-depth case studies: the 2011 uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia and the 2014 Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine. While nonviolent action helped ensure more inclusive processes, grassroots actors struggled to make their voices heard even after playing a crucial role in bringing about transitional dialogue. The findings lead to several recommendations for ensuring that inclusion in transitional DNPs encourages democratization. Inclusion that merely puts grassroots actors at the negotiation table is unlikely to resolve underlying grievances and promote democracy unless combined with selection mechanisms, rules of procedure, and a balance of power at the table.
Introduction

Nonviolent action is a potent force for establishing and sustaining democracy. Political transitions initiated by nonviolent action are roughly three times as likely to end in democracy than any other form of transition. Yet prominent cases such as the Arab Spring revolutions in Egypt and Syria, in which nonviolent action resulted in returns to authoritarianism or devastating civil war, show that this relationship is far from easy or direct.

One missing piece in the existing literature is the role of dialogue and negotiation processes (DNPs) in promoting successful moves from resistance to democracy. Research into conflict resolution suggests that, to promote the peaceful consolidation of democracy, such processes should be inclusive, participatory, and comprehensive. Yet little work has been done applying these insights to political transitions after nonviolent action movements.

This report is one of the first of these analyses, drawing on a new comprehensive dataset of dialogue and negotiation processes in every political transition initiated through nonviolent action from 1945 until 2018; three in-depth case studies of transitions in Egypt, Tunisia, and Ukraine based on interviews with key figures and experts; and research into the secondary literature.

The report first maps the landscape of dialogue and negotiation processes in transitions initiated through nonviolent action, including their length, typical actors, and the presence or absence of international mediators. Nonviolent action is nearly always followed by transitional dialogue and negotiation processes. The overwhelming majority of transitions initiated through nonviolent action, including all of those of the last decade have at least one DNP. These processes have significant consequences for the outcomes—78
percent had mandates for change at least at the level of changing a country’s constitution, and 84 percent of the agreements reached through these processes at least partially addressed the core concerns of the nonviolent action campaign.

The core finding on how dialogue and negotiation processes can help transitions initiated through nonviolent action to peacefully democratize, reinforced by both statistical analysis and detailed case studies, is that although dialogue and negotiation on their own do not significantly promote democracy, highly inclusive processes do. The extent of inclusion, not just its nominal presence, also matters. DNPs that simply “check the inclusion box” by giving civil society actors seats at the negotiation table are no more likely to lead to a peaceful transition to democracy than those with solely elite participants. But when the selection mechanism, balance of power between participants, and decision-making procedures make such inclusion meaningful, the positive effect on democracy is a strong and statistically significant positive one. Of all the various aspects of inclusion, the inclusion of women at the negotiation table has the strongest positive effect on future democracy, reinforcing existing research on how crucial a gender lens is for understanding dialogue and negotiation outcomes in times of transition and conflict.

Case studies from Tunisia, Egypt, and Ukraine lend detail and nuance to the statistics. In all three cases, DNPs were aimed at de-escalating the conflict or addressing the core conflict drivers, or both. However, variation was significant in attempts to include participants from formal civil society and nonviolent action campaign activists at the table, and in the degree to which their participation was made meaningful by the rules and norms of the dialogue or negotiation. In Tunisia, the country with the most inclusive and comprehensive dialogue process, the transition resulted in an emergent democracy. In Ukraine, elite-based attempts at dialogue and negotiation failed to account for the preferences of activists on the streets of Kyiv, undermining a negotiated agreement almost immediately. Subsequent dialogue attempts were overshadowed by Russian action to undermine the new transition government and spark a violent separatist movement in the East. Hardened political positions in the face of foreign aggression could not mitigate conflict escalation, and an armed conflict ensued. In Egypt, a fragmented opposition and lack of enforcement mechanisms for agreements were ultimately followed by increased polarization, violent repression, and a return to authoritarianism. Nonviolent action was a powerful force initiating more inclusive dialogue and negotiation processes, and activists taking to nonviolent action during the processes often helped move them forward from the outside, but active participation was a significant challenge.

The findings inform several actionable recommendations. Nonviolent action can be a powerful force for bringing opposing forces to the negotiating table, and inclusive dialogue and negotiation processes can help carry countries from nonviolent action to democracy. Nonviolent action campaigns often succeed in getting many of their core demands at least partially addressed through negotiated transitional agreements, yet grassroots activists often lack the training, experience, and political savvy to have significant input on these agreements, which can undermine their staying power and implementation. In addition, resources for mediators and other international actors to effectively support movements are limited. To ensure democratization, inclusion in transitional dialogue must involve not just seats at the table but also mechanisms for making that involvement meaningful.
Three decades after the peaceful revolutions that ended the Cold War in Eastern Europe, and more than a decade after the Arab Spring uprisings, the evidence consistently shows that political transitions brought about through nonviolent action tend to promote peace and democracy. Nonviolent resistance was a central factor in fifty of sixty-seven democratic transitions between 1973 and 2005. Further, nonviolent movements are 40 percent more likely to lead to democracy and long-term internal peace than violent insurrections. Democratic transitions brought about through nonviolent action also tend to result in democracies that endure longer and have greater protections for freedom of association and expression.

Yet despite this general positive relationship, variation is still significant in whether a successful nonviolent breakthrough against a dictatorship will be followed by democracy. Political transitions, including those brought about through nonviolent action, are times of significant uncertainty, and examples such as the return to authoritarianism following the 2011 revolution in Egypt or the outbreak of civil war in Yemen speak to the horrific ways in which hopeful mass mobilization on the streets can end in tragedy. Why do some successful nonviolent action campaigns lead to long-term peace and democracy and others not? Crucial, yet little explored to date, are the dialogue and negotiation processes that bridge the period from a nonviolent action campaign’s breakthrough against an authoritarian regime to the establishment of new political institutions.

**CATALYSTS OF NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS**

Nonviolent action is intimately connected to dialogue and negotiation. For instance, the Solidarity movement in Poland was transformational not just because of its success in democratizing the country, but also because of the open and transparent “round table” dialogue with Poland’s Communist leaders through which it brought about that transformation. This model was replicated across Eastern Europe by leaders such as Vaclav Havel, who skillfully blended in-depth negotiations with continued pressure on the streets. In the 1990s, beginning in Benin, nonviolent action campaigns across sub-Saharan Africa pressured authoritarian governments to agree to sovereign “national dialogues” that would fundamentally reshape their countries’ political institutions and usher in multiparty democracy.

Despite these powerful examples, relatively few scholars have systematically explored the intersection between nonviolent action and dialogue and negotiation processes. Early writings conceptualized the “mechanisms of change” through which nonviolent movements reach their objectives, by either converting or coercing their opponents, or by reaching a common agreement through accommodation. Although this work highlights negotiation’s positive role as a driver of democratization, it pays little attention to the interactions between incumbent elites and nonviolent opposition forces in the transition between nonviolent action campaigns and the establishment of new or reformed political institutions.

Most scholarly focus so far has been on depicting nonviolent action as a precursor or catalyst for negotiated settlements, by shifting power between oppressive elites and oppressed majorities and hence balancing the playing field for effective conflict resolution. A recent study found that “the focus in nonviolent research has been on identifying conditions for success defined in terms of an opposition achieving its aspirations . . . [but] little attention has been paid toward examining
negotiated settlements.” As a result, “the fields of conflict resolution or conflict management, on the one hand, and the field of strategic nonviolence, on the other, have been . . . working in silos,” developing “separate communities of practice and divergent theories.”

One possible explanation for this research gap lies in the skepticism many activists frequently have about dialogue and negotiation—perceiving it as “pacification,” “selling out,” or a risk of compromising on justice and basic rights. For example, the most prominent slogans heard during the 2019 movement in Algeria to end the reign of Abdelaziz Bouteflika invoked a firm rejection of dialogue before a complete overhaul of the system. As Anthony Wanis-St. John and Noah Rosen highlight, “The righteous indignation translated into mass mobilization makes rights and negotiation sometimes seem incompatible on moral, psychological, and ideological grounds.”

Activists’ frequent negative views of dialogue and negotiation are well warranted in some cases. Authoritarian regimes’ calls for dialogue are often cynical, motivated by a desire to blunt activists’ momentum rather than open space for meaningful change. At the negotiation table, they frequently apply strategies such as foot-dragging and overly complex or technical rules of procedure to hijack ostensibly inclusive dialogues or negotiations and ensure that the status quo prevails.

Yet this skepticism toward “talking to the enemy,” though understandable, may lead to serious challenges when movements seek to turn their hard-fought gains into long-term political change. For instance, unpreparedness for effective participation in negotiations may give movements a disadvantage in the choice of transition instruments (such as national dialogue, national assembly, pact or agreement, elections, and
power-sharing) and the composition of participants. In contrast, elites may have more political experience, social capital, and technical and legal expertise to shape transitional processes on their own terms.20

Ultimately, political transitions in the absence of inclusive negotiations run the risk of being short lived (if the nonviolent movement becomes crushed by a military coup or co-opted by elites) or incomplete (if they fail to generate tangible social change). These dramatic scenarios underscore the need for nonviolent activists and scholars to better understand the roles of negotiation and dialogue during transitions in advancing democracy.

CONCEPTUALIZING BARGAINING SPACE

How does democracy emerge from dictatorship? How can this emergence happen without violent conflict? Democratization research and practice has traditionally focused on interactions between elites: individuals who, because of their leadership positions in organizations, are able to regularly shape national-level political outcomes.21 Scholars have often argued for pacted transitions between elites to ensure democratic survival.22 The more recent scholarship on political settlements at the interface between development and peacebuilding research makes the case for “inclusive elite bargains” or “inclusive enough coalitions” as being conducive to enduring peace and stability.23 These include key state actors, but also other important socioeconomic elites who have the capacity to implement or block reform processes, such as business leaders, large landowners, or religious and traditional authorities.24 Less attention has focused on the interaction between elites and the broader populace.

The literature on inclusive peace processes offers insights into these broader interactions. Although it focuses on armed conflicts, its broader lessons on inclusive dialogue are equally relevant for transitions driven by nonviolent action. Negotiations between national governments and their (armed or unarmed) opponents have been historically depicted as closed-door and exclusionary deal-making processes, but a notable shift in recent policy discourses and academic writing is evident, one that advocates for broader participation of marginalized voices in negotiation processes, including women and civil society groups. The positive correlation between inclusive peace processes and sustainable peace is strong.25 Public participation in decision-making processes also contributes to societal awareness, acceptance, and support for their outcomes, and hence greater legitimacy and accountability. If inclusion matters in the context of armed conflict, it is likely to be even more important when nonviolent action has played a significant role in initiating a transition because high degrees of social mobilization are likely to have activated many new social forces with grievances that must be reckoned with. If transitional dialogue or negotiation is entirely elite based and does not give these new social forces the opportunity to have their voices heard, they are less likely to support new democratic institutions. For all these reasons, inclusion is a crucial characteristic of transitional DNPs.

As mentioned, several prominent transitions brought about through nonviolent action have resulted in inclusive dialogue and negotiation processes with incumbent regimes, such as roundtable talks (Poland and East Germany in 1989) or national dialogue conferences (Benin and Mali in 1990 and 1991, and Tunisia and Yemen in 2011–2013). Better understanding these dynamics is directly valuable to both nonviolent movements and external actors interested in supporting nonviolent movements. It can help them better understand the role, timing, and design of interparty dialogue and negotiations. This can in turn help them ensure that their interests are best represented at the table and prevent future spoilers by bringing the widest range of pro–status quo forces onboard or expanding the range of elites committed to social change. Yet although previous scholars and activists have examined individual cases of nonviolent action and dialogue and negotiation, systematic research in this subject is at best scant.
The first step in understanding the impact of dialogue and negotiation processes on the outcomes of nonviolent action campaigns is to map these processes. How frequent are DNPs in transitions brought about through nonviolent action? Who are the typical participants at the table? How frequent are domestic and international mediation efforts?

Next is to better understand which DNP characteristics facilitate democratization. Two plausible hypotheses stand out from the examples and literature described.

First, transitions with at least minimal dialogue and negotiation are more likely to lead to democracy than transitions without any. Although some form of dialogue is quite common in nonviolent action transitions, it is by no means universal. Nonviolent action transitions include some cases in which no significant dialogue or negotiation appears to have taken place, or in which foreign intervention obviated the need for dialogue or negotiation. It is unlikely that these transitions would have the necessary buy-in from all major political forces to ensure that democracy became the “only game in town” and instead are more likely to break down into civil conflict and a return to autocracy.

Second, inclusion likely plays a critical role in shaping the long-term outcomes of dialogue and negotiation processes in nonviolent action transitions. The greater the degree of inclusion in a transition’s dialogue and negotiation processes, the more likely it is that the transition will not break down into unrest, violence, and a return to autocracy. Democracy is unlikely to be sustainable if transitional DNPs have excluded the voices of the marginalized.

Inclusion is a complex concept with many potential dimensions of interest. Yet far too often it has been reduced to a “check the box” exercise, in which marginalized groups may be at the table but unable to meaningfully exercise power. This report approaches inclusion more expansively, looking not just at whether marginalized groups have seats at the table but also at whether the conditions of the dialogue make those seats at the table politically meaningful, for instance, through looking at whether the balance of power is relatively even between forces at the table, the selection mechanism for dialogue participants, and the procedures through which decisions are made.

The analysis entailed first mapping the patterns of dialogue and negotiation processes in nonviolent action transitions and then testing the two hypotheses. A mixed-methods research strategy combined collection of a cross-national dataset of dialogue and negotiation processes in nonviolent action transitions with three in-depth case studies. Results from the cross-national data collection and analysis are followed by the case studies.

**RESEARCH DESIGN**

The statistical testing in this report uses an original dataset of all dialogues and negotiations in every political transition initiated primarily through nonviolent action from 1945 through 2018. It includes data at the DNP level, a linked series of meetings between parties with similar participants, issues, and negotiation structures. Although some DNPs may consist of a single meeting, they may also consist of more long-term sequences of meetings continuing for weeks, months, or (rarely) years.

The data on each DNP include sixteen variables, including the length, number of participants, selection mechanisms, whether the DNP resulted in an agreement, and domestic or international efforts at mediation. Several of these variables in turn make up an index measuring...
the level of inclusion in the processes in each transition. Table 1 presents these variables. For each question answered yes, a value of 1 is added to the index, giving the index a total possible range of 0 to 6.

The analysis measures the impact of DNPs on democratisation using two indexes from the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem): polyarchy (a general measure of democracy) and deliberative democracy (whether a country’s decision-making process at all levels involves respectful dialogue). Variation in DNPs, particularly their degree of inclusion, should have particularly strong effects on deliberative democracy. Both scores are continuous indexes, meaning that countries are never considered fully nondemocratic or fully democratic but are always along a spectrum that ranges from 0 to 1. For example, in 2019 V-Dem gave the United States a score of 0.8 and China a score of less than 0.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Scope</td>
<td>Did the DNP have at least a minimal mandate for change?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Civil society inclusion</td>
<td>Were civil society organizations included in the DNP? a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Gender diversity</td>
<td>Did women participate in the DNP?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Selection mechanism</td>
<td>Were at least some participants selected through something other than government appointment?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Balance of power</td>
<td>Did non-elite forces have at least some real power and influence in the process?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Decision-making mechanism</td>
<td>Were decisions made by more than just a small group of leaders?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Inclusion Index Variables

a. This measure of inclusion is intentionally blunt, simply capturing whether civil society organizations had any role in the negotiations, ranging from indirect consultation to full-fledged participation in decision-making processes. The wide variation in availability of data raised concerns that a more fine-grained measure would be influenced by systematic bias that would undermine statistical findings. The binary measure of any inclusion or no observed inclusion, though not fully removing the potential for bias, reduces it by making the positive case (any inclusion) easier to observe even in cases when media or scholarly coverage is minimal.

PATTERNS OF DIALOGUE

Nonviolent action has been crucial to every significant period of political change in recent decades. From the African independence movements of the 1960s to the anti-military movements in Latin America in the 1980s, to the anticommunist movements that peaked in 1989 and 1990, to the color revolutions, to the Arab Spring, nonviolent action has been leading political transformation. Transitions initiated through nonviolent action have taken place in every decade since World War II and have led to political change in every region of the world.

Public dialogue and negotiation processes are a common part of these transitions. Roughly 81 percent of the nonviolent action transitions initiated from 1945 until 2018 had at least one identifiable DNP. This high rate has remained relatively constant for the more than seventy-year period of this study, speaking to the
importance of understanding dialogue and negotiation’s impact on the outcomes of nonviolent action campaigns and the potential for nonviolent action to motivate power-holders to come to the negotiation table.30

The average level of the inclusion index was relatively high (4.6 on a 0 to 6 scale), indicating that DNPs in most nonviolent action transitions are characterized by broader representation at the table and decision-making and selection mechanisms to make that representation meaningful.

**To what degree did DNPs vary in duration and scope?**
The longest dialogue and negotiation process involved the Portuguese government, the Indonesian government, and the Timorese independence movement, and lasted in some form from 1983 until 2001. Multiyear DNPs were very much the exception, though. The most common length for a dialogue and negotiation process was a single day; a third of the DNPs were ten days or fewer; and fully half lasted less than a month.

Most DNPs had a quite expansive scope: 79 percent had either a “revolutionary” or a “constitutional” mandate for change. This meant that changes to the basic sociopolitical structures of the country were on the table in the first case, and in the second case that changes to the basic legal institutions of the country were on the table. Relatively few dialogues had no major mandate for change.

**How often do dialogue and negotiation processes in nonviolent action transitions include civil society groups and women?** The most common groups participating in DNPs were representatives of the government and political opposition parties. However, civil society groups had a seat at the table in nearly half of these processes, and ethnic or other minority population groups in around 20 percent of them. Nonstate armed groups (including but not limited to armed rebel groups) participated in relatively few. Although not difficult to anticipate given that many of these countries had few or no significant armed actors active during the transition, this sharp contrast from civil war peace processes, in which nonstate armed groups typically play a significant role and in which civil society groups are rarely negotiating parties, bears highlighting.

Women’s participation in DNPs was quite low: only thirty-three DNPs (roughly 28 percent of the total) had the observable participation of even one woman. Of these thirty-three, only eight had spots specifically set aside for women. In the other twenty-five, they did so in their roles as members or leaders of an existing organization.

**How do these groups come to be at the negotiating table?** The data separate selection mechanisms into four broad categories: election, appointment by leaders of existing social political groups, personal leadership of an existing social or political group, or selection by the government. Personal leadership was the most common method of selection—in 76 percent of cases participants were selected at least in part because they were the leaders of an existing group. Selecting participants by election was quite rare, only 9 percent of cases. Selection by the government (appointment) took place in about 40 percent.31 This finding has interesting implications for which segments of a nonviolent action movement are likely to be privileged in negotiations, particularly considering the nonhierarchical or leaderless aspect of many groups that participate in nonviolent action. Given that a leadership position is the most frequent way of getting to the negotiating table, groups within a movement that explicitly disavow formal leadership structures are likely to struggle to influence dialogue or negotiation processes, a theme in the case studies.

**Are the voices of civil society and other emerging political forces heard at the dialogue table?** Three variables give insights into this question: a measure of the coder’s judgment of the balance of power between old elites or emerging forces during the DNP (informed by media and scholarly sources), a measure of the decision-making mechanisms of the DNP, and a measure of whether the resulting agreement addressed the key issues that motivated the nonviolent action campaign that initiated the transition.
The findings in all three cases speak to the influence of emerging political forces in nonviolent action transitions. In 70 percent of DNPs, the balance of power between old elites and emerging political forces was at least roughly even, and fourteen DNPs were almost entirely dominated by new political forces. A plurality of DNP decision-making procedures (36 percent) either required consensus from all parties or at least a majority vote; only 24 percent had decisions made solely by small groups of leaders.

This balance of power and more inclusive decision-making procedures appear to translate into real concessions in the agreements that originated in transitional DNPs as well. In 84 percent of cases, the agreement addressed the core issues that motivated the nonviolent action campaign.

Of course, these two measures are blunt indicators. They do not measure, for instance, how many concessions nonviolent action campaign leaders or new political parties were forced to make in order to reach agreement at the negotiation table. They do speak, however, to the powerful influence of nonviolent action on transitional dialogue.

Do most DNPs take place with or without domestic or international mediation? Although not considered part of the inclusion index, the data also contain several interesting patterns related to mediation. Evidence indicates at least minimal international mediation in 42 percent of DNPs. Interestingly, more evidence points to international mediation than to domestic mediation, which only took place in 27 percent of DNPs. This may indicate a genuine underlying trend, but quite possibly domestic mediation is undercounted as well as less high-profile than international mediation and thus less likely to be picked up in the sources on which this data collection relies. This is an important area for future exploration, as the research on insider mediators shows.

The frequency of mediation in nonviolent action transitions has significantly changed over time. Few of the transitions of the 1940s and 1950s had any mediation (domestic or international); but those from 2010 until 2018 had some form, whether international, domestic, or both.

**Dialogue and Democratization**

Dialogue and negotiation during transitions, in particular dialogue and negotiation processes that are more inclusive, should correlate with higher levels of democracy. However, because many other factors may affect the level of democracy after a transition, simply looking at what kinds of dialogue or negotiation took place in those with high levels of democracy is not enough. Inclusive dialogues or negotiations and democracy may result simply from factors that correlate with both and not be related to inclusion itself.

To address this question, the analysis tests the impact of inclusion in DNPs on post-transition democracy using standard statistical models that account for the potential impact of other factors, such as the country's pre-transition level of democracy. In these models, dialogue on its own does not appear to have a statistically significant impact on future levels of democracy, either polyarchy or deliberative. The effect of having at least one DNP during a transition was very close to zero and far from statistical significance. As shown in the top graph in figure 1, the average predicted level of deliberative democracy for transitions with and without a DNP (not taking into account whether it was inclusive) was nearly identical, and indeed was slightly lower in cases with dialogue or negotiation processes; predicted values were with all control variables held at their mean.

In contrast, the inclusion index had a robust, statistically significant correlation with post-transition democracy. Increasing from the minimum observed level of inclusion in the dataset to the highest resulted in a 45 percent increase in the level of polyarchy (from roughly 0.39 to 0.59) and a nearly 90 percent increase in the level of deliberative democracy (from roughly 0.26 to 0.49) five years after the transition (see the second graph in figure 1); again, predicted values were with all control variables held at their mean. These translate to highly substantive changes with major real-world consequences. To illustrate, a shift in the deliberative democracy score of this magnitude is
Figure 1. Dialogue and Democratization

**Deliberative Democracy Score**
Degree to which political decisions are informed by respectful and reasonable dialogue at all levels (0=low, 1=high)

**Polyarchy Score**
General measure of democracy (0=low, 1=high)

**EFFECT OF A TRANSITIONAL DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION PROCESS (DNP) ON POST-TRANSITION DEMOCRACY**

- No DNPs
- DNPs

**EFFECT OF INCLUSION IN TRANSITIONAL DNPs ON POST-TRANSITION DEMOCRACY**

- Low level of inclusion
- Medium level of inclusion
- High level of inclusion

**EFFECTS OF WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION**

- No women's participation
- Women's participation

**DEMOCRACY SCORES IN CASE STUDY COUNTRIES FIVE YEARS AFTER TRANSITION**

- Tunisia
- Ukraine
- Egypt
equivalent to the difference in the level of deliberative democracy in 2019 between Myanmar, an emerging democracy with significant authoritarian elements (as demonstrated in a military coup in early 2021), and the United States.

**Which aspects of inclusion have the strongest effect on post-transition democracy?** A third set of models separates the index into its individual components. On their own, the individual components largely did not have a statistically significant effect. In particular, simply including civil society groups did not have a positive effect on future levels of democracy. The major exception was in the participation of women, which had a highly positive effect on both polyarchy and deliberative democracy five years after the transition; this effect remained statistically significant across several robustness checks, including dropping observations with no DNPs, and with both dependent variables. The third graph in figure 1 shows this difference for the polyarchy score, which was nearly 50 percent higher after DNPs that included women, controlling for several potential alternative explanations.

**How can these results be interpreted?** It is important to acknowledge first that definite causal conclusions cannot be drawn from these correlational patterns. Although descriptive statistics and statistical models can give strong indications that one factor (such as civil society inclusion or the participation of women) can affect outcomes, it is always possible for some unobserved third factor to cause the patterns described. The statistical modeling here accounts for several of the most plausible alternative explanations but cannot rule out some less observable factor.

For this reason, it is important to take these statistical results as evidence to be interpreted in light of what is already known about transitions initiated through nonviolent action, dialogue and negotiation processes, and democratization. Does the pattern identified fit with what would be expected based on these large (but previously distinct) literatures? This report argues that the answer is yes. There are good reasons to believe that dialogue on its own may not facilitate democratization but that higher levels of inclusion make it more likely to do so. Similarly, the growing literature on women’s participation in peace processes from numerous academics, as well as organizations such as the Council on Foreign Relations, heightens our confidence that the highly robust relationship between women’s participation and democratization is genuine.34

These relationships were examined in more depth by analyzing three selected cases of transitions initiated through nonviolent action that occurred within the last ten years. In all three cases there were some instances of transitional DNPs, but they varied significantly in terms of their inclusivity and of their long-term outcomes. On the two measures of democracy used in the statistical testing, the level of polyarchy and the level of deliberative democracy, the three cases range from an emerging democracy (Tunisia) to a relatively open but not very democratic society (Ukraine) to a new autocracy (Egypt). The bottom graph in figure 1 shows the scores for these three countries on both dimensions of democracy five years after their transitions.

Each case study briefly covers the movement that initiated the political transition, the major events of the transition itself, and the conclusion of the transition with a democratic election, adoption of a new constitution, or interruption of the transition and authoritarian reversal or descent into civil war. Although the analysis touches on each element of the inclusion index described in the statistical testing, it focuses on the participation and interaction of three key groups of actors: incumbent elites (former government), aspiring counter-elites (represented by opposition political parties), and activists from the nonviolent action movement. As described earlier, incumbent elites and aspiring counter-elites participate in the overwhelming majority of DNPs in nonviolent action transitions. The participation of other non–political party actors is less common, taking place in only around 50 percent of DNPs, but is often pointed to as a crucial aspect of inclusion. Drawing on the statistical findings that the quality of inclusion matters, each case study looks not just at whether non-elite actors had seats at the table but also whether structures were in place to make their participation meaningful.
Tunisia (2010–2014)

The Tunisian revolution unfolded over a heady twenty-eight days of nonviolent action. The campaign was sparked by the self-immolation of a street merchant, Mohamed Bouazizi, in the city of Sidi Bouzid on December 17, 2010, in a context of high poverty and unemployment, corruption, nepotism, and political repression. The aims of campaigners were to overthrow President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and his Democratic Constitutional Rally party and to demand economic justice, political and social freedoms, and an end to police brutality and government corruption.

The campaign included secular parties that had operated legally but were marginalized in a closed political system; Islamist organizations led by the Ennahda party; organized civil society, with the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) at the forefront; and Tunisian youth such as social media activists forming the “avant-garde of the revolution.”

Established opposition parties played a limited role in the 2011 revolution, which was “deeply politicized but did not have political leadership.” Women were active in the opposition and arguably played a big role in “tipping the balance,” especially by rallying across party lines in defense of their collective rights.

The uprising included street demonstrations, strikes, and peaceful occupations of public spaces throughout the country. Security forces cracked down on activists by arresting, torturing, and killing dissenters. But the army sided with protesters, which precipitated the fall of the regime. President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fled the country to Saudi Arabia on January 14, 2011, and officially resigned the next day, ending his twenty-three years in power. The protests inspired similar actions throughout the Arab world, the Arab Spring.
After President Ben Ali’s resignation, Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi led a caretaker administration with a primary goal of maintaining the state and providing a legal framework for new elections. He attempted to form a national unity government of old regime politicians, opposition parties, and civil society (labor union and youth) representatives, but the coalition did not last long. Sustained pressure from the street against remnants of the old regime clinging to power led to several cabinet reshuffles, including Ghannouchi’s demission and the disbanding of the former ruling party.

Elections were held on October 23, 2011, for a National Constituent Assembly (ANC) mandated to rewrite Tunisia’s constitution. The formerly banned Islamist party Ennahda, which was legalized in March 2011 after operating from exile since the early 1990s, and which had not taken an active part in the uprising, emerged as the largest party, garnering 37 percent of the vote. Ennahda formed a Troika government with two smaller coalition partners and excluding left-wing political parties. Mistrust between the Troika and the leftists grew in the following months, especially after the extension of the Troika and ANC beyond their original one-year mandate. The Troika government also met constant pressure from the street during 2012, provoked by concerns over the Islamization of the constitutional project and growing influence of Salafist groups. As a former vice president of the ANC put it:

Tunisians praised themselves for their liberal model of society. When the media started reporting speeches about women circumcision by the ruling party, and bearded men appeared on the street, citizens felt threatened in their model of society and their modernist identity. They took to the street to defend their values, their progressive laws on the status of women, and their freedom of religion.38

A wave of assassinations of prominent left-wing politicians between February and July 2013 further escalated these political tensions, triggering calls for inclusive dialogue to prevent a civil war and build trust among polarized parties.

A national dialogue was formally launched on October 25, 2013, and facilitated the finalization of the new constitution in January 2014. The new democracy was further consolidated by the organization of legislative and presidential elections in October and November 2014.

**DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION PROCESSES**

**Case 1: Transitional power-sharing, March–October 2011.** Formed as a transitional ad hoc commission in charge of preparing the ANC elections on March 15, 2011, the High Authority for the Realization of the Objectives of the Revolution, Political Reform and Democratic Transition played a central role in devising the process leading to a new legitimate political system after the fall of Ben Ali’s regime. It was also the first attempt at forging consensual positions among all major political and civil society groups and had a high degree of revolutionary legitimacy and inclusive representation.39 Headed by a well-respected scholar of law and Islam, the High Authority was made up of 155 self-appointed members from twelve parties and eighteen trade unions and associations in addition to former government officials, independent national figures, scholars, representatives from civil society organizations (CSOs), labor union and youth activists (including from the interior provinces), families of the victims of state security, and a representative of the Tunisian diaspora. Although the interim government remained the sole executive and decision-making power, the High Authority submitted draft legislation for approval by decree, and de facto acted as a legislative body. All decisions were made by consensus. One of its main responsibilities was to draft a new electoral law and to set up an independent body in charge of organizing the elections. The High Authority also adopted new laws on political parties, on freedom of association, and the media.40 It concluded its work on October 13, 2011, shortly before the ANC elections. This was the last occasion for popular participation in the transition. As analysts argued, “From this moment on, dialogue and politics were ‘hijacked’ and conducted by the ‘old actors’ within party politics and civil society at an elitist political level and with support from external donors.”41

The second negotiation process took place from July 2013 to January 2014. It was preceded by various initiatives and talks, including several attempts at forming a national dialogue (ND) initiated in turn by the president, the prime minister, the UGTT, and human rights associations. However, none of these managed to encompass a wide range of actors and did not last beyond a meeting or two. Civil society actors and politicians also held many informal spontaneous meetings based on a “clear perception that all forces had to be joined to keep the country from going down the path of destruction.” The main parties finally agreed to launch an ND after a wave of political assassinations they perceived as bringing Tunisia to the brink of civil war. The dialogue’s most immediate goal was therefore to de-escalate violence by breaking the political deadlock and acute polarization. It aimed to reach a political agreement on three main issues: setting up a nonpartisan technocrat government to replace the Troika, finalizing and endorsing the constitution, and organizing new electoral mechanisms.

The ND’s agenda was negotiated through a written road map in late 2013 and followed by formal dialogue sessions until the passing of the new constitution in January 2014. Its conveners opted for a system of selective, inter-elite inclusivity by reaching out to all political parties represented in the ANC. It comprised self-appointed representatives from twenty-three political parties, including Ennahda, Nidaa Tounes (with politicians from the former regime), and left-wing parties. Given its political focus, the ND did not have any representatives from the revolutionary youth who symbolized the uprising. In an interview for this report, the vice president of the ANC (and a national dialogue participant) said that “there were no attempts to involve youth. It was a highly political process with party veterans, and organized civil society; there was no need for unorganized civil society. Youth mainly cared about employment.” Civil society was represented by a “dialogue Quartet” of insider mediators from four CSOs: UGTT, the Tunisian League of Human Rights (LTDH), the Bar Association, and the Tunisian Union of Industry, Commerce, and Crafts (UTICA). With the exception of UTICA, these organizations had been actively involved in the protest movement, from which they drew their legitimacy. Although no women’s groups were nominally included, individual women played decisive roles during the ND, such as UTICA President Ouided Bouchamaoui and several women representing political parties in the negotiations.

The ND achieved its main objectives in that it effectively “saved Tunisia from escalation into civil war” by breaking the political deadlock between the Islamist-led government and the left-wing and secular opposition and by negotiating a political framework for finalizing the draft constitution by the ANC on January 26, 2014. The ND formulated consensus positions on contentious issues, which the ANC then validated.

Factors Influencing Dialogue

These two negotiation processes were both largely inclusive and effective. They enabled dialogue among political elites and a few CSOs, and across postrevolutionary society. They also ended in formal agreements that were fully implemented. What factors made these successes possible?

Legacy of interparty dialogue. Despite the repressive environment prior to the revolution, Tunisian political parties and CSOs shared past experiences of collaboration, consultation, and dialogue: “Many of the actors knew each other from the years and decades before the uprising and . . . they had created various coalitions. They simply had each other’s phone numbers and made phone calls and arranged face-to-face informal talks about how to get the process back on track.” This willingness to engage in direct dialogue provided room for concrete outcomes, even though ND participants lacked a formal culture of dialogue, which they had to learn and develop as the process unfolded.
Insider mediation by civil society leaders. The role of the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet was recognized internationally when it received the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize for “its decisive contribution to the building of a pluralistic democracy in Tunisia in the wake of the Tunisian revolution of 2011.” The four CSOs in the Quartet succeeded in facilitating dialogue and bridging divides between ND participants, thanks to their personal relations and ideological affinities with various sides of the political spectrum and social makeup of Tunisia. The UGTT was historically close to left-wing and secular parties, UTICA was close to both Ennahda and the business community, and the LTDH and Bar Association were seen as neutral bodies with outreach to all parties. The Quartet played its most important role by leading informal “corridor talks” to break deadlocks and generate consensus positions among formal delegates and with other actors behind the scenes. Thanks to their representative power, Quartet members also symbolized indirect participation by Tunisian citizens. In particular, the UGTT drew its legitimacy from the street on the basis of its leading role during the revolution. As a mass-based organization (with 750,000 members and local branches throughout the country), its calls for demonstrations and general strikes played a huge mobilizing role and had a significant impact on the dynamics of the revolution and subsequent transition.

Sustained street mobilization. Bottom-up nonviolent pressure from the street from 2011 through 2013—both by government supporters and contenders—also helped keep the dialogue process going and remind politicians of their responsibilities to respect the rules of the game (such as a one-year term for the ANC) and to deliver on the demands of the revolution. For example, a large sit-in initiated by members of the ANC in summer 2013 to demand the resignation of the government, known as Errahil (Departure), pressured the ruling coalition to suspend the legislative process. Women actively supported the sit-in and organized a march initiated by a collective of associations and political parties on the National Day of Women in August 2013. These events had a significant influence on the onset of the dialogue. The constitutional debates and drafting of the ANC that occurred in parallel to the ND were also shaped by protests and strikes conducted by civil society groups, judges, lawyers, and imams during the article-by-article vote on the constitution in January 2014.

International influences. International actors supported dialogue and negotiation efforts in various ways: through diplomatic support by European Union (EU) officials and other actors visiting Tunis to express their support to the ND; technical support to the ND and transitional institutions by international agencies such as the UN Development Programme; discreet capacity-building support by international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and diplomatic mediation, such as a secret meeting in Paris between leaders of Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes in August 2013 supported by France, the United States, and Germany; and economic leverage, such as the Internal Monetary Fund’s delaying a major loan to the Troika until the conclusion of ANC. Finally, the so-called Egypt factor accelerated the search for a compromise in Tunisia: the July 2013 military coup in Egypt had a decisive impact on the onset of the Tunisia ND because it provoked fears among Ennahda cadres that the violence in Tunisia could escalate further and result in repression, and this fear drove them to seek a way out of the political deadlock.

In summary, the twenty-eight-day nonviolent revolution that precipitated the demise of the Ben Ali regime was followed by a prolonged three-year transition. The two instances of transitional dialogue and negotiation examined here—the commission that prepared the October 2011 election and the national dialogue that broke the political deadlock over the new constitution—succeeded...
in representing all major segments of elites and society, including the old regime, opposition parties, and civil society. The popular movement led by youth activists and organized civil society (trade unions)—the backbone of the revolution—was directly involved in early dialogues and transitional structures but only represented in the ND through the mediation Quartet. Established opposition parties, which had played a very limited role in the popular revolution, were able to reassert their power and influence after the National Constituent Assembly elections. Hence the ND was dominated by the political class, though its course was also influenced by extra-institutional pressure from the street as popular protests continued throughout the transition.

Through inter-elite bargaining, the ND played an important conflict prevention function, and helped advance the country toward democracy. However, many Tunisians felt that their demands from the popular uprising in 2010–2011 were “hijacked by an old, political and intellectual elite which did not address the pressing needs of socio-economic reform which were at the origin of the uprising.” A former leading member of the LTDH and ND facilitator explained: “We achieved freedom of expression, but have remained stuck on the economic and social transition. The real causes of the uprising, inequality between regions, have even been reinforced.” It is thus fair to conclude that dialogue and negotiation processes, partly thanks to their inclusive nature and support from the street, facilitated crisis management and political change toward liberal democracy, but because of their indirect representation of grassroots demands and interests failed to address the deeper roots of the conflict.
EGYPT (2011–2013)

Although years of organized campaigns by youth, workers, and other civil society activists had long pushed against the Egyptian government, the Egyptian revolution entered its final intense phase on January 25, 2011, in the immediate aftermath of the Tunisian revolution. It was a heterogeneous alliance made up of secular political parties; Islamist parties and movements led by the Muslim Brotherhood (which joined the revolution on January 30); and civil society forces led by revolutionary youth groups, such as the April 6 movement (which sprang from a Facebook group formed in 2008), youth supporters of opposition parties, and social media bloggers and their followers. Women asserted themselves as leading activists, making up 40 to 50 percent of the protesters. Popular grievances included state-of-emergency laws, government corruption, worsening economic conditions and high unemployment, blatantly rigged parliamentary elections, and lack of political freedom and civil liberty.

Over eighteen days, millions of protesters from a range of socioeconomic and religious backgrounds across Egypt took part in demonstrations, marches, sit-ins, civil disobedience, and strikes. The symbol of the revolution was the mass occupation of Tahrir Square in central Cairo. Police repression of protesters resulted in at least 846 people killed and more than six thousand injured. The main demand and rallying cry of the movement quickly became the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak. After attempting to appease protesters with minor reforms, the regime finally gave in on February 11. Under pressure from Egyptian generals who feared that the growing uprising would challenge the military’s leading role in the country, Mubarak resigned and turned
over power to a transitional government headed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).

Over the following months, smaller protests continued to demand the end of martial law, justice for police killings, end of military rule, and a civilian government. Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood, which had been a major opposition force to the Mubarak regime, took power through a series of popular elections, including the March 2011 constitutional referendum, the November 2011–January 2012 parliamentary election, and the May–June 2012 presidential election (won by Mohamed Morsi). However, the Brotherhood government under Morsi encountered fierce opposition due to his conservatism and semi-autocratic style. This opposition peaked when Morsi attempted to pass an Islamist-leaning constitution. Secular parties, revolutionary youth, and supporters of the old regime—quietly encouraged by the military—returned to mass protests in June 2013, precipitating a coup led by Minister of Defense General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi. Islamist supporters in turn took to the street to condemn Morsi’s overthrow and were severely repressed by the army, which killed more than one thousand protesters on August 14, 2013.57 El-Sisi consolidated his power by being elected president in May 2014 in a context of government repression that “severely limited political freedoms, marginalized opposition groups, and prohibited free and open political participation.”58 This marked the end of the democratic transition and a return to authoritarian rule.

DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION PROCESSES

Case 1: Dialogue meeting, February 6, 2011. During the eighteen days of revolution, as protests gained momentum, the Egyptian government invited handpicked individuals for a face-to-face dialogue meeting in what was described as an “attempt to split the opposition.”59 Hosted by Egyptian Vice President Omar Suleiman, the meeting brought together members of official opposition parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood, eleven independent figures such as prominent male intellectuals and businessmen, and six members of the popular movement. However, these self-appointed representatives of the protesters “had no mandate from them and the mainstream political parties likewise lacked credibility with the protesters.”60 The meeting was not mediated externally, but vocally supported by US President Barack Obama and his Secretary of State Hilary Clinton.61 Its official aim was to negotiate a pathway out of the crisis through a peaceful transition including early elections, but no agreement was reached. This failed dialogue attempt had negative consequences for the unity of the nonviolent movement, as it “created a first source of discord and mistrust between the revolutionary groups opposed to dialogue with the regime, and the Muslim Brotherhood more inclined to negotiate.”62

Case 2: Fairmont Agreement, June 2012. During the second round of the 2012 presidential election, a large coalition of opposition political parties and youth revolutionary groups calling themselves the National Front for the Protection of the Revolution (National Front) held several meetings with Muslim Brotherhood presidential candidate Morsi in the Fairmont Hotel in Cairo. Their aim was to protect the gains of the revolution by preventing the election of his opponent, former general and Mubarak regime Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq. Shortly after the election and before Morsi’s inauguration, the National Front sought to preempt electoral fraud by publicly expressing their conditional support for his candidacy. The political agreement reached with Morsi centered around his promise to guarantee national cooperation by launching a “national unity project,” forming a “national salvation government” that included representatives from all political forces, and nominating an independent political figure as prime minister. After taking office, however, Morsi failed to honor these commitments, refusing to even meet National Front representatives.63 Thus the Fairmont Agreement ended up granting President Morsi a “revolutionary legitimacy that he did not deserve.”64 Although these two processes were the most reported instances of official negotiations during the Egyptian revolution and subsequent transition, they do not capture the full picture of interparty bargaining among opposition
Several factors contributed to the failure of dialogue and negotiation attempts in Egypt, including the unpreparedness of the revolutionary movement, the growing polarization between secular and Islamist groups, the divide and rule strategies of the military, and the lack of third-party mediation.

groups or between them and the Mubarak regime. For example, revolutionary groups and Muslim Brotherhood leaders engaged in regular dialogue in January and February 2011, seeking to unite around a consensual figure to lead the transition; the civil society initiative National Association for Change, led by the independent diplomat Mohamed ElBaradei, was at the forefront of these efforts. For its part, the Muslim Brotherhood engaged in informal power-sharing deals with the military council during the immediate post-Mubarak transition, which diminished its credibility among its former secular allies. During the Morsi government, regular interactions also took place between new allies united against the one-sided Islamist constitutional project, which formed National Salvation Front, and between some members of the opposition and the Muslim Brotherhood. A former member of a youth revolutionary group recalled last-minute attempts to open a dialogue track with Brotherhood leaders following the July 2013 coup, to convince them to support an inclusive transition and new elections. But he found them to be “stubborn and delusional, and single-mindedly focused on their own interests instead of what was good for the country.”

FACTORS INFLUENCING DIALOGUE

Several factors contributed to the failure of dialogue and negotiation attempts in Egypt, including the unpreparedness of the revolutionary movement, the growing polarization between secular and Islamist groups, the divide and rule strategies of the military, and the lack of third-party mediation.

Unpreparedness of revolutionary youth. Former youth activists interviewees pointed to strategic and tactical weaknesses inhibiting their ability to enter effective and equitable negotiations with their allies or adversaries. For instance, the revolutionary movement was so focused on ousting whoever was in power (Mubarak, SCAF, Morsi), or on debating procedural issues (which candidate, which sequencing between elections and constitution) that they failed to develop a comprehensive political project. As a former leader of the April 6 movement recalled, “The time for protesting was over and the opportunity for building real participation had arrived, we had to think of alternatives to speeches and demonstrations . . . [but] we were unable to translate the slogans for freedom, justice and dignity into a political program.”

Moreover, because most activists were not part of any formal organization but participated only through loose umbrella coalitions, they struggled to select representatives to speak in the name of the movement:

The movement had a populist tendency: nobody could claim to speak in the name of the people; anyone who would try to do so would get discredited, treated as traitors. Also, activists were opposed to the idea of formulating political compromises, their point was “we go all the way to the end, until we cripple the system, then we will see what happens.”

It was easier for organized structures such as political parties and trade unions to elect representatives for negotiations or political campaigning. Another tactical mistake was the lack of sustained mobilization from Tahrir Square after the demise of Mubarak, which affected the strategic momentum and bargaining power of the revolutionary movement.

Polarization of former allies. The growing strategic and ideological divide between elements of the former opposition in the wake of the revolution also inhibited dialogue and compromise. As soon as March 2011, interests clearly diverged because the Muslim Brotherhood was focused on winning the forthcoming election and seizing state power, and secular, leftist parties and
youth groups continued to use street protest to push for reforms and accountability against state repression. The polarization was also fed by a media war between political rivals: “Instead of healthy face to face dialogue, we went to the media and accused each other. . . . This was a recipe for catastrophe.” Egyptians lacked a culture of open dialogue, which was reinforced by the practices of “secret deals behind the doors” practiced by the Muslim Brotherhood and its lack of interest in compromising with its former allies once it climbed to power. Finally, deepening cleavages among Islamists, leftists, and liberals were reinforced by the divide-and-rule strategy former regime elites used to prevent consensual dialogue among them. Mass protests mounted against the Morsi government, with quiet support from military intelligence services, were “skillfully used to turn people against the January 2011 revolution itself.”

Lack of third-party mediators. As noted earlier, third-party intervention by international or domestic mediators has become increasingly common in transitions initiated through nonviolent action. However, the Egyptian case seems unusual in this respect because internal bridge builders and foreign mediators made few dialogue facilitation attempts, especially in the early stages of the transition. Insider mediators emerging from society, as in Tunisia, could not be found in Egypt other than rare figures such as Mohamed ElBaradei. Moderate Islamists within the Muslim Brotherhood, such as the youth leaders of its student unions, had established solidarity ties with secular youth revolutionaries but were later excluded from the party and hence lost their leverage and access to the leadership.

In the wake of the 2013 military coup, international actors made several attempts to mediate between Egypt’s main political factions. These included a visit by human rights groups to the Muslim Brotherhood protest camps in summer 2013 in which the human rights activists were attacked by party hard-liners, a delegation of Tunisian Islamist clerics who were refused access to Morsi, aborted mediation efforts by a European NGO, and an intervention by the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton who visited Morsi in prison after meeting other political leaders and was seen as “the only foreign mediator to have access to all of the political forces in the country.” These late efforts did not bear fruit, however, and no trusted third parties could be identified.

The transition in Egypt supports the hypothesis that democracy is unlikely to be sustainable if transitional dialogue and negotiation processes have excluded the voices of the marginalized. Both processes failed to include all relevant political forces (incumbent elites, aspiring counter-elites, and grassroots activists), and negotiators lacked a popular mandate from their alleged constituents. Moreover, both failed to reach their stated goals because the first did not conclude in an agreement, and the second resulted in an accord that was never implemented because the new government refused to abide by its commitment to power-sharing. The rush to elections and constitutional change after the demise of Mubarak, the heterogeneity of opposition parties and movements, the lack of negotiation experience and long-term vision by the disorganized groups that led the revolution, and the failure of external actors to facilitate timely dialogue between polarized forces all contributed to the abrupt interruption of the democratic transition. Finally, although women took active roles at the forefront of the revolution and later mobilized for progressive reforms during the constitutional process, this did not translate into long-lasting political empowerment, despite the persistence of grassroots women’s initiatives born out of the January 25th revolution.
The February 2014 Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine came about precisely a decade after the country’s Orange Revolution, which brought down a semi-authoritarian government in 2004. Unlike its predecessor, the Euromaidan revolution was not precipitated by a fraudulent election, but by the decision by Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych to suspend plans for an association agreement with the European Union. The decision, made under the threat of economic pressure from the Kremlin, which saw the association agreement as a threat to its plans for an expansive “Eurasian Union,” represented a significant move away from the west and toward a closer relationship with Russia. This was unacceptable to a significant plurality of the Ukrainian population, which wanted closer relations with the EU and opposed closer relations with Moscow.

As the protest movement grew, so did the scope of its demands. While these had initially focused solely on pro-European, anti-Russian messages, they escalated to calls for the resignation of Yanukovych and his government, the organization of new elections, and the restoration of 2004 amendments to the Ukrainian Constitution that limited the power of the presidency. The protests were also rooted in social upheaval fueled by perceptions of widespread government corruption, abuse of power, and human rights violations.

The Euromaidan movement consisted of an amalgam of civil society and political activists, including students, trade unions, artists, nationalists, and opposition parties. Its most controversial participants were radical far-right paramilitary groups such as the Right Sector, which,
though a very small portion of the movement, participated in an outsized number of violent clashes with security forces and may have been infiltrated by provocateurs seeking to discredit the opposition through escalating violence. The movement did not have any formal leadership, but several attempts were made to coalesce the various groups around a grand coalition such as the Maidan People’s Union, where the three parliamentary opposition parties played a prominent role.

The movement erupted on November 21, 2013, with public protests in Kyiv’s central square. The violent dispersal of protesters by police on November 30 further galvanized the movement in Kyiv and across the country. Activists used a wide array of nonviolent tactics to express their discontent, mobilize a cross-sectoral coalition, and foster nonviolent discipline. These included mass demonstrations, blockades and occupations of public spaces (including the three-month-long Maidan camp in Kyiv) and administrative buildings, general strikes, boycotts of businesses tied to the regime, tax resistance, internet activism, neighborhood watches, and popular education. Increasingly brutal state repression, possibly supported by Russian special forces and encouraged by a Russian propaganda campaign that depicted the protesters as violent fascists, led to an increasingly violent climax in mid-February. At the peak anti-riot police and alleged protesters were firing live and rubber bullets across Kyiv. More than a hundred people, including eighteen police officers, were killed in the final four days of the revolution. Protests also flared outside the capital. In several cities in eastern and southern Ukraine, clashes occurred between pro-European, anti-regime protesters and pro-government, “anti-Maidan” crowds, supplemented in some cases by Russian agitators crossing the border to join demonstrations and destabilize the situation to prompt Russian intervention.

A major turn of events that precipitated the end of the government was the defection of ruling party members on February 20, which led to the government losing its majority in Parliament. Following a compromise deal signed with opposition leaders (see case 1), President Yanukovych fled to Russia, and the opposition formed an interim government. The new government immediately took a pro-European turn and implemented several measures to reform the country and address protesters’ demands, including banning the former ruling party and releasing detained protesters and opposition leaders. Events in Kyiv led to an intensification of ostensibly pro-Russian unrest in southern and eastern Ukraine, largely Russian-speaking areas.

Moscow took quick military advantage of the situation. First, Russian military troops invaded Crimea, legally a part of Ukraine. The Russian government declared that it had annexed the peninsula in March 2014 following a Russian-conducted referendum in clear violation of international law. In April, fighting broke out in the eastern region of Donbas as Russian-backed fighters appeared, claiming to be separatists and to represent inhabitants who wished to join Moscow. In the face of successful Ukrainian counterattacks over the next few months, Russia introduced regular Russian military personnel and equipment, eventually setting up the so-called People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. A large-scale conflict erupted as the government armed forces set in motion “anti-terrorist operations” in Donbas.

In the rest of Ukraine, presidential and parliamentary elections were held respectively in May and October and won by the pro-European parties, which undertook a series of reforms aimed at greater government transparency and good governance—including a reduction of Ukraine’s energy dependency on Russia—and pledging to seek eventual Ukrainian membership in the EU and NATO.

Two rounds of negotiations among Ukraine, Russia, Germany, and France in subsequent months produced a framework for a settlement—the so-called Minsk Accords. They provided for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Russian troops, the decentralization of power in Russian-speaking areas, international monitors, and the return of the border to Ukrainian control. But the
agreement has never been fully implemented, and repeated attempts to forge a stable ceasefire have foundered under near-constant violations.79

**DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION PROCESSES**

**Case 1: Political agreement, February 18–21, 2014.**
The government and (exclusively male) leaders of three parliamentary opposition parties initiated negotiations on February 18 as clashes between the police and protesters intensified. The immediate objective was to de-escalate the situation. After several unsuccessful rounds, the parties agreed to a compromise deal on February 21 following overnight negotiations with the participation of the foreign ministers of Germany, France, and Poland representing the EU and an envoy representing the Russian Federation. The deal included a careful balance of concessions from both sides. On the one hand, it promised to restore 2004 constitutional amendments limiting presidential power, conduct electoral reforms and hold early elections, organize a constitutional reform process, investigate the violence conducted by the state, withdraw police forces from central Kyiv, and liberate the activists arrested during the revolution. On the other, it required the protest movement to surrender occupied public buildings and to forfeit illegal weapons.80

Politicians from the opposition made it clear that they were not representing the Euromaidan movement in negotiations with the regime when they stated on the eve of the agreement: “It was not we who brought Maidan together, and it is not for us to disperse it! People will decide themselves what to do depending on when and how their demands are satisfied.”81 In fact, revolutionary activists from various factions vehemently rejected the agreement and criticized opposition leaders for signing it and shaking hands with a “killer.”82 Several leaders took the stage in Euromaidan to announce that they would accept nothing short of Yanukovych’s resignation and gave him an ultimatum to give up power the next day. The agreement became irrelevant when the president fled the country the next day and opposition forces overtook the transitional government.

**Case 2: National Unity roundtables, May 2014.** On April 17, 2014, as pro-Russian fighters continued to violently challenge the authority of the new government, an agreement was negotiated in Geneva between the governments of Ukraine, Russia, the United States, and the EU. It called for amnesty provisions for protesters in eastern Ukraine and public consultations on power devolution to the provinces in exchange for the disarming of illegal groups and their vacating of government buildings and public spaces occupied during the crisis (provisions that would appear again in the Minsk Accords). As with the February agreement, Euromaidan activists were not part of the Geneva talks. Militants from Donbas were also not invited or consulted.83

One of the key outcomes of the Geneva agreement was a commitment from the Ukrainian government to launch a national dialogue, with support from the Swiss chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). However, against the backdrop of escalating violence in eastern Ukraine, more ambitious plans involving broad-based consultations on constitutional reform had to be abandoned; and the process was reduced to three high-level roundtables held in early May 2014 in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Mykolaiv. The dialogue was convened by the transitional government and moderated by two former presidents. Outside experts assessed the process as “reasonably inclusive of the political factions and regional and local institutions that still functioned within the Ukrainian legal system,” including prominent members from the former ruling party, local officials from Donbas, and civic leaders from the anti-Maidan groups.84 However, women were underrepresented in the dialogue, and neither the conveners nor the OSCE made any effort to enhance gender inclusion because their priorities were elsewhere at the time. The National Unity roundtables enabled all invited stakeholders to voice their concerns and priorities but did not result in a formalized outcome with an implementable reform agenda. The process never resumed after the election given the escalation of the conflict—military logic prevailed on all sides and confrontation slid into full-scale war.
FACTORS INFLUENCING DIALOGUE

Although the Revolution of Dignity, as it came to be called, was initiated by an open and progressive movement resisting corrupt and self-serving elites, it came to be framed as a rivalry between pro-European and pro-Russian forces and escalated into full-scale armed conflict. Both described dialogue attempts failed to achieve a negotiated way out. Several factors contributed to this failure: an unwillingness by the Kremlin to engage constructively; misperceptions around the value of dialogue and the legitimacy of the parties; growing mistrust between Maidan activists and the regime, and later between pro-Western and pro-Russian constituencies; and shortcomings of external mediation attempts.

Lack of strategic readiness for negotiations.

Euromaidan activists did not take part in dialogue efforts from February through May 2014 for several reasons. As a former movement member recalled, “Many activists have strong negative feelings about negotiations”; in fact, many were on the street because of their rejection of a culture of “informal deals” by political elites and oligarchs that fueled the system of corruption and prevented a regeneration of leadership. As a result, street protesters firmly rejected the February 21 agreement not only because they did not trust President Yanukovych to adhere to its terms, but also because they interpreted it as a betrayal by political opposition leaders. Given the escalation of violence in the days that preceded the deal, the momentum for constructive engagement had been lost: “People were radicalized, more so than at the beginning of the movement. The reaction could have been different if it took place earlier.” The heterogeneity and horizontal structure of the movement was also an impediment to internal and interparty dialogue: “As in many revolutions, it was a challenge to embrace diversity. The composition of the pro-Maidan groups was very diverse . . . and there was no single attempt to find a common ground.” Moreover, the revolution “lacked a genuine leadership. In the absence of elected leaders, informal leaders emerged from the struggle . . . but they did not have a strong mandate.” Ultra-nationalist groups, in particular, were highly vocal in their rejection of dialogue with the government.

As for elected leaders of the political opposition, first during the protests and later when leading the government after Yanukovych’s flight, they “lacked the strategic skills to engage in dialogue with society” and failed to act on their experience of negotiating with Moscow. More broadly, because of its relatively peaceful environment since gaining independence, Ukraine had no accumulated experience of conducting political dialogue, engaging key actors, and building public support.

Hardened positions due to international threat. The inability of both Maidan activists and the post-Maidan transitional administration to conduct a dialogue or negotiation with their political opponents was due to the fact that the latter were closely allied with, and supported by, Moscow and thus seen as agents of a foreign power. This powerful foreign threat hardened attitudes on the side of the new government in Kyiv, where “anyone who criticized the leadership was seen as a traitor, as a Russian agent.” In fact, very few in eastern and southern Ukraine supported Russian actions. Opinion polls in the Donbas region after the revolution showed significant concerns about rising ultranationalism and a desire for a more decentralized Ukraine, but only a small minority supported separatism to form an independent state or join Russia. Yet dialogue about these concerns was undermined by, on the one hand, fear of concessions as giving in to Moscow and, on the other, the orchestration of more radical separatist actions by the Kremlin. Anti-Maidan protests unfolded during the national dialogue roundtables, but against the backdrop of the ensuing armed confrontation, the protests negatively influenced the course of the dialogues. According to an international OSCE adviser, the protests “contributed to a mindset on the part of the transitional government that now was the time to defend the country rather than making compromises to people who pursued an agenda that was increasingly seen as a Russian conspiracy aimed at disintegrating the country.”
**Geopolitical influences.** Unlike in Egypt and Tunisia, international entities (the EU and OSCE) and Western governments took a leading role in calling for and facilitating political dialogue in Ukraine, aimed primarily at stopping bloodshed. However, their interventions had several shortcomings. For example, EU diplomats demonstrated political will to mediate during the revolution, but their timing was “often one step behind the events” or “at least slower than the expectations of Ukraine. When the efforts were undertaken, the solutions were no longer satisfying for either the protesters or the incumbent.”95 The role of EU leaders in brokering the February 21 deal later reverberated negatively on its perceived credibility among Ukrainians because it proposed compromises with a leader who had lost legitimacy and power. In subsequent intergovernmental negotiations over the armed conflict in Donbas, EU governments no longer appeared as impartial third parties but instead as interested parties to the wider geopolitical conflict. For its part, the OSCE—which deployed a Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine in March 2014 and coordinated the May 2014 high-level roundtables—was perceived as a weak facilitator, lacking a mechanism to enforce compliance. The “blend of in-house professional mediation and dialogue resources, and the unique political leverage [and perceived impartiality] of the OSCE did not suffice for the establishment of a lasting National Dialogue.”96

In addition to third-party mediators, broader geopolitical influences also had a significant impact on the transition. The Kremlin’s expansive ambitions in Ukraine—the most important country in Russia’s “near abroad”—fueled the conflict, prevented meaningful dialogue between key Ukrainian constituencies, and influenced the framework and content of the negotiations.97 The Russian government envoy refused to sign the February 21 agreement because Russia perceived it as a capitulation to protesters’ demands that would pave the way for an opposition takeover. In the words of the Russian minister of foreign affairs, “Instead of the promised creation of a national unity government [that would have included former ruling elites], the creation of a government of the winners has been announced.”98 In fact, although the negotiations took place with the sitting president, opposition party leaders had a clear advantage in setting the agenda and pressuring the president.99

In summary, the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine succeeded in ousting a government widely perceived as illegitimate and resulted in substantive democratic reforms but failed to establish a stable and peaceful transition of power. Two major episodes of conciliatory dialogue and negotiation were unsuccessful in de-escalating tensions and opening the political system. The February 21 political deal was dominated by counter-elites claiming to represent the Euromaidan movement but lacking a mandate from civil society activists, who mistrusted opposition party leaders. The subsequent attempt at national dialogue was dominated by the new, pro-European government. Russia instrumentalized these inclusivity gaps to escalate the conflict. This case study thus also illustrates the role of other countries, operating in hybrid fashion through both external pressure and domestic third-party proxies, in fueling conflict during a fragile transition and the incapacity to foster confidence building and mitigate violence through third-party mediation. It also offers a lesson on the timing of dialogue and negotiation, demonstrating that a meaningful national dialogue cannot be effectively conducted at a time of armed conflict escalation fueled by foreign intervention. Finally, it confirms the trend that grassroots activists at the forefront of nonviolent revolutions become sidelined during negotiated transitions and from subsequent governance systems, and that regime (or governmental) change alone does not result in a real rupture of the system and can fail to dislodge entrenched political elites and oligarchs.100
Conclusion and Recommendations

Transitions initiated through nonviolent action are much more likely to lead to democracy but still often fail to do so. Looking at dialogue, negotiation, and mediation during transitions initiated by nonviolent action can help explain this. The literature on peace processes in the context of civil wars and on democratization suggests that DNPs would promote peaceful democratic transitions and in particular that high levels of inclusion in dialogue and negotiation—measured not just by “seats at the table” but also by a more comprehensive conception of inclusion based on the scope of discussion, mechanisms for participant selection, and balance of power between the parties at the table—would lead to greater democracy.

SYNTHESIS OF KEY FINDINGS

Collecting data on DNPs in transitions initiated through nonviolent action yielded several insights. Significant DNPs have taken place in almost all transitions, underscoring their importance as a mechanism for shaping the path from nonviolent action to the peaceful establishment of a new democratic regime. These DNPs’ most common participants are from the government or opposition political elite but also include civil society actors around 50 percent of the time, typically have an expansive mandate for change, and reach some form of agreement more than 80 percent of the time.

Although mediation was a relatively rare factor in these DNPs in the past, it has become a near-universal characteristic in recent decades. Statistical modeling did not confirm the impact of DNPs per se. Dialogue or negotiation on its own does not have a significant impact on future democracy. The case studies from Egypt, Tunisia, and Ukraine largely confirm the statistical analysis and add helpful nuance. All three cases included multiple DNPs. Yet these processes had widely divergent outcomes. Simply sitting down at the table did not push these transitions toward peaceful, democratic resolution. Indeed, DNPs poorly handled can reduce confidence in political elites and make future conflict resolution more difficult. This was highlighted in Ukraine, where poor perception of the initial round of dialogue between the opposition and government undermined future DNPs.

However, both the statistical analysis and case studies confirmed that higher levels of inclusion within DNPs tend to lead to significantly higher levels of democracy. In all three cases, some form of dialogue took place between important conflict parties; but they differed greatly in the roles and degree of influence by old elites, new elites, and grassroots voices. In some cases, the disadvantaged parties were the civil society actors who had been struggling on the streets. In others, they were old elites who had been pushed to the side by revolutionary mobilization and opposition political parties. The importance of this was highlighted in both Ukraine and Egypt, where dialogue took place, but the government or opposition elites closely controlled the participants and agenda, undermining their legitimacy, and no mechanisms were in place to ensure that participants who later achieved power were held accountable for their agreements. As a result, negotiations deadlocked, old elites often transformed into antidemocratic spoilers, and the transitions failed to achieve significant democratic progress or to promote peace and stability.
The case studies also shed light on several dynamics not well captured by the quantitative measures in the statistical tests. In particular, all three cases were characterized by complex coalitions with shifting alliance structures and only imperfectly aligned interests. Even within the category of civil society, distinctions between long-standing organized groups closely associated with the political elite (such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt) and the more diffuse, less hierarchical youth-led forces that initiated the revolution were significant. All three transitions were pushed forward by these newer forces; but once the transition was underway, they were pushed to the side, and old elites and aspiring counter-elites from traditional opposition groups tended to rise to the fore. This was the case even in Tunisia, where the DNP was the most inclusive of the three countries and the outcome the most democratic. The civil society groups of the Quartet played a key role in bringing about the national dialogue and drew legitimacy from their own grassroots constituencies and leading role in the revolution. However, the elitist nature of the constitutional and dialogue processes limited the scope of reforms and failed to address the socioeconomic marginalization that had been such a strong mobilizing factor of the revolution. Thus, in all three cases, although nonviolent action provided the initial impetus for transformation, the transition in its final form looked much like an elite-led pacted transition.

Why did this failure of meaningful inclusion occur? One key disadvantage for many nonviolent action movements was a lack of capacity to negotiate. Movements with no hierarchy, few well-trained leaders, no mechanisms to select legitimate representatives, and little experience in political dialogue were ill placed to translate power and gains won on the streets into policy agendas. As George Lawson notes in the context of the Arab Spring, such
movements are a great benefit when mobilizing, but their inability to develop into coherent, enduring opposition forces leaves them unprepared for meaningful participation in negotiations. As a result, “post-uprising pacts were made out of the reach of the popular coalitions that had been at the heart of the protests.”

Yet activists still had an impact on transitional DNPs. Particularly in Tunisia and Ukraine, sustained street mobilization influenced the course of negotiations by raising the momentum for progress and affecting the agenda and substance of the talks. When protests were marred by violence, however, as in May 2014 in Ukraine, they diminished confidence among both elites and external forces in a dialogue approach. This kind of external influence may be one important channel through which activists excluded from the formal dialogue and negotiation may still have their voices heard. Yet the ambiguous impact of this external pressure makes it a key area for additional research.

Although domestic dynamics played a central role in all three cases, international influences also had an impact. In Tunisia, international influence was largely positive, in terms of both the practical engagement of international actors and the indirect influence of the “Egypt example.” Ukraine provides the most dramatic example of the pernicious influence of international actors, and in particular speaks to the challenge of effectively mediating in a conflict in which geopolitical competition makes the motives of international actors suspect. These differing effects were also well reflected in the statistical analysis, which found that although international mediation has become increasingly common in nonviolent action transitions, it has at best an ambiguous effect on future levels of democratization.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

If international mediation has had an ambiguous effect on democracy in these transitions, how can this impact be improved? What can activists going through transitions learn from this research? The findings in this report have several practical implications, some of which echo long-standing recommendations in the peacebuilding field. The importance of inclusion, and in particular the participation of women in transitional dialogues and negotiations, needs to be emphasized to ensure both successful dialogue and that the outcome of that dialogue is a stable democracy. Yet the distinctiveness of the context leads to several important differences from the general recommendations of the field.

**Do not approach dialogue or negotiation in nonviolent action transitions with a civil war mindset.** Negotiated transitions out of armed conflict have informed much of the literature on dialogue and negotiation, and even recommendations for inclusion tend to focus on bringing a limited number of elite-led conflict parties to the table, with broader social engagement or inclusion more of an afterthought. Despite similarities between DNPs in civil wars and DNPs in nonviolent action transitions, the conflict parties in a nonviolent action transition are radically different and include civil society and grassroots groups. Including their voices is not merely a beneficial but optional extra. These actors’ interests, grievances, and perspectives need to be considered and meaningfully represented if the process is to be viable and not be followed by transitional breakdown.

**Ensure meaningful participation, not just symbolic inclusion.** The participation of civil society on its own had no effect on increasing democratic prospects after ostensibly inclusive dialogue. In nonviolent action transitions, civil society and social movements are conflict actors in their own right, not simply interested third parties. They represent major mobilized constituencies and often function as brokers for their demands. Thus, when DNPs are designed, measures to ensure their participation is meaningful are essential. Some measures examined in this study are equitable selection mechanisms, open and transparent decision-making rules, and a broad mandate.

**Increase activists’ familiarity with and training in dialogue and negotiation tools.** Actors outside the opposition or pro-government political elite participated in only 50 percent of DNPs. And across the three
cases, activists who pushed the transition forward struggled to instantiate their gains at the negotiation table, in part due to their movements’ diffuse, nonhierarchical nature. In particular, the strong fear of and opposition to dialogue in nonviolent action movements undermined dialogue prospects in both Egypt and Ukraine. A greater ability to engage in dialogue and negotiation—and better understanding of how dialogue with “the enemy” can be an avenue not for “selling out” but instead for turning an initial breakthrough moment of transition into long-term political change—might have helped with these dynamics. This is the core insight that motivates USIP’s Synergizing Nonviolent Action and Peacebuilding curriculum, and the findings here speak to its importance.102

Maintain peaceful grassroots pressure to help move dialogue and negotiation forward. Grassroots activists, even when excluded from DNPs, can positively affect DNP outcomes through outside pressure. Political elites in the case studies were wary of outside mobilization and sought to address the concerns of mobilized groups. Maintaining such active civic engagement, even when seemingly disruptive, can be a crucial leverage point. Yet sustaining momentum through the ups and downs of transitional dialogue and negotiations is a significant challenge for many activist groups.

Raise the profiles of female leaders in civil society, social movements, and opposition political parties before transitions start. The statistical findings of this report speak to how crucial it is to ensure that women’s voices are included at the negotiation table during political transitions. The strong effect of women’s participation in negotiation on future democratic prospects was by far the most statistically robust finding. Yet room for improvement here is significant. In only 28 percent of the dialogue and negotiation processes in the dataset could the participation of even a single woman be identified.

Nonviolent action remains one of the most transformational forces in global politics today. Recent years have seen a dramatic increase of nonviolent action. Even during the COVID-19 pandemic, activists and dissidents have planned, strategized, and adapted their activities to continue to peacefully push for peace, democracy, and social justice. As described in this report, the road from these struggles to a better, more peaceful and democratic world is by no means easy. Yet as understanding of this road’s challenges deepens, the activists who sacrifice so much to fight for a better world will hopefully see the fruits of their many labors.
1. The report defines *nonviolent action* as “a method of advancing social, political, and economic change that includes tactics of protest, noncooperation and intervention designed to shift power in a conflict without the threat or use of violence.” See Nadine Bloch and Lisa Schirch, *Synergizing Nonviolent Action and Peacebuilding (SNAP): An Action Guide* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2018), 8. The report also uses cognate terms such as *civil resistance, nonviolent resistance, or people power* interchangeably with the term *nonviolent action*.


3. Although the term *Arab Spring* has gained popularity, it does disservice to the Copts, Imazighen, Kurds, Assyrians, Yezidis, and others who, in addition to Arabs, have been involved in these uprisings.

4. Dialogue and negotiation represent distinct, but overlapping, methods of conflict resolution. Dialogue usually entails a series of open-ended meetings between conflict parties with the aim of exchanging perceptions and building understanding and trust; it does not primarily aim at decisions and implementable action. Negotiations entail a bargaining relationship and an exchange of concessions in the aim of reaching a mutually acceptable agreement. Dialogue and negotiation may or may not require the intervention of a third-party mediator or facilitator. Recognizing their distinctions, this report often uses the terms *dialogue* and *negotiation* interchangeably, except when using the official names of specific DNP instances—such as national dialogues. For more detail, see Dan Snodderly, ed., *Peace Terms: Glossary of Terms for Conflict Management and Peacebuilding*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2018).

5. Mediation is a process whereby a third party assists two or more parties, with their consent, to prevent, manage, or resolve a conflict by helping them develop mutually acceptable agreements. This report uses mediation as an all-encompassing term that also includes other forms of third-party support to dialogue and negotiation, such as facilitation and good offices. See United Nations, *United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation* (2012).


14. See, for example, the sequential steps in the Curle diagram. Adam Curle, *Making Peace* (London: Tavistock, 1971). This model was used in sources such as Véronique Dudouet, “Powering to Peace: Integrated Civil Resistance and Peacebuilding Strategies” (Washington, DC: International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, 2017), www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content


28. The data on dialogue and negotiation during transitions were collected by the program on nonviolent action at USIP for all the transitions listed in the Civil Resistance Transitions dataset (seventy-eight cases), which ends in 2011; an additional six transitions from 2012 through 2018 were identified in separate research. A detailed description of the coding process, criteria for inclusion, and all variables collected is available in the project codebook, posted on the public Harvard University Dataverse repository (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/usipnva).

29. Michael Coppedge et al., V-Dem Country-Year Dataset V10 (Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Project, 2020). V-Dem is the world’s most comprehensive dataset on political regimes, and includes thousands of indicators for every country in the world. Indicators are coded by multiple country or subject matter experts. Individual expert codings are then combined statistically to create estimates of a political system’s characteristics. The polyarchy score combines variables measuring the freedom and fairness of elections, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and suffrage. The deliberative democracy score combines variables measuring whether elites give reasoned explanations for their policies based in the common good, how much counterarguments are respected, and the degree of consultation on important decisions.
30. Only two transitions starting in the 1940s are included in the dataset. No evidence of a DNP could be determined in either of these transitions.

31. The percentages add up to more than 100 percent because more than one selection mechanism can be used in a single DNP.


33. Specifically, multivariate ordinary least squares linear regression models include control variables for the most prominent alternative explanations and with both dependent variables (the polyarchy score and the deliberative democracy score) measured five years after the transition. Methodological best practice meant including a sparse number of control variables. See Kevin A. Clarke, “The Phantom Menace: Omitted Variable Bias in Econometric Research,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 22, no. 4 (2005): 341–52; and Christopher H. Achen, “Let’s Put Garbage-Can Regressions and Garbage-Can Probits Where They Belong,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 22 (2005): 327–39. Three control variables were included: the country’s pre-transition level of democracy, the average level of democracy in the country’s geopolitical region, and the country’s GDP per capita at the beginning of the transition.


37. Interview with former vice president of the ANC and ND participant, September 18, 2020.

38. Interview with former vice president of the ANC and ND participant, September 18, 2020.


44. Interview with former vice president of the ANC and ND participant, September 18, 2020.


46. Interview with former leading member of the LTDH and ND facilitator, November 28, 2020.


50. Interview with former leading member of the LTDH and ND facilitator, November 28, 2020.

51. IPTI, “Women in Peace & Transition Processes.”


55. Interview with former leading member of the LTDH and ND facilitator, November 28, 2020.


88. Interview with Ukrainian former activist and civil resistance trainer, September 30, 2020.
89. Interview with former dialogue coordinator in Ukraine, September 24, 2020.
91. Interview with former dialogue coordinator in Ukraine, September 24, 2020.
93. Most infamously, on May 2, 2014, clashes in Odessa led to the death of forty-six anti-Maidan and two Maidan protesters.
94. Email exchange with former OSCE adviser, January 22, 2021.
97. The Kremlin’s ambitions for the conflict may have extended as far as dismembering Ukraine in favor of the creation of an expansive “Novorossiya” client state covering roughly a third of Ukraine’s territory that, if created, would reduce Ukraine’s population by half and cut the rump Ukrainian state off from the Black Sea. See Christian Caryl, “Novorossiya is Back From the Dead,” Foreign Policy, April 17, 2014, https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/04/17/novorossiya-is-back-from-the-dead; or Adrian Basora and Aleksandr Fisher, “Putin’s ‘Greater Novorossiya’—The Dismemberment of Ukraine,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 2, 2014, www.fpri.org/article/2014/05/putins-greater-novorossiya-the-dismemberment-of-ukraine.
103. The Inclusive Global Leadership Institute, a joint effort of USIP and the University of Denver, is one effort that seeks to further this goal.
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The United States Institute of Peace is a national, nonpartisan, independent institute, founded by Congress and dedicated to the proposition that a world without violent conflict is possible, practical, and essential for U.S. and global security. In conflict zones abroad, the Institute works with local partners to prevent, mitigate, and resolve violent conflict. To reduce future crises and the need for costly interventions, USIP works with governments and civil societies to help their countries solve their own problems peacefully. The Institute provides expertise, training, analysis, and support to those who are working to build a more peaceful, inclusive world.

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Nonviolent action is a powerful force for establishing and sustaining democracy, yet this relationship is far from easy or direct. What distinguishes political transitions initiated by nonviolent action that end in democracy from those that result in returns to authoritarianism or devastating civil war? This report examines the role of dialogue and negotiation processes (DNPs), drawing on a new comprehensive dataset of DNPs in every political transition initiated through nonviolent action from 1945 until 2018 and looking in depth at three cases: Tunisia, Egypt, and Ukraine. Finding that highly inclusive processes are key, and that women’s participation is by far the most influential factor, the report offers actionable recommendations to increase the probability that DNPs will lead to higher levels of democratization.

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