

# PEACEWORKS



## Understanding Resistance to Inclusive Peace Processes

By Esra Cuhadar



UNITED STATES  
INSTITUTE OF PEACE  
Making Peace Possible

NO. 159 | MARCH 2020

# PEACEWORKS

NO. 159 | MARCH 2020

---



## ABOUT THE REPORT

This report examines the notion of inclusivity in peace processes—the extent to which negotiation and decision making include excluded voices, and of representativeness of citizens in state institutions and distribution of rights and entitlements across society—and resistance to it. Commissioned by the United States Institute of Peace, the report builds on Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative case studies collected between 2013 and 2015 and additional research by the author.

## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Esra Cuhadar is an associate professor of political science at Bilkent University in Turkey, and a senior fellow at the Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative in Geneva. She was a Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow at USIP in 2018, and a Fulbright Visiting Scholar at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in 2011–12.

---

**Cover photo:** Representatives of the Taliban met with a delegation of female lawmakers and peace negotiators in June 2015, including Hasina Safi (center), executive director of the Afghan Women’s Network. (Photo by Massoud Hossaini/AP)

The views expressed in this report are those of the author alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace. An online edition of this and related reports can be found on our website ([www.usip.org](http://www.usip.org)), together with additional information on the subject.

© 2020 by the United States Institute of Peace

### United States Institute of Peace

2301 Constitution Avenue NW  
Washington, DC 20037

Phone: 202.457.1700

Fax: 202.429.6063

E-mail: [usip\\_requests@usip.org](mailto:usip_requests@usip.org)

Web: [www.usip.org](http://www.usip.org)

Peaceworks No. 159. First published 2020.

ISBN: 978-1-60127-798-5



UNITED STATES  
INSTITUTE OF PEACE  
Making Peace Possible



# Contents



3	Unpacking Inclusion
12	Types of Resistance
14	Locus of Resistance
18	Behavioral Modes of Resistance
26	Tackling Resistance

# Summary



As inclusion has become a buzzword in policy and practice circles, awareness has increased that exclusion is not only a characteristic of bad governance but also often a catalyst to violent conflict. Peace processes today are thus designed to make them more inclusive—of women, civil society, youth, opposition political parties, business actors, and other actors such as indigenous communities, internally displaced people, diasporas, and refugees. Implementation, however, has not progressed smoothly. It is in fact frequently resisted. Meanwhile, understanding why inclusion is correlated positively with the durability of subsequent peace is elusive, despite growing empirical support for the normative and strategic arguments to justify inclusivity. These perspectives also fall short in regard to resistance.

At the heart of both inclusion and exclusion is the basic cognitive process of how we organize ourselves socially into in-groups and out-groups, which speaks directly to the need of people to belong to one societal group or another—that is, to inclusivity as a fundamental human need. This perspective is crucial to understanding both the various modes of resistance to inclusion and why resistance—whether by powerholders, rebel groups, or civil society—is so widespread. Most resistance originates with the political elite, followed by societal and rebel groups. It can be implicit-elusive, direct-explicit, or coercive, or a mix of these.

Tackling resistance to inclusion requires a nuanced approach that addresses the specific actors engaging in resistance, their motivations, and the tactics they use. For example, resistance motivated by political competition and economic self-interest will require different tools than resistance involving an identity component in which the dominant group perceives inclusion as an existential threat.

For political motivation, incentive structures that make inclusive processes more amenable to powerholders may be enough (as long as progress is safeguarded by appropriate benchmarks and milestones). Overcoming resistance motivated by identity (whether it is gender or ethnicity) requires a more difficult and sustained effort. It demands not only institutional incentives, careful design of decision-making processes, and effective compliance measures, but also a long-term strategy that targets ideological and cultural change.



Nobel Peace Prize laureate Rigoberta Menchu stands with other indigenous leaders outside the Constitutional Court in Guatemala City, on August 29, 2017. Menchu played a prominent role in promoting the rights of Guatemala's indigenous peoples during and after the country's civil war. (Photo by Luis Soto/AP)

# Unpacking Inclusion

**Current peace processes are designed to make them more inclusive of women, civil society, youth, opposition political parties, business actors, and other excluded actors. . . . Implementation of inclusive processes, however, has not progressed smoothly and is frequently met with resistance.**

In recent years, a sweeping consensus has come to favor inclusive peace processes within the international peacebuilding community. Bodies such as the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe promote inclusivity and encourage both conflict parties and mediators to act on the principle in negotiations and mediations. Although inclusion has become a buzzword in policy and practice circles, a single definition remains elusive, despite the United Nations describing it as “the extent and manner in which the views and needs of conflict parties and other stakeholders are represented and integrated into the process and outcome of a mediation effort.”<sup>1</sup> Some scholars focus on examining the process; others focus on the outcome.<sup>2</sup> Process inclusivity refers to the extent to which negotiation and decision-making processes include excluded, relevant, and marginalized voices; outcome inclusivity refers to the distributive outcomes and is assessed by the degree of representativeness of state institutions vis-à-vis citizens and the distribution of rights and entitlements across societal groups.<sup>3</sup>

At the same time, awareness in policy circles is increasing that exclusion—a characteristic of bad governance—is often a catalyst of violent intrastate conflicts.<sup>4</sup> Although social, political, and economic exclusion are often intertwined, they are each distinct and discrete. Political and economic exclusion, studied especially in regard to economic



Acehese women pray for a peaceful election at Istiqlal mosque in Jakarta on December 9, 2006. (Photo by Dadang Tri/Reuters)

consequences, relates to the characteristics of institutions and state-society relations. One definition of an inclusive state cites positive competition between the state elites and society, which results in the absence of domination of one subset of society over another.<sup>5</sup> Social exclusion, on the other hand, can be defined as not only limited to state-level economic and political institutions and competition to control them, but also prevalent in society in the form of values, beliefs, social and political attitudes, ideology, and culture that legitimizes and supports the exclusion of certain groups.

Current peace processes are designed—given the destructive effects of exclusion—to make them more inclusive of women, civil society, youth, opposition political parties, business actors, and other excluded actors such as indigenous communities, internally displaced persons, diasporas, and refugees. Implementation

of inclusive processes, however, has not progressed smoothly and is frequently met with resistance. The target, locus, tactics, and motivation of resistance may change from one case to another, but resistance in some form is common—and success in overcoming it varies. Sometimes it is overcome during the peace process (as in the cases of Tajikistan and Aceh, discussed below). Other times it is more pervasive and systemic (as in Guatemala and Nepal). Resistance cannot be overcome easily during the process, disrupts the implementation of the inclusivity agenda, and may lead to mass action (whether violent or nonviolent). In either case, a systematic and sophisticated understanding of how, why, and by whom resistance to inclusion occurs has not yet been established.

For this report, resistance to inclusion is defined as the behaviors of a particular person (or persons) or group (or

groups) that undermine the successful design or implementation of an inclusive peace or transition process.<sup>6</sup> The report enhances understanding of this phenomenon by exploring who tends to resist, against whose participation, using what tactics, and with what motivation. Data for this report build on case studies collected and analyzed between 2013 and 2015 by the Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative (IPTI) and the author's own research. Previous IPTI studies focused on the modalities of inclusion in forty peace and transition negotiations between 1990 and 2015; three new cases were added for this research.<sup>7</sup> In total, eighty-five incidents of resistance in thirty negotiation cases were identified. The unit of analysis is *resistance behavior* at either the individual or the group level. The identified events were coded into five categories—target, locus (who resists), tactics, timing, and motivation—which enabled the identification of trends in resistance behavior across cases.

The three perspectives on examining inclusivity in peace processes are to consider it, in turn, as a norm, as a negotiation strategy, and as a fundamental human need. The last of these is introduced here for the first time because it helps clarify the various motives for resistance, enabling practitioners to address and counter them.

## **INCLUSIVITY AS A NORM**

Most existing work on inclusion relies on a normative argument to justify an inclusive peace process. Such arguments refer primarily to the right to participation of women, youth, and civil society in peace processes—specifically in negotiations. This argument in turn frequently references UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 (on women) and 2250 (on youth) in addition to other international frameworks recognizing the right of historically excluded and marginalized groups to participate.<sup>8</sup> Recent research corroborates this argument. Studies document the benefits of including women in peace and political transition processes. When women were able to influence negotiations, such proposals suggest, they brought new perspectives to the conflict and its solution, pushed for the initiation and continuation of negotiations,

facilitated the signing of agreements, and incorporated gender equality provisions into agreements. Women's participation in peace processes also correlates positively with the likelihood of implementation and (after controlling for other variables) the durability of agreements.<sup>9</sup> However, despite this growing preliminary empirical support for the normative argument, understanding why the inclusion of women, civil society, and others is correlated positively with durability of peace is elusive. Examination of the normative argument so far has barely gone beyond correlational analysis and into causal mechanisms.

An important step in strengthening the normative argument has been the recent call not just for the inclusion of women but their *meaningful* inclusion. This advocacy is a result of rising apprehension about women's inclusion being seen simply as a head count or as a presence during negotiations.<sup>10</sup> Observations from a number of cases indicate that meaningful achievements by women were possible only when they both participated and managed to exert influence in the proceedings.<sup>11</sup> This follows more recent evidence suggesting that despite a slight increase in participation over the last decade, women's ability to influence outcomes and decisions is still sluggish. Critical research is thus required to establish what conditions lead the way to meaningful participation.

The normative argument, however, has not to date offered much explanation as to why inclusion is resisted. Anecdotal evidence from women about the obstacles they encounter is considerable—including the idea that negotiations are a power game that should include just the “fighters in the conflict,” challenges posed by the mediation landscape (that is, mediators' dismissal of women), lack of awareness about women's contributions, and traditional attitudes toward women's roles in society.<sup>12</sup> These stories help advance understanding about obstacles, but theoretical explanations as to the prevalence of resistance are lacking. Knowledge accumulated so far on the adoption of human rights norms can also be highly beneficial to understanding resistance—how and why these norms are sometimes adopted and sometimes

rejected by local actors.<sup>13</sup> For example, a recent study on the Kurdish peace process in Turkey (2012–15) looked into limited receptivity of international norms and suggests that they are adopted or rejected by local political actors in a way that legitimizes and promotes their self-interested political agenda in the negotiation process, not because they create a better, just, or more effective peace process or because of any fear of nonconformity with processes designed by international actors.<sup>14</sup> Hence, it is essential to consider the political and psychological motives behind such resistance.

### **INCLUSIVITY AS A NEGOTIATION STRATEGY**

The second most prominent argument for an inclusive peace process emphasizes the practical and strategic gains. Civil society inclusion is considered instrumental to increasing legitimacy and public buy-in and to minimizing spoiler effects. Researchers usually agree, as they do on the effects of women’s participation, on the positive impact of civil society inclusion, especially on the durability of peace agreements.<sup>15</sup> They also argue that adding more actors to the process, though it increases strategic gains, does not necessarily create negative consequences even though it might make the design more complex and possibly cumbersome.<sup>16</sup> Overall, inclusion can be designed in an *incremental* and strategic manner to optimize gains.<sup>17</sup>

Desirée Nilsson, in her analysis of eighty-three peace agreements, found that when civil society actors are included in the process, either alone or together with a broad spectrum of political parties, the risk of peace failing is reduced by 50 percent (60 percent when both civil society and political parties are included).<sup>18</sup> Francisca Zanker’s comparative case studies on civil society inclusion expounded these correlational studies by identifying the conditions that enhance legitimacy when civil society is included in negotiations. She concluded that inviting civil society actors to negotiations is not enough to engender legitimacy in a peace process; legitimacy may in fact come through other mechanisms.<sup>19</sup> What matters is the type and diversity of actors. Extremely divisive civil

society and political polarization impede the positive influence of including civil society in a peace process. Accountable representation is also key in enhancing the legitimacy of a negotiation process achieved by either civil society participation or another method.

Thania Paffenholz added further nuance to the field with her framework on the seven modalities through which participation of civil society is realized in negotiations.<sup>20</sup> She expanded the options for civil society inclusion beyond the “negotiation table” to inclusion “around” and “away from” the table. Inclusion modalities designed away from the negotiation table (such as consultations, inclusive commissions, and high-level problem-solving workshops) can deliver equally meaningful input from civil society to the negotiations if designed effectively and strategically.<sup>21</sup> In fact, these modalities were sometimes more effective than those that included civil society at the table (national dialogues, enlarging negotiation delegations, and observer status in negotiations). Hence, following the strategic inclusion approach, the benefits of civil society participation can be realized simultaneously with keeping the number of actors at the table manageable. Paffenholz and her colleagues at IPTI enhanced understanding about how the participation process actually takes place by providing information on who tends to be included from civil society in a negotiation process, with what rationale, and through which mechanisms.<sup>22</sup>

Adding another dimension to strategic effectiveness, Véronique Dudouet, Stina Lundström, and David Rampf examined how an inclusive process, if implemented incrementally, is likely to increase the effectiveness of a peace process. The two-stage process they describe includes an initial cease-fire with a restricted agenda negotiated between the main conflict parties followed by a participatory stage during which reforms and peacebuilding mechanisms are negotiated and decided.<sup>23</sup>

In sum, the practical-strategic approach to inclusion has been extremely instrumental in advancing the practice. It urges practitioners to consider the political

calculations and power dynamics realistically in a negotiation process while strategically incorporating excluded social and political actors to increase legitimacy and ownership of the process. However, it still does not offer a theoretical narrative on how and why resistance to inclusion occurs, though one inference is clear—that resistance originates mostly with powerholder elites and is motivated by their politically competitive behavior and reluctance to share power.<sup>24</sup> This perspective helps us understand the inclination of powerholders to politically exclude others from the negotiation process.

Overall, although the normative and strategic lenses have proved useful so far in promoting inclusive peace processes, they are not enough. First, they fall short in explaining more systemic politically and socially engrained, identity-based resistance. When resistance is motivated by political competition during the negotiations, it may be more successfully overcome during the process, as in Tajikistan and Aceh, for example. (This is referred to in this report as *targeted resistance*.) However, at other times, it may be more systematic and pervasive, such as in Guatemala and Nepal, and supported by a widespread ideological narrative that legitimizes the social, economic, and political exclusion of a subset of society. This type cannot be easily overcome and is more likely to disrupt the implementation of the inclusion agenda at some point. In this latter type, members of dominant social groups—to which political and economic elites also belong—want to maintain both their dominant group status and the long-lasting privileges afforded by an economically, politically, and socially exclusive system. This type of resistance also brings political and economic elites and larger identity groups together because their interests are often aligned.

Second, these two perspectives define inclusion as the participation of various societal groups other than the main negotiating representatives. Focus is on the process of participation—the participating societal actors' input and influence over the process—and the overall effect and gains of participation on successful

implementation and achievement of durable peace. Under this lens, designing an inclusive process may become routine when participation space is created for certain groups; it may be treated simply as a public opinion instrument measuring whether enough public buy-in and legitimacy exists to initiate and complete a peace process. However, a significant obstacle may arise when a negotiation process seems inclusive procedurally yet fails to satisfy and balance the fundamental psychological need (among all social groups) for a sense of belonging and distinctiveness. In this event, inclusion remains symbolic, and the process fails to create meaningful participation.<sup>25</sup>

Symbolic inclusion conveys an intention for inclusion, but appropriate related behaviors do not necessarily follow. In fact, powerholders may use symbolic inclusion to disguise their exclusionary agenda in order to not lose their legitimacy with the public and to not appear to be bullying those who favor inclusive practices. Ironically, those who resist often agree to initiate an inclusive process to regain their lost legitimacy, but then look for opportunities to block the implementation of provisions that are disadvantageous to them because a genuinely inclusive society threatens their privileged, dominant status. It is easier to set up symbolic inclusion because resistance from privileged groups is less likely. However, the moment the process turns toward genuine inclusion or threatens long-practiced privileges, strong resistance is almost certain to follow. For instance, in 2011, the Egyptian military initially agreed to a national dialogue—a dialogue it later sabotaged—precisely because pressure from the masses generated a legitimacy crisis. A genuinely inclusive process is more likely to be met with stronger and persistent resistance. A procedurally inclusive process, even if backed by a strong normative paradigm, is not enough to prevent such manipulation. Thus, inclusive peace processes should be designed to take into account the psychological meaning of inclusion, which treats it as a fundamental human need. This last perspective is crucial to understand why resistance to inclusion is also widespread.

## INCLUSIVITY AS A FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN NEED

At the heart of inclusion and exclusion lies the basic cognitive process of how we organize ourselves socially into in-groups and out-groups, which speaks directly to people's need to belong to one societal group or another. Humans evolved to organize themselves socially not only into groups, but into similar and distinct groups. Identification with large groups constitutes social identity.<sup>26</sup> In creating and maintaining a socially, economically, or politically exclusionist society, individual-level psychological dynamics (such as bias and prejudice toward out-group members) interact with institutional- or systemic-level dynamics (such as ideologies and narratives legitimizing group dominance and social hierarchy to maintain institutional exclusion).<sup>27</sup>

Inclusion as a fundamental psychological need can be described as the degree to which a disadvantaged (excluded or subordinate) social group perceives that they are esteemed and respected members of the society as a result of fair treatment, which in turn satisfies their need for both belongingness and uniqueness simultaneously.<sup>28</sup> Being accepted into the in-group cultivates the need for belongingness and should not deny or reject the unique or distinct characteristics of the included, and therefore should be accompanied with an appreciation of those characteristics.

This view of social inclusion is echoed in Marilyn Brewer's optimal distinctiveness theory, which suggests that the main motivation affecting strength of identification with a social group derives from the competition between the fundamental human needs for belongingness (inclusion) and uniqueness (differentiation or distinctiveness).<sup>29</sup> Human behavior constantly seeks an equilibrium between these two fundamental needs—known as the *optimal level of distinctiveness*. People seek a balance between the validation of their identity and similarity with others (the pull factor) and the recognition of their uniqueness and distinction from others (the push factor).<sup>30</sup> Given a deprivation of one or

the other, behavior will generally be inclined in that direction. The ongoing tension between belongingness and uniqueness motivates seeking inclusion in a social group. Inclusion is an equilibrium, the optimal balance between belongingness and uniqueness (see figure 1). Under the alternatives to inclusion—exclusion, assimilation, or differentiation—these competing needs are out of balance and thus will continue to motivate individuals to seek changes until they reach equilibrium.<sup>31</sup>

What motivates people to seek this balance is complex, but one explanation highlights the negative cognitive and emotional consequences of social exclusion. Recent research in neuroscience enlightens us about the sources of these fundamental human needs. For instance, MRI images demonstrate that social exclusion overlaps in our brain with physical pain: each hurts equally.<sup>32</sup> Exclusion, Paul Hutchison, Dominic Abrams, and Julie Christian explain, has significant psychological consequences for the individual and for the group. It leads to emotions such as anger, disappointment, and sadness. It results in a sense of loss of social support, decreased access to resources, and diminished group self-esteem. All of these eventually reduce the excluded individual's or group's sense of self-efficacy. Reduction of self-efficacy in turn undermines the perception of control. Loss of control is known to be a trigger of various negative emotions such as anxiety, frustration, and anger. In the end, social exclusion becomes a root cause of low self-esteem, perceived loss of control, and feelings of not being valued equally with members of the dominant group. Behavioral responses among the members of the excluded group vary: anger and aggression in some because of diminished sense of control, distancing and withdrawal in others, and (among a smaller subgroup) prosocial feelings.<sup>33</sup>

To illustrate this perspective in the context of peace processes, consider the demands for women's inclusion. Women demand to be accepted and included in the negotiation and mediation processes that determine the future of their country as equal and

**Figure 1. Inclusion as the Optimal Balance between Belongingness and Uniqueness**

	Low belongingness	High belongingness
Low uniqueness	<p><b>Exclusion</b></p>	<p><b>Assimilation</b></p> <p>Accepted as an insider as long as you conform to the norms and rules set by the dominant group and set aside who you are</p>
High uniqueness	<p><b>Differentiation</b></p> <p>Your unique characteristics are accepted but you are not seen as an insider</p>	<p><b>Inclusion</b></p> <p>Treated as an insider like others and also allowed to retain your unique value and identity within the group</p>

**Source:** Adapted from Shore et al., “Inclusion and Diversity in Work Groups,” *Journal of Management* 37, no. 4 (2011): 1266.

esteemed members—“just like men”—and challenge their historical exclusion. However, they also want their unique contributions to the society to be recognized “as different from men’s” and demand to be included in these processes with their “distinct” characteristics. We know that women bring unique perspectives and issues to the negotiation table; without them it is likely that negotiations take a different course. However, women often complain about “having to act like men,” that is, being forced to assimilate to male-dominant gender norms if they are to be included in decision-making and negotiation processes. Inclusion of this kind denies women's distinct characteristics and thus cannot be considered as optimal inclusion. For example, in Kenya during the mediation process conducted after the post-election violence in 2008, Minister of Justice Martha Karua often spoke to the media even as male cabinet members refrained from doing so. Because of this, she was called “the only man in the president’s cabinet,” as if it were a compliment, though it in fact denied her recognition for her unique and distinct gender identity and her contribution as a woman. This rhetoric forced her to assimilate into “honorary man” rules so that she

could be a “true” insider. This kind of behavior, which appears to be the inclusion of a woman in a negotiation process, is not optimal inclusion that fulfills the fundamental needs of that individual; it is instead assimilation—a suboptimal outcome.<sup>34</sup>

Recent attempts to include women in negotiations have also been *differentiating*, for instance, by limiting women’s participation and input in negotiations to gender-only committees or issues, which is also suboptimal. In this case, women are recognized for their distinct characteristics but are again not seen as equal insiders. Their contributions are isolated and limited to women-only issues, such as in the recent round of negotiations on Cyprus. In response to pressure from the United Nations and the US Agency for International Development to follow UN Resolution 1325 and advocacy by the local Gender Advisory Team (a women’s group formed in Cyprus with members from both Turkish and Greek communities), a committee was established in 2015 specifically to include women in the reinvigorated bilateral negotiations. The committee’s work, however, was limited to issues concerning gender equality. It was also announced by the Cypriot

leadership that it was “pleased to convey that *in the margins of the bicomunal negotiations* to reaching a settlement on the Cyprus problem, a Technical Committee on Gender Equality has already been established” (emphasis added).<sup>35</sup> Further, the committee members indicated on a number of occasions how challenging it had been to get their voices heard by decision makers and negotiators.<sup>36</sup>

In a peace process, such assimilation or differentiation practices can easily be presented as “including women,” but none of these alternatives are optimal forms.

One group’s status relative to others also affects both belongingness and distinctiveness. Moral superiority is the basis of legitimization for the in-group to dominate or actively subjugate out-groups.<sup>37</sup> The in-group justifies this situation ideologically with the help of a “hierarchy enhancing legitimizing narrative.”<sup>38</sup> Such narratives justify the unequal power and unequal access to economic and political resources between groups. Societal groups in an advantaged position seek to maintain, enhance, or exaggerate the positive social comparisons that favor their group only.<sup>39</sup> When their dominant status or privileged group position is threatened, which is often the case when an inclusive agenda is set in motion, the dominant group perceives a threat and in response often resists inclusion. The status quo thus reinforces low- and high-status groups, and the system based on economic, political, and social exclusion repeatedly and consistently favors high-status groups.

Social dominance theory further conceptualizes the process of establishing a position of dominance for the in-group against the out-group and offers insights into understanding the motivation for resistance to inclusion. Social dominance theory analyzes group relations not only as in-group and out-group, but also by critically looking at which groups are disadvantaged in the society, referred to as subordinate groups. Such groups have fewer opportunities to “belong to” valued groups in society and thus have unequal access to

power, resources, and privileges. Unlike the disadvantaged subordinate groups (minorities, women, refugees, for example), dominant groups occupy higher status positions in society. In societies organized along these kinds of strict group-based social hierarchies, such as in Nepal, the dominant group or groups systematically receive most of the positive social, political, and economic value generated (resources, political power, social status) at the expense of subordinate groups. Hence, in these societies, social, economic, and political exclusion are often intertwined. However, social dominance theory argues that at the heart of this structure is the social value the group receives, such as status and esteem. Subordinate groups thus constantly strive to belong to valued groups in society (that is, to be included as esteemed and equally respected), in other words, as similar to dominant group members yet retaining their distinct (such as ethnic or religious) identity. An inclusion agenda in peace negotiations creates an historic opportunity for subordinate groups to secure such social standing. Simultaneously, historically dominant groups strive to keep entrenched social hierarchies intact for themselves.

Social hierarchies are reproduced and maintained at all levels: individual-psychological, group, institutional, and systemic-ideological. At the individual level, they are expressed through an individual’s attitudes and beliefs in the form of implicit and explicit bias, stereotyping, and an individual’s social dominance orientation (the extent to which the individual holds beliefs that legitimize a social hierarchy). These beliefs generate discrimination and exclusion toward members of subordinate groups in everyday life. At the systemic-ideological level, hierarchy-enhancing forces produce, justify, and maintain a high group-based social hierarchy and inequality. These forces exist simultaneously with hierarchy-attenuating forces that push toward group-based equality and equal social value for everyone. Hierarchy-enhancing narratives are embedded in culture and institutions and passed on to individuals in various ways. On the one hand, individual attitudes are



Maoist rebels in south-central Nepal listen to their commander discuss the cease-fire that brought an end to the country's ten-year-long conflict in May 2006. (Photo by Ruth Fremson/New York Times)

shaped by the widespread ideology that legitimizes social hierarchy; on the other, individual discriminatory and exclusive behaviors toward subgroups provide a conducive environment for the hierarchy-enhancing ideology to flourish and persist over the long term.

It is not uncommon for dominant group members to adopt a hierarchy-enhancing ideology justifying the hierarchy, which also often blames subordinate groups for negative social outcomes. The dominant group adheres tightly to the narratives that promote, justify, and legitimize the hierarchy between the dominant and subordinate groups. These narratives not only help justify unequal power and unequal access to resources, but also diminish the potential motivation for the social mobilization of subordinate groups.<sup>40</sup> By contrast, members of subordinate groups often adopt a

hierarchy-attenuating ideology that advocates societal change toward equality and justice for all in society.

A peace process that advocates including subordinate groups in the political and economic system as equal members of society is a hierarchy-attenuating force, one that triggers resistance from dominant groups and hierarchy-enhancing forces, which view any move toward genuine inclusion as an ontological threat. Individual variations may also exist within each group. Some in dominant groups with low social dominance orientation are more likely to act with the hierarchy-attenuating forces and support the inclusion of subordinate groups. Likewise, some within subordinate groups with high social dominance orientation are more likely to act with the hierarchy-enhancing forces and justify the continuation of the hierarchical system.

# Types of Resistance

Resistance to inclusion in peace processes can be sorted into two categories. Targeted (limited) resistance usually takes place either as opposition to the participation of a particular group or individual (such as a political party, women, diaspora, certain representatives of civil society, or clan representatives) in the negotiation or peace process or as opposition that is limited to a particular time during any stage of the process. This type of resistance is primarily motivated by political competition or economic self-interest.

On the other hand, pervasive resistance is usually more entrenched. It is systematic, often perpetrated by actors belonging to the dominant social or political group, and persists throughout the different phases of a peace process, often with the aim of curbing the process, either in general or the inclusion-related elements specifically. Pervasive resistance tends to have more potential to disrupt or reverse the inclusion achievements of a peace process since it lasts throughout the process. When one opportunity fails, it is likely that the same group will try to revive its hindrance efforts at a later stage. Hence, more effort is required to overcome such resistance.

The 1997 negotiations to end the civil war in Tajikistan is an example of targeted resistance. Despite a request by UN mediators, the Tajik government initially did not want to include civil society representatives in the negotiations, arguing they were too cozy with the opposition. However, as ideas from civil society proved useful—especially those from the high-level track 2 workshops known as the Inter-Tajik Dialogue—President Emomali Rahmon softened his attitude and stopped seeing civil society as a political threat. Civil society representatives who participated in the Inter-Tajik Dialogue were later included in the negotiation teams in the UN-mediated talks. The subsequent


agreement ended the civil war in Tajikistan and was implemented, if not fully, at least to a large extent.

An example of pervasive resistance is the Guatemala peace process, especially the behavior of the economic and political elite. In the 1994 negotiations, the signed Framework Accord for the Renewal of the Negotiating Process between the government of Guatemala and the armed group URNG (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity) established the Civil Society Assembly (ASC) as the primary venue for broad civil society participation.<sup>41</sup> The ASC was a nationally representative and elected body that included political parties, religious groups, unions, academic institutions, small and medium enterprises, journalists, development nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), women, Maya (indigenous) groups, and human rights organizations. However, one of the most powerful groups in Guatemalan society—the Coordinating Committee of Commercial, Industrial, and Financial Associations (CACIF)—boycotted the ASC and did not participate in the process.<sup>42</sup> CACIF favored the status quo, particularly the aspects of the peace process that threatened the associations' long-held economic privileges, and organized the elite to play a disruptive role, especially during the implementation of the peace agreement. Even though the CACIF could not prevent the agreement from being signed, it later organized a campaign during the referendum against the implementation of articles related to land reform and succeeded in curbing those efforts.<sup>43</sup>

Figure 2 illustrates that resistance to inclusion can be observed at each level and every stage of a political settlement. It can occur first as resistance to an inclusive negotiation process (such as sabotaging the participation of women). For example, during Yemen's national dialogue, women's participation was resisted by public

## Figure 2: Inclusive Negotiation, Inclusive Peace Process, and Inclusive Institutions/Society

Limited resistance is usually pertinent to one stage of the political settlement, though it can occur at any stage, or aims to prevent the participation of a particular group of people at any stage (such as women or a branch of civil society). Pervasive resistance is more persistent throughout all stages of political settlement and based on the entrenched and systematic exclusion of a social identity group from the process.



shaming, acts of humiliation, and even physical attacks or threats of attacks. Second, resistance can occur again within the broader peace process, such as by resisting the codification of inclusion-related provisions. In the peace agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), several of the gender-related provisions were dropped after the agreement failed to pass in a referendum.<sup>44</sup> Third, resistance can also occur during the implementation of codified articles designed to encourage more inclusive institutions and society (for example, preventing women from being represented in security institutions such as the police force). According to a recent report on the implementation of the FARC peace

agreement, the implementation rate for the stipulations (measurable commitments) with a gender perspective (4 percent) lags far behind that for other stipulations (22 percent). Further, female community leaders complain that promises given by the government during the negotiations are not being kept. They refer to many instances of exclusion of women from decision-making processes, especially at the local level during the implementation phase, such as in meetings concerning rural development projects.<sup>45</sup> Yet it is still considered one of the most innovative peace agreements in terms of incorporating gender equality provisions: 130 of the 578 stipulations commit the parties to address issues from a gender perspective to promote parity.<sup>46</sup>

# Locus of Resistance

Analysis of the eighty-five incidents of resistance to inclusion considered in this study reveals that resistance has more than one origin. However, in just over half of these incidents (56 percent), it comes from the powerholder elite (political leaders, military, government actors). In about 13 percent, it came from rebel groups, and in 20 percent from societal actors such as broadly organized ethnic and religious groups (see figure 3).

## POWERHOLDERS

That most of the resistance comes from the powerholder elite—those such as high-caste elites and old guard politicians in Nepal or the privileged economic and political elite in alliance with the military in Guatemala—is not surprising.

Signed in 2006, the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) between the Maoist armed insurgency and political parties in Nepal led to the end of the monarchy and the formation of an inclusive Constituent Assembly (CA). The agreement created an historic window for including, despite some opposition, marginalized societal actors into politics. The CA was tasked with drafting a new constitution. Although the traditional parties accepted the CA and its authority, resistance to inclusion built up and became stronger during the implementation phase of the CPA. Given the Maoists' commitment, the CPA aimed at creating a new state structure to include representation of diverse social groups excluded for many years. The 2008 CA convened a highly representative and inclusive body that included lower castes, ethnic groups, and women. Yet in 2012, when it failed to produce a draft constitution, it was dissolved and replaced in 2013 by a less inclusive one that also reached an impasse on the demands of ethnic minorities for less centralized federalism and more power sharing in state governance. Unable to agree on a

constitution, the decision-making process was taken over by old guard political leaders who were all male and from traditionally privileged upper-caste groups.<sup>47</sup> Manjushree Thapa summarized the political elite's rationale for hijacking the inclusive constitution-making process:


What do you do if you're the high caste leader of a democratic party faced with a vote that will end your caste's supremacy? You avoid voting at all costs. This is what the leaders of the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (UML) did in Kathmandu on May 27, 2012. Their refusal to compromise with the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and other parties led to the failure to pass a new constitution and the dissolution of the country's only democratically elected body, the 601 member Constituent Assembly.<sup>48</sup>

Even though the negotiation process created a historic opportunity for excluded groups in Nepal, the old political elite, fearful of losing their privileged status and dominance, eventually captured the decision-making process and reversed most of the inclusion achievements. Some intellectuals from the dominant social groups argued that the "inclusion agenda favored the foreign powers, Maoists, and those ethnic groups that are going to take the country to disunity and division." Further, members of privileged groups claimed that it was actually the Brahmins and Chhetris—the two dominant castes—who felt discriminated against because of the implementation of the social inclusion agenda.<sup>49</sup> Such examples are representative of dominant group attitudes blaming the subordinate groups for insisting on the inclusion agenda and hence putting the stability of the country at risk.

The social-psychological perspective on inclusion is critical to understanding this type of resistance. In a complex conflict setting such as Nepal, individual-psychological and institutional-ideological levels are entangled and

### Figure 3. Locus of Resistance

Of the 85 incidents of resistance to inclusion identified for this report, more than half (56%) originated with the powerholder elite (political leaders, military, government actors).



interact with each other in multiple ways to sustain the exclusive system. Nepal has been historically organized along a strict social hierarchy. The country's Muluki Ain code legitimized the hierarchical structure of the society by ranking castes from more to less favorable.<sup>50</sup> Those at the top, Brahmins and Chhetris, excluded others from access to economic and political resources. This code, which was promulgated in 1854 together with other Hindu norms and mythology, was the basis of the hierarchy-enhancing narrative and used to justify the social and political exclusion of other groups. When the old political elite hijacked the inclusive constitution-making efforts, they relied on narratives such as this.

The constitution was not the only area in which the traditional powerholder elite pushed back and recaptured

what it had lost. The inclusive reforms promised in the CPA to transform the Nepali army into a more representative one was also reversed to a great extent by the military and political elite. Implementing the core principles agreed to in the CPA, such as the demobilization of the Maoist guerillas and the integration of more than nineteen thousand former combatants into the Nepali army, was repudiated by the elites and the military on the grounds that it was in the Maoists' self-interest at the expense of the country. Reintegration became highly controversial during the implementation phase and, as a result of successful pushback from the military, has never been realized completely. Even though the Maoists came to power during the 2008 elections and formed a coalition government, the dominant caste groups were able



Justice and Equality Movement leader Khalil Ibrahim, center, and his brother Jibril Ibrahim, left, during the Darfur peace talks, in Doha, Qatar, on February 11, 2009. (Photo by Maneesh Bakshi/AP)

(given their control of the military) to build resistance to the Maoists' inclusion during the implementation of the agreement. The resistance of the army escalated into a governmental crisis in which Nepal's cabinet voted to dismiss the military, which prompted the Maoists' largest coalition partner to quit the government.<sup>51</sup> Although resistance on this issue during the negotiation stage was not significant enough to prevent codification into the peace agreement, the backlash from the army came during the implementation phase, when it resorted to the institution's decision-making procedures to prevent the inclusion of Maoist insurgents.

## REBEL GROUPS

Rebel groups sometimes resist the participation of others in negotiations for the purpose of excluding political competitors or rival groups rather than protecting their own group identity and status. Examples include

the negotiations in Aceh, an autonomous province in Indonesia, and the Darfur region of Sudan. In Aceh, the armed group GAM (Geurakan Acèh Meurdëka, or Free Aceh Movement) tried to keep other Acehnese parties out of the negotiation process even as the government tried to broaden participation, which GAM perceived as undermining its negotiating position. Similarly, in Turkey, to maintain its control over the process, the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, or Kurdish Workers' Party) wanted to exclude all other Kurdish groups from the peace process between 2013 and 2015. In the negotiations over Darfur, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) sought to strengthen its position as the primary representative for Darfurians, and tried to exclude other rebel groups from track 1 negotiations. The negotiations were delayed because of JEM's rejection of civil society participation and dismissal of the legitimacy of other rebel groups.

## SOCIETY

Societal resistance to inclusion usually involves mass resistance, whether nonviolent or violent, against the participation of other ethnic, religious, or social groups in negotiations or against more inclusive institutions. This sometimes occurs parallel to powerholder elite resistance, especially if the elites and the resisting societal group are from the same group. But societal resistance may also occur in opposition to the powerholder elite. This is especially the case when the elite take steps advancing an inclusion agenda but are rejected by an ethnic or religious group trying to maintain its position in society.

In Fiji, the interests of both the powerholder elite and the ethnic group aligned to oppose inclusion. Resistance to the inclusion of Indo-Fijians in the political system was resisted both by the military elite and the nationalistic indigenous Fijian population. Indigenous Fijians ruled the country for decades and barred Indo-Fijians from access to political power. Violent attacks by indigenous Fijians against Indo-Fijians took place occasionally. Whenever an Indo-Fijian party won an election, the result was reversed with the help of a military coup. About 80 percent of the land was owned by indigenous Fijians, but about 90 percent of the crops were produced by Indo-Fijians. Indigenous Fijians, the indigenous elite, and the military all had the same interest: keeping their dominant group status in society and the political privileges they had gained during British colonial rule. In this context, that the last inclusive constitution-making process initiated in 2014 ultimately failed is not a surprise. The military elite recaptured the decision-making process and rejected the draft constitution prepared during public consultations and a national dialogue facilitated by international NGOs and the UN Development Program (UNDP).

On the other hand, in Kyrgyzstan, the attitude of the ruling political elite and the dominant social group (ethnic

Kyrgyz) about including Uzbeks in the political system differed. Following independence from the Soviet Union, the ethnic Kyrgyz dominated politics in Kyrgyzstan at the expense of the Uzbek minority, who thrived in the business sector. Uzbeks were mostly excluded from the public sector; only 8 to 9 percent of civil service employees were non-Kyrgyz. Divisions and ethnic violence between the Uzbeks and the Kyrgyz came to a head in the 2010 riots, during which nearly a thousand people died. The newly elected and moderate president, Almazbek Atambayev, wanted to introduce political reforms in 2011 in a document titled the “Concept Note on National Unity and Interethnic Relations” to address the causes of the conflict and formulate a new ethnic policy that would encompass an inclusive national citizenship and civic identity that included Russians, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and other minorities. The government sought input on these reforms by creating consultative councils across the country. These attempts, however, were resisted by both hard-line Kyrgyz nationalists in the opposition parties in Parliament and those outside in society.

Melis Myrzakmatov, the de facto leader of South Kyrgyzstan, consistently favored the Kyrgyz population and did not support further Uzbek involvement in national politics. In his book, he shared the view that Kyrgyzstan should be a state focused on the Kyrgyz people and that other ethnicities living in Kyrgyzstan should assimilate to Kyrgyz traditions. Although Myrzakmatov was dismissed from his post in 2013, his ideas remained popular among Kyrgyz nationalists and opposition political parties, such as Ata Jurt. The narrative of Kyrgyz identity, as exemplified in Myrzakmatov’s book, celebrates the dominant group status of the Kyrgyz and excludes and subordinates Uzbeks and other minorities. In the end, the nationalists resisted Atambayev’s inclusive ethnic concept and released their own version emphasizing Kyrgyz supremacy.



Filipino Muslim women rally outside the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process in suburban Pasig, east of Manila, on March 20, 2013. (Photo by Aaron Favila/AP)

# Behavioral Modes of Resistance

Resistance to inclusion is expressed through various behaviors, which fall along a continuum of directness and aggressiveness as implicit-elusive, direct-explicit, and coercive.

## IMPLICIT-ELUSIVE TACTICS

Implicit resistance entails elusive and unconscious acts of resistance. Behaviors include implicit (unconscious) bias and automatically activated stereotypes.<sup>52</sup> Implicit bias and automatic stereotypes may activate resistance toward including a specific person or group simply because of the social category they represent.<sup>53</sup> Implicit bias may be prevalent even among people who consider themselves pro-equality and pro-inclusion. In fact, many argue that automated stereotyping or implicit bias is more widespread than explicit bias. Simple cues from the environment, such as the social category

a person represents—being a woman, belonging to an ethnic group—can activate stereotypes and lead to discriminatory behavior that works against inclusivity.

Implicit bias is a strong predictor of behavior and has consequences in shaping not only our individual decisions, but also our social environments through collective impact. An individual may not consciously want to inhibit the participation of a person, but implicit bias and automatic stereotyping can lead to inhibitive behavior. Biases and stereotypes, especially pertaining to gender and race, are known to be automatically activated by semantic cues without the full awareness of the perceiver.<sup>54</sup> For example, gender-related cues in group-dominance-based patriarchal cultures may automatically generate behaviors that leave women without a seat at the negotiation table and keep them out of critical decision-making roles. However,

it is not easy to detect this kind of behavior, especially in a negotiation setting. Anecdotes and interviews with women negotiators reporting the behaviors of powerful individuals toward them are illuminating in efforts to understand this kind of implicit resistance.

A woman's assignment to a negotiation team dominated by powerful men may itself become a cue that activates such bias and leads to exclusionary and discriminatory behavior. The traditional pattern of behavior that "deals are done by and among powerful men" can be an unconscious shortcut that triggers behavior that generates discrimination and exclusion for women at the negotiation table. This may happen even when these men do not explicitly oppose the inclusion of women; in fact, they can be supportive. Yet implicit bias triggered by simple cues still prevails in micro-behaviors that may be contrary to explicit views.

The story of the appointment of a woman to a negotiating panel in the Philippines illustrates how implicit bias can lead to assumptions that women are satisfied with a supporting position rather than a leadership role:

The chair of the panel called me up because he was a friend of mine. Every time he got some important position he would call me because he would ask me to help him. "So," he said, "I was just asked to be the chair of the panel, will you help me?" And I said, "No, because I am done sitting behind you. If you want me, I will sit beside you. So, you make me a member of your panel or I am not going to help you." And I told him, "You know I am as good as you are. So why don't you?" I think this wasn't resistance, because he agreed right away. It was just that he was so used to women "just helping him." Just being there at the back, being their brains as it were. And then at a certain point I said, "No I'm not doing this anymore." So, that is how I became a member of the panel and he agreed. Sometimes it's just because they don't think about it. That's where the resistance is. In a sense it is very subtle. You have to ask for it, you have to assert yourself, and confront because they won't think about it. It's like they think you are not interested. It's not that I don't think he thought that I was not competent, but I think he just thought that it was not something that I was interested in.<sup>55</sup>

Such bias is subtle, unconscious, and unintentional but can still prevent inclusion in negotiation and peace processes, which require full awareness by the participants, mediators, and observers to detect when bias is present in a negotiation and mediation setting. Those in decision-making positions also need to pause and stop subconscious reasoning and replace immediate action based on assumptions and impulsive decisions with a thorough and fair deliberative process. Control for implicit bias entails applying the same criteria in selecting all candidates and evaluating everyone under the same or equivalent circumstances.

### **DIRECT-EXPLICIT TACTICS**

Direct and explicit resistance involves intentional use of explicitly hostile and competitive tactics, short of violence, to prevent the participation of particular groups in a peace process. As long as these tactics are employed, regardless of the inclusion procedures adopted, the inclusion will be far from satisfying fundamental psychological needs. Such resistance is not automatic like implicit bias and not forceful like violent resistance. These tactics resemble everyday resistance tactics in that they are less forceful and less visible than coercion; resisters often adopt a manipulative and duplicitous approach to influence or reverse the outcomes of an inclusive process.<sup>56</sup> One definition is "resistance that doesn't make any headlines."<sup>57</sup> One reason resisters take this route is that they do not want to end the negotiation process, which a spoiler would, but do want to maintain their exclusive control over the process. These tactics often aim at manipulating or capturing the decision-making processes in ways that eventually diminish their inclusive nature rather than ending them entirely.<sup>58</sup> They were observed in almost all the cases examined and occurred more frequently than coercive tactics. Most of the time direct-explicit tactics are associated with powerholder groups, especially political elites; but other actors, such as rebel groups and opposition movements, also use them. Four common tactics are sabotage, false compliance, foot dragging, and vocal resistance.

**Negotiating parties might agree to include civil society or women, but only on the condition that the parties themselves select which women and which civil society representatives can attend. The inclusive process is supported as long as it remains within the boundaries the powerholder elite draw.**

### **Sabotage**

Sabotaging the participation of a person or group in peace negotiations and processes is a common resistance tactic. It aims to block the access of people to an inclusive process, to sensitive information about the process, or to the decision-making setting. Blocking participation can take many forms, among which are manipulating and hijacking decision-making rules and processes, boycotts and withdrawals from inclusive bodies, and dissolving commissions or consultative bodies.

An example is the constitution-making process in Nepal described earlier. When the Constituent Assembly could not agree on a constitution, the decision-making process was taken over by former political leaders, all of whom were from traditionally privileged upper-caste groups. They used the failure to reach an agreement—along with the hardship caused by the April 2015 earthquakes that killed thousands and left Kathmandu devastated—to recapture the decision-making process and decide in a closed-door session on an exclusive deal that sidelined minority groups and their representatives. Monopolizing the decision-making process, they eventually formulated a constitution favoring their preferences and maintaining the privileged status of their social groups. Some of the inclusion gains for women and low caste groups achieved during earlier negotiations were thus reversed. This catalyzed mass mobilization among the excluded ethnic minorities, especially the Madhesis in the south, who favored a federalist constitution and felt betrayed not only because they were left out of the decision-making process, but also because they felt the promises made in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to address their grievances were not kept. The timing of the takeover was also crucial. Were it not for the earthquakes and the two rounds of failure to reach an agreement on the constitution, the old powerholder elite would have found it more difficult to legitimize their unilateral move.

Furthermore, because this resistance closed the space for a more inclusive society, the Maoist party also slowly withdrew its political support from the inclusion agenda.<sup>59</sup>

Sabotage can be accomplished by micro-behaviors or setting up minor obstacles. For instance, during the inter-Congolese negotiations of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2000, President Laurent Kabila engaged in micro-behaviors that sabotaged the inclusion of unarmed opposition and civil society in the negotiations. The 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement established the Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations, the objectives of which were to structure a new political administration in the DRC with the assistance of a facilitator to work with the DRC government, the rebel groups Rally for Congolese Democracy and Movement for the Liberation of the Congo, opposition political parties, and civil society representatives, also known as *forces vives*. Kabila thought that allowing civil society and opposition participation would eventually decrease his power given that the negotiations not only gave “equal status” to each of his armed and unarmed opponents, but also aimed at a new power-sharing arrangement within the DRC. So, motivated by political calculations (specifically, reluctance to share power), Kabila successfully undermined the inclusive negotiation process by introducing minor obstacles. First, he instructed the closure of the president’s office to protest the assigning of a French-speaking cofacilitator. He then did not provide travel authorizations to delegates from unarmed political opposition and civil society.<sup>60</sup> Only after he was assassinated in 2001 and replaced by his son Joseph Kabila did the negotiations garner broader societal representation.

### **False Compliance**

Another common resistance tactic is controlling and handpicking participants for the inclusive process,

which may sometimes be accompanied by a threat to terminate support for inclusion unless demands for the inclusive process are accommodated. False compliance is a type of symbolic inclusion. On the surface, it seems as if the powerful party agrees to and supports an inclusive negotiation process; in fact, however, it seeks to manipulate the process to maintain full control. Hence, the inclusive process remains at the whim of the powerful party's conditional support. For instance, negotiating parties might agree to include civil society or women, but only on the condition that the parties themselves select which women and which civil society representatives can attend. The inclusive process is supported as long as it remains within the boundaries the powerholder elite draw. And although this tactic is used mostly by the powerholder elite, sometimes others—such as armed groups—use it as well.

For example, during the DRC negotiations, Laurent Kabila used the false compliance tactic by advocating for an alternative inclusive process, namely, a newly created Constituent Assembly of three hundred members he had appointed. This was a symbolic inclusion attempt, Emeric Rogier observed, hardly compatible with the requirements of a broad and genuine dialogue.

Insistence on the selection of participants, especially if they will participate directly in track 1 negotiations, can be anticipated given concerns about confidentiality and strategic information sharing with the public. Several leaders have dissolved inclusive commissions (the Central African Republic, for example) because their recommendations had not been favored in them; subsequent commission members were replaced by other, handpicked members. Government parties have also insisted on personal selection of participants for high-level problem-solving workshops and rejected selection based on expertise or diversity (as in Abkhazia during negotiations to end the conflict with Georgia). The motivation to control participants, these examples suggest, is not necessarily based on confidentiality concerns, but often aims to tighten and maintain

political control over the process and eliminate political competitors in the negotiations.

The 2011–12 national dialogue process in Egypt is a good example of the motivation to maintain control. The dialogue, initiated in the wake of pressure from public protests demanding political reforms, was officially announced as an opportunity for national reconciliation that would gather a wide range of political actors and civil society organizations.<sup>61</sup> Managed and controlled by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) with logistic support from the UNDP, it would address five major issues: democracy and human rights, social and human development, the economy, media and culture, and foreign relations. However, SCAF's tight control over the design and outcome of this process prevented a genuine dialogue, failed to equip the process with any decision-making power, and eventually failed to have any constructive impact on regime transition in Egypt. For example, participant selection was done on a personal basis, including both leaders of the dialogue, Yehia El-Gamal (in March) and Abdel Aziz Hegazy (in May), who were appointed by the SCAF. Both were former members of the authoritarian regime, which many people approached skeptically. Reports were delivered to Hegazy, who would transfer the recommendations to the military. The military would then decide how to move forward with the report's recommendations. Most people therefore did not believe that the recommendations would be taken seriously. Critical stakeholders within youth coalitions, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Wafd, Nasserist, and Tagammu parties denounced the process and boycotted it on the grounds that it had no predefined agenda and objectives.<sup>62</sup> The timing of the dialogue also elicited skepticism given resentment among many participants that constitutional amendments had been passed before the start of the dialogue.

In sum, although the Egyptian regime (the military elite in particular) reluctantly agreed to set up an inclusive national dialogue to secure much-needed public

legitimacy and end collective upheaval against the regime, the attitude of the powerholder elite throughout the process was no more than false compliance. The inclusive process aimed at strategic gains but fell short of meeting the fundamental needs of the excluded social groups and providing a fair and inclusive process toward a peaceful transition.

### **Foot Dragging**

Foot dragging is another tactic that resembles support for an inclusive process, but in fact is yet another form of disguised resistance. It may involve a variety of micro-behaviors such as delaying, neglecting, or finding various excuses for not implementing agreed-upon steps for inclusion. Foot dragging tactics often occur after an agreement to initiate an inclusive process, and ironically often by the same actor who had agreed to the inclusive mechanism but later prevented it during implementation and realization of commitments. Other times, foot dragging occurs because of dispersion of authority or diffusion of responsibility across different government departments, or because of competing or divergent bureaucratic interests. For instance, despite possible support for an inclusive process at the national government level, some of these decisions may be delayed or not implemented at the local government level.

An example of foot dragging is the negotiations in Aceh between the Acehnese armed group GAM (mentioned earlier) and the government of Indonesia. In mid-2001, the Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue pushed to bring broader Acehnese perspectives into the negotiations by proposing “democratic consultations.” The government realized that the cease-fire agreement was unraveling in large part because it did not address GAM’s political grievances. When GAM and the government met, they agreed to hold inclusive consultations with the public in Aceh. The attempt failed, however, when the provincial governor of Aceh, whom Jakarta had tasked with leading the development of public consultations, neglected to engage with the process.

Delaying the establishment of commissions and committees despite an agreement to do so is a common behavior among powerholders resisting the implementation of agreements. Failure to implement or not follow through on the decisions of a commission or committee has occurred in numerous peace processes. The Constitution Review Commission, established in 2012 by the government of Fiji during its constitution writing and dialogue process, is one example. The commission planned an inclusive process with public consultations to channel the grievances of the indigenous Fijian and Indo-Fijian communities. The government delayed the consultation process by tactics such as not releasing information to the commission in a timely manner. As a result, the window of time for feedback from the public remained very short even though the consultations were eventually held, effectively excluding public voices from the draft. Although the government tried to convey the appearance of supporting consultations, its support was not genuine. In the end, it rejected the draft and wrote its own, later annulling implementation of the constitutional process altogether.

Another example of government foot dragging is the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in Burundi. Agreed to in the 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement between the government and opposition parties, the TRC aimed to tackle crimes against humanity committed during the war and to promote ethnic reconciliation. Because little progress had been made, a 2005 UN Security Council resolution again called for the creation of a TRC and pressured the government to bring the process forward. Given the lack of meaningful support from the government, political parties, or regional leaders, many delay tactics ensued until finally, in 2014, the National Assembly passed a law allowing the United Nations to set up a “non-Judicial Truth Commission” whose eleven members were appointed by the National Assembly.<sup>63</sup> However, despite the Arusha agreement’s provision that “the candidates for membership of the commission shall be put forward by civil society associations,



Members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) discuss their future in one of the zones set up to transition former rebels back to civilian life, near La Paz, Colombia, on February 1, 2017. (Photo by Federico Rios Escobar/New York Times)

political parties, religious denominations and women's organizations, or may stand as individual candidates," the law omitted a role for civil society organizations.<sup>64</sup> The government subsequently diverted from and diluted its original mandate and procedures by gradually excluding civil society and political opposition from the process. It also opposed the population's wishes articulated in the 2009 national consultations and as issued by civil society actors in 2011 through a series of recommendations regarding the role of civil society in appointing TRC members.<sup>65</sup> In addition, the opposition boycotted and accused the ruling party of setting up an institution that was not independent. Similarly, a former diplomatic correspondent deemed the TRC creation process not transparent given the opaque discussions between government and parliament.

### Vocal Resistance

Resistance to inclusion is also seen in speech, primarily by powerholder elites. Powerholders rely on speeches that express and justify anti-inclusion attitudes and behaviors, which then may transform into an internalized discourse among many in society. Two types of such behavior were observed in the cases studied: uttering a narrative that labels attempts at inclusion as a security threat (securitizing inclusion), and a public narrative that justifies slander, ridicule, or humiliation toward people and groups whose participation is not wanted.

Securitizing inclusion means that "by labelling something a security issue . . . it becomes one."<sup>66</sup> Securitization helps the securitizing actor easily legitimize taking extraordinary measures—which may be difficult to do under normal political circumstances—because it activates a mental state of survival and safety



Men and women take part in the National Dialogue Conference, part of the broader Yemeni peace process, in Sana'a, on March 20, 2013. (Photo by Hani Mohammed/AP)

by implying an existential threat. It helps move an issue from the realm of normal politics into that of security politics, where it can be dealt with swiftly, bypassing the usual rules and regulations of democratic policymaking.

Securitizing inclusion is usually done in two ways. First, attempts at inclusion are labeled as an imposition on local actors by foreign powers that seek to divide the country and as a scheme to impose on its sovereignty. Elites take inclusion discussions in the negotiation and peace process outside the usual political realm and instead frame them as a security threat from external forces that needs to be repudiated to reestablish the nation's security. Second, civil society is identified as an extension of armed groups and terrorists, and thus a security threat that should be kept away from negotiations. Exclusion from the negotiation or peace process is thereby justified as a matter of national security.

Nepal is an apt example. As discussed earlier, the constitution-writing process bogged down on the issue of federalism and how it would be implemented. Throughout the negotiations, the inclusion perspective was strongly supported by the United Nations and other international donor agencies. Donors were critical in the empowerment and capacity-building support given to the members of the Constituent Assembly, especially to subordinate and excluded groups. These training programs aimed to increase the access of marginalized groups (such as the Janajatis) to state institutions and societal resources by promoting their social, economic, and political inclusion. As the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Accord progressed, major resistance from the old elite increased, especially after 2011. They wanted an end to foreign financial support of marginalized groups such as the Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities.<sup>67</sup> These elites argued that

inclusion was an imposed foreign agenda and that sticking to it constituted an existential threat to the sovereignty of the nation. They succeeded in depicting the changes sought by the Maoists and ethnic minorities—such as secularism, federalism, and equitable sharing of resources—as threatening security and stability in the country. They criticized, for example, quotas for diverse ethnic groups as actions legitimizing inequality and unfairness in society. They also continued to resist other commitments made in the CPA on federalism and secularism during the implementation phase on the grounds of threatening national security. This discourse went so far as to implicate foreign donors in instigating violence in Nepal, which eventually resulted in the withdrawal of some of the Western donors. Securitizing the inclusion agenda as a national security threat made it easier to justify the capture of the decision-making process and unilateral drafting of a constitution without the participation of marginalized and excluded groups. The crisis that the country went into after the earthquakes helped this discourse take hold in society, reinforcing the idea that swift action had to be taken to resecure the country from “disunity and threat of dissolution.”<sup>68</sup>

Ridicule, slander, and humiliation are other forms of speech used to resist the participation of certain groups. A typical example is labeling members of such groups as “incapable,” “lacking skills and expertise,” or “lacking political relevance.” Such narratives have often been used to justify the exclusion of women from the negotiation table, often including humiliation and ridiculing language.

In an interview with one of the women delegates to the negotiations in Northern Ireland, it was mentioned that such humiliating words were used against them during the Good Friday negotiations. Women delegates and the issues they raised in the negotiations concerning socioeconomic development and social justice were denigrated as irrelevant. In return, the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition made sure to prepare position papers and contribute to the negotiations on every issue,

not just the socioeconomic development and justice agenda. One of the women delegates was verbally attacked by a member of a political party, who told her to go home and have babies. In response, the woman delegate stood up and sang the song “Stand by Your Man.” Some of the same party members even pushed women delegates in the corridor and ridiculed them on the basis of their gender.<sup>69</sup>

Speech emphasizing lack of adequacy is commonly used against civilian actors, especially by the power-holder elite. For instance, political party leaders used such rhetoric in Burundi to justify the exclusion of civil society representatives from the peace negotiations. Civil society was labeled as “too disorganized” and “young and inexperienced” by the leaders of the political parties attending the negotiations to resist their inclusion.

## COERCIVE TACTICS

Resistance is also expressed aggressively and violently. Such behavior includes physical violence, the threat of violence, vandalism against targets, confiscation of property, detention, and depriving people of their livelihood by creating economic hardship. The threat of violence targeting the participants of inclusive processes was observed in twenty-two of the eighty-five incidents of resistance (26 percent), compared to sixty-three incidents in the category of explicit or manipulative resistance (74 percent). Although not as common as explicit or manipulative tactics, examples of physical violence against inclusion attempts are numerous, such as in Fiji, Guatemala, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Mexico, Sri Lanka, Togo, and Yemen.

For example, violence was directed against the women participants in the National Dialogue Conference held in Yemen in 2013 and 2014. Many women delegates of the conference were threatened for participating and endured attacks ranging from harassment to sexual assault. This included an online defamation and shaming campaign against women candidates, calling them dishonorable for attending the dialogue meetings alone.

# Tackling Resistance

Tackling resistance to inclusion requires a nuanced approach. Findings indicate different types of resistance in regard to motivation, actors, and tactics.

## OVERCOMING POLITICALLY MOTIVATED RESISTANCE

As discussed, one form of resistance is motivated primarily by political competition, economic self-interest, or reluctance to share power, as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. An identity threat component, in which the dominant group perceives inclusion as an existential threat, is also possible. The existential threat is more deep-rooted, having a long-standing ideology and culture that legitimizes the hierarchical and exclusive structure of the system. Political motivation is prevalent among powerholder elites. The identity threat involves the dominant social group as well as the powerholder elite and political leadership representing the same group, as in Kyrgyzstan, Fiji, Nepal, and Guatemala. Different types clearly require different measures and remedies.

For political motivation, incentive structures that make inclusive processes more amenable to powerholders may be enough. Rewards that the leadership or political-economic elite expect for engaging in a peace process can be provided and conditioned on implementation of measures toward inclusive institutions and society. Inclusion indicators can be identified in the beginning of a process and compliance with them can be incorporated into the peace process architecture; milestones could be integrated into implementation monitoring. For example, inclusion procedures set up during the negotiations—such as the rules for decision making in smaller groups, how small group discussions are transferred to larger discussions or

public consultations and to track 1 negotiations and so on—could be monitored by impartial third parties. An inclusion compliance ombudsman could be assigned to a peace process to advise on these steps.

Most resistance by powerholders is disguised, especially manipulation of decision-making processes within a peace process. Thus decision-making rules and procedures, including transfer mechanisms, need to be inclusive to better minimize hijacking or foot dragging.<sup>70</sup> Incentives and institutional pressure may deter those who intend to hijack or manipulate the process. The following precautions can be considered as part of the peace process architecture to this end.

The presence of third-party facilitators and mediators in these processes, especially if they are trained to be aware of such manipulative tactics, may be critical to monitoring the decision-making process for better compliance with inclusion goals.

Whether the results of the inclusive process are treated as binding or nonbinding affects the outcome in regard to the likelihood of recommendations from the process being incorporated into elite decision making.<sup>71</sup> If the peace architecture treats the outcomes as nonbinding, as suggestions or informal feedback, they are less likely to be taken into consideration by negotiators and decision makers, especially if no transfer mechanism has been established.

Especially in inclusive bodies with a nonbinding mandate, if the peace architecture does not have a carefully planned transfer mechanism for the outcomes of the inclusive process to reach decision-making bodies, those outcomes may be dismissed or sidelined more

**If the peace architecture does not have a carefully planned transfer mechanism for the outcomes of the inclusive process to reach decision-making bodies, those outcomes may be dismissed or sidelined more easily by powerholders, or not received at all.**

easily by powerholders, or not received at all. Effective mechanisms should be set up to ensure that results from the inclusive process reach negotiators efficiently.<sup>72</sup>

Decision-making procedures and rules for the inclusive negotiation process, such as a national dialogue or an inclusive constitutional drafting commission, should strive to avoid the potential for deadlock. Deadlocks are often used as an excuse by powerholders to hijack the decision-making process and impose their unilateral and noninclusive agenda. Certain decision-making settings are more likely to generate deadlocks, such as unanimity rule or veto in highly polarized political and social settings. Practitioners designing inclusive processes should reflect on the degree of polarization and division within the deciding group and society.

Monitoring and enforcement are already integral to the peace architecture, but monitoring should not be just about the implementation of usual peace agreement provisions, such as disarmament activities. Mechanisms could also be set up to monitor and safeguard compliance with inclusion indicators and activities. As mentioned, an ombudsman could be assigned to advise the members of inclusive commissions, national dialogues, constitution drafting bodies, or mediators to facilitate compliance with inclusion standards and procedures. Compliance and enforcement mechanisms could also specify the consequences for violating indicators.

## **OVERCOMING IDENTITY THREAT RESISTANCE**

Identity threat resistance requires a more sustained and difficult effort to overcome. It requires not only institutional incentives, careful design of decision-making processes, and effective compliance measures, but also a long-term strategy that targets ideological and cultural change. In these places, ideological narratives that legitimize strict social hierarchy, domination of

one subgroup over the other, and unequal access to resources need to be transformed with systemic efforts (which in some cases are part of the transformative elements within a peace process). A number of strategies are possible, depending again on the timing of resistance, the actors, and the tactics involved.

Extensive use of manipulative tactics such as foot dragging and false compliance hindered successful transformation in all cases discussed here. In fact, such efforts create more obstacles for durable peace in the long run by diluting trust and legitimacy, as in Egypt and Nepal. The unfulfilled expectations of social groups in regard to achieving a sense of belonging (raised because they had initially been included in the process) could lead to perceived relative deprivation and result in violent collective action. This was the case in the Madhesi uprisings in Nepal after the inclusive constitution-making process failed. If inclusive processes are planned and designed as part of a peace process, they should strive to achieve a genuine inclusion of historically excluded groups. Further research is needed on how inclusion mechanisms can be set up in practice that adequately fulfill the need for both belongingness and distinctiveness.

The level of intervention to address resistance to inclusion, whether individual or intergroup, should be clearly spelled out following a theory of change applicable to that level. For example, changing an individual's exclusion behavior resulting from implicit bias requires a different approach than dealing with pervasive and systemic resistance. The first can benefit from training that raises the individual decision maker's awareness about implicit bias and from various other established methods that focus on attitudinal and behavioral change. The second type, however, may be overcome only through civil resistance or change in ideological

narratives. Group-based attitudes will resist inclusion of subordinate groups as long as the dominant group's ideology persists.<sup>73</sup> In other words, without a change in the ideological narrative, a society cannot be transformed into an inclusive one. Research focusing on attitude change indicates that unless larger group norms support equality between groups, training that targets bias at the individual level will not engender sustainable results and systemic change.<sup>74</sup> The following tools are useful to consider in this regard but require additional conceptual development and research.

At the individual and group levels, reducing individual bias and intergroup prejudice was a central concern of scholars who developed dialogue and problem-solving methodologies in the conflict resolution field. Most of these approaches relied on social-psychological theories on reducing prejudice and inducing positive attitudinal change. These methods relied in turn on a variety of methodologies and interventions, such as generating complex and non-zero sum thinking about the out-group, generating affective (emotional) ties (empathy) with the out-group members, and generating complex and reflective thinking about the in-group to reduce in-group favoritism and any sense of moral superiority over other groups. They are therefore expected to lead to a "less provincial" and "ethnocentric" view of the out-group.

At the ideological and cultural level, tackling resistance to inclusion requires a different approach. One theory explaining ideological and cultural change comes from complex systems theory and cognitive science.<sup>75</sup> Ideology is defined as a complex system of beliefs that can be the source of resistance to social change; at the same time, however, the system can flip and change rapidly. Cognitive-affective mapping, an individual-level tool that can be aggregated to an intergroup level, can be used to map belief systems (both favoring and

opposing inclusion) constituting a complex system of ideology. Analysis of such a map can identify attractors in the system that sustain ideological continuation and explore possible entries to create tipping points in the system. From a complex systems perspective, it becomes possible to assess whether the system is geared more toward pro-exclusion belief systems in the beginning of a peace process and whether any change occurs and perhaps flips in favor of a pro-inclusion belief system later in the process. Points of resistance to ideological change can also be identified.

At the societal level, a third theory of change involves civil resistance or nonviolent action. The failure of the inclusive peace process sometimes generates collective unrest and action. In both Nepal and Guatemala, the peace process opened a space for the inclusion of historically excluded groups. Yet this space began to close up during the implementation of the peace agreement in the face of resistance from the powerholder elite. Resistance by the elite triggered a counterresistance in the form of mass action. In Nepal, the Madhesi uprisings were not civil resistance because they involved violence. Eventually, as other groups that had previously challenged the exclusive nature of the system (such as the Maoists) stopped doing so, the Madhesi became isolated in the uprising. In Guatemala, the indigenous Mayan population was more successful, allying with nonindigenous people (the urban middle-class in particular) to push for a counterreform agenda to overcome elite resistance. In sum, not all collective action is disciplined civil resistance; it can be in the form of reactionary protests that in turn may also result in street radicalism and violence. It is critical to look into the conditions under which civil resistance successfully and nonviolently overcomes systemic and pervasive resistance to inclusion.

# Notes



1. United Nations, “UN Guidance on Effective Mediation,” September 2012, 11, [https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GuidanceEffectiveMediation\\_UNDPA2012%28english%29\\_0.pdf](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GuidanceEffectiveMediation_UNDPA2012%28english%29_0.pdf).
2. Thania Paffenholz, “Civil Society Inclusion: Beyond the Inclusion-Exclusion Dichotomy,” *Negotiation Journal* 30, no 1 (2014): 69–91; and Christine Bell and Jan Pospisil, “Navigating Inclusion in Transitions from Conflict: The Formalised Political Unsettling,” *Journal of International Development* 29, no. 5 (August 2017): 576–593.
3. Véronique Dudouet, Stina Lundström, and David Rampf, “Post-War Political Settlements: From Participatory Transition Processes to Inclusive State-Building and Governance,” Berghof Foundation, December 2016, 9–10, [www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Papers/IPS\\_Synthesis\\_Report\\_web.pdf](http://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Papers/IPS_Synthesis_Report_web.pdf).
4. See, for example, United Nations and World Bank, *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2018), <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28337>.
5. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, “The Emergence of Weak, Despotic and Inclusive States,” NBER working paper no. 23657, National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2017, [www.nber.org/papers/w23657](http://www.nber.org/papers/w23657).
6. The term *peace process* is used to refer to the longer lasting broader process encompassing not only the negotiations, but also pre-negotiation and implementation phases. Resistance to inclusion can emerge in any of these stages in a peace process, not just around the negotiations.
7. For more information, see Association for Inclusive Peace, “Map of Inclusive Peace Processes,” [www.inclusivepeace.org/content/map-inclusive-peace-processes](http://www.inclusivepeace.org/content/map-inclusive-peace-processes).
8. See, for instance, Catherine Barnes, “Owning the Process: Public Participation in Peacemaking,” *Accord* 13 (2002); Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, “Peace Negotiations and Agreements,” in *Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace: A Toolkit for Advocacy and Action* (London: International Alert and Women Waging Peace, 2004); and Michelle Page, Tobie Whitman, and Cecilia Anderson, “Strategies for Policymakers: Bringing Women into Peace Negotiations,” Institute for Inclusive Security, October 2009, [www.inclusivesecurity.org/publication/strategies-for-policymakers-bringing-women-into-peace-negotiations](http://www.inclusivesecurity.org/publication/strategies-for-policymakers-bringing-women-into-peace-negotiations).
9. Steven Dixon et al., “Making Women Count, Not Just Counting Women: Assessing Women’s Inclusion and Influence on Peace Negotiations,” Inclusive Peace & Transition Initiative, April 2016, [www.inclusivepeace.org/sites/default/files/IPTI-UN-Women-Report-Making-Women-Count-60-Pages.pdf](http://www.inclusivepeace.org/sites/default/files/IPTI-UN-Women-Report-Making-Women-Count-60-Pages.pdf); and Marie O’Reilly, Andrea Ó Súilleabháin, and Thania Paffenholz, “Reimagining Peacemaking: Women’s Roles in Peace Processes,” International Peace Institute, June 2015, 6, [www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/IPI-E-pub-Reimagining-Peacemaking.pdf](http://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/IPI-E-pub-Reimagining-Peacemaking.pdf). See also Nanako Tamaru and Marie O’Reilly, “How Women Influence Constitution-Making after Conflict and Unrest,” Inclusive Security, January 2018, [www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/How-Women-Influence-Constitution-Making.pdf](http://www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/How-Women-Influence-Constitution-Making.pdf); and Laurel Stone, “Women Transforming Conflict: A Quantitative Analysis of Female Peacemaking” (unpublished paper, 2014), <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2485242>.
10. Dixon et al., “Making Women Count”; and UN Women, “Women’s Meaningful Participation in Negotiating Peace and the Implementation of Peace Agreements. Report of the Expert Group Meeting,” October 2018, [www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2018/10/egm-report-womens-meaningful-participation-in-negotiating-peace](http://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2018/10/egm-report-womens-meaningful-participation-in-negotiating-peace).
11. Dixon et al., “Making Women Count.”
12. O’Reilly, Ó Súilleabháin, and Paffenholz, “Reimagining Peacemaking.”
13. Three models have been suggested for the diffusion of international human rights norms. These are the life cycle model (Martha Finnemore, and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” *International Organization* 52, no. 4 [1998]: 887–917); the spiral model (Thomas Risse-Kappen, Steve C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999]); and boomerang effects (Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998]). For a discussion of the types of norms used in a peacebuilding context, see Sara Helmuller, Julia Palmiano Federer, and Mathias Zeller, “The Role of Norms in International Peace Mediation,” Swisspeace, April 2015, [www.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user\\_upload/Media/Publications/The\\_Role\\_of\\_Norms\\_in\\_International\\_Peace\\_Mediation.pdf](http://www.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Media/Publications/The_Role_of_Norms_in_International_Peace_Mediation.pdf).

14. Esra Dilek, "Reconsidering Hybridity: The Selective Use of International Norms in Turkey's Resolution/Peace Process (2009–2015)" (dissertation, Bilkent University, 2018).
15. Anthony Wanis-St. John and Darren Kew, "Civil Society and Peace Negotiations: Confronting Exclusion," *International Negotiation* 13, no. 1 (2008): 11–36.
16. For a study that alerts to the negative consequences of adding more actors to the negotiation table, see David Cunningham, "Who Should Be at the Table? Veto Players and Peace Processes in Civil War," *Penn State Journal of Law and International Affairs* 2, no. 1 (2013): 38–47. This is also an argument often made by government officials to make negotiations more exclusive.
17. Dudouet, Lundström, and Rampf, "Post-War Political Settlements."
18. Desirée Nilsson, "Anchoring the Peace: Civil Society Actors in Peace Accords and Durable Peace," *International Interactions* 38 (2012): 243–66.
19. Francisca Zanker, "Legitimate Representation: Civil Society Actors in Peace Negotiations Revisited," *International Negotiation* 19, no. 1 (2014): 62–88.
20. Paffenholz, "Civil Society Inclusion."
21. For summary findings, see Association for Inclusive Peace, "Research Project—Broadening Participation," [www.inclusivepeace.org/content/broadening-participation](http://www.inclusivepeace.org/content/broadening-participation). See also Esra Cuhadar and Thania Paffenholz, "What Is a Constructive Peace Process? Inclusion in Peace Negotiations," in *Perspectives in Waging Conflicts Constructively*, ed. Bruce Dayton and Louis Kriesberg (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2017).
22. Cuhadar and Paffenholz, "What Is a Constructive Peace Process."
23. Dudouet, Lundström, and Rampf, "Post-War Political Settlements."
24. An example of a backlash story in which the political elite's reluctance for power sharing can be found in a recent conciliation resources and Political Settlements Research Program case study on Nepal. See Anagha Neelakantan, Alexander Ramsbotham, and Deepak Thapa, "Peace, Power, and Inclusive Change in Nepal," Conciliation Resources, October 2016, [www.c-r.org/accord/peace-power-and-inclusive-change-nepal](http://www.c-r.org/accord/peace-power-and-inclusive-change-nepal).
25. The term *symbolic inclusion*, which some refer to as *token participation*, was first coined in comparative politics to refer to the inclusion of minorities in electoral politics. See Rafaela Dancygier, *Dilemmas of Inclusion* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017), 27.
26. For more on group identification, see Marilyn Brewer, "The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love or Outgroup Hate?" *Journal of Social Issues* 55, no. 3 (1999): 429–44; and, on large group identification, Vamik Volkan, "Large Group Identity, International Relations, and Psychoanalysis," *International Forum of Psychoanalysis* 18, no. 4 (2009): 206–13.
27. Certain social conditions have been listed as characteristics of group dominance societies such as segregation, intergroup competition, group power differentials, and tokenism. For more information, see Felicia Pratto, "The Puzzle of Continuing Group Inequality: Piecing Together Psychological, Social, and Cultural Forces in Social Dominance Theory," *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 31 (1999): 191–263.
28. One of the main premises of social-psychology on intergroup conflict is that most human societies are organized in social hierarchies. Several prominent theories in social psychology, such as social dominance, have dealt with the nature of group relations in socially hierarchical systems. See Felicia Pratto and Jim Sidanius, *Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); on system justification theory, see John T. Jost, Mahzarin R. Banaji, and Brian A. Nosek, "A Decade of System Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo," *Political Psychology* 25, no. 6 (2004): 881–919; and on group position theory, see Lawrence D. Bobo, "Prejudice as Group Position: Microfoundations of a Sociological Approach to Racism and Race Relations," *Journal of Social Issues* 55, no. 3 (1999): 445–72.
29. For instance, see Roy F. Baumeister and Marc R. Leary, "The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation," *Psychological Bulletin* 117 (1995): 497–529; and Marilyn Brewer, "The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the Same Time," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 17 (1991): 475–82.
30. Brewer, "The Social Self."
31. Lynn M. Shore, Amy E. Randel, Beth G. Chung, Michelle A. Dean, Karen Holcombe Ehrhart, and Gangaram Singh, "Inclusion and Diversity in Work Groups: A Review and Model for Future Research," *Journal of Management* 37, no. 4 (2011): 1262–89.
32. Ethan Kross, Marc G. Berman, Walter Mischel, Edward E. Smith, and Tor D. Wager, "Social Rejection Shares Somatosensory Representations with Physical Pain," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 108, no. 15 (2011): 6270–75.
33. Paul Hutchison, Dominic Abrams, and Julie Christian, "The Social Psychology of Exclusion," in *The Multidisciplinary Handbook of Social Exclusion Research*, ed. Dominic Abrams, Julie Christian, and David Gordon (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2007).
34. James Brownsell, "Profile: Martha Karua," *Al Jazeera*, February 28, 2013, [www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/02/2013222164629316425.html](http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/02/2013222164629316425.html).

35. Quoted in Olga Demetriou and Maria Hadjipavlou, "The Impact of Women's Activism on the Peace Negotiations in Cyprus," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 24, no. 1 (2018): 50–65.
36. Demetriou and Hadjipavlou, "The Impact of Women's Activism."
37. Brewer, "The Psychology of Prejudice," 435; and Jim Sidanius, "The Psychology of Group Conflict and the Dynamics of Oppression: a Social Dominance Perspective," in *Explorations in Political Psychology*, ed. Shanto Iyengar and William McGuire (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993).
38. Pratto and Sidanius, *Social Dominance*; and John Jost and Erik Thompson, "Group-Based Dominance and Opposition to Equality as Independent Predictors of Self-Esteem," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 36 (2000): 209–32. Hierarchy-enhancing narrative is understood as ideology.
39. Brewer, "The Psychology of Prejudice," 437.
40. Why subordinate groups accept the existing social hierarchy and submit to hierarchy-enhancing ideologies is known as *system justification*. Dynamics that create system justification among subordinate groups have been well documented in a number of studies looking into subordinate group attitudes. For more, see Jost, Banaji, and Nosek, "A Decade of System Justification Theory."
41. Roman Krzanic, "Civil and Uncivil Actors in the Guatemalan Peace Process," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 18, no. 1 (1999): 1–16.
42. Susanne Jonas, *Of Centaurs and Doves: Guatemala's Peace Process* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), 12.
43. For more information on the disruptive role of the economic elite in the Guatemalan peace process, see Esra Cuhadar, "Enlarging the Negotiation Table with Business Sector Actors: Who, How, and with What Effect?" *International Negotiation* 24, no. 1 (March 2019): 91–116.
44. Personal correspondence with a Colombian negotiator, Washington, DC, June 2018.
45. Interview with women community leaders from ANMUCIC, Washington, DC, November 2018.
46. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, "Monitoring of the Gender Perspective in the Implementation of the Colombian Final Peace Accord," 2018, [https://kroc.nd.edu/assets/297624/181113\\_gender\\_report\\_final.pdf](https://kroc.nd.edu/assets/297624/181113_gender_report_final.pdf).
47. Article 3.5 of Nepal's Comprehensive Peace Accord included provisions on inclusion. See Shradha Ghale, "Backlash against inclusion," *Accord*, no. 26 (March 2017): 123–4.
48. Manjushree Thapa cited in Balkrishna Mabuhang, "From Peace Settlement to Political Settlement in Nepal: State Restructuring and Inclusive Measures for Marginalised Groups," IPS Paper no. 10, Berghof Foundation, April 2015, [www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Other\\_Resources/IPS/IPSPaper-10-From-Peace-Settlement-to-Political-Settlement.pdf](http://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Other_Resources/IPS/IPSPaper-10-From-Peace-Settlement-to-Political-Settlement.pdf).
49. For examples of such rhetoric, see Molly Elgin-Cossart, Bruce Jones, and Jane Esberg, *Pathways to Change: Baseline Study to Identify Theories of Change on Political Settlements and Confidence Building* (UK Department for International Development, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Carnegie Corporation, July 2012), 48, 49.
50. Mabuhang, "From Peace Settlement to Political Settlement."
51. Manesh Shrestha, "Nepalese president in dispute over army chief," CNN, May 4, 2005, <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/05/04/nepal.army>.
52. For automatic stereotypes, see Mahzarin Banaji and Curtis Hardin, "Automatic Stereotyping," *Psychological Science* 7, no. 3 (1996): 136–41.
53. A growing literature on implicit bias and stereotyping is relevant to this paper. For example, see Eric Hehman, Jessica Flake, and Jimmy Calanchini, "Disproportionate Use of Lethal Force in Policing Is Associated with Regional Racial Biases of Residents," *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 9, no. 4 (2017): 393–401; J. Orchard and J. Price, "County-Level Racial Prejudice and the Black-White Gap in Infant Health Outcomes," *Social Science and Medicine* 181 (May 2017): 191–98; Jordan Axt, Charles Ebersole, and Brian Nosek, "The Rules of Implicit Evaluation by Race, Religion, and Age," *Psychological Science* 25, no. 9 (2014): 1804–15; Anthony Greenwald and Mahzarin Banaji, "Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem and Stereotypes," *Psychological Review* 102, no. 1 (1995): 4–27. As research on social dominance shows, people in positions of power coming from socially dominant groups in society are more likely to stereotype (Pratto and Sidanius, *Social Dominance*, 195–97).
54. Irene V. Blair and Mahzarin R. Banaji, "Automatic and Controlled Processes in Stereotype Priming," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 70, no. 6 (1996): 1142–63.
55. Interview with Irene Santiago, Washington, DC, April 2018.
56. The definition of everyday forms of resistance belongs to the anthropologist James C. Scott and his seminal *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985). Scott used this concept to describe daily resistance tactics used by peasants and other subordinate groups. In his work, resistance is not attributed to dominant and powerful social groups; yet some of the tactics used by Scott were found quite relevant to the tactics used by resisters, including powerholders, in this research.
57. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak*, 3.

58. I argue that this is one of the major ways resistance to inclusion differs from the spoiler notion.
59. Shradha Ghale, "Backlash against inclusion."
60. Emeric Rogier, "The Inter-Congolese Dialogue: A Critical Overview," in *Challenges of Peace Implementation: The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, ed. Mark Malan (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 27–8.
61. For more information on this dialogue, see Thania Paffenholz, Anne Zachariassen, and Cindy Helfer, "What Makes or Breaks National Dialogues?," Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative, October 2017, [www.inclusivepeace.org/sites/default/files/IPTI-Report-What-Makes-Breaks-National-Dialogues.pdf](http://www.inclusivepeace.org/sites/default/files/IPTI-Report-What-Makes-Breaks-National-Dialogues.pdf).
62. "Experts, political figures criticize National Dialogue," *Daily News Egypt*, April 13, 2011, [www.dailynewsegypt.com/2011/04/13/experts-political-figures-criticize-national-dialogue](http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2011/04/13/experts-political-figures-criticize-national-dialogue).
63. Ephrem Rugiririza, "Burundi Truth Commission 'A Diversionary Tactic,' Say Critics," JusticeInfo, March 16, 2016, [www.justiceinfo.net/en/truth-commissions/26370-burundi-truth-commission-a-diversionary-tactic-say-critics.html](http://www.justiceinfo.net/en/truth-commissions/26370-burundi-truth-commission-a-diversionary-tactic-say-critics.html).
64. Protocol 1, Chapter II, Article 8:2a of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (2000), <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/arusha-peace-and-reconciliation-agreement-for-burundi>.
65. Rugiririza, "Burundi Truth Commission."
66. This definition of securitization is adapted from Ole Wæver, who used the term and formulated the theory in international relations ("Politics, Security, Theory," *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 4–5 [2011]: 465–80).
67. Ghale, "Backlash against inclusion." As a result of this pressure, the British government's Department for International Development stopped funding the Janajati Empowerment Program.
68. Elgin-Cossart, Jones, and Esberg, *Pathways to Change*, 48–50.
69. Interview with Northern Ireland Women Coalition founding member and negotiator, July 2018.
70. The term transfer mechanisms refers to how outcomes from inclusive bodies (commissions, committees, consultations) are linked and transferred to decision makers and negotiators. See Esra Cuhadar and Thania Paffenholz, "Transfer 2.0: Applying the Concept of Transfer from Track-Two Workshops to Inclusive Peace Negotiations," *International Studies Review*, June 24, 2019.
71. Thania Paffenholz and her colleagues highlight the importance of binding vs nonbinding rules in the context of national dialogues (see Paffenholz, Zachariassen, and Helfer, *What Makes or Breaks*).
72. See Cuhadar and Paffenholz, "Transfer 2.0."
73. Ideology is used in the same sense here as in social dominance theory (Pratto and Sidanius, *Social Dominance*, 45). It is described as "hierarchy legitimizing myths, which consist of attitudes, values, and beliefs, that provide moral and intellectual justification for the social practices that distribute social value within the system." A similar definition for ideology is offered by the Ideological Conflict Project as follows: "systems of socially shared ideas, beliefs, and values used to understand, justify, or challenge a particular political, economic, or social order." See Tad Homer-Dixon et al., "A Complex Systems Approach to the Study of Ideology: Cognitive-Affective Structures and the Dynamics of Belief Systems," *Journal of Social and Political Psychology* 1, no 1 (2013): 337–63.
74. On sustainability of individual attitude change in an ongoing conflict environment, see Maya De Vries and Ifat Maoz, "Tracking for Peace: Assessing the Effectiveness of Track Two Diplomacy in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict," *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* 6, no. 1–3 (2013): 62–74; and Yigal Rosen, "Long-Term Effects of Peace Education Programs in the Context of Intractable Conflict" (paper presented at European Conference for Research on Learning and Instruction, Budapest, August 28, 2007).
75. For more information, see the Ideological Conflict Project housed at the University of Waterloo, Canada, which applies systems thinking to ideological conflicts ([www.ideologicalconflict.org](http://www.ideologicalconflict.org)).

---

## ABOUT THE INSTITUTE



The United States Institute of Peace is a national, nonpartisan, independent institute, founded by Congress and dedicated to the proposition that a world without violent conflict is possible, practical, and essential for US and global security. In conflict zones abroad, the Institute works with local partners to prevent, mitigate, and resolve violent conflict. To reduce future crises and the need for costly interventions, USIP works with governments and civil societies to help their countries solve their own problems peacefully. The Institute provides expertise, training, analysis, and support to those who are working to build a more peaceful, inclusive world.

---

## BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Stephen J. Hadley (Chair), Principal, RiceHadleyGates, LLC, Washington, DC • George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, DC • Judy Ansley, Former Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. Bush, Washington, DC • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC • Joseph Eldridge, University Chaplain and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC • Kerry Kennedy, President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights, Washington, DC • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC, Las Vegas, NV • Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA • John A. Lancaster, Former Executive Director, International Council on Independent Living, Potsdam, NY • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA • J. Robinson West, Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, DC • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Washington, DC

## MEMBERS EX OFFICIO

Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State • Mark T. Esper, Secretary of Defense • Frederick J. Roegge, Vice Admiral, US Navy; President, National Defense University • Nancy Lindborg, President & CEO, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

---

## THE UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE PRESS

Since its inception in 1991, the United States Institute of Peace Press has published hundreds of influential books, reports, and briefs on the prevention, management, and peaceful resolution of international conflicts. All our books and reports arise from research and fieldwork sponsored by the Institute's many programs, and the Press is committed to expanding the reach of the Institute's work by continuing to publish significant and sustainable publications for practitioners, scholars, diplomats, and students. Each work undergoes thorough peer review by external subject experts to ensure that the research and conclusions are balanced, relevant, and sound.

---

# PEACEWORKS

NO. 159 | MARCH 2020

---

In the peacebuilding field, inclusion—of women, civil society, youth, indigenous communities, the internally displaced, diasporas, refugees—has become a buzzword, yet despite United Nations guidelines a single definition remains elusive. On the one hand, inclusion is correlated positively with durability of peace processes. On the other, resistance to it is widespread and persistent. At the heart of both inclusion and exclusion is how we organize ourselves socially, which speaks directly to inclusivity as a fundamental human need. This perspective is crucial to understanding resistance and why it is so widespread and to addressing it effectively. Tackling resistance requires a nuanced approach, as this report reveals, that takes motivation, actors, and tactics into account.

---

## OTHER USIP PUBLICATIONS

- *The “Green Diamond”: Coffee and Conflict in the Central African Republic* by Fiona Mangan, Igor Acko, and Manal Taha (Special Report, February 2020)
- *Rethinking Transnational Terrorism: An Integrated Approach* by Martha Crenshaw (Peaceworks, February 2020)
- *The Intersection of Investment and Conflict in Myanmar* by Priscilla Clapp (Special Report, February 2020)
- *A Peace Regime for the Korean Peninsula* by Frank Aum, Jacob Stokes, Patricia M. Kim, Atman M. Trivedi, Rachel Vandenbrink, Jennifer Staats, and Joseph Y. Yun (Peaceworks, February 2020)
- *Afghan Women’s Views on Violent Extremism and Aspirations to a Peacemaking Role* by Haseeb Humayoon and Mustafa Basij-Rasikh (Peaceworks, February 2020)



UNITED STATES  
INSTITUTE OF PEACE  
**Making Peace Possible**

2301 Constitution Avenue NW  
Washington, DC 20037  
202.457.1700  
[www.USIP.org](http://www.USIP.org)