



SPECIAL REPORT

2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

ABOUT THE REPORT

This Special Report examines China's ongoing participation in UN peacekeeping missions in Mali and elsewhere in Africa, and how it reflects Beijing's desire to project its diplomatic influence and soft power around the world. Based on an extensive review of reporting, interviews, and field research, the report also documents the operational and security challenges Chinese peacekeepers face in Mali, as well as efforts to build support at home for its participation in peacekeeping missions. The report was supported by the Asia Center's China Program at the United States Institute of Peace.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Jean-Pierre Cabestan is a professor of government and international studies at Hong Kong Baptist University. Since 2011, his research has focused on China-Africa relations. He has published several articles on specific bilateral relations that China has developed in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly with Ethiopia, Tanzania, Cameroon, Gabon, Burkina Faso, and Mali. He has more recently focused on the military and security dimensions of China's policy towards Africa.

Jean-Pierre Cabestan

China's Evolving Role as a UN Peacekeeper in Mali

Summary

- China's participation in the United Nation's Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is only the second time in its history that the country has contributed combat troops to a UN peacekeeping mission.
- China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) has used its participation in MINUSMA to train its personnel to operate in a hostile environment, gain experience working with other UN contingents and in a French-speaking country, and test new military equipment.
- The MINUSMA experience has also underscored for China the importance of improving interactions with local populations, strengthening cooperation with local militaries, and better communicating the value of China's growing role in UN peacekeeping to Chinese citizens.
- However, the PLA contingent in Mali has remained largely risk adverse, particularly since a May 2016 attack that killed one Chinese soldier and injured four others. Moreover, the leading role played by French counterterrorism forces has mostly limited the activities of Chinese combat troops to building infrastructure and providing medical care.
- China's participation in MINUSMA underscores Beijing's ambition to become a key player in UN peacekeeping operations and African security, which is a reflection of its efforts to expand its diplomatic influence and soft power around the world.

© 2018 by the United States Institute of Peace.
All rights reserved.

SPECIAL REPORT 432

SEPTEMBER 2018

CONTENTS

Introduction	1
China's Contingent in the MINUSMA Mission	2
What China is Learning in Mali	3
Toward a More Assertive Chinese Engagement in Africa	6
Conclusion	7

Introduction

China's decision in 2013 to participate in the United Nation's Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali—more commonly known by the French acronym MINUSMA—represented a turning point in China's history in United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPKO). Throughout the Cold War, China saw any Western military intervention in Africa as driven by neocolonialist or imperialist motives. Today, by contrast, China contributes more personnel to UN peacekeeping missions than any other permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, and China is now the second-largest contributor to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations budget (behind the United States but ahead of Japan).

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Stephen J. Hadley (Chair), Principal, RiceHadleyGates, LLC, Washington, DC • **George E. Moose** (Vice Chair), Adjunct Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, DC • **Judy Ansley**, Former Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. Bush, Washington, DC • **Eric Edelman**, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC • **Joseph Eldridge**, University Chaplain and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC • **Kerry Kennedy**, President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights, Washington, DC • **Ikram U. Khan**, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC, Las Vegas, NV • **Stephen D. Krasner**, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA • **John A. Lancaster**, Former Executive Director, International Council on Independent Living, Potsdam, NY • **Jeremy A. Rabkin**, Professor of Law, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA • **J. Robinson West**, Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, DC • **Nancy Zirkin**, Executive Vice President, Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Washington, DC

MEMBERS EX OFFICIO

Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State • **James Mattis**, Secretary of Defense • **Frederick J. Roegge**, Vice Admiral, US Navy; President, National Defense University • **Nancy Lindborg**, President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, email: permissions@usip.org.

Beijing's participation in MINUSMA marked just the second time that China has contributed combat troops to a UN peacekeeping operation (the first was in 2012, in South Sudan). Over the longer term, China's participation in MINUSMA should be viewed as proof of Beijing's ambition to play a more expansive role in UNPKO, to more actively contribute to African security, and to extend its diplomatic reach and soft power in Africa and beyond.

This is a dramatic transformation since China first contributed personnel to a UN peacekeeping mission in 1992, in Cambodia. Until the 2010s, China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) generally sent only noncombat troops on peacekeeping operations, mainly dispatching police, logistics, construction, and medical contingents to these operations.

China's Contingent in the MINUSMA Mission

The African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), originally set to deploy in the fall of 2013, was established by the Economic Community of West African States, with the support of the African Union (AU) and with UN authorization, to check the actions of armed groups linked to al-Qaeda that were seeking autonomy in Mali's northern regions. In January 2013, the rebels were rapidly gaining territory and even threatening Bamako, Mali's capital. The AFISMA troops deployed ahead of schedule to deal with the threat were not able to stop the rebels.¹ These developments led to the Malian government's request that France send troops to Mali, then to its request that AFISMA be replaced by a UN stabilization and peacekeeping mission.² China (tepidly) endorsed these decisions. The peacekeeping mission was established in April 2013 under chapter 7 of the UN Charter to support the transitional authorities in Mali in the stabilization of the country.

As both a peacekeeping and a peacemaking operation, MINUSMA is an example of China softening its traditional principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of another country. China's participation in MINUSMA has also confirmed China's increasing acceptance of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, which asserts that the international community may intervene across borders to safeguard civilian populations from acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other human rights abuses when their government has failed to do so.³ The doctrine was endorsed by UN member states in 2005, but China has succeeded in setting strict conditions on the use of force, including requiring UN Security Council endorsement and confirmation that war crimes or worse have been committed in the country targeted by R2P.⁴

China's support of the "third pillar" of R2P—the use of force with UN authorization when a state fails to protect its civilian population—is still cautious and partial, with Beijing not wanting R2P to become the grounds for regime change. As a result, Beijing continues to regard peacekeeping missions not as R2P operations per se, but as "helping the countries in question to effectively assume their responsibility for the protection of their own nationals."⁵ Notably, China's Ministry of Defense has not formally recognized the peacekeepers dispatched to Mali as "combat troops" (*zuozhan budui*), since the purpose of their mission is to "maintain peace, prevent war and control the ceasefire" and "not to be a direct party to the internal military conflict."⁶

Since its inception, MINUSMA has had a very strong mandate "to use all necessary means...to stabilize key population centers, especially in the north, deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas."⁷ Since June 2014, MINUSMA's mandate has been expanded to supporting national political dialogue and assisting the reestablishment of state authority over the whole Malian territory. MINUSMA is currently the third-largest UN peacekeeping operation, involving 15,514 personnel—

Table 1. China's UNPKO Contingents (as of August 31, 2018)

Mission	Country/Region	Contingent
UNMISS	South Sudan	518
UNIFIL	Lebanon	418
MINUSMA	Mali	403
UNAMID	Sudan (Darfur)	374
MONUSCO	Democratic Republic of Congo	232
MINURSO	Western Sahara	12
UNFICYP	Cyprus	6
UNTSO	Middle East	5
		Total 1,968

Source: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

including 11,752 troops and 1,728 police—as of August 2018.⁸ The Chinese contingent consists of about four hundred personnel serving in police, engineering, and medical units and is the third-largest contingent of Chinese UN peacekeepers in the field (see table 1).⁹

The PLA contingent is posted in Gao, a city of about a hundred thousand people on the Niger River some 1,200 kilometers (740 miles) northeast of Bamako and 320 kilometers (200 miles) downstream of Timbuktu, the main city in northern Mali. Gao is strategically important because of roads that link it with the conflict-prone Kidal region in Mali's north and Niamey, Niger's capital city, to the south. Since its initial deployment, the Chinese peacekeepers' mission has been to guard and protect the UN military camp in Gao. The Chinese contingent rapidly built a hospital there, and its engineers contributed to mine clearance efforts in the Gao region. In January 2017, Chinese medics took care of some of the wounded after a Malian military camp located near the PLA camp was hit by a suicide car bomb attack that killed seventy-seven people.¹⁰ Later, Chinese engineers helped rebuild the camp. In September 2017, PLA engineers completed construction of MINUSMA's central materials storehouse at the UN Super Camp House in Gao.

What China Is Learning in Mali

Because Chinese soldiers have had so little experience operating overseas, China's blue helmets in Mali have faced a long and slow learning curve. Nevertheless, there are several important ways in which China is benefiting from its participation in the MINUSMA and other UNPKO missions. The lessons it learns are sure to inform its participation in future UN peacekeeping missions as well as influence Chinese foreign policy more broadly.

Increasing troop readiness and improving risk assessment

First, participation in MINUSMA has given Chinese troops opportunities to train in hostile environments. This experience has led the PLA to adopt measures to improve protection of its soldiers and operations in a hostile environment while reevaluating its tolerance for risk. The PLA has not fought a land war since 1979, and its participation in UNPKO is one

of the ways it tests new equipment and improves its operational and logistical capabilities. The Chinese contingent has used the Malian mission to regularly conduct live-fire drills and test new weapons, such as infantry fighting vehicles and Type 95-1 assault rifles. As far as is known, no other nation's contingents are involved in these drills.

Despite the presence of French and UN peacekeepers, MINUSMA is still the most dangerous ongoing UN peacekeeping mission in the world, with 172 fatalities as of mid-2018. In Gao, China's MINUSMA contingent has acquired the experience of providing force protection on a small scale to a regional UN camp in a highly insecure environment. Some reports have underscored the fact that Chinese peacekeepers, while cultivating an image of strict discipline and professionalism, have remained largely risk averse, rarely adventuring outside of their base except when holding drills and, not unlike most UN peacekeepers, having little contact with the local population.

There are good reasons for the Chinese contingent's caution, however. Armed groups have carried out dozens of mortar attacks on the Chinese base. On May 31, 2016, one Chinese soldier was killed and five others were injured when a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device was detonated.¹¹ In response, the Chinese camp strengthened its protection walls and equipped itself with a radar-based system capable of detecting rockets or mortars launched up to 10 kilometers (6 miles) away.

China has become even more risk averse since the 2016 attack, reducing any operation or exercise to Gao and its surroundings. The more-dangerous-than-expected Malian environment has therefore, ironically, limited what PLA soldiers can learn militarily from their participation in MINUSMA. China's operational role has been further limited by French counterterrorism forces—part of Operation Barkhane—focused on keeping the rebels out of northern Mali. For example, China's mine clearance efforts have been taken over by French troops who, wary of intelligence leaks, do not allow PLA soldiers to operate in areas under their control. As a result, China's units now primarily build infrastructure and take care of casualties.

Working with other nations' peacekeepers and overcoming language barriers

Second, the Chinese contingent of MINUSMA is learning to work with other UN contingents and to operate in a non-Chinese-language environment. The PLA's military culture of independence and secrecy makes cooperation with other countries' militaries difficult, as does the language barrier. In Mali, as in other countries, Chinese peacekeepers tend to interact more frequently and easily with peacekeepers from other developing countries rather than contingents from the West.¹² This attitude stems partly from China's diplomatic principles, partly from the identity it still claims as a developing country, and partly from its focus on South-South relations.

Given the multinational composition of UN peacekeeping missions, Chinese peacekeepers are compelled to communicate better and cooperate with other contingents, including those from Western countries. These interactions are also a way for China to reach out to other countries' militaries and develop closer relations with them.

The Chinese medical unit in Gao is based near Dutch UN troops, which has encouraged contacts between the two contingents. PLA soldiers also interact with elements of France's parallel counterterrorism mission. Moreover, Chinese peacekeeping officers deployed in Mali are willing to learn from developed countries' military experience and knowledge of African terrains and have shown a genuine interest in training some of their contingents in European countries, such as France. However, such trainings have not yet taken place, despite the readiness of European countries to explore their feasibility. On a lighter note, the Chinese contingent in Gao has participated in soccer matches with UN contingents, as well as with French and Malian troops.

As in the Democratic Republic of Congo (since 2008) and Haiti (since 2004), the PLA contingent in Mali is working in a UNPKO mission where the primary language is French. This has been a real challenge for the PLA, which has relatively few French speakers and interpreters. However, China can gradually capitalize on its experience in Mali and be better prepared to send future peacekeepers to any other French-speaking African country.

Bolstering China's image in Africa

Third, the PLA contingent has learned that increased engagement with local society is necessary to boost China's image, diplomatic outreach, and soft power. In most UNPKO missions, China's peacekeepers interact with the local communities by providing medical services to those in need. However, in Mali, Chinese peacekeepers have struggled to connect with the local population. Due to language and cultural barriers, many Malians are more trusting of the services provided by French and other Western medical teams.¹³ The Chinese medical detachment has proactively tried to build better relations with the local population around Gao by providing medical support to numerous schools and by helping rescue and treat victims of attacks such as the car bombing at the Malian military camp in January 2017.¹⁴

Strengthening ties with local militaries

Fourth, China's participation in MINUSMA has provided Beijing with an opportunity to strengthen its relationship and cooperation with the local military. China has never been a key weapons supplier to Mali, but since China's participation in MINUSMA the two countries have strengthened military ties. In May 2014, China donated military equipment worth five billion Central African francs (\$10.4 million) to the Malian armed forces. In December 2014, China delivered another CFA 1.6 billion (\$3 million) in supplies, mainly uniforms and shoes. Another donation valued at CFA 1.8 billion (\$2.9 million), including equipment to protect against improvised explosive devices, occurred in November 2016.¹⁵

In November 2015, then defense minister Tieman Coulibaly visited China and met with General Fan Changlong, the vice chairman of China's Central Military Commission, who promised to deepen military ties between the countries.¹⁶ A Chinese military delegation headed by Political Commissar Major General Jing Xianfang visited Mali in August 2017 to inspect work carried out by the PLA to improve the transmission system of the Malian armed forces' General Headquarters and the Directorate of Transmissions and Telecommunications.¹⁷ In October 2017, Harbin Aircraft Industry delivered two Y-12 transport aircrafts to the Malian Air Force.¹⁸ As with many other African countries, every year China invites a handful of Malian military officers to receive short-term training at China's National Defense University. In August 2016, on the occasion of the visit to Mali of Rear Admiral Guan Youfei, director of the Office for International Military Cooperation in the Central Military Commission, both sides agreed to strengthen personnel training.¹⁹

This increased military cooperation has been the clear result of China's participation in MINUSMA. Despite these overtures, however, Mali continues to privilege its military partnerships with France, and the West in general. According to data compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, between 2013 and 2017 Mali imported \$53 million of armaments, including \$23 million worth from Russia, \$12 million from Spain, and \$7 million from France. Mali imported just \$5 million in arms from China—the same amount as from Bulgaria.

Building domestic support for China's UN peacekeeping role

Lastly, China has learned the importance of an active communications campaign to convince its domestic audience of the value of China's growing role in UN peacekeeping. After the

May 2016 attack, the Chinese government confronted at home a more vocal public, who sometimes questioned the rationale and risks of China's participation in peacekeeping missions. Since it began participating in UNPKO in 1992, China has suffered eighteen fatalities, including three in Cambodia (1992–93), four in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake, three in Liberia since 2003, two in South Sudan in 2016, and one in Mali in 2016.

In light of the increased risk and heightened public scrutiny, the Chinese government has taken a more active stance in promoting the contributions of China's peacekeepers and the importance of UNPKO for China's international standing and image. In particular, the Chinese authorities have used these deaths to stir up nationalism, underscore China's great power responsibilities, and promote the need to accept sacrifices, including loss of life, to a Chinese public whose attention is increasingly focused on money and consumption. The success of movies such as *Wolf Warrior 2*, in which the lead character, a former PLA special forces officer, takes on rebels attempting to overthrow an unnamed African nation's government, suggests that the government has had some success in shaping the discourse on the issue and shoring up support for Chinese participation in UN peacekeeping operations.

Toward a More Assertive Chinese Engagement in Africa

China's participation in MINUSMA is ongoing. Nonetheless, the Chinese military has already drawn some lessons from this deployment that have influenced the behavior of its peacekeepers in other contexts, such as South Sudan.

China's participation in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan has a number of similarities with MINUSMA. In South Sudan, as in Mali, the environment in which PLA combat troops are deployed, has remained largely unstable and dangerous, and the Chinese contingent has suffered several casualties, triggering a strong outcry from the public in China. However, while the armed conflict in Mali is concentrated in the north of the country and does not affect the UN's cooperation with the Malian government, in South Sudan two major liberation movements and armies are competing for power in a conflict that has engulfed the whole of the newly created nation in a prolonged civil war. This has complicated the role and operations of Chinese and other UN peacekeepers there.

Consequently, after two of China's peacekeepers were killed in July 2016, shortly after the fatalities and casualties in Mali in May of that year, Chinese peacekeepers have become even more risk averse in South Sudan. This may help explain why PLA peacekeepers in South Sudan were accused, in an October 2016 report by the Center for Civilians in Conflict, of staying in their base and refusing to protect civilians on at least two occasions.²⁰

This more cautious approach is a setback for a Chinese peacekeeping force that has made efforts to increase its contacts with the local population. In particular, the Chinese police force, as part of a UN Formed Police Unit, has been involved in search operations in UN Protection of Civilians sites, patrols, and press and information duties—efforts that led to the group being awarded medals, in December 2017, for “their commitment and service to the UN and the people of South Sudan.”²¹ And in January 2018, Chinese peacekeepers were involved in a tense standoff with armed militants as they were trying to protect civilians.²² But the ongoing civil war, by complicating China's effort to reach out to the local population, means that contacts have remained irregular.

China's decision in South Sudan and Mali to deploy combat contingents under the UN banner has been well received internationally and has reinforced China's desire to play a more robust role in global security, especially in Africa. China is prioritizing regional stability and battling Islamist extremism on the continent and is more willing to cooperate with France and other powers to achieve those goals.

China's peacekeeping deployments in Mali and South Sudan are part of the broader trend of Beijing's increased support for UN peacekeeping operations. At a September 2015 speech at the UN General Assembly in New York, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced plans to create a standing peacekeeping police force and build a peacekeeping rapid-deployment standby force of eight thousand troops. Xi also pledged to provide \$100 million in financial assistance for the creation of an African Union standby force to enhance the organization's capacity to respond to crises. In September 2017, a Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman announced that the standby force had been registered at the UN, but he also indicated that China was still negotiating with the AU to draft the implementation plan for the assistance expected to be delivered by this force.²³ No additional information has been published since then, although China's deeper involvement in Africa's security has been confirmed by the Forum on China Africa Cooperation summit held in Beijing in early September 2018.²⁴

China's increased willingness to support UNPKO and enhance China's security role in Africa has had important benefits for both China's bilateral relations with African countries and its relations with the AU. The PLA's establishment of a military logistical base in Djibouti, in August 2017, is part of China's effort to become more involved in Africa's security and to better protect Chinese nationals and interests there. Some of its two thousand personnel stationed in Djibouti have already conducted drills in the nearby desert. The Djibouti base, which can house up to ten thousand troops, will also help the PLA better supply and rotate its UN peacekeepers deployed in Africa and the Middle East.

Conclusion

China's growing participation in UN peacekeeping operations, particularly in Africa, has two major implications. First, it is a way for Beijing to demonstrate that it cares about Africa's security, peace, and stability, and not just raw materials, infrastructure projects, and markets. Second, it underscores China's willingness to play a leading role in the UN's peacekeeping operations, both financially and organizationally, with the ambition of sooner or later having Chinese representatives assume leadership positions within the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

Sticking to a cautious—and limited—embrace of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, China is not showing signs that it wants to change the existing norms of UN peacekeeping interventions and operations. Nevertheless, in exerting a larger influence in UN peacekeeping, China may one day seek to more vigorously promote a world order based on protecting sovereignty rather than expanding R2P—and giving priority to stabilizing sometimes-embattled authorities rather than pushing for regime change.

Notes

1. Adam Nossiter and Eric Schmitt, "France Battling Islamists in Mali," *New York Times*, January 11, 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/01/12/world/africa/mali-islamist-rebels-france.html.
2. "History," United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, <https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/history>.
3. For more on R2P, see United Nations General Assembly, "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General," January 12, 2009, www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/SG_report/A_63_677_en.pdf.
4. Courtney J. Fung, "China and the Responsibility to Protect: From Opposition to Advocacy," Peace Brief no. 205 (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, June 2016), www.usip.org/publications/2016/06/china-and-responsibility-protect-opposition-advocacy.
5. "Statement by Ambassador Wang Min at the Security Council Open Debate on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN, June 11, 2014, www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/t1168830.htm.
6. Ministry of Defense of the People's Republic of China, "Chinese Peacekeeping Forces Will Perform Such Tasks as Security Guards in Mali" [in Chinese], June 27, 2013, www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2013-06/27/content_4458431.htm.

ISBN: 978-1-60127-739-8

An online edition of this and related reports can be found on our website (www.usip.org), together with additional information on the subject.

7. United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 2100 (2013)," April 25, 2013, www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/documents/mali%20_2100_E_.pdf.
8. "MINUSMA Fact Sheet," United Nations Peacekeeping, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma>.
9. Xinhua, "China to Send 395 Peacekeepers to Mali," April 19, 2018, http://xinhuanet.com/english/018-04/19/c_137120762.htm.
10. *ChinaMil*, "Chinese Peacekeepers Help with Rescue after Mali Car Bomb Attack," January 23, 2017, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-01/23/content_7464524.htm.
11. Xinhua, "Chinese Peacekeeper's Body Brought Home from Mali," *China Daily Asia*, June 9, 2016, www.chinadailyasia.com/nation/2016-06/09/content_15446845.html.
12. Frans Paul van der Putten, "China's Evolving Role in Peacekeeping and African Security: The Deployment of Chinese Troops for UN Force Protection in Mali," Clingendael Report, (The Hague: Clingendael Institute, September 2015), www.clingendael.org/publication/chinas-evolving-role-peacekeeping-and-african-security.
13. Mathieu Duchâtel, Richard Gowan, and Manuel Lafont Rapnouil, "Into Africa: China's Global Security Shift," Policy Brief (London: European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2016), www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/into_africa_chinas_global_security_shift.
14. Xinhua, "UN says China peacekeepers make crucial contribution in Mali," November 13, 2015, www.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-11/13/c_134813044.htm.
15. Dollar values in this and following passages are based on the approximate CFA-USD exchange rate at the time of the transaction. *Bamada.net*, "Coopération Militaire: La Chine Donne un Bel Exemple," May 17, 2014, www.bamada.net/cooperation-militaire-la-chine-donne-un-bel-exemple; Issa Kaba, "Coopération Militaire Sino-Malienne: Des Équipements de 1,6 Milliards de FCFA pour les FAMA," *Maliactu.net*, December 10, 2014, www.maliactu.net/mali-cooperation-militaire-sino-malienne-des-equipements-de-16-milliards-de-fcfa-pour-les-fama; Xinhua, "La Chine Offre au Mali du Matériel et des Équipements Militaires," *MaliJet.co*, November 24, 2016, www.maliJet.co/politique/cooperation/la-chine-offre-au-mali-du-materiel-et-des-equipements-militaires.
16. Xinhua, "China, Mali pledge to Deepen Military Cooperation," November 19, 2015, www.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-11/19/c_134834589.htm.
17. *MaliWeb*, "Visite de la Délégation Chinoise: La Coopération Militaire Sino-Malienne Se Renforce Davantage," August 29, 2017, www.maliweb.net/armee/visite-de-delegation-chinoise-cooperation-militaire-sino-malienne-se-renforce-davantage-2507342.html.
18. *DefenseWeb*, "President Keita Inspects Mali Air Force's New Aircraft," October 5, 2017, www.defencenweb.co.za/index.php?article&id=49476.
19. *ChinaMil*, "Malian Defense Minister Meets with Chinese Military Delegation," August 12, 2016, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-08/16/content_7210210.htm.
20. See *Under Fire: The July 2016 Violence in Juba and UN Response* (Washington, DC: Center for Civilians in Conflict, 2016), www.civiliansinconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/civic-juba-violence-report-october-2016.pdf.
21. United Nations Peacekeeping, "Chinese Police Peacekeepers Awarded UN Medal in South Sudan," December 1, 2017, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/chinese-police-peacekeepers-awarded-un-medal-south-sudan>.
22. Kristin Huang, "Chinese Peacekeepers in Tense Stand-Off with Armed Militants in South Sudan," January 6, 2018, www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2127140/chinese-peacekeepers-tense-stand-armed-militants-south.
23. *Global Times*, "China to Offer \$100m in Military Aid to African Union in Next 5 Years," September 28, 2017, www.globaltimes.cn/content/1068735.shtml.
24. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2019-2022)," September 5, 2018, www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1593683.shtml.

Of Related Interest

- *South Sudan's Civil War and Conflict Dynamics in the Red Sea* by Payton Knopf (Special Report, September 2018)
- *The Role of UN Peacekeeping in China's Expanding Strategic Interests* by Marc Lanteigne (Special Report, September 2018)
- *Nigeria's 2019 Elections: Change, Continuity, and the Risks to Peace* by Aly Verjee, Chris Kwaja, and Oge Onubogu (Special Report, September 2018)
- *The Intersection of China's Commercial Interests and Nigeria's Conflict Landscape* by Matthew T. Page (Special Report, September 2018)
- *Libya's Next Elections: A Step Forward or a Step Back?* by Alexander A. Decina with contributions from Darine El Hage and Nathaniel L. Wilson (Peaceworks, August 2018)



UNITED STATES
INSTITUTE OF PEACE
Making Peace Possible

2301 Constitution Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20037
www.usip.org

