We spoke to USIP President Richard Solomon about U.S.-China relations, 40 years after "the week that changed the world," the major visit of President Richard Nixon to China.

Richard H. Solomon has been president of the United States Institute of Peace since 1993 and has overseen its growth into a center of international conflict management analysis and applied programs.

Dr. Solomon participated in the opening of relations with China in 1971-72 as a member of Henry Kissinger's National Security Staff. He provided analytical inputs and speech drafts in support of President Nixon's pathbreaking trip to Beijing in February 1972, and in subsequent years helped develop cultural and economic relations as part of the process of normalizing relations with the People's Republic. In 1990-91, as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, he worked with Chinese officials and the United Nations Security Council in developing the Cambodia peace agreement. In February 2012, he was asked to deliver a keynote presentation [pdf] to the Shanghai Institute of International Studies and Fudan University on his assessment of the U.S.-China relationship 40 years after President Nixon opened of relations. Following is a series of questions and answers based on the Shanghai presentation.

 

Q:  With the benefit of hindsight and history, and the knowledge of where U.S.-China relations are today, how do you assess the relationship between our two countries?
A: The relationship between the United States and China today is, what I call, “strategically ambiguous.” We are neither adversaries nor allies.  We compete economically even as we are bound together by market access and financing.  There are limited areas of cooperation on many international issues, yet significant areas of disagreement on how to handle issues such as territorial disputes in the South China Sea to nuclear proliferation. What is important to underscore is that we are two major powers whose relationship will have profound impact, either for good or ill, on the rest of the world.  Our fundamental challenge is to manage that relationship - its challenges and opportunities - to everyone’s benefit.

 
Q: So how does one go about managing a complex relationship like this one and what can the U.S. do to minimize the prospects for a return to confrontation?
A: This is an issue that requires a shared interest on the part of Chinese leaders; it cannot be a unilateral effort. But I would stress three approaches the U.S. should pursue – apart from the fundamental of getting our own economic house in order.  First is the necessity to vigorously engage China on the sources of economic tension – primarily the shared concern with “jobs, jobs, jobs.” The specific issues currently on the bilateral economic agenda affect jobs in both countries. Engagement with China on these issues can at least “contain” problems if not resolve them.  We can build cooperation on the basis of China’s own interests in sustaining access to foreign markets and capital, protecting intellectual property, and jointly working issues that can only be resolved through cooperative endeavors.  The Chinese, for their own domestic stability, need an open international trading environment – even as they make the slow transition from export led growth to an economy with diversified foreign markets and heightened domestic consumption. And for effective management of China’s global economic impact, as the economist Fred Bergsten has stressed, we should develop and strengthen multilateral fora for dispute management and collective approaches to economic growth – The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, or the now-forming Trans-Pacific Partnership.  
 
Second, there are the territorial disputes over the East and South China Sea and the issue of Taiwan’s future. Turf conflicts are the issues over which countries go to war; and failure to resolve Taiwan’s future relationship with the mainland peacefully is the most likely source of a breakdown in the U.S.-China relationship. Over the past four decades there has been a remarkably positive evolution in cross-Strait relations. What had been a military confrontation derivative of China’s civil war has now evolved into increasingly constructive economic and social dealings between the island and the mainland. There is even open political communication between leaders in Taipei and Beijing. The challenge to all three parties involved is to facilitate further demilitarization, and for the U.S. to do what it can to encourage a political settlement acceptable to both Beijing and Taipei. China now designates Taiwan as a “zizhiqu,” a self-governing territory. If reality were given to this conception, there could be a favorable evolution of the current situation. The most costly outcome for all concerned, of course, would be an escalation of political tensions and a return to military confrontation. 
 
The third element of managing the U.S.-China relationship should be the construction of a positive agenda of economic and security cooperation. This would maximize the benefits to both sides of normal relations. Energy security, access to raw materials, counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, sea lane security, the impact of climate change, and many other international issues cannot be dealt with as zero-sum challenges.
 
 
Q:  Does China trust U.S. intentions? Does it really want a stable relationship with the U.S.?
A: The Chinese highly value their national independence, and hold significant distrust of U.S. intentions. They see a multipolar world of diverse and independent power centers. Collaborative relationships, much less formal coalitions or alliances, are beyond the historical experience and sense of national pride of the inheritors of the Middle Kingdom. The hope for a constructive future for China is in the country’s increasingly close integration into the world economy, and the transformative effects of returning students and openness to global communication. These factors will be a powerful force for social change. The late 19th century Chinese who led the “self strengthening” movement argued that China could adopt foreign technologies while retaining the integrity of its culture. I believe modernization will produce dramatic changes in China’s approach to the world, even as the sense of nationalism will remain strong. 
 
Finally, there is one critical factor largely beyond American influence – China’s internal stability and how its own party politics play out. Can one-party rule be sustained? This issue relates to how china grapples with a new force that is already producing political change in other parts of the world:  mass publics mobilized by the information revolution and social networking. China’s politics will no longer be controlled “just from the top down.” Public pressure “from the bottom up” will be a major force for change.  Even though uncertainty and suspicions abound, China does, in my view, want a stable relationship with the United States.  The current interest in Chinese leaders in commemorating the 40th anniversary of the historic Nixon trip is but one indicator of their interest in sustaining positive relations with us.

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