John Park, a senior program officer who directs USIP's Korea Working Group, examines what North Korea's planned long-range missile test reveals about the hermit nation and what the after effects will be for the key parties.

April 12, 2012

John Park, a senior program officer who directs USIP's Korea Working Group, examines what North Korea's planned long-range missile test reveals about the hermit nation and what the after effects will be for the key parties.

In the lead up to the failed missile test, North Korean officials framed it as a "satellite launch" to commemorate the centenary of Kim Il-sung's birth. North Korea's neighbors viewed it as a provocative long-range missile test from the beginning. The North Korean leadership's decision to proceed with the test – cognizant that it would lead to the collapse of the recently concluded "Leap Day" Agreement with the U.S. – raises the question of who's really making the decisions in Pyongyang.

 

From this perspective, what does the test tell us about post-Kim Jong-il North Korea?

In Chinese, the ideogram for "crisis" denotes both danger and opportunity. In one respect, the missile test posed the immediate danger of debris falling into busy maritime sea lanes and on populated islands had it proceeded over the South China Sea. It also posed a growing threat in terms of providing more technical data that would help the North Koreans move closer to weaponizing their stockpile of nuclear warheads.

On the other hand, the missile test offers three distinct opportunities. The first is a window through which we can gain further insights into China-North Korea relations. Despite recent North Korean provocations, there are no signs that Beijing is trying to seriously reign in its North Korean ally. Rather it appears that the Communist Party of China is seeking to deepen its institution-building activities with the Workers' Party of Korea in an effort to shore up stability on a more sustainable basis. Concerned about a fragile post-Kim Jong-il leadership structure, China is more hesitant than before to join any collective effort like sanctions that may tip the regime into collapse. Cognizant of this Chinese fear, Pyongyang appears to be emboldened to carry out more provocations. 

The second opportunity is the ability for the U.S. to frame North Korea as a threat to international safety – especially as the U.N. Security Council now deliberates on a response to the missile test. Earlier efforts to generate international support in dealing with North Korea as a threat to international security have been difficult as many countries did not assess North Korea's nuclear weapons or ballistic missile programs as directed at them. In light of the fact that this missile test's declared final debris field had been near the Philippines – but could have strayed into other Southeast Asian countries – the U.S. can make a convincing case that North Korea's continued long-range missile testing could result in accidents involving loss of life and damage to property. Such an approach could result in a larger and more diverse grouping of countries joined in a collective effort to address North Korea's danger to international safety.

The third opportunity is to test North Korean intentions. While many U.S. analysts now view the Leap Day Agreement as a waste of U.S. political capital, it clearly shows to previous skeptics in the international community how North Korea ranks its priorities. Instead of freezing its nuclear and missile development activities in return for 240,000 metric tons of nutritional assistance for vulnerable groups, the North Korean leadership proceeded with the launch. Development of the North Korean regime's ballistic missile capability ranks higher than feeding its people.

 

How will the missile test affect North Korea, the United States, South Korea and Japan?

The U.S. has reaffirmed that it will suspend the nutritional assistance component of the "Leap Day" Agreement now that North Korea has gone ahead with the missile launch. North Korea is likely to be subject to another round of sanctions, either from the UN Security Council or various countries' national initiatives. The world's most heavily sanctioned country will receive more layers of sanctions in the aftermath of this missile test. 

The U.S., South Korea and Japan are likely to expand the development of their missile defense capabilities as a result of North Korea's missile launch. North Korea's 1998 long-range missile test sparked a significant increase in Japanese military spending on missile defense. It was also the key event that cleared the way in the U.S. Senate for deploying the national missile defense system we have today. The 2006 missile test contributed to another round of military developments in the region. Going forward, there will be more joint military exercises and coordination among U.S. allies to prepare for future North Korean missile tests. A key argument that senior U.S. officials have raised in meetings with their Chinese counterparts is that if Beijing does not do more to use its influence and leverage to prevent future North Korean missile tests, there will be continued expansion of trilateral military capabilities – a development that Beijing is eager to avoid.

The unintended consequence of responses to this North Korean provocation is a militarized Asia-Pacific region that will exacerbate a preexisting conviction in Beijing that the U.S. and its allies are intent on containing the rise of China.

 

How is USIP contributing to efforts to prevent conflict on the Korean Peninsula?

Although security, political, economic, and environmental challenges are growing more complex in the region, the U.S. and its Northeast Asian counterparts increasingly lack the capacity for sustained analysis, development, and implementation of policy approaches to prevent conflicts. Cognizant of this trend, USIP launched and convenes recurring Track 1.5 policy dialogues – like the Korea Working Group – with current and former policymakers and advisers. They facilitate three goals: a deeper understanding of complex policy issues, early direct crisis communication, and the development of prevention initiatives and strategies. By generating feedback on early-stage policy proposals developed and discussed in USIP's Track 1.5 meetings, we have been able to increase the likelihood of traction of these proposals at the Track 1 level.

North Korean rocket trajectory and splashdown areas

Map courtesy of the U.N. International Maritime Organization

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