Institute Newsbyte.

This week, the parliament met for the first time in Pristina, Kosovo, to select a president and to begin forming a government. Though its final status remains uncertain, Kosovo is heading down the path towards self-governance. The United States and the European Union have bet heavily on establishing democracy in Kosovo. What are the prospects for this outcome?

The first "free and fair" multi-party parliamentary elections ever held in Kosovo were conducted under the supervision of the international administration on November 17. Less than two and a half years after the end of the NATO-Yugoslavia war and more than a year after municipal elections held in October 2000, the parliamentary elections were intended to establish the framework for substantial autonomy and meaningful self-government as set down in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. Although the United Nations retain substantial powers, the formation of parliament and the selection of a president and prime minister starts the process of Kosovo self-governance.

On Thursday, December 7, 2001, the U.S. Institute of Peace organized a Balkans Working Group meeting to discuss next steps in post-election Kosovo. Although the discussion was off the record and not for attribution, this Newsbyte summarizes its main points.

 

Despite Insecurity for Serbs, the Elections Were Successful

The elections should be deemed a success by virtue of the following criteria:

  • Turnout: due to a major outreach effort, the registered electorate this year cast 100,000 more ballots than it did last year. Overall, however the vote was down from 79 percent in last year election to 65 percent in this year's.
  • Serb participation: of those residing in Kosovo 47 percent voted, among those displaced to Serbia, 57 percent voted.
  • Violence: virtually no political violence occurred during the election period.
  • Complaints: on election day last year, 127 complained; only 44 complained this year, and no one disputed the results.
  • Inclusivity: women represent 28 percent of parliamentary deputies; Serbs, 18 percent--the third largest group in Parliament; other minorities, 2.6 percent.

Although international supervision will be needed through next year's municipal elections, the electoral process is helping to turn Kosovo from violence to politics.

 

Coalition Government, but How Wide?

The proportional electoral system applied in Kosovo, which reserved some seats for Serbs and other minorities, was designed to stimulate coalition formation. With 46 percent, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) received the largest percentage of votes. LDK leader Ibrahim Rugova is widely expected to be chosen by the parliament as Kosovo's president, but his party will not be able to govern alone. Rugova's rival, Hashim Thaci and his Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), polled second, with 26 percent of the vote, but the LDK and PDK have a sometimes history of violent competition. A coalition consisting of the LDK and Ramush Haradinaj's Alliance for the Future of Kosovo, which polled third amongst ethnic Albanian parties with 8 percent, is also possible. Minorities other than Serbs are expected to join whatever coalition is formed. The LDK is unlikely to form a coalition with the Serbs. One ministry is to be reserved respectively for the Serbs and for other minorities.

Some working group participants thought Kosovo would benefit from leadership by a relatively narrow coalition led by the LDK. Such an arrangement would leave a major Albanian party in loyal opposition, presumably the PDK. Other participants preferred a "grand coalition," comprising all the parties and ethnic groups.

 

Can it Govern?

The UN governing presence in Kosovo, UNMIK, will pass to the new Kosovo government 70-80 percent of the government functions it now currently exercises. The Special Representative of the Secretary General, however, will retain substantial residual powers, including veto power and control over security, the judiciary, and the budget. Retaining authority over the budget will doubtless frustrate the new government, since the parliament will have the authority to create programs but not the authority to fund them.

Key obstacles to effective self-governance include:

  • Lack of experience with political pluralism;
  • Efforts by some in Belgrade to reestablish its authority;
  • Bad blood between Albanian and Serb parliamentarians stemming from the Serb dissolution of Kosovo's Albanian-dominated parliament in 1990;
  • International reluctance to allow the parliament to make its own mistakes; and
  • Security for Serb members of parliament.

 

Meanwhile Europe appears more reluctant than the United States to allow the new government full powers of self-governance. Foot-dragging on this issue will lead to severe tensions between the Kosovo and UNMIK.

The main challenges for the parliament include:

  • Gaining the above residual authorities from UNMIK;
  • Drawing a road map to a reach a decision about Kosovo's final status; and
  • Opening a dialogue and developing a relationship with Belgrade.

It was also suggested that the new government establish an office in Washington.

 

Independence, on the Table, But Off the Agenda

Despite Rugova's immediate post-election declaration of the goal of independence, the Albanians know that final status will not be decided by the parliament. Polls show that the electorate give immediate priority to jobs and education. But because Albanians view the process of self-government and democratic institution building as earning Kosovo's independence, the possibility of independence must remain on the table. If that hope is extinguished, violence will again erupt.

The international community's policy of deliberate ambiguity and the need to settle Kosovo's final status creates political tensions between the two and sets up practical contradictions that inhibit good governance. This ambiguity has already caused problems for privatization and will make it difficult for Kosovo to establish the relationships it needs for trade and investment as well as border controls with its neighbors.

In the past, the Balkans, in general, and Kosovo, in particular, have been managed by "crisis diplomacy." Future efforts in the region should focus on establishing stability and eliminating uncertainty. Developing a framework for an eventual settlement on a regional basis would help avoid a return to crisis diplomacy. There are no ideal solutions--independence efforts may lead to partition, which in turn could lead to further conflict. With the assistance of the international community, Belgrade and Pristina will have to negotiate a final status. Doubtless it will be a difficult process, which will require further democratization in both capitals and involve acknowledging mutual past wrongs.

The United States must not cede the final status issue to Europe, which would be tempted to sweep it under the rug or worse. Especially after September 11, the United States should remain engaged in an issue of great importance to a secular, pro-Western and largely Muslim community. Moreover in light of the potential for further instability in southern Serbia and in Macedonia, the United States needs to ensure a satisfactory outcome for Kosovo.

 

The United States Institute of Peace is mandated by Congress to strengthen the nation's capabilities to promote the peaceful resolution of international conflict.

The views summarized here reflect the discussion at the meeting; they do not represent formal positions taken by the Institute, which does not advocate specific policies.

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