While conditions on the ground deteriorate and diplomatic options narrow, the wins claimed by each side do nothing to advance peace and, in fact, may lead to disaster. It is not the case that nothing can be done. If each side steps back and reconsiders its position in the cold light of reality, a retreat from the brink and a path forward to peace is still possible. But that will require setting aside what have become illusory assessments of their own strategic and tactical successes. For now, unfortunately, there is no movement in that direction by any of the actors.

The Palestinians

On January 28, 2020, President Donald Trump launched his “Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People.” As anticipated, the Palestinians rejected the plan outright, citing its divergence from parameters for resolving the conflict long held by the international community. Days after its release, an extraordinary meeting of the Arab League yielded a firm rejection of the plan and full support for the Palestinian position. The Arab League meeting was soon followed by a similar declaration from both the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the African Union. Russia, too, criticized the plan, and the European Union was neither supportive nor critical—signaling member states’ inability to reach a unified position. Furthermore, the Palestinians latched on optimistically to signs of potential partisan disagreement in the United States over the vision offered by the Trump plan.

These developments and positions may have heartened Palestinian leaders, but they also created a false sense of assurance that the Palestinians have unshakable support in holding the line against the Trump vision. At the outset many Arab states cautiously welcomed the U.S. effort and urged the parties to return to the negotiating table under American leadership. These same Arab actors also called for the conflict to be resolved in accordance with international legitimacy—code for the generally accepted terms of reference for resolving the conflict—and stressed that a resolution should be achieved in accordance with the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API), the tenets of which are in direct contradiction of the U.S. plan. Still, most Arab states articulated some support for the idea of a renewed diplomatic effort to resolve the conflict.

One could argue that an initially muted Arab stance toward the plan merely reflects reluctance to directly challenge or antagonize the U.S. president. There is certainly merit to this point, and the Arab states won’t back down, in the foreseeable future, from commitment to the API principles. But it is also notable that while the Palestinian cause still resonates in the Arab world, regional actors—with the possible exception of Jordan—have increasingly deprioritized the Palestinian issue in relation to more pressing national security concerns. As such, the Palestinian leadership must recognize that even vocal support for their rejection of the plan does not translate into any practical advancement of the Palestinian cause.

Israel

In Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu celebrated the Trump administration’s plan, describing it as a historic opportunity. Addressing the AIPAC Policy Conference in Washington on March 1, he said the administration’s “Deal of the Century is the opportunity of a century for Israel. It enables Israel to secure our vital security and our vital national interests by recognizing Israel’s sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and over the Jewish communities that flourish in the heart of our ancestral homeland.”

Netanyahu knows that the plan does not represent a package that the Palestinians can ever accept—it is not a roadmap to a bilateral peace. However, he did see the plan as a major development to be touted in weeks leading up to Israel’s March 2 election, and it may have helped him gain critical additional votes.

Netanyahu also knows that the annexation plans he is advocating—and which seem to be supported by the Trump administration—may have devastating repercussions.

Such a move could result in severing Israeli security coordination with the Palestinian Authority (PA), and even in the PA’s collapse. Furthermore, annexation would negatively affect Israeli-Jordanian relations that the King of Jordan recently described as at an “all-time low”; be yet another nail in the coffin of the failing two-state solution; and precipitate large-scale Palestinian and broader regional support for one bi-national state. For Israel’s self-defined long-term interests, the latter outcome signifies a march toward an uncomfortable decision point for the country: a one-state outcome, which by necessity becomes a choice between its Jewish and democratic identities.

Israel’s political establishment and voters generally have been moving rightward for years. Future Israeli governments will almost undoubtedly seek to advance the Trump plan’s vision or will be pressured to do so by the Israeli public. The result, unfortunately, may be to make the resolution of the conflict more difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.

The United States

Trump said that his peace plan “could be the last opportunity for a Palestinian state” as it provides for a “realistic two-state solution,” and offers a chance to achieve peace in light of realities on the ground. Jared Kushner, senior advisor to Trump, told a bipartisan group from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the international reaction to the plan was “encouraging.” He argued that there were signs the plan could still advance despite Palestinian rejection. Even after the plan was spurned by the Arab foreign ministers, administration officials indicated in private meetings that the response from the Arab world was much better than they expected.

As suggested above, however, the Arab response was multilayered. While Trump and Netanyahu celebrated the presence of three Arab ambassadors at the launching of the plan, days later–and in advance of the strong Arab League statement rejecting the plan—an Arab official stated that those envoys attendance was based on the U.S. providing incomplete information on the document’s contents. Moreover, the U.S. administration may not appreciate the extent to which many Arab countries are unwilling to confront the Trump administration at a time when they have more urgent priorities and when, above all, they firmly believe that this plan has no chance of achieving peace.

The U.S. administration, therefore, risks overestimating support for the plan, as well as the potential for its advancement. The administration may also be forcing the hand of Israeli leaders into positions which undermine Israeli security and long-term interests, while potentially straining relations with key allies, most notably Jordan.

Where do we go from here?

The conclusion that can be reached is that:

• The Palestinians are acting on the belief that they enjoy greater support than they actually have for confronting the plan, and that it will translate into practical steps to advance their cause.
• Israel is embracing as a win a plan that cannot lead to a peaceful settlement of the conflict or satisfaction of its long-term interests.
• The U.S. is acting on the false assumption that the plan has a realistic diplomatic path forward, undermining its potential to be a credible and effective mediator going forward.

For a resolution to this conflict to be a realistic prospect, these three actors will need to reset.

• The U.S. will need to rebalance its policy in order to regain the trust of the Palestinians and play a role that would result in a just and sustainable peace similar to its effort in achieving peace between Israel and both Egypt and Jordan.
• Israel will need to decide whether it is willing to sacrifice the prospect of peace and to compromise either its democratic system or Jewish character for short-term realization of maximalist positions on Palestinian sovereignty, territory, refugees, security and more. The next Israeli government will face decisions that will forever affect the state’s trajectory.
• Palestinian leaders will need to regain the credibility that they have all but lost in the eyes of the Palestinian people and Arab publics. They must take serious steps toward ending Palestinian political division; commit to holding elections and righting the ship toward good governance; and develop a proactive strategy to achieve these objectives and address their domestic and international challenges. Failure to do so may damage the Palestinian national movement in irredeemable ways.

These challenges come at a critical juncture, and these three actors complacently congratulate themselves at their own peril. While a full-scale resolution to the conflict is a near-term impossibility—especially in the midst of a multidimensional global pandemic and inhospitable politics—each must steer clear of antagonistic and potentially irreversible actions. Instead, they need to take confidence-building measures that can serve to rebuild goodwill. Such steps will enable all three to pull back from a mutually destructive point of no return. These are the times that forge leadership, and the kinds of tasks for which the Nobel Peace Prize was created to reward.