Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction

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United States Institute of Peace
United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute

Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction

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Section 1

Introduction

1.0 Context

Terrorists, transnational organized crime syndicates, local warring factions, warlords, and petty thieves have all found common cause in states and regions in conflict. This nexus of interests has grown in sophistication over the past decade, aided by money and technology and fueled by greed and fanaticism. Civilians have increasingly become the victims of violence fostered by this nexus. The required response is a comprehensive[1] one that brings together specialized organizations to stabilize extremely dangerous and hostile environments while laying the foundations for a sustainable peace. This journey is a continuum that nests stabilization[2] within conflict-sensitive development. Stabilization aims to prevent the renewal of violent conflict; conflict-sensitive development seeks to enable a long-lasting peace.

While some progress has been made over the years, the U.S. capability and those of its partners to leverage and coordinate adequate civilian and military assets for this journey still lags behind the current adaptive abilities of the enemies of peace. To address the capacity challenge in the United States, the Clinton administration issued Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD/NSC-56) in 1997, the first U.S. directive to provide for whole-of-government planning and execution.[3] Eight years later, the Bush administration issued National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44), another executive decision to bolster a whole-of-government response.[4]

Against this backdrop, thousands of U.S. government personnel from more than a dozen civilian agencies have deployed to more than a dozen stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) missions during the past two decades.[5] But the U.S. government does not engage in this business alone. It is but one player in a complex maze of peacebuilders working in increasingly harsh places like Afghanistan, the Congo, Somalia, Sudan, and Haiti. Indeed, sixty operations have been conducted under the auspices of the United Nations since 1948.[6] UN-led operations in 2009 have surged once again to an all-time high. Another signal is the doubling of operations mounted by regional organizations in the past decade.[7]

As global trends indicate, instability is likely to pose greater, and perhaps more numerous, challenges in the years to come.

> Statistical modeling shows that economic crises increase the risk of regime-threatening instability if they persist over a one- to two-year period. Besides increased economic nationalism, the most likely political fallout for US interests will involve

1. See Appendix E, Acronyms and Glossary of Selected Key Terms.
2. Ibid.
3. United States President, "United States Presidential Decision Directive 56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations," 1997.
4. United States President, "United States National Security Presidential Directive 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization," 2005.
5. This includes, but is not limited to, the U.S. Departments of State, Labor, Treasury, Justice, Homeland Security, Agriculture, Energy, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development and Transportation; and agencies including the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
6. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines,* 2008. Hereafter: UNDPKO, *Principles and Guidelines,* 2008.
7. International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations, *A Comparative Study on Doctrine and Principles for Multinational Peace Operations: A Case for Harmonization and Enhanced Interoperability,* 2007.

allies and friends not being able to fully meet their defense and humanitarian obligations.[8]

Dennis C. Blair
Director of National Intelligence
February 12, 2009

Learning how to succeed in these missions is one of the greatest challenges of the century.

1.1 Purpose

For the sake of comparison, the U.S. military is equipped with doctrine that guides its decisions and actions. This guidance is the basis for decision-making, planning, education, training, and implementation on the ground. Yet more than a decade after U.S. troops crossed the River Sava to help build peace in Bosnia and years after entering Afghanistan, *civilian* agencies of the U.S. government still lack any comprehensive strategic guidance. No guidance exists to inform decision makers, planners, or practitioners who deploy from civilian agencies to understand exactly *what* these missions are all about. In cloakrooms and conference rooms, in forward operating bases and humanitarian compounds, those who are engaged in these operations ask: *what* are we trying to achieve? The *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* is an attempt to fill this gap.

Each S&R mission is quite unique depending on the local context. There are, however, general "rules of the road" or "principles" that have emerged from decades of experience in these missions. These principles serve as a handrail for decision makers, planners and practitioners as they attempt to navigate through these challenging environments. For the first time, the *Guiding Principles* manual seeks to present strategic principles for all major activities in S&R missions in one place. It seeks to provide a foundation for decision makers, planners, and practitioners—both international and host nation—to construct priorities for specific missions.

1.2 Caveats

- The *Guiding Principles* manual bears no government stamp, nor has the U.S. government adopted it officially. It is offered as a strategic tool.
- The manual is not intended to replace any single agency's "doctrine," strategic guidance, or mission statements. It is intended to incorporate the major principles embedded in them.
- This document should be treated as a living document and should be revised as new lessons emerge, learning advances, new strategies are tested, and the multiple gaps are filled.
- The manual is not intended to prescribe priorities, but rather a comprehensive view of complex S&R missions.
- The *Guiding Principles* is not a panacea for the extreme political complexities and financial constraints of these missions. These constraints may force difficult trade-offs in implementation.

8. Dennis C. Blair, "Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2009).

1.3 Methodology

The manual rests on a comprehensive review of major strategic policy documents from state ministries of defense, foreign affairs, and development, along with major intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) that toil in war-shattered landscapes around the globe. The collection of documents[9] was built through consultations with dozens of major institutions and reviewed by a team of researchers over the course of a year and a half. It is extensive, but not exhaustive.

Many U.S. agencies, UN organizations, regional institutions and major foreign state partners and their respective agencies involved in these operations have had an opportunity to vet this manual.[10] It has been reviewed by a number of NGOs that are present before most missions deploy, during the mission, and after the peace is largely in the hands of the host nation.

1.4 Scope

The manual focuses on host nation outcomes, not programmatic inputs or outputs. It is focused primarily on what the host nation and international actors are trying to achieve, not how they are trying to achieve it at the tactical level. It is not about how to conduct an election or disarm warring parties—it is about the outcomes that these activities support. Excellent "how-to" guides already exist across the U.S. government and partner institutions. These should be accessed regularly and used diligently in the conduct of these missions.

1.4.1 Audience

The primary audience for the manual is U.S. government agencies engaged in S&R missions—principally their decision makers, planners, and practitioners. At the time of this writing, these agencies' contributions are coordinated under the leadership of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the U.S. Department of State (S/CRS).[11] Though not written specifically for U.S. partners and others who labor in these difficult environments, the manual may be of value to them as well since it is based in part on their good work. In the final analysis, it is intended to help host nations and victims of conflict rebuild shattered societies.

1.4.2 Boundaries

- ***Type of Mission.*** This manual deals with missions that involve helping a country move from violent conflict to peace. It is a mission requiring the presence of peacekeeping and peace enforcement forces and other peacebuilding institutions. The mission will have some international leadership governing the institutions deployed.[12] Finally, the mission should be guided by a mandate, preferably from the United Nations.
- ***Temporal Dimension.*** Many institutions align their objectives according to particular phases or time spans of a mission. For the purposes of this manual, the principles apply from the moment the need for an intervention is first recog-

9. See Appendix A, Resource List.
10. See Appendix B, Participants in Review Process.
11. United States Department of State, "Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization," www.state.gov/s/crs/.
12. The international leadership could be the United Nations, a lead nation, a coalition of nations, a regional organization, or some hybrid of these institutions.

nized through the time when the host nation can sustainably provide security and basic services to its population. Local conditions in the host country will determine the type and length of international engagement. Based on the last few decades of experience, it takes at least ten years to achieve this. A stroke of good fortune and diligent action can deliver the result in less time.

- ***Focus.*** Due to these deliberate boundaries, the manual does not attempt to address the development challenges that take generations to overcome. The focus here is on that unique, perilous stage where everything must be viewed through the lens of conflict. A focus on short-term objectives is essential to help the host nation get off life support and on a sustainable path to recovery. But to ensure coherence, these objectives must be nested within longer-term development goals.

1.5 Comprehensive Review of Frameworks: A Snapshot

In seeking to offer a common set of guidelines, the writers performed a canvas of major institutional frameworks for this document.[13] This comprehensive review hopes to act as a Rosetta stone for S&R missions by extracting and building upon what is common and highlighting, for the future, areas of divergence.

One area of divergence worth mentioning is the fine separation—both cultural and intellectual—between guidance focused on stabilization and peacekeeping and that written for long-term development. Ironically, the vetting process reveals that stabilizers need to understand principles for sustainable development, while the development community needs to understand how to apply conflict-sensitive approaches to S&R environments. The literature in both communities of practice is now slowly reflecting these imperatives. Another area of divergence involves terminology and definitions. The multiple institutions working side by side in S&R missions do not share either of these.

Perhaps the strongest point of convergence involves the major components of these missions, or what the U.S. government calls "technical sectors."[14] Almost all frameworks address security, political, economic, social and justice dimensions. That important agreement is the starting point for this document.[15]

To elevate this shared construct to the level of strategic guidance, the *Guiding Principles* manual translates these shared components into purpose-based end states:[16] a safe and secure environment, the rule of law, stable governance, a sustainable economy, and social well-being. End states represent the ultimate goals of a society emerging from conflict.[17] These conform to the technical sectors currently used by the U.S. government: security, justice and reconciliation, governance and participation, economic stabilization and infrastructure, and humanitarian assistance and social well-being.

13. See Appendix C, Summary of Strategic Frameworks Surveyed.
14. United States Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks, 2005.
15. See Appendix D, Snapshot of Components From Overarching Resources.
16. United States Army, *Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the U.S. Army, 2008). Hereafter: U.S. Army, *FM 3-07,* 2008.
17. Daniel P. Serwer and Patricia Thomson, "A Framework for Success: International Intervention in Societies Emerging from Conflict," in *Leashing the Dogs of War* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2008).

Guiding Principles End States	U.S. Government Technical Sectors
Safe and Secure Environment	Security
Rule of Law	Justice and Reconciliation
Stable Governance	Governance and Participation
Sustainable Economy	Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure
Social Well-Being	Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being

1.6 A Note to Readers

This is a relatively short document to describe a massive challenge. A comprehensive understanding of what the mission is trying to achieve is required for success. In order to appreciate the interdependence and linkages among all actors and all actions—host nation and international—this manual should be read in its entirety. It represents a step toward professionalization for those engaged in the complex art of stabilization and reconstruction.

Section 2

Strategic Framework for Stabilization and Reconstruction

2.0 The Strategic Framework for Stabilization and Reconstruction

The Strategic Framework for Stabilization and Reconstruction offers a comprehensive look at the complexity of these missions. Based on a comprehensive review of guidance, it provides a foundation from which to determine priorities with and based on the needs of the host nation. The framework below depicts the major *end states,* as well as the *necessary conditions* that should be established to achieve those end states. The framework also elevates a set of *cross-cutting principles* that applies to each and every actor and impacts each end state. This framework recognizes that the end states and their associated conditions cannot be pursued independently of one another. The overlapping circles underscore this interdependence.[18]



18. The development of this framework occurred over a two-step process. The U.S. Institute of Peace developed the "Framework for Success for Societies Emerging From Conflict" in 2006. In developing this manual, the objectives and sub-objectives were translated into conditions necessary to reach the core end states. This new construct is based on a review of hundreds of core strategic documents and a nine-month vetting process.

2.1 End States[19]

Below is a summary description of each end state, framed according to the perception of the host nation population, as they will be the final arbiters of whether peace has been achieved.

- **Safe and Secure Environment**
  Ability of the people to conduct their daily lives without fear of systematic or large-scale violence.
- **Rule of Law**
  Ability of the people to have equal access to just laws and a trusted system of justice that holds all persons accountable, protects their human rights and ensures their safety and security.
- **Stable Governance**
  Ability of the people to share, access or compete for power through nonviolent political processes and to enjoy the collective benefits and services of the state.
- **Sustainable Economy**
  Ability of the people to pursue opportunities for livelihoods within a system of economic governance bound by law.
- **Social Well-Being**
  Ability of the people to be free from want of basic needs and to coexist peacefully in communities with opportunities for advancement.

2.2 Cross-Cutting Principles

The following are high-level principles that should be applied by every person and to every activity that is conducted in support of the S&R mission. The division of labor into five core end states helps to focus and standardize actions based on decades of experience. But this division also neglects the big picture—the overarching guidance that cuts across every end state and affects every action of every individual:

- **Host Nation Ownership and Capacity**
- **Political Primacy**
- **Legitimacy**
- **Unity of Effort**
- **Security**
- **Conflict Transformation**
- **Regional Engagement**

19. See Appendix D, Snapshot of Components From Overarching Resources.

2.3 Structure of the Manual

The manual is structured according to the framework. Cross-cutting principles are presented in Section 3. Each end state corresponds with a dedicated section in the body of this manual. Each section includes descriptions for the necessary conditions, and the major approaches that have been used to establish those conditions based on decades of experience. Relevant trade-offs, gaps, and challenges[20] are also addressed at the end of each section.

20. See Appendix E.

Section 3

Cross-Cutting Principles



3.0 What are cross-cutting principles?

Cross-cutting principles apply to every actor across every end state—no matter who you are, international or local; where you are, in the UN Security Council or in a host nation municipality; or what you are doing, running a school or creating a new banking system. The principles are focused, according to the purpose of this manual, on outcomes. Legitimacy, for example, is an outcome of an untold number of actions. It is a cross-cutting principle that should guide all actions. Maintaining legitimacy is the responsibility of all actors in an S&R mission. The cross-cutting principles included here are discussed throughout the manual.

3.1 What are the key cross-cutting principles in an S&R environment?

- ***Host nation ownership and capacity*** means that the affected country must drive its own development needs and priorities even if transitional authority is in the hands of outsiders.[21] Ownership requires capacity, which often needs tremendous strengthening in S&R environments.
- ***Political primacy*** means that a political settlement is the cornerstone of a sustainable peace. Every decision and every action has an impact on the possibility of forging political agreement.
- ***Legitimacy*** has three facets: the degree to which the host nation population accepts the mission and its mandate or the government and its actions; the degree to which the government is accountable to its people; and the degree to which regional neighbors and the broader international community accept the mission mandate and the host nation government.
- ***Unity of effort*** begins with a shared understanding of the environment. It refers to cooperation toward common objectives over the short and long term, even when the participants come from many different organizations with diverse operating cultures.[22]
- ***Security*** is a cross-cutting prerequisite for peace. The lack of security is what prompts an S&R mission to begin with. Security creates the enabling environment for development.
- ***Conflict transformation*** guides the strategy to transform resolution of conflict from violent to peaceful means. It requires reducing drivers of conflict and strengthening mitigators across political, security, rule of law, economic, and social spheres, while building host nation capacity to manage political and economic competition through peaceful means.[23]
- ***Regional engagement*** entails encouraging the host nation, its neighboring countries, and other key states in the region to partner in promoting both the host nation's and the region's security and economic and political development. It has three components: comprehensive regional diplomacy, a shared regional vision, and cooperation.

21. United States Agency for International Development, "Nine Principles of Development and Reconstruction," 2005. http://www.usaid.gov/policy/2005_nineprinciples.html, accessed July 2009.
22. U.S. Army, *FM 3-07*, 2008.
23. United States Department of State and United States Joint Forces Command, *United States Government Draft Planning Framework for Stabilization, Reconstruction and Conflict Transformation,* 2005.

3.2 Why is it necessary to fulfill these cross-cutting principles?

S&R missions are messy and complex endeavors involving thousands, if not millions, of moving parts. The same principles that guide one individual charged with implementing a political settlement must guide another who is responsible for operating a transitional prison system to achieve peace.

3.3 Host Nation Ownership and Capacity

3.3.1 What is host nation ownership and capacity?

If the end game is a locally led, sustainable peace, then host nation ownership must be developed at all times by all actors. This means that the affected country must drive its own long-term development needs and priorities.[24] Ownership requires capacity, and in these environments, capacity may need strengthening. Emphasize the building of capacity for public and private, national and local, and formal and informal institutions to mitigate and manage drivers of conflict.[25]

3.3.2 Locally led peace

The international community can impose stability, but only the host nation population can create sustainable peace. A situation requiring the intervention of military forces to enforce peace is always deeply complex and can only be resolved through local settlements and institutions.[26]

3.3.3 Host nation ownership and capacity depend on:

- *Understanding the local context*
  Every region, every state and every village has unique economic, cultural, religious, political, and historical characteristics. In assessing the local context, always carefully consider all of these characteristics.

- *Fostering ownership*
  The ultimate responsibility for the stabilization and reconstruction process belongs to the host nation. This means assisting the host nation government and civil society to lead and participate in both planning and implementation.[27] Utilization of host nation processes and structures, both formal and informal, builds ownership. For example, using the central budget of the host nation government, with appropriate safeguards, allows host nation actors to shape priorities and meet the needs of the population.

- *Inclusivity*
  Partnerships with host nation actors should be guided by impartiality, inclusiveness, and gender considerations based on a solid understanding of the local context (to include civil society; private sector actors; and all ethnic, religious,

24. USAID, "Nine Principles," 2005.
25. United States Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, *Principles of the USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation,* 2008. Hereafter: S/CRS, *Principles*, 2008.
26. United Kingdom Stabilisation Unit, *The United Kingdom Approach to Stabilisation—A Stabilisation Guidance Note,* 2008. Hereafter: UK Stabilisation Unit, *UK Approach to Stabilisation,* 2008.
27. S/CRS, *Principles*, 2008.

and minority groups). Seek to include those who have demonstrated support for the peace process and made efforts to end the violence.

- *Capacity*
  Capacity building involves transferring technical knowledge and skills to the host nation, individuals, and institutions to help them develop effective policies and administer public services across the economic, social, political, and security realms.[28] This requires adequate resources for a basic level of civil service capacity and perseverance to mentor and assist in building that capacity. Experience has shown that it is still preferable to deliver services "with" rather than "for" the host nation government, despite weak capacity.[29]

- *Formal and informal systems*
  Building on and reforming existing structures and systems is more fiscally sustainable and often more palatable to the host nation population than starting from scratch, as long as the institution has not been one of the principal drivers of conflict. Local customs and structures that are legitimate are better than transplanted models that are unfamiliar. Often, the population's contact with formal state institutions—including those responsible for justice and security—is negligible or very negative. On the other hand, contact with informal systems, such as customary justice, may have been frequent and positive. Understanding the role of formal vs. informal systems is a prerequisite for action.

- *Early resources*
  Early resources tend to be used for projects that produce quick and visible results—often known as "quick impact"—to demonstrate that things are different in the country. Some examples include rehabilitating infrastructure or cleaning the streets. Early resources may be important, but only if they contribute to increasing host nation ownership over development, supporting the peace process, and building capacity over the long term. Be vigilant about monitoring and accounting for resources by establishing mechanisms to track money flows and progress.

- *The role of women*
  The engagement of women is necessary to ensure sustainable peace, economic recovery, and social well-being.[30] Include women at the peace table, in the recovery process, in the host nation government, and in local public and private sector institutions. Protect them at all times so they can make their unique contribution to peace. Train them and give them the capacity to lead and participate. Women improve the chances for legitimacy when they are involved in mobilizing constituencies for peace and helping to design core programs such as security sector reform (SSR).[31]

28. USAID, *Nine Principles,* 2005.
29. UK Stabilisation Unit, *UK Approach to Stabilisation,* 2008.
30. United Nations Development Group and World Bank, "DRAFT Joint Guidance Note on Integrated Recovery Planning Using Post Conflict Needs Assessments and Transitional Results Frameworks," 2007. Hereafter: UNDG/WB, "DRAFT Joint Guidance Note," 2007. United Nations Security Council, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325," www.peacewomen.org/un/sc/res1325.pdf (accessed June 17, 2009).
31. Camille Pampell Conaway, *The Role of Women in Stabilization and Reconstruction* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2006).

- *Effective transitions from international to host nation*
  In these environments, international actors may help manage crucial state functions until there are leaders who are committed to peace and institutions with the capacity to run a legitimate government. Effective transitions to full host nation ownership looms as a large gap in knowledge and practice across end states for all institutions.

3.4 Political Primacy

3.4.1 What is political primacy?

Political primacy refers to the basic premise that everything is political. Violent conflict occurs when nonviolent political processes break down and when authority structures are no longer viewed as legitimate by some or all of the population. Political settlements may seek to end this violence, but the motives for conflict may not have been extinguished. Each action in the recovery phase must be carefully weighed against its impact on the politics of the conflict. Additionally, the politics between donors, within governments, and in and among international organizations and regional institutions, impact prospects for a political settlement.

3.4.2 Political primacy requires:

- *Using a conflict lens*.
  The perceptions of the population about rewards and punishment, and winners and losers are ultimately what count. A unique assessment and understanding of the political, social and economic "rules of the game" is necessary.

- *Fostering and sustaining a political process.*
  Fostering and sustaining a political process is essential. Negotiating a political settlement can be an intricate and volatile process. How the agreement is written can shape the kinds of challenges that arise in implementing the agreement. Key considerations to remember when negotiating settlements include

  - Relationships among conflicting parties are often unequal.
  - Support those who support the political process and oppose those who oppose it.
  - There is a need to address the unresolved issues that underlie the conflict and other interrelated conflicts.
  - There is often a perceived or real bias of international players.
  - Disagreements over implementation can undermine peace (usually regarding politically sensitive processes such as SSR; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration [DDR]; power sharing; or resource distribution.
  - Agreement on measurable goals to enhance accountability of the parties.
  - Unrealistic goals and timetables can create challenges in implementation.
  - Host nation leadership is critical for the political process and its implementation.

- *Inclusivity of warring parties and marginalized groups*.
  Political processes are more sustainable when they include all parties that have the power to obstruct the process in violent ways if they do not have a substan-

tial stake in it. Equally important is the inclusion of marginalized groups, such as women and minorities, who may have been victimized or excluded in the past.[32] This can ensure that their needs are reflected and their rights are protected.

- *Effective strategic communications.*[33]
  Political processes should not take place exclusively in the "official" arena. The involvement of the population through public dialogue and civil society underpins the success of any political settlement. Effective strategic communications should aim to
  - Deliver credible messages about the objectives of the peace process.
  - Ensure these messages are articulated in a way that is understandable by the population.
  - Manage expectations by painting a realistic picture of the situation and the capacity of the host nation government and international community to implement agreements.

3.5 Legitimacy

3.5.1 What is legitimacy?

Every actor and every action can contribute to legitimacy. This term has several meanings:

- The degree to which the local population accepts and supports the mission, its mandate and its behavior over time.
- The degree to which the local population accepts and supports the host nation government (which can include informal governance structures as well), and the manner in which the government attains power.
- The extent to which regional neighbors and the international community accept the mission's mandate and its actions and the host nation government and its actions.

3.5.2 Legitimacy derives from:

- *A bargain between citizens and the government*
  The generally accepted concept of state legitimacy is based on a bargain between state and citizenry. Legitimacy here is what citizens grant to the state in exchange for security.[34] In this century, however, more is required. In addition to the provision of security, legitimacy is also derived from the ability of the state to perform critical functions in the economic, political, and social spheres in an accountable manner.[35] Legitimacy also requires the state to observe international law and protect human rights. The bargain today may exist between citizens and subnational entities, both formal and informal.

32. John Darby, *The Effects of Violence on Peace Processes* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2001). United Kingdom Stabilisation Unit, *Quick Guide to Stabilisation Planning,* 2007.
33. U.S. Army, *FM 3-07,* 2008.
34. United Nations Development Programme and United States Agency for International Development, *First Steps in Post-Conflict State-Building: a UNDP-USAID Study,* 2007. Hereafter: UNDP/USAID, "First Steps," 2007.
35. Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). Hereafter: Ghani/Lockhart, Fixing Failed States, 2008.

- *Mandate and authorities*
  To establish mission and host nation legitimacy, a UN Security Council Resolution and mandate is the preferred route. The mandate or peace agreement should provide clear rules for how the host nation will be managed after war in terms of executive, legislative, and judicial structure and functions; participation (citizens' rights, civil liberties); and accountability (especially elections).[36] Specifying the short-term stability requirements along with provisions for transferring all long-term responsibilities to the host nation helps to ensure ownership and facilitate transition.[37] Developing this mandate with all key stakeholders of the peace process aids legitimacy.

- *Matching resources to goals and delivering a timely peace dividend*
  The goals of a mandate are only achievable when the resources provided are adequate and rapidly distributed to affirm credibility and legitimacy. The early establishment of a credible presence can help to deter spoilers and other threats and diminish the likelihood that force will be needed to implement the mandate.[38] Mobilize a minimum of assets to provide immediate security and restore essential services with funded plans for mandated activities such as DDR and the training or retraining of indigenous police that typically accompany DDR.[39] Short-term efforts to establish legitimacy can be sustained by fully resourcing longer-term initiatives.

- *Leadership*
  There are two levels of leadership: (1) that of an international mission typically authorized by the UN and (2) that of the host nation. Those charged with the responsibilities in a mandate should have the authorities to make decisions and implement them. Sometimes, leaders will have to work with a mandate, which may be ambiguous. Navigating this ambiguity and maximizing flexibility is a job for political leaders, not technocrats, and informs what kind of leadership is required for the mission and host nation. A sustainable peace depends on how adeptly the custodian of the peace process can guide the transformation of conflict among warring factions.[40]

- *Accountability and transparency*
  Basic systems for accountability—both for the international mission and the host nation—are critical factors for legitimacy. Accountability requires transparency. This means making government transparent to the population through media, civil society, and other reporting mechanisms. Together, these are the basic building blocks for any approach to limit the de-legitimizing corruption that often pervades war-torn environments—both in host nation institutions and those of international actors.

36. Ibid.
37. UK Stabilisation Unit, "UK Approach to Stabilisation," 2008.
38. UNDPKO, *Principles and Guidelines,* 2008.
39. James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, and Beth Cole DeGrasse, *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2007). Hereafter: Dobbins/Jones/Crane/Cole DeGrasse, *Beginner's Guide,* 2007.
40. Jack Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Leonard R. Hawley, eds., *The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2005). Hereafter: Covey/Dziedzic/Hawley, *Quest for a Viable Peace,* 2005.

- *Management of expectations and communication*
  Constant and clear communication helps manage expectations about the realities of donor and state resources and progress of reconstruction. It also dispels rumors and counters spoiler narratives that undermine peace. Local voices and traditional forms of communication deliver messages more effectively and can help sustain support. Communication requires dedicated resources throughout the life of a mission.

- *Constituencies for peace*
  A peace process will only be successful if the local population is engaged in and committed to peace.[41] In the literature, this is often referred to as "buy-in" or "consent," but the essential ingredient remains the same: Prospects for a durable political settlement rest on active constituencies for peace that must be brought in to the political process. To maintain credibility and to prevent supporters from becoming fence sitters or spoilers, confront those who oppose the political process. Building constituencies for peace requires concerted efforts to tap into capacities across the wider society, including those offered by women, ethnic minorities, youth, and local leaders.[42]

- *Engagement of the international community*
  Legitimacy falters when the international community is not engaged. It is not enough to pass a Security Council resolution. Engagement should begin with a UN mandate and continue through the active participation of donors putting qualified personnel and resources to assist the host nation make the transition from violent conflict to peace. Managing this engagement may include mission-specific consultative mechanisms or host nation advisory structures to coordinate efforts and confront challenges.

3.6 Unity of Effort

3.6.1 What is unity of effort?

Unity of effort is the outcome of coordination and cooperation among all actors, even when the participants come from many different organizations with diverse operating cultures.[43] This applies to efforts among agencies of the U.S. government, between the U.S. government and the international community, and between the host nation government and the international community. Unity of effort is an important cross-cutting principle because the U.S. government will always find itself to be just one player among numerous local and international actors.

3.6.2 Unity of effort is based on:

- *A shared understanding of the situation*
  Unity of effort begins with a shared understanding of the situation that is derived from an assessment. Within the U.S. government, that shared understanding is based on a whole-of-government assessment of the dynamics driving and

41. International Forum for the *Challenges of Peace Operations, Meeting the Challenges of Peace Operations: Cooperation and Coordination, Challenges Project Phase II Concluding Report,* 2003–2005, 2006.
42. UNDG/WB, "DRAFT Joint Guidance Note," 2007.
43. U.S. Army, *FM 3-07,* 2008.

mitigating violent conflict within a country.[44] The United Nations and agencies of other nations employ similar assessment frameworks. Creating a common picture from these disparate assessments is a challenge confronted frequently in developing UN mandates and shaping country-specific strategies.

- *A shared strategic goal*
  Based on a shared understanding, an overarching goal is determined to unify the efforts of U.S. agencies behind a strategic plan. This should ideally be linked with the goals of other international and host nation actors.

- *Integration*
  Integration means that capabilities across the U.S. government will be brought together in a coherent manner to achieve unity of effort. This process of integration is also occurring outside of the U.S. government, within the UN, within other states and among nongovernmental humanitarian organizations. Linking these integrated systems is a challenge that has yet to be met.

- *Cooperation and coherence*
  Full integration may be achievable within individual states or organizations, but may be very difficult to attain across disparate systems. Cooperation, however, may be a realistic goal to strive for and arrived at through tight or loose forms of coordination.[45] Cooperation exists when information is shared and activities are deconflicted as much as possible among independent institutions so as not to undermine a shared strategic goal. The outcome of cooperation should be a coherent effort by multiple actors to establish sustainable peace.

- *Civil–military cooperation*
  Civil-military cooperation needs to be understood in three ways: cooperation between civilian and military actors of official government and inter-governmental institutions, between the military and NGOs (among international actors), and between the military and host nation government and its population. The size and strength of the military, with its own command and control structure, creates a unique impact that requires specific forms of cooperation. In environments where military forces are engaged in combat and S&R missions simultaneously, consider specific guidelines for relations between the U.S. military and U.S. NGOs.[46]

- *Recognition of humanitarian space*
  There are actors who remain outside of the unity of effort campaign for good reason. Maintain clear separation between politically motivated actions to end violent conflict and movement toward development, and apolitical humanitarian assistance based exclusively on impartial response to assessed need.[47]

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44. United States Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, *Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework,* 2008. Hereafter: S/CRS, *Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework,* 2008.

45. See Section 5, Fundamentals of a Comprehensive Approach.

46. Interaction, U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Institute of Peace, "Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Nongovernmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments," 2006.

47. UNDPKO, *Principles and Guidelines,* 2008.

3.7 Security

3.7.1 What is security?

The importance of security jumps off every page of every major institutional framework. It is one of the few preconditions for enduring peace. In its broadest sense, security is an "all encompassing condition" that takes freedom, safety, governance, human rights, public health, and access to resources into account.[48] This is commonly known as "human security."[49] For the purposes of cross-cutting principles presented here, security is defined as the physical security that permits the freedom necessary to pursue a permanent peace

3.7.2 Security is the platform for development.

It is a prerequisite for a safe and secure environment, the rule of law, stable governance, a sustainable economy, and social well-being. The human security imperative is addressed in all sections of this manual, but the physical aspect is covered in Section 6. It cannot be delegated only to peacekeepers or military intervention forces or begin and end with a successful DDR program. Many aspects are cross-cutting and are highlighted here.

3.7.3 Security rests on:

- *Information*
  Sharing timely information about threats and potential threats to the peace process or the population is vital to security. This information may address a potential threat to women foraging for firewood outside the perimeter of a refugee camp, an assassination threat to a government minister, or illicit power structures engaged in arms trafficking. Having access to this kind of information requires deep links with the population. The sharing of information should not jeopardize the work of impartial NGOs or the neutrality of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

- *Management of spoilers*
  Spoilers are individuals or parties who believe that the peace process threatens their power and interests and will therefore work to undermine it.[50] Understand what gives power brokers power, including their financing, their roles in the previous regime and their standing in the community.[51] Recognize that they exist in the economic, political, and security arenas, at both the local and national level. They may have fed off the conflict or emerged in the wake of defeat as new spoilers. If reconcilable, spoilers should be encouraged to change their behavior over time. Depending on their motives and capacity at state and local levels, spoilers may need to be dealt with militarily or through political or economic negotiations.

- *Reform of the security sector*
  Control of the security apparatus is the basic source of state power and its use

48. Japan International Cooperation Agency, *Handbook for Transition Assistance,* 2006. Hereafter: JICA, *Handbook for Transition Assistance,* 2006.
49. See Appendix E, Acronyms and Glossary of Selected Key Terms.
50. UNDG/WB, "DRAFT Joint Guidance Note," 2007.
51. Karen Guttieri and Jessica Piombo, eds. *Interim Governments: Institutional Bridges to Peace and Democracy?* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2007). Hereafter: Guttieri/Piombo, *Interim Governments,* 2007.

will likely have been one of the major drivers of conflict. Its reform therefore is a priority.[52] Security sector reform touches every aspect of an S&R mission: actors directly involved in protecting civilians and the state from violence (e.g., police and military forces and internal intelligence agencies), institutions that govern these actors and manage their funding (e.g., ministries of interior, defense, and justice, and national security councils), and oversight bodies (legislative and nongovernmental).[53] Reform aims to create a professional security sector that is legitimate, impartial, and accountable to the population.[54]

- *Protection of human rights*[55]
  A human rights-based approach, where all actions uphold human rights, is required to establish the necessary conditions for each end state. This involves a mandate to protect and promote human rights and ensure that the host nation has the will and capacity to do so on its own.[56] Rights protected under international law include life, liberty, and security of person; the highest attainable standard of health; a fair trial; just and favorable working conditions; adequate food, housing, and social security; education; equal protection of the law; and a nationality. These also include freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home, or correspondence; arbitrary arrest or detention; torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; slavery; and freedom of association, expression, assembly, and movement.[57]

3.8 Conflict Transformation

3.8.1 What is conflict transformation?[58]

Conflict will always persist in these environments and affect security, governance, and economic development in ways that threaten peace and undermine legitimacy. The goal of conflict transformation is to reach the point where the host nation is on a "sustainable positive trajectory," where it can independently manage the dynamics causing violent conflict. Conflict transformation requires reducing the drivers of conflict while supporting those that mitigate conflict across security, economic, and political spheres. For the long term, transformation rests on the ability of the host nation to sustain stability and create conditions for long-term development.

52. UK Stabilisation Unit, "UK Approach to Stabilisation," 2008.
53. United States Department of State, United States Department of Defense, and United States Agency for International Development, *Security Sector Reform,* 2008.
54. Sean McFate, *Securing the Future: A Primer on Security Sector Reform in Conflict Countries* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2008).
55. Rights are cross-cutting and are enshrined in law, including the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," the "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights," the "International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights," the "Convention of the Rights of the Child," the "Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment," and the "Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women."
56. UNDPKO, *Principles and Guidelines,* 2008.
57. United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Frequently Asked Questions on a Human Rights-Based Approach to Development Cooperation,* 2006.
58. S/CRS, *Principles*, 2008. Covey/Dziedzic/Hawley, *Quest for a Viable Peace,* 2005.

3.8.2 Conflict transformation focuses on:

- *Understanding drivers and mitigators of conflict*
  Identify key groups that may threaten the peace process, if they do not perceive the benefits of peace, and regions and localities at risk, where visible reconstruction is important.[59] Identify sources of institutional resilience and other mitigating factors critical for peace. Understand how upcoming events (elections, transitional justice processes, events in neighboring countries) may have an impact on both drivers and mitigators. Understand what motivates opponents to peace, why they resort to violence, where they derive their support, how they make decisions and what might convince them to support peace and renounce violence.

- *Reducing drivers of conflict and strengthening mitigators*
  No matter how inclusive the emerging political settlement, powerful groups that want to continue the violence need to be reckoned with either through mediation and co-option or military defeat. Contain spoilers by constraining or removing them, disrupting their flow of resources and channeling the competition for power from bullets to ballots. Enhance the capability for dispute resolution and support institutional and social resilience to transform conflict.

- *Building host nation capacity to manage the drivers of conflict through nonviolent means and support long-term development*
  This is the end game. It cycles back to the strategic framework and five end states that underpin this manual: a safe and secure environment that enables development; the rule of law that allows grievances to be addressed through a system of justice and confronts impunity; stable governance that permits contestation for power to take place peacefully; a sustainable economy that provides the framework for licit economic competition; and social well-being that affords equal access to basic human needs and the opportunity to live in communities that have mechanisms for peaceful resolution of conflict.

3.9 Regional Engagement

3.9.1 What is regional engagement?

Neighboring countries play a major role—at times positive and negative—in the host nation's stabilization and reconstruction. Regional interests, issues, and unresolved conflicts can continue to influence and affect the host nation throughout an S&R mission. The host nation may be at risk from its neighbors' domestic instabilities and foreign policies.[60] And conflict within the host nation may have bled across borders through refugee flow and arms trafficking. A long-term solution for the host nation must include a consideration of the effects of both its conflict on the region and the region on its conflict.[61] Regional engagement entails encouraging the host nation,

59. S/CRS, "Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework," 2008. UNDG/WB, "DRAFT Joint Guidance Note," 2007.

60. Marvin G. Weinbaum, *Afghanistan and Its Neighbors: An Ever Dangerous Neighborhood* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2006).

61. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, Pamela Aall, *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2007).

its neighboring countries, and other key states in the region to partner in promoting both the host nation's and the region's security and economic and political development.

3.9.2 Regional engagement is based on:

- *Comprehensive regional diplomacy*
  While the host nation's neighbors should not, at a minimum, sabotage stabilization and reconstruction, their active engagement and cooperation is advantageous. Conduct a comprehensive diplomatic offensive that aims to halt any destabilizing actions by the host nation's neighbors. Elicit their support for a stable and peaceful host nation and region, and the security of the host nation's borders. Obtain their cooperation in providing economic and military assistance, giving political support and engaging in trade and commerce.[62] The region should continue or restore diplomatic relations with the host nation, where appropriate.

- *A shared regional vision*
  Left to their own devices, neighbors may act according to their own strategic interests, which could be destabilizing for the host nation and the region. Instead, the neighbors—typically with encouragement and assistance from the international community—should collaborate to develop a shared vision for the region. Be sure to recognize and consider the neighbors' concerns and interests during this process.[63]

- *Cooperation*
  Ensure the neighbors' ongoing active participation by forming or supporting regionwide structures—necessary in today's globalized world—that promote the region's security, economic growth, and social and political development.[64] These structures should encourage and solidify mutually beneficial cooperation in fields such as transportation, trade, science and technology, health, natural resources, energy, culture, education, and politics; strengthen goodwill between the states; collaborate to maintain the region's peace and security by reducing mutual perceptions of threat; and develop common political values and systems.[65] For the state emerging from violent conflict, the structures should help the host nation in ways that support its legitimacy and sovereignty, determined with the consent of the host nation.[66]

62. Iraq Study Group, *The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward—A New Approach* (New York: Vintage Books, 2006). Hereafter: Iraq Study Group Report, 2006.
63. Ibid.
64. Ghani/Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States,* 2008.
65. Southern African Development Community, "SADC Profile," www.sadc.int/ (accessed June 18, 2009). Shanghai Cooperation Organization, "Shanghai Cooperation Organization," www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/sco/t57970.html (accessed June 18, 2009); Economic Community of West African States, "ECOWAS in brief," www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=about_a&lang=en (accessed June 18, 2009).
66. *Iraq Study Group Report,* 2006.

Section 4

High-Level Trade-offs, Gaps, and Challenges

4.0 High-Level Trade-offs

Many decisions in S&R missions involve difficult trade-offs. Trade-offs refer to the inherent conflicts that exist between objectives. They involve making concessions between those objectives and understanding the impact on stability. For example, bringing a warlord into government can undermine legitimacy of the government, but it may be the only way to end violence in a particular part of the country. Banning a group of people from government can signal an end to impunity for some, while also fueling an insurgency. Understanding these trade-offs can help guide strategy and mitigate possible negative consequences. Trade-offs are highlighted throughout this manual and embedded in specific discussions of the five end states. The following high-level trade-offs are overarching:

4.1 ***Stability vs. host nation legitimacy*** refers to the trade-off between the urgent need for international actors to secure the peace and the possibility that these actions are not seen by the host nation population as connected to their local leaders or government and do not build the legitimacy or capacity of the host nation.

4.2 ***Expediency vs. sustainability*** refers to short-term actions that show a peace dividend and signal that violent conflict is over but are not sustainable by the host nation over time. Inherent conflicts between short- and long-term objectives can include maintaining employment vs. cutting jobs in order to restructure the economy.[67] Large infrastructure projects, oversized armies, and expensive national elections are other examples related to this trade-off.

4.3 ***Meeting needs vs. building capacity*** refers to the quandary faced by international actors—governmental and nongovernmental—when it is easier to fulfill needs directly than to build host nation capacity to deliver critical assistance.

4.4 High-Level Gaps and Challenges

Gaps refer to weaknesses that exist in knowledge and that recur from mission to mission. Challenges refer to shortfalls in practice, even when best practices have already been identified. Both gaps and challenges are addressed throughout the manual.[68]

4.5 ***Lack of an agreed overall vision or "storyline"*** that sets the strategic direction for stabilization and reconstruction. See Sections 3.4, Political Primacy and 3.6, Unity of Effort.

4.6 ***Insufficient realism in the timelines for key recovery outcomes,*** resulting in unreasonable expectations on the part of the host nation population and leadership and international partners. See Section 3.5, Legitimacy.

4.7 ***Inadequate links between priorities*** across the security, rule of law, governance, economic and social arenas. See Section 3.6, Unity of Effort.

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67. United States Agency for International Development, *Guide to Economic Growth in Post-Conflict Countries,* 2009.
68. UN Development Group, UN Development Programme, World Bank, *Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments,* 2004. United Kingdom Department for International Development, *Review of the United Kingdom Government Approach to Peacebuilding and Synthesis of Lessons Learned from United Kingdom Government Funded Peacebuilding Projects, 1997–2001,* 2003. Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding, *Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together,* 2004. UK Stabilisation Unit, "UK Approach to Stabilisation," 2008.

4.8 ***Loss of momentum after the key transition event,*** such as a peace agreement or election. See Section 3.3, Host Nation Ownership and Capacity.

4.9 ***Ineffective transitions from international to local control*** to sustain peace and prevent a relapse into conflict. See Section 3.3, Host Nation Ownership and Capacity.

4.10 ***Insufficient understanding of host nation context and needs.*** See Section 3.3, Host Nation Ownership and Capacity.

Section 5

Fundamentals of a Comprehensive Approach

5.0 What are the fundamentals of a comprehensive approach?

An understanding of the Strategic Framework for S&R is necessary. Just as important is an understanding of the fundamentals of a comprehensive approach. These fundamentals come from almost every official guidance document that has been written on these missions and appear to be widely shared.

5.1 Interdependence

- ***"Everything is connected to everything else,"*** as General Anthony Zinni (retired U.S. Marine Corps) wrote in the aftermath of the 1990s missions in Somalia.[69] The end states and conditions described in this manual are part of an interlocking system of systems: Security requires the rule of law, essential services require governance, the rule of law is dependent on security, sustainable economies are dependent on the rule of law, ownership requires capacity, and meeting basic human needs requires all of the above. It is a spider web of interdependence that requires as much integration as possible.
- ***Interdependence requires that all actors break out of their stovepipes.*** Actors in the political, security, economic, and social realms are not independent. Failing to achieve success in one realm jeopardizes success in all the others. Understand one's role and connection to others in the big picture.[70]

5.2 Cooperation[71]

- ***A shared strategic vision enables different actors to work cooperatively toward the same goal.*** This vision is the "storyline" that must be communicated through mandates, by leadership, and with full participation by the host nation population.[72]
- ***Understanding organizational cultures and interests is necessary for cooperation.*** A basic knowledge of different organizational principles and cultures of actors is required.[73] Understanding must be followed by a high degree of sensitivity to their interests and operating cultures or what motivates them and directs them to operate in a certain manner.
- ***Cooperation requires constant communication, dialogue, and negotiation among all actors—international, host nation, government, and nongovernment.*** Communication involves mechanisms for sharing and reporting information about goals and activities. Active dialogue entails open exchanges between actors to facilitate a mutual understanding that may lead to better cooperation. When differences impede cooperation, negotiation may be required.

69. Lt. Gen. Anthony Zinni, "Lt. Gen. Zinni's Twenty Lessons Learned for Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations," presented at the Center for Naval Analysis Annual Conference Proceedings: Military Support to Complex Humanitarian Emergencies, 1995.
70. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile Societies,* 2006.
71. Cooperation is also addressed in Section 3.6 Unity of Effort in Cross-Cutting Principles.
72. UNDG/WB, "DRAFT Joint Guidance Note," 2007.
73. Robert Perito, ed. *Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability and Relief Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2007).

5.3 Prioritization

- ***Priorities are necessary but must be flexible.*** Experience reveals that there are fundamental priorities in most societies emerging from conflict.[74] Prioritization is required because multiple competing demands on the ground cannot be met with the available time and resources.

- ***Focus priorities on:***

  - Sources of conflict and stability[75]
  - Implementation of a political settlement[76]
  - Provision of services that meet basic human needs.

5.4 Nesting

- ***Short-term objectives should be nested in the longer-term goals.*** An S&R mission restores peace to enable development. The millennium development goals embraced by member states of the United Nations *are* the longer-term goals.[77] This requires a conscious nesting of the short-term stabilization imperative within the longer-term development objective. For example, the short-term need to establish order may require the involvement of international police. This should be nested in longer-term objectives to have routine law enforcement conducted by local, not international, police.[78]

- ***Focus on rapid results, while understanding the impact on longer-term goals.*** Speedy commencement of assistance and the ability to deliver quick, observable, high-impact results establishes credibility.[79] This still requires understanding the impact of urgent actions on the long-term.

- ***Do not neglect the medium term.*** The rapid pace of S&R missions often gives way to a slower, more sluggish, middle-age period, where interest and resources decline. This widespread phenomenon risks a return to violent conflict. Focus on the importance of a medium-term framework for distributing international resources.[80]

5.5 Flexibility of Sequencing and Timing

- ***Sequencing and timing or phasing are dependent on context.*** Any plan based on sequenced or timed and phased actions is a notional understanding of how events might proceed. In reality, local conditions are likely to change during the duration of each phase. They may even cause progress to revert from one phase to the other or to jump across phases:

74. Dobbins/Jones/Crane/Cole DeGrasse, Beginner's Guide, 2007.
75. S/CRS, "Principles," 2008.
76. UNDP/USAID, "First Steps," 2007. UK Stabilisation Unit, "UK Approach to Stabilisation," 2008.
77. United Nations Development Programme, "Millennium Development Goals," 2000, www.undp.org/mdg/basics.shtml (accessed June 18, 2009).
78. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Conflict Prevention, Peace Building and Development,* 2004.
79. Japan International Cooperation Agency, *Handbook for Transition Assistance,* 2006. S/CRS, *Principles*, 2008. United States Agency for International Development, Fragile States Strategy, 2005.
80. Ghani/Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States,* 2008.

Post-conflict environments are characterized by high volatility. Needs may change (new population displacements, for example); priorities may change (subsequent realization that a marginalized region or population segment poses a risk for peace building if their needs are not addressed); national counterparts may change, with implications for their views on recovery priorities; reforms or capacity building may prove to be more difficult than originally envisaged, necessitating changes in timing; the composition of the donor or international support group may change; and costs of reconstruction may change, due to security conditions or changes in possible sources of supply of materials or services.

Source: UNDP/WB, "DRAFT Joint Guidance Note on Integrated Recovery Planning." 2007.

- ***Locally led input on sequencing and timing actions is essential for success.*** Legitimate national and local representatives of the host nation should participate fully in shaping sequencing and timing of actions. The UN Peacebuilding Commission and its Peacebuilding Support Office have pioneered this consultative path with groundbreaking work in Burundi and Sierra Leone.[81] Knowing if or when to strengthen substate, suprastate, or nonstate institutions; avoiding an often inappropriate replication of Western institutional models; and avoiding recreating institutions that caused conflict in the first place requires local input and deep consultation.[82]
- ***The opening days and months of an S&R mission provide an opening to seize the initiative.*** The arrival of peacekeepers provides an opportunity to maximize initial efforts and solidify a fragile peace. Relief among the local population tends to be widespread and resistance among spoilers is often unorganized.[83]
- ***Learn and adapt.*** The successful transition from conflict to sustainable peace involves managing change through constant learning and calibration of strategies to particular country circumstances that are always in flux.[84]
- ***Forget linearity.*** Planned or logical sequencing will almost always be disrupted by the unpredictability of activities on the ground. Asynchronicity is the rule, not the exception.[85] Since S&R missions do not unfold with any linear logical process, the need for a strategic vision and direction towards that vision is crucial.[86]

5.6 Measurements of Progress

- ***A system of metrics translates lofty goals into measurable outcomes.*** The best goals can be undermined by inadequate initial analysis that does not identify the drivers and mitigators of conflict.[87] A system of metrics should not measure success against inputs, but rather outcomes. For example, rather than measuring progress

81. Burundi and the United Nations, *Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi,* 2007.
82. Charles Call, *Institutionalizing Peace: A Review of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Concepts and Issues for DPA* (New York: United Nations, 2005).
83. Dobbins/Jones/Crane/Cole DeGrasse, *Beginner's Guide,* 2007.
84. S/CRS, *Principles,* 2008.
85. Guttieri/Piombo, *Interim Governments,* 2007.
86. UK Stabilisation Unit, "UK Approach to Stabilisation," 2008.
87. Craig Cohen, *Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2006).

by the number of police trained, the system should assess whether there has been a reduction in crime.

- ***Measuring progress allows continuous adjustments to strategy and implementation to improve success.*** Ongoing measurements should contribute to adjusting the goals, plans, and activities of all actors. Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments[88] (MPICE) is a tool that is organized according to the five end states presented in this manual and offers a means to assess whether conflict drivers have been diminished and whether host nation institutions can maintain stability without significant international assistance.

88. Michael Dziedzic, Barbara Sotirin, and John Agoglia, eds., *Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE)—A Metrics Framework for Assessing Conflict Transformation and Stabilization,* Defense Technical Information Catalog, 2008.