The Congressional Role in Military and Police Reform
In Afghanistan and Iraq, Congress provides oversight and resources for U.S. programs to reform local military and police forces. This process is critical to U.S. success, but is little understood. USIP's Security Sector Reform Working Group examined the role of Congress in ensuring that security assistance is effective, serves U.S interests and creates democratic security forces.
In Afghanistan and Iraq, Congress provides oversight and resources for U.S. programs to reform local military and police forces. This process is critical to U.S. success, but is little understood. USIP's Security Sector Reform Working Group examined the role of Congress in ensuring that security assistance is effective, serves U.S interests and creates democratic security forces. A panel of distinguished experts discussed this issue:
Speakers
- Hans Born
Senior Fellow, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF)
Director, DCAF Working Group on Parliamentary Accountability of the Security Sector - William Monahan
Counsel, Senate Committee on Armed Services - Patrick Garvey
Professional Staff Member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations - John Lis
Staff Director, House Democracy Partnership Committee on Foreign Affairs - Pat Towell
Specialist in National Defense, Congressional Research Service - Robert Perito, Moderator
Director, Security Sector Reform Working Group, U.S. Institute of Peace
Explore Further
- Read the USIP Peace Brief on Congress and Parliaments in Security Sector Reform
- Learn more about USIP's work on Security Sector Reform and Security Sector Governance
Event Summary
Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a complex task that includes reforming a country’s military and police forces to make them responsive to their citizenry. SSR requires a comprehensive approach, yet too often, donors conduct “train and equip” programs, neglecting the structures that oversee and support security forces. For the United States, this neglect is due in part to the lack of relevant institutions, such as an interior ministry with oversight of a federal police force. The European Union, with its experience assisting countries to reform their governing structures as part of the EU and NATO accession processes, could be an effective partner for the United States in this aspect of SSR.
Parliamentary oversight of security forces and their governing institutions is another essential component of SSR, but one where the U.S. does have well-developed institutions that can serve as models for other countries. The U.S. Congress plays a critical role in making defense policy and overseeing defense-spending programs, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. The robustness of the U.S. congressional oversight system argues for the U.S. playing an important role in developing parliamentary structures and capacity in conflict-affected states.
U.S. Congressional Oversight of Security Sector Reform
The U.S. Congress has a remarkable suite of instruments available to carry out oversight of the national security budget. These instruments include the oversight committees’ professional staff, the Congressional Research Service and Government Accountability Office, and the ability to conduct site visits to gather first-hand information.
Congress also has the capacity to develop security policy and promote ‘whole of government’ approaches to security assistance programs. The “1207 program,” named after the relevant section of the Defense Authorization Act of 2006, provides funding that DOD can make available to State for integrated security assistance programs developed jointly by embassies and Combatant Commands, approved by State, DOD and USAID and reviewed by Congress.
Other measures to improve interagency, civil-military cooperation include requirements for defense programs to report to both the Senate Foreign Affairs and Senate Armed Services Committees. Such dual reporting mechanisms, in addition to informal collaboration between the committees, are productive but tenuous steps toward improving U.S. capabilities for oversight of SSR and other complex civil-military operations.
Building Capacity for Host-Nation Parliamentary Oversight
Conflict countries face many obstacles to developing effective parliamentary oversight of security agencies and their activities. Parliamentarians may lack expertise, experience, political will or legal authority to oversee security policies, programs and expenditures. In post-conflict countries, major portions of national budgets are provided by donors and not subject to local oversight. In Afghanistan, defense oversight committees have expertise and interest, but most of the Afghan defense budget is donor-provided and outside their purview.
To build foreign parliamentary capacity, the House Democratic Partnership Committee (DPC) works with foreign parliaments in cooperation with USAID to host parliamentarians to discuss oversight mechanisms. In cooperation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the DPC also conducts seminars for foreign defense oversight committees. The DPC is a demonstration of the personal commitment from members of Congress to work alongside other countries to develop security forces that are responsive to their legislatures and their citizens.