



EVALUATING MEDIA INTERVENTIONS IN CONFLICT COUNTRIES

TOWARD DEVELOPING COMMON PRINCIPLES AND A
COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE

Amelia Arsenault, Sheldon Himelfarb,
and Susan Abbott



UNITED STATES
INSTITUTE OF PEACE



ABOUT THE REPORT

The Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania, Fondation Hirondele, Internews Network, the United States Broadcasting Board of Governors, and the Center of Innovation for Media, Conflict, and Peacebuilding at the United States Institute of Peace commissioned this report following a five-day multistakeholder meeting of donors, implementers, and academics on how to better evaluate media's impact in ameliorating conflict, at the Caux Conference Center in Switzerland. The report both reviews the state of the art in evaluating media interventions in conflict and outlines the Caux Guiding Principles (hereinafter, Caux Principles) for improving the evaluation process. It stresses effective evaluation as a critical step forward for using the media in conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Amelia Arsenault is an assistant professor of communication at Georgia State University, and the Media and Democracy Research fellow at the Center for Global Communication Studies at the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania.

Sheldon Himelfarb directs the USIP Center of Innovation for Media, Conflict, and Peacebuilding. He has managed peacebuilding programs in numerous conflicts, including in Bosnia, Iraq, Angola, Liberia, Macedonia, and Burundi, and received the Capital Area Peacemaker Award from American University. **Susan Abbott**, deputy director of program development at Internews Network, works with Internews programs worldwide on monitoring and evaluation and on research and learning. Abbott was previously associate director of the Center for Global Communication Studies at the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania. Before that, she was a Media Development Division program officer at the International Research and Exchanges Board in Washington, D.C.¹

Cover image—© Journalist in DRC (photo: Lâm Duc Hiên/Fondation Hirondele)

Table of contents image—© Emrys Schoemaker. Used with permission.

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, and do not represent official positions of the United States Government.

United States Institute of Peace
2301 Constitution Ave., NW
Washington, D.C. 20037


Phone: 202.457.1700
Fax: 202.429.6063
E-mail: usip_requests@usip.org
Web: www.usip.org

Peaceworks No. 77

First published 2011

© 2011 by the United States Institute of Peace

CONTENTS



PEACEWORKS • OCTOBER 2011 • NO. 77

Introduction ...	5
Evaluation Under Pressure ...	8
Roadblocks to Improved Evaluation ...	13
The Caux Principles ...	23
Conclusions and Future Directions ...	28
Appendices ...	30

[The ability to impart and share information in real time, twenty-four hours a day, both globally and locally via multiple communication channels, has expanded the media's role in precipitating, ameliorating, and discouraging conflict.]

Summary

- Recognizing media's heightened importance in peacebuilding, governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), multilateral organizations, broadcasters, and community activists have expanded their efforts in using the media to prevent, manage, and reconcile conflicts.
- Poorly designed media interventions, no matter how well intentioned, may exacerbate tensions and undermine peacebuilding efforts.
- In the face of the global economic downturn, policymakers and politicians no longer have the economic or political capital to fund projects without evidence of their efficacy. As a consequence, implementers and donor organizations alike are under increased pressure to demonstrate the utility of the programs they produce or fund.
- Improving and expanding evaluation of current and future projects is essential because evaluation provides critical evidence that can inform future programs and better direct donors and policymakers in the judicious, economical allocation of funding and policy.
- A wide array of media development practitioners, donors, international broadcasters, and methodologists—all with extensive experience working in media initiatives in conflict environments—met in Caux, Switzerland, in December 2010, to establish the Caux Guiding Principles, whose full text is in this report.
- Based on a careful appraisal of the current status of monitoring and evaluating media interventions in conflict countries, the Caux Principles outline measures that stakeholders can take to improve evaluation.
- The Caux Principles urge those working in media and conflict initiatives to take several concrete steps to improve evaluation. These include enabling better collaboration between donors and implementers, expanding financial support for evaluation, encouraging realistic and honest assessments of project successes and failures, designing flexible evaluation plans that are sensitive to changing conditions on the ground, and engaging with local researchers.

Introduction

During 2010, an estimated 363 armed conflicts took place around the world.² These conflicts are not uniform and range from all-out interstate wars to low-intensity conflicts over resources or succession. The World Bank calculates that conflict in some way affects more than 45 countries and the lives of more than 500 million individuals. In these environments, access to information can often make the difference between life and death. How do you get a particular message to the most people possible? Increasingly, the answer is through the media. The ability to impart and share information in real time, twenty-four hours a day, both globally and locally via multiple communication channels, has expanded the media's role in precipitating, ameliorating, and discouraging conflict.³

Media platforms provide a platform for dialogue among disagreeing parties, and a critical source for information about available services and potential threats. For example, in 2006–09, every day at eight a.m. and eight p.m., thirteen Sudanese journalists broadcast *Darfur Lifeline* via shortwave radio.⁴ The one-hour program featured critical information on health and human services available for displaced persons in Darfur. UNICEF estimates that the number of people participating in National Immunization Day doubled as a result of these broadcasts. In the postconflict phase, the media can prove invaluable to the peacebuilding process by publicizing the terms of peace settlements, educating and informing citizens about elections, and providing an outlet for discussion and debate about the original causes of the conflict. Conversely, when misappropriated, the media may intensify conflict and further encourage violence, instability, and fragmentation, as was the case in the 1990s when Slobodan Milošević nationalized the most popular media outlets in Yugoslavia and used them as a platform to call for ethnic nationalism and violence.⁵

Recognizing media's heightened importance in conflict environments, governmental organizations, NGOs, multilateral organizations, broadcasters, and community activists have expanded their efforts to use the media to prevent, manage, and reconcile conflicts. Just as conflict environments are heterogeneous, so, too, are these media interventions. They vary from context to context and are differentiated by function (e.g., peacebuilding, election monitoring, nation building), form (e.g., radio, television, new media), and audience. Media programs include establishing or supporting radio and television stations, conducting press and regulatory training, international broadcasting efforts, and other issue-specific media outreach initiatives. NGOs such as Internews Network (U.S.A.), IREX (U.S.A.), Press Now (Netherlands), and Fondation Hironnelle (Switzerland) work in countries such as Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan to strengthen existing independent media organizations or build new ones, with an eye toward improving the media's ability to serve as information providers and political and social watchdogs. Organizations such as Search for Common Ground and BBC World Service Trust work with local partners to produce culturally sensitive radio and television programs aimed at developing collaborative problem solving and mutual understanding. International broadcasters such as Voice of America, BBC World Service, Deutsche Welle, and France 24 seek to ensure the free flow of information across national borders and promote cross-cultural understanding between the target country and the broadcasting country.

But even the best-intentioned media interventions, if poorly designed, may exacerbate tensions and undermine peacebuilding efforts. In the immediate aftermath of the war in Yugoslavia, for instance, the UN produced a series of peace and reconciliation programs. As Jeffrey Heyman, former head of United Nations Radio Yugoslavia, recounts, "Few stations would take the risk playing such programmes. Those that did air them often used any slight accent,

mistake or bias (it was impossible for local journalists to be unbiased during the war) to their advantage—a situation that made the UN an accomplice in the propaganda war. We finally stopped the programmes, no longer certain of the integrity of the message.”⁶


In light of past missteps, such as those cited by Heyman, and the broadening size and scope of media-related activities in conflict environments, the international community has turned greater attention toward determining the impact and efficacy of media initiatives in conflict countries. Financial constraints imposed by the global economic downturn, and related calls for aid effectiveness, have also intensified pressure on implementers and donor organizations around the world to demonstrate the utility of the programs they produce or fund.⁷

Many of the roadblocks and the solutions to improved evaluation discussed in this report are not unique to the community of stakeholders working in media and conflict. Actors across the international development spectrum are under similar pressure to strengthen evaluation. But those working in media in conflict environments face a distinct set of challenges to providing evidence-based support for program effectiveness. These include collapsed timelines, quickly shifting conditions, and the frequent inability of researchers to travel into the areas covered by the media interventions they are assigned to evaluate, to name but a few. And the biggest, most daunting challenge, against which all others pale, is that the vast array of factors that determine conflict (and, conversely, peace) make it extremely hard to isolate the impact of a specific media intervention on the prevailing state of affairs. In recognition of these challenges, in December 2010, thirty-four people representing thirty different organizations working in media in conflict countries spent five days at the Caux Conference Center in Switzerland, grappling with ways to improve current evaluation practices. This workshop evolved out of a shared desire to improve evaluation techniques, and a common belief that the first step to improvement lay in establishing the foundations for a community of practice. The conveners also shared a common frustration: while media conferences commonly feature panels on evaluation, the topic is so complex that they rarely produce concrete recommendations. Therefore, the conveners agreed that the Caux Workshop would be materially different in providing a five-day forum for in-depth consideration of methodology, policy, and practical implementation.

This report draws heavily on the discussions and research shared at the Caux Workshop. It has three principal functions. First, to chart a new way forward, it provides a careful appraisal of the current status of monitoring and evaluating media interventions in conflict countries. Second, the report represents a call to action for policymakers and practitioners with interests in media in conflict environments, by showing how these stakeholders can provide better support for evaluation. It further shows how better evaluation benefits policymakers and program implementers by encouraging accountability and building knowledge about how media can contribute to stabilization and peacemaking. Improved evaluations create more realistic expectations about what media interventions can and cannot achieve. Primed with more realistic expectations, funding organizations can, in turn, more clearly define project goals at the level of requests for proposals, benefitting future evaluations and future projects (see figure 1).

Third, this report provides support for evaluators and methodologists working in conflict environments, by outlining guiding principles for evaluation in conflict countries. These guiding principles, referred to as the Caux Principles (detailed on pages 23–28), are perhaps most useful for those working in monitoring and evaluation (M & E), while the sections leading up to them are better framed for policymakers and implementers wanting to understand the challenges and importance of evaluating media’s role in conflict.⁸

*Those working in media
in conflict environments
face . . . collapsed
timelines, quickly shifting
conditions, and the
frequent inability of
researchers to travel into
the areas covered by the
media interventions they
are assigned to evaluate.*

Figure 1. The Importance of Realistic Expectations

Media's diverse roles in conflict are listed below:

- **Citizen journalism initiatives** give people without professional journalism training Web-based or mobile tools to create, augment, or fact-check traditional media on their own or in collaboration with others. These initiatives are critical in conflict areas where traditional media are biased or lack resources.
- **Crowdsourcing technologies** are increasingly popular in conflict environments. Crowdsourcing initiatives invite citizens to use geo-mapping, blogging, Short Messaging Services, or other Web-based technologies to collect and share information about such issues as election fraud, violence, and humanitarian crises.
- **International broadcasting** typically refers to radio or television (but also, increasingly, Internet) content directed at foreign rather than domestic audiences. Most international broadcasters are government funded. In conflict situations, these broadcasts may provide critical sources of information when domestic information sources are silenced or absent. In pre-conflict situations, they may serve as platforms for practicing preventive diplomacy.
- **Media monitoring** involves surveying media for evidence of destructive content such as incitement to violence or extremism. Monitoring may provide early warning of impending conflicts or the reescalation of old ones.
- **Media professionalization programs** are designed to encourage media independence, objectivity, and improved standards in editing and reporting. These efforts include journalist training, editorial training, and promoting the use of diverse sources.
- **Peace, preventive, and conflict-sensitive journalism training** is aimed at building journalists' awareness about the potentially pivotal role they can play in mediating or exacerbating conflict. Such initiatives entail working with journalists to find a means of reporting that balances between two disparate positions or emphasizes peacekeeping goals over objectivity.
- **Promoting an enabling environment** includes programs that promote media law and regulations that inhibit incitement to violence, government monopoly over communication platforms, and censorship.

- **Social marketing or media-for-development programs** use existing media outlets to convey messages about specific peacebuilding issues through such vehicles as radio dramas, public service announcements, and roundtable talk shows.

Evaluation under Pressure

The Arab Spring upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa in early 2011 has prompted calls for more rigorous research into the current and potential roles that media—and, increasingly, new media—can play in conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Protesters in countries across the region relied to varying degrees on social media to organize protests against incumbent regimes and leveraged international news organizations such as Al Jazeera English to solicit international support. Recognizing the power of the media, those in power made asserting control over media platforms a top priority. Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak shut down all access to Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and Google in the first few days of the protests before essentially shutting down the Internet on January 28. Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi's security forces detained journalists, jammed the frequencies of international broadcasters such as Al Jazeera and Alhurra, and blocked all Internet traffic in and out of the country.⁹ In response, the international community redirected funds toward programs aimed at strengthening media in the Middle East–North Africa region, to provide conduits between governing bodies and potential voters, information sources for those needing medical or humanitarian aid, and platforms for discussion and debate on how to structure and implement reforms.¹⁰ With Egypt and Tunisia moving toward democratic reform, fighting still engulfing Libya, and resolution still unclear in Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen, the final outcomes of the Arab Spring remain uncertain. While there is consensus that the media played and will continue to play a role, considerable debate surrounds precisely what credit properly goes to the media compared with other factors in precipitating this wave of political unrest.¹¹ Most importantly for stakeholders involved in media-related activities in conflict environments, there is equal disagreement about what role the media can play in helping Egypt and Tunisia reach full democratic transitions, ameliorating civil war in Libya, and avoiding full-blown conflicts in Bahrain, Yemen, and other countries under stress across the region. As the policy community looks backward at the still ongoing transformations, and forward toward the implementation of new programs and reforms, at the forefront are calls for better evaluation of media's role in economic, political, and social transition; empowerment of youth and women; and conflict prevention and resolution. These are three areas that donors often highlight as major priorities.

The concern over better understanding the role of media (particularly of media programs implemented by international funders) builds on a preexisting movement within the international development community for improved evaluation of all forms of international interventions.¹² In the face of broader calls for government accountability and overall belt tightening (largely in response to the global economic downturn), both private and public funding agencies around the world are under increased pressure from policymakers, government auditors, and other regulatory bodies to demonstrate the value of the programs they fund. In response, funding agencies are instituting more stringent evaluation requirements on their implementer partners. This focus on evaluation gained strength in the wake of the 2005 Paris Declaration for Aid Effectiveness, an international agreement signed by more than 100 government ministers, heads of agencies, and other senior officials. The declaration committed signatories to make strides toward harmonizing, aligning, and managing international aid with a set of mon-

Muammar Gaddafi's security forces detained journalists, jammed the frequencies of international broadcasters such as Al Jazeera and Alhurra, and blocked all Internet traffic in and out of the country.

Box 1. Monitoring and Evaluation Resources

Here are some of the databases and knowledge-sharing sites aggregating M & E publications and methodologies across development sectors, including media and communication:

- African Community of Practice on Managing for Development Results, www.cop-mfdr-africa.org/page/resource-center
- Australian Development Gateway, www.developmentgateway.com.au/cms/op/preview/sectors/dpe/page718.html
- Independent Evaluation at Asian Development Bank, www.adb.org/evaluation/
- OECD-DAC Evaluation Resource Centre, www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_35038640_35039563_1_1_1_1_1_1,00.html
- Search For Common Ground Design, Monitoring and Evaluation Resources, www.sfcg.org/programmes/ilt/dme_home.html
- United Nations Evaluation Group, www.uneval.org/
- USAID, www.usaid.gov/policy/evalweb/evaluation_resources.html
- World Bank Institute, <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/0,,contentMDK:20396074~pagePK:209023~piPK:335094~theSitePK:213799,00.html>
- Rick Davies, an independent M & E consultant, also maintains the M & E developments newsletter *Monitoring and Evaluation News*, <http://mande.co.uk/>

Journals dedicated to sharing M & E research include the following:

- *American Journal of Evaluation*, <http://aje.sagepub.com/>
- *Evaluation Exchange*, www.hfrp.org/evaluation/the-evaluation-exchange
- *Evaluation: The International Journal of Theory*, www.uk.sagepub.com/journals/Journal200757
- *Evaluation and Program Planning*, www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/593/description#description
- *Evaluation Review*, <http://erx.sagepub.com/>
- *Journal of Development Effectiveness*, www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/19439342.asp
- *New Directions for Evaluation Research and Practice*, www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-EV.html

itorable actions and indicators, especially in conflict areas.¹³ In October 2010, the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), the UK's Department for International Development (DFID), and the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation announced a joint initiative to promote systematic reviews to strengthen the international community's capacity to enact policies based on solid evidence.¹⁴ On January 19, 2011, a little over a month after the close of the Caux Workshop, Rajiv Shah, Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), announced a new evaluation policy encouraging every major USAID-funded project to use independent third-party evaluators, include counterfactuals, and release the results of the evaluations within three months of project completion.¹⁵ Consequently, methodologists and M & E professionals have turned their attention to charting the best ways forward and sharing evaluation resources (see box 1).

Still, very few of these resources are specific to conflict environments, and far fewer yet address issues facing the evaluation of media-and-conflict initiatives. While people working in media in conflict scenarios experience pressures similar to those working in nonmedia-related interventions (such as health and safety and security promotion), to improve the evaluation components of their programs, they face a special set of challenges. These include lack of control over the research environment, rapid shifts in international public and donor attention, difficulties in measuring the causal impact of media interventions, unreliable data about media usage, heterogeneity of conflict environments, shifting objectives according to changes in conflict, and media's multiple roles in conflict.

Lack of Control over the Research Environment

Ideal research methods are based on a researcher's ability to do careful planning and assert maximum control over the research environment. Research in conflict environments suffers from the same political, economic, and social uncertainties that characterize conflict areas in general. For example, a recent British National Audit Office report found that security considerations had disrupted the monitoring and evaluation plans of 40 percent of DFID programs in fragile states.¹⁶ Researchers and program implementers must continually adapt their plans in response to unexpected shifts in safety, economic, and social conditions. A carefully detailed evaluation plan constructed at the beginning of a project may well prove untenable given rapidly changing on-the-ground conditions. The longer the project's duration, the more difficult it becomes to predict the research environment.

This unpredictability is particularly acute for media interventions. In times of crisis, the media provide critical conduits for information about humanitarian aid, political reform, and peace-building, largely because media platforms can reach large populations quickly and efficiently, unencumbered by geography or violence. But because of safety or financial constraints, researchers investigating the efficacy of specific media interventions often cannot travel so easily. Moreover, because implementers and methodologists are often physically separated from the location of the media intervention, they are often less able than those evaluating nonmedia programs to identify and predict changes in the research locale. Media programs designed to improve media professionalism suffer from a different but related set of challenges. Journalists trained under one set of conditions, for example, may change jobs, adapt reporting habits to shifts in political power, or be physically displaced due to violence. Thus, an evaluator seeking to measure the long-term outcomes of a specific training exercise may struggle even to locate participants at a later date.

Rapid Shifts in International Public and Donor Attention

While adapting to physical impediments to field research, those working in conflict environments must often navigate rapid shifts in international public and donor attention, propelled by changes in the intensity of the conflict itself or by the presence of new, more pressing crises elsewhere. U.S. government funding for media development in South and Central Asia, for example, doubled from \$21.7 million in 2009 to \$49.8 million in 2010. Conversely, media development funding for the Near East region dropped from more than \$42 million in 2008 to just under \$21 million in 2010, likely due to the Obama administration's refocusing from the war in Iraq to the war in Afghanistan.¹⁷ Upswings in political and public attention to a conflict may cause what is often referred to as the "fishbowl effect."¹⁸ Faced with increased public scrutiny and concern about loss of life or societal fragmentation, donors and implementers may feel pressured to produce evidence that their actions are having positive results and doing so quickly. This pressure may encourage unsystematic and hasty evaluations. Conversely, programs initiated during periods of international attention may find their funding streams drying up as donor and public attention moves to the next big conflict or crisis. In the face of budget cuts, research is often the first area to go. These unpredictable shifts in international engagement present major hurdles to sustained improvements in evaluating and learning from past mistakes.

Measurement Difficulties

Measuring the causal impact of media interventions has its challenges even in the most controlled environments. Communication as an academic discipline evolved out of studies of

propaganda campaigns conducted during the First and Second World Wars. This early work ascribed powerful and direct effects to media. This perception of a powerful media propagated the first major round of internationally funded media development interventions conducted in less-developed countries (including conflict countries) in the 1950s and 1960s.¹⁹ But more than half a century of research has illustrated that media's ability to produce change is neither straightforward nor self-evident. Researchers of media's effects generally agree that exposure to media programming may affect certain audiences, under certain conditions. Media's effects depend heavily on the specific attributes of the media consumers and on the specific conditions under which they consume media. A number of researchers have documented that in times of heightened uncertainty, individuals may increase their dependency on the media.²⁰ At the same time, few studies have actually documented direct causal links between media and violence, and fewer still have investigated media's ability to promote peace. The existing studies exploring the causal links between media and peacebuilding diverge significantly in their conclusions. Some highlight the media's peacebuilding capacity.²¹ Others focus on media's ability to amplify conflict and unrest. Snyder and Ballentine, for example, resist the common wisdom that media diversity and the free flow of information necessarily promote peace:

We agree that media manipulation often plays a central role in promoting nationalist and ethnic conflict, but we argue that promoting unconditional freedom of public debate in newly democratizing societies is, in many circumstances, likely to make the problem worse. Historically and today, from the French Revolution to Rwanda, sudden liberalizations of press freedom have been associated with bloody outbursts of popular nationalism. The most dangerous situation is precisely when the government's press monopoly begins to break down. During incipient democratization, when civil society is burgeoning but democratic institutions are not fully entrenched, the state and other elites are forced to engage in public debate in order to compete for mass allies in the struggle for power. Under those circumstances, governments and their opponents often have the motive and the opportunity to play the nationalist card.²²

In a different vein, Cees Hamelink argues that “communication may not build peace, but it can certainly contribute to war,” necessitating the creation of an international media alert system that monitors for hate speech and incitement to violence in areas in conflict.²³

Measuring the causal impact of one specific media intervention is perhaps even more challenging than measuring the overall relationship between a country's or area's media and communications system, and peacebuilding. Caux participant Bridget Kimball, project manager at IREX, underscores the problems of attributing impact to a specific program or set of programs:

Since 2008, IREX has supported media associations and outlets in Somaliland advocating for private radio, believing this to be a force for peace. Recently, IREX learned that the Somaliland Ministry of Information and National Guidance is preparing new guidelines that will permit private radio. Is this the result of IREX-supported advocacy? Or is it due to the work of other groups carrying out similar advocacy during the same time period? Or was the key factor the 2010 election that brought a different political party into power?

The debates surrounding the relative influence of media vis-à-vis other factors may never be completely settled. But systematic attention to research design, the expansion of experimental methods that seek to isolate media effects,²⁴ and careful consideration and testing of metrics will help expand knowledge about the relationship between media interventions and peacebuilding.

Unreliable Media Usage Data

Actors working in conflict environments are also unlikely to have accurate data on media usage and reach. Indeed, reliable and up-to-date information about media usage is available

Few studies have actually documented direct causal links between media and violence, and fewer still have investigated media's ability to promote peace.

Afghanistan, once a backwater of media and communication, is now home to 75 active television stations, 175 active radio stations, and a monthly increase of 150,000 new cell phone subscribers.

only in the world's richest countries. Moreover, what data are available become quickly out-dated. The information revolution has permeated countries and communities at every level of development and stability. Afghanistan, once a backwater of media and communication, has experienced media growth rates of more than 20 percent per year and is now home to 75 active television stations, 175 active radio stations, and a monthly increase of 150,000 new cell phone subscribers. The lack of baseline data and the proliferation of new information sources, coupled with the growing complexity of information flows both within and into conflict-affected countries, present major challenges for evaluation.

In the first half of 2011, the international community watched in amazement as protests spread from Tunisia to Egypt, to Bahrain, to Libya, and to other countries in the Middle East. Old and new media platforms provided critical conduits for information both among protesters and between protesters and the international community. At the same time, due to their perceived importance, these same platforms were major targets for those attempting to stay in power. With uncertain access to old and new media platforms, different actors moved to use different mechanisms for communication. Messages moved from person to person by word of mouth, to mobile networks, to social media, to old media, and back again in a labyrinthine web. Moreover, media platforms intended for one use were quickly appropriated for another. It is no wonder that considerable debate remains about the role of social media in the Arab Spring. In such an environment, how does a researcher isolate the contribution of a specific platform or initiative?

Heterogeneity of Conflict Environments

Conflicts are diverse. While certain organizations might specialize in working on "media in conflict," there is extreme variation both within and between conflict countries. The heterogeneity of conflict situations has only increased in recent years. Until the end of the Cold War, most international conflicts occurred between states. In the post-Cold War environment, there has been a major upswing in civil wars (e.g., in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Liberia), terrorist attacks, and humanitarian disasters evolving out of these occurrences.²⁵ Moreover, regardless of the root causes of the conflict, any conflict scenario involves multiple stages. Different bodies ascribe different terminology, but at a minimum these stages generally include no conflict, latent conflict, emergence, escalation, stalemate, de-escalation, settlement/resolution, postconflict peacebuilding, and reconciliation.²⁶ This multiplicity of stages presents innumerable challenges to instituting replicable research methods that allow for comparisons between and across conflict zones.

Shifting Objectives

The macrolevel objectives of a specific intervention often change according to the overall level of conflict. Different levels of conflict necessitate different goals. Media interventions may be conducted to facilitate one or more of the following:

- **Preventive diplomacy**, which involves efforts used by the international community to keep disputes from turning into full-scale conflicts.
- **Conflict prevention techniques**, used to prevent local disputes and conflicts from escalating into wider confrontations. This may entail addressing factors that cause conflicts to develop, such as poverty, corruption, unaccountability in government or the military, or inequality.

- **Peacemaking efforts**, to encourage dialogue between opposing sides, and, ultimately, establish a peace accord.
- **Peacekeeping efforts**, to monitor and observe peace processes that emerge in postconflict situations and help ex-combatants implement the peace agreements they have signed. Such assistance comes in many forms, including confidence-building measures, power-sharing arrangements, electoral support, measures to strengthen the rule of law, and economic and social development.

One project, spanning several years or sometimes just a few months, may operate through different stages of conflict, which can and often do influence the project's ultimate objectives.

Media's Multiple Roles in Conflict

On a related note, a single media initiative can play multiple roles simultaneously or over the life cycle of a project. A media organization may either propel or undermine movements toward a free and open political system. At the same time, the organization's programs may also serve as conduits for transmitting important health or safety information. Funding bodies and project implementers often disagree about what roles should be assessed during evaluation. For example, a project implementer may propose to construct a community radio station in order to ameliorate conflict by providing a platform for constructive dialogue and debate among local citizens. The funding agency, on the other hand, may be interested only in evaluations that measure the extent to which the radio station furthered Millennium Development Goals.²⁷ Because the time and money allocated to evaluation is typically limited, evaluations often focus on measuring the extent to which projects achieve donor-outlined goals, thus missing other significant outcomes. M & E often uncovers unexpected findings. In 2007, when conducting media monitoring of the quality of political journalism, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights became concerned that callers to the Kalenjin-language station urged for "the people of the milk . . . to cut the grass"—their coded language for the forceful removal of the ethnic Kikuyu from traditional Kalenjin homelands in the Rift Valley. Thus, assessing a media intervention according to criteria determined at the outset of a particular project may not adequately capture the full range of its contributions.

Despite the challenges to evaluation discussed above, better evaluation is essential because it offers critical evidence that can inform the production of future programs and direct donors and policymakers in the judicious and economical allocation of funding and policy. For some useful guides to evaluation, see box 2.

Improving evaluation begins with attention to a series of issues discussed in the next section.

Roadblocks to Improved Evaluation

All activities undertaken by the international community inside the territory of another country entail a high degree of uncertainty. There are few safeguards to ensure a particular program's success. That a program worked in one country is no guarantee that it will have the same result in a different country or environment. Still, there are lessons to be learned from every project, whether it succeeds or fails. There is a general consensus that evaluation techniques should be improved and expanded in three ways: (1) encouraging realistic expectations, (2) promoting clarity about evaluation requirements, and (3) improving conflict-specific research methods.

Box 2. Guidebooks for Monitoring and Evaluation

Banda, Fackson, Guy Berger, et al. *How to Assess Your Media Landscape*. Grahamstown, South Africa: Global Commission for Media Development. 2008. http://fesmedia.org/fileadmin/files-fesmedia.org/GFMD-Media_assessment_tool_2-09.pdf

Church, Cheyanne, and Mark Rogers. "Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programs." Search for Common Ground Manual. 2006. www.sfcg.org/Documents/manualintro.pdf

Dziedzic, Michael J., Barbara Sotirin, and John Agoglia. *Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE): A Metrics Framework for Assessing Conflict Transformation and Stabilization*. Washington, DC: USIP Press, 2008. www.usip.org/publications/measuring-progress-conflict-environments-mpice

DFID. "Working Effectively in Conflict-Affected and Fragile Situations." Briefing Paper I: Monitoring and Evaluation. 2010. www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/governance/building-peaceful-states-l.pdf

DFID. *Working with the Media in Conflicts and Other Emergencies*. London: DFID, 1999. See chapter 4 for monitoring and evaluation guidance. <http://reliefweb.int/node/21762>

Howard, Ross. *The Power of the Media: A Handbook for Peacebuilders*. Washington, DC: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 2003. For information on evaluation, see chapters 2 and 3.

Knowlton, Lisa W., and Cynthia C. Phillips. *The Logic Model Guidebook: Better Strategies for Great Results*. London: Sage, 2008.

OECD-DAC. *Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities*. 2008. www.oecd.org/secure/pdfDocument/0,2834,en_21571361_34047972_39774574_1_1_1_1,00.pdf

Sartorius, Rolf, and Christian Carver. *Monitoring, Evaluating and Learning for Fragile States and Peacebuilding Programs, Practical Tools for Improving Program Performance and Results*. Prepared for USAID. Arlington, VA: Social Impact, 2006. www.gsdc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=2674

UNDP. *Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results*. 2009. www.undp.org/evaluation/handbook/documents/english/pme-handbook.pdf

UNESCO. *Media Development Indicators: A Framework for Assessing Media Development*. Paris: UNESCO, 2008. www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/resources/publications-and-communication-materials/publications/full-list/media-development-indicators-a-framework-for-assessing-media-development/

USAID. "Evaluation Policy." 2011. www.usaid.gov/evaluation/

Encouraging Realistic Expectations

The Democratic Republic of Congo has fluctuated between full-scale civil war and sporadic violence since 1997. The Eritrean war spanned three decades, from 1961 to 1991. Afghanistan has been in a state of war since the 1978 Saur Revolution. Even with brief conflicts, such as the 1991 Togo War which lasted only six days, creating a lasting and sustainable peace may take years or even decades. Specific media interventions, in contrast, are typically much shorter. Governments and other funding organizations tend to plan in three- to five-year cycles. Projects that span an entire funding cycle are considered long-term and are the exception rather than the rule. Most funded projects last only weeks or even days. This typically short life span has created a situation in which implementers seeking to conform to funding cycles exaggerate the claims of what a specific program is likely to achieve in the short term. This presents a significant challenge for evaluation, because research is most helpful when it is framed realistically. This issue influences all stakeholders involved. Implementers feel pressured to report positive outcomes to their funding organizations, and funding organizations feel similar pressure to report success to their boards or to the policymakers who ultimately decide their budgets. At the same time, there is a common recognition that only realistic assessments are useful in guiding future programs. These frustrations are echoed in more general assessments

of the monitoring and evaluation of development projects. In their independent evaluation of reforms leading out of the Paris Declaration, Richard Blue and John Eriksson conclude, “Political and statutory pressure to report positive outcomes on a yearly basis works against the kinds of time frames and long-term efforts most likely to be effective, making ‘the long run’ simply too long. Good development practice may end up subsumed under short-term diplomatic and defense objectives.”²⁸

The promotion of realistic evaluations requires several institutional changes. First, where possible, follow-up assessments should be conducted well after the project cycle has completed. Positive outcomes identified in the immediate aftermath of a specific intervention may quickly fade. In 1996, following the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, the international community poured millions of dollars into creating the Open Broadcast Network (OBN), a private broadcaster designed to challenge the dominance of partisan and ethnic news sources. Initial evaluations deemed OBN a major contributor to democratic debate. But the OBN never attracted an audience proportionate to its cost, and after donor funding ended in 2000, it gradually moved into obsolescence as partisan media continued to thrive.²⁹ Therefore, follow-up assessments conducted well after the conclusion of a project are a critical component of realistic evaluations. Also, evaluators should use multiple methods in order to crossverify findings and test for unexpected outcomes. Pressures to report positive outcomes encourage evaluation plans designed to confirm that the project implementers have achieved whatever they set out to achieve. But media interventions may produce unintended consequences, both positive and negative. Methodologists frequently express discontent with uniform approaches to evaluation and emphasis on research methods that test only for anticipated results. To better identify unexpected outcomes, evaluations should, where possible, incorporate emergent practices such as participatory evaluations—a form of evaluation in which stakeholders in the program (providers, partners, customers, beneficiaries, and any other interested parties) actively participate in all stages of research, from planning and design to forming conclusions and future recommendations.

Promoting Clarity about Evaluation Requirements

Methodologists and practitioners concur that funding agencies need to provide greater clarity about their expectations for evaluations. Evaluation guidance can be improved in three central areas: (1) using clear and consistent terminology, (2) standardizing reporting requirements within and across funding agencies, and (3) cogently articulating project goals and outcomes and the theoretical assumptions that link them to project activities.

Clear and Consistent Terminology

Effective evaluation begins with the clear and consistent use of critical terminology. Semantic confusion undermines not only the conduct of evaluations but also dialogue about, and understanding of, research findings. This confusion impedes effective programmatic monitoring and evaluation and impact evaluation, thus preventing the sharing of best practices and lessons learned.

Perhaps surprisingly, the word “evaluation” itself often leads to confusion between implementers and donors. Those unfamiliar with M & E practices often use “evaluation” as an umbrella term encompassing all appraisals of a specific program or initiative. For M & E professionals, evaluation refers to a particular step in efforts to demonstrate the efficacy and impact

Effective evaluation begins with the clear and consistent use of critical terminology. Semantic confusion undermines not only the conduct of evaluations but also dialogue about, and understanding of, research findings.

of a program or set of programs. It is critically important to employ precise terminology that disaggregates the three equally important and integrated steps to any programmatic review:

- **Assessment:** appraisal of the media landscape and sociopolitical context for the conflict at the outset of a media intervention, which produces the project design.
- **Monitoring:** the regular collection of information to assess *operational progress* in implementing the plan. If properly conducted, monitoring produces valuable insights for improving project results and uncovering unintended consequences.
- **Evaluation:** the periodic collection of information to assess progress in *changing the behavior and well-being of target populations* at the project's end or at the conclusion of a distinct phase, where the project funder and the implementer have agreed to conduct an evaluation. Ideally, evaluations are designed to produce a comprehensive picture and shared understanding of the project's results through one or more research methods (e.g., surveys, interviews, focus groups, experimental designs).

Monitoring data are collected regularly and reported at regular intervals, whereas evaluation data are typically collected beforehand (i.e., baseline data), at the midpoint, and at the conclusion of the project. A definitive set of steps or ways to do assessment, monitoring, or evaluation does not exist. The components of each vary widely depending on the type, context, and scope of the program under review.

A second key area of definitional confusion is the use of the word “impact” to describe any one of what are actually three distinct, equally important results that flow from a combination of inputs (funds, personnel, and other resources) and activities (training, production, capacity building, and so on):

- **Outputs:** Easily quantified or observed (though not always easily obtained) results, such as numbers of personnel trained, numbers of programs produced, laws or regulations passed or improved, or creation of a new handbook of terms to avoid in broadcasts because of their potential to incite violence.
- **Outcomes:** Changes in knowledge, attitudes, behaviors, or practice that result from a given media intervention (e.g., displaced persons learn from radio broadcasts how to reach loved ones; news editors receive training and begin emphasizing more balanced reporting; or a government passes a new law banning hate speech, in response to a groundswell in public opinion generated by call-in talk shows or news reports).
- **Impact:** The conflict-prevention or peacebuilding effect of an intervention, such as a decrease in the number of violent incidents. Of the three categories of result, impact is the most difficult to gauge, because of the vast and complex constellation of social, political, economic, security, and other factors that determine levels of violence.

All stakeholders need to work proactively on using clear and consistent terminology. Donors should work with other donors to develop and agree on a common vocabulary. Methodologists have a responsibility to reach out and educate nontechnical funding staff and policymakers, and implementers need to take the time to become familiar with key terminology. Rather than reinvent the wheel, all parties involved should make an effort to consistently use the definitions outlined in the OECD Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management.³⁰

Standardized Reporting Requirements

Differing reporting requirements present a major hurdle to effective evaluation. While implementers lament the lack of standardized reporting requirements in general, this frustration is most keenly felt over the use of logical frameworks. Most donors require that monitor-

Table 1. AusAID General Logframe Matrix

Activity Description	Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
Goal or Impact The long term development impact (policy goal) that the activity contributes at a national or sectoral level	How the achievement will be measured—including appropriate targets (quantity, quality, and time)	Sources of information on the Goal indicator(s)—including who will collect it and how often	
Purpose or Outcome The medium term result(s) that the activity aims to achieve in terms of benefits to target groups	How the achievement of the Purpose will be measured—including appropriate targets (quantity, quality, and time)	Sources of information on the Purpose indicator(s)—including who will collect it and how often	Assumptions concerning the Purpose to Goal linkage
Component Objectives or Intermediate Results This level in the objectives or results hierarchy can be used to provide a clear link between outputs and outcomes (particularly for larger multicomponent activities)	How the achievement of the Component Objectives will be measured—including appropriate targets (quantity, quality, and time)	Sources of information on the Component Objectives indicator(s)—including who will collect it and how often	Assumptions concerning the Component Objective to Output linkage
Outputs The tangible products or services that the activity will deliver	How the achievement of the Outputs will be measured—including appropriate targets (quantity, quality, and time)	Sources of information on the Output indicator(s)—including who will collect it and how often	Assumptions concerning the Output to Component Objective linkage

Source: AusAID, "Ausguideline 3.3: The Logical Framework Approach," Oct. 2005, www.ausaid.gov.au/ausguide/pdf/ausguideline3.3.pdf.

ing and evaluation plans be placed in a logical framework matrix or LogFrame (also called a results framework matrix). First put into use by USAID in the 1960s, the LogFrame is now the most popular planning tool required by major donors. In asking for a LogFrame, a donor is essentially asking project implementers to map out the path (also called a results chain) of their monitoring and evaluation plan from beginning to end, in the form of a chart. Table 1 replicates the general LogFrame format required by AusAID.

However, almost every donor uses its own variation on the LogFrame model. Table 2 compares the different logical frameworks used by major donors.

As table 2 illustrates, each of the donor LogFrame templates differs slightly in terminology and ordering. What table 2 does not illustrate is that because terminology and reporting requirements are not standardized, donor expectations for how each of these boxes should be completed vary significantly. Ensuring that the completed LogFrame fulfills the specific donor's requirements entails a careful review of the accompanying explanatory literature provided by the donor. The quality and clarity of this supporting literature also differs from donor to donor, and some donors provide dedicated support staff readily available for consultation, while others do not. One project may be funded by a number of different donors, each requiring a different LogFrame and each using different terminology. Not surprisingly, this often leads to significant confusion about donor expectations and slows down the reporting process. Streamlined and consistent reporting requirements are particularly important for those working in conflict environments, where time is typically of the essence.

Table 2. Comparison of Donor Agency Logical/Results Frameworks

AusAID LogFrame	Goal/Impact Indicators Means of Verification Assumptions	Purpose/Outcome Indicators Means of Verification Assumptions	Component Objectives/ Intermediate Results Indicators Means of Verification Assumptions	Outputs Indicators Means of Verification Assumptions
DANIDA LogFrame	Development Objective/ Immediate Objective Indicators Targets Means of Verification	Outputs Indicators Targets Means of Verification	Activities Indicators Targets Means of Verification	Inputs Indicators Targets Means of Verification
DFID LogFrame	Goal Indicator Baseline & year Milestone 1 Milestone 2 Target Year	Purpose Indicator Baseline & year Milestone 1 Milestone 2 Target Year	Inputs (£) DFID (£) Govt (£) Other (£) DFID Share £%	Inputs (HR) DFID (FTEs) Output 1 Indicator Baseline & year Milestone 1 Milestone 2 Target Year Impact Weighting Indicator Baseline & year Milestone 1 Milestone 2 Target Year Risk Rating
EU LogFrame	Overall Objective Intervention Logic Objectively verifiable indi- cators of achievement Sources & means of indicators Assumptions	Specific Objective Intervention Logic Objectively verifiable indi- cators of achievement Sources & means of indicators Assumptions	Expected Results Intervention Logic Objectively verifiable indi- cators of achievement Sources & means of indicators Assumptions	Activities Intervention Logic Objectively verifiable indicators of achievement Sources & means of indicators Assumptions

SIDA¹ LogFrame	Development Objective/ Goal	Project Objective/ Purpose	Activities	Results/Outputs	Inputs/Resources
	Intervention Logic Objectively measurable & verifiable indicators Sources of verifications	Intervention Logic Objectively measurable & verifiable indicators Sources of verifications	Intervention Logic Objectively measurable & verifiable indicators Sources of verifications	Intervention Logic Objectively measurable & verifiable indicators Sources of verifications	Intervention Logic Objectively measurable & verifiable indicators Sources of verifications
USAID Results Framework	Strategic Objective	Intermediate Results	Outputs	Activities	Inputs
World Bank² LogFrame	Program Strategy (CAS³ Goal) Cause & Effect Performance Indicators Monitoring & Evaluation Goal to Super Goal	Project Impact (DO) Cause & Effect Performance Indicators Monitoring & Evaluation DO to Goal	Project Deliverables (Outputs) Cause & Effect Performance Indicators Monitoring & Evaluation Output to Purpose	Key Component Activities Cause & Effect Inputs Monitoring & Evaluation Activity to Output	

1. Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency.

2. World Bank, *The LogFrame Handbook: A Logical Framework Approach to Project Cycle Management* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000), [www.wau.boku.ac.at/fileadmin._/H81/H811/Skripten/811332/811332_G3_log-framehandbook.pdf](http://www.wau.boku.ac.at/fileadmin/_/H81/H811/Skripten/811332/811332_G3_log-framehandbook.pdf).

3. Country Assistance Strategy.

Cogently Articulated Project Goals

It is critical that implementers and donors agree on and clearly define the different steps to project planning, execution, and evaluation outlined in the project's logical framework. This includes project inputs (e.g., money, manpower), activities (e.g., peace journalism training), outputs (e.g., number of journalists trained), project outcomes (e.g., improved reporting), and impact (e.g., democracy promotion)—and, most importantly, the assumptions that link these elements together. The assumptions that link project inputs and activities to outputs and impact are often referred to as a *theory of change*.

A theory of change is the set of beliefs or assumptions about how change happens. Many pundits suggest, for example, that diversification of media outlets leads to a diversity of voices, which engenders democratic change. Social scientists are trained to articulate a theory of change, which they test through the research process. In principle, all research, whether academic or non-academic, begins with a clearly articulated theory of change that can then be tested through the research process. Theories supported by research will be applied in the future, and those that are disproved are discarded. There is broad agreement among those working in conflict environments and in the international development and peace support community that theories of change benefit M & E frameworks by providing a systematized means of thinking about the different components of project planning, implementation, and evaluation.³¹

But too often, monitoring and evaluation plans are drafted without a clear articulation of the theory of change that guides a specific media intervention. Failure to articulate theories of change impedes learning from the research process, because there is no systematic test of which theories work and which do not. One of the most consistent questions asked by M & E professionals is, “Are we asking the right research questions?” More importantly, are the questions we are asking answerable by the research methods employed? Regardless of the scope of an organization's goals, budget, and philosophy, LogFrames undergirded by a clear theory of change are an elemental best practice because they help donors, implementers, and methodologists get on the same page and agree on the right research questions. But in actual practice, regrettably, monitoring and evaluation plans are often treated as perfunctory and not as an opportunity to bring clarity and utility to the research process.

Below are some examples of theories of change associated with media interventions in conflict environments:

- **Individual change theory:** Media promote peace by affecting the knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors of a critical mass of people.
- **Healthy relationships and connections theory:** The introduction or improvement of media sources promotes peace by providing an information conduit between dissenting groups, thus reducing prejudice and stereotypes between groups.³²
- **Political elite theory:** Media interventions promote peace because they place pressure on the political elites to move toward conflict resolution.
- **Grassroots change theory:** Empowering communities by providing them with balanced information or the necessary tools to circulate their own information encourages grassroots mobilization for conflict resolution.
- **Public attitudes theory:** Prejudice, ignorance, and intolerance of difference encourage war and violence. The media can encourage peace by changing public attitudes and building greater tolerance in society.

LogFrames undergirded by a clear theory of change are an elemental best practice because they help donors, implementers, and methodologists get on the same page and agree on the right research questions.

Improving Conflict-Specific Research Methodologies

Conflict-specific approaches are needed in three major areas: (1) expanding the number of media-specific conflict indicators, (2) adapting research methods to conflict environments, and (3) engaging with, and building the capacity of, local researchers.

Indicators

There are several sets of indicators tailored to assessing media initiatives, and a number of metrics developed for measuring conflict transformation.³³ But neither group of indicators is tailored toward assessing the relationship between media, on the one hand, and peacebuilding and conflict prevention, on the other. Few, if any, conflict-specific indicators for assessing media's impact in conflict countries are applicable across a range of conflict situations, countries, and cultures, and relevant in different implementation and evaluation contexts. The Freedom House Freedom of the Press Survey, IREX's Media Sustainability Index, and Reporters Without Borders' Press Freedom Index produce aggregate rankings against which to measure the evolution of a media environment at the country level. And while these indices are often used as proxy measurements for the success or failure of a specific program, they were not designed to serve as project-level indicators.³⁴ While each of these indices, in calculating country rankings, weighs the number of journalists subject to violence or intimidation, none probes the broader relationship between changes in the media and peacebuilding. In other words, they are principally interested in how conflict influences the media, rather than in how changes in the media influence conflict.

Some donors, such as USAID, have developed program-level indicator standards that do measure media activities in conflict environments. But these standards speak only to the quantity rather than the quality of individual project outputs (e.g., the "number of media stories disseminated with US government support to facilitate the advancement of reconciliation or peace processes").³⁵ Standardized project-level indicators need to be developed that assess media-related outcomes in the context of a range of conflict conditions and measure the quantity as well as the quality of the media intervention in question. In a 2003 report, Mark Frohardt and Jonathan Temin laid out a series of indicators that may be useful to identify societies in which media outlets are especially susceptible to abuse or may be in the early stages of manipulation.³⁶ Frohardt and Temin suggest looking at three categories of structural indicators: (1) the reach, accessibility, and plurality of media outlets; (2) the capacity and the political, ethnic, religious, and regional composition of media professionals; and (3) the independence and effectiveness of government institutions concerned with the media. They also highlight the importance of assessing two content indicators: (1) the presence of content creating fear and (2) the presence of content suggesting that conflict is inevitable.

But so far, no indicators measure the contribution of a specific media intervention to peacebuilding or, conversely, to the exacerbation of conflict. Because there is extreme variation between and within fragile or conflict situations, building a generally applicable set of indicators is no easy task. But it is both possible and desirable to develop sets of indicators tailored to different conflict scenarios. All such indicators should use a sufficiently bold and resilient matrix to allow donors and implementers to discern whether specific media interventions are likely to promote a culture of peacebuilding or whether they may produce the opposite effect, thus fueling violence and insecurity. For a list of useful media-and-conflict research publications, see box 3.

Box 3. Media-and-Conflict Research Publications

BBC World Service Trust. "The Role of Media in Fragile Situations: A Research Dialogue Across Disciplines." Report of research symposium, Stanmer House, Brighton, UK, January, 2009. www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/trust/pdf/media_fragile_states.pdf

Bratic, Vladimir. "Media Effects During Violent Conflict: Evaluating Media Contributions to Peace Building." *Conflict & Communication Online*. 4 (2). 2005. www.cco.regener-online.de/2006_1/abstr_engl/bratic_abstr_engl.htm

Bratic, Vladimir, and Lisa Schirch. "Why and When to Use Media for Conflict Prevention and Peace Building." Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict. Issue Paper 6. 2007. www.centreforcommunicationrights.org/images/stories/database/tools/gppac-whyand%20when-to-use-the-media.pdf

Frohardt, Mark, and Jonathon Temin. "Use and Abuse of Media in Vulnerable Societies." USIP Special Report no. 110. 2003. www.usip.org/publications/use-and-abuse-media-vulnerable-societies

Mbeke, Peter Oriare. "The Role of Media in Conflict and Peacebuilding in Kenya." In-ternews Literature Review Report. 2009. www.internews.org/pubs/kenya/LiteratureReview_ReportingPeaceKenya_20090415.pdf

Melone, Sandra D., Georgios Terzis, and Ozsel Beleli. "Using the Media for Conflict Transformation: The Common Ground Experience." Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation. 2003. <http://opentraining.unesco-ci.org/cgi-bin/page.cgi?g=Detailed%2F926.html;d=1>

Putzel, James, and Joost van der Zwan. "Why Templates for Media Development Do Not Work in Crisis States: Defining and Understanding Media Development Strategies in Post-War and Crisis States." Workshop Report, LSE Crisis States Research Centre. 2005. <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/837/1/MEDIA.REPORT.pdf>

Price, Monroe E., Ibrahim al-Marashi, and Nicole A. Stremlau. "Media in the Peace-building Process: Ethiopia and Iraq." In *Public Sentinel: News Media and Governance Reform*, ed. Pippa Norris. Washington, DC: World Bank. 2010. www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Acrobat/WorldBankReport/Chapter%209%20Price,%20Al%20Marashi,%20Stremlau.pdf

Robertson, Andrew, Eran Fraenkel, Emrys Schoemaker, and Sheldon Himelfarb. *Media in Fragile Environments: The USIP Intended-Outcomes Needs Assessment Methodology*. Washington, DC: USIP Press. 2011. www.usip.org/files/COI%20-%20Images/PMT_Robertson_final.pdf

Flexible Research Methods

Research methods developed in stable conditions are commonly ported into conflict situations with little adaptation. Because conflict frequently disrupts monitoring and evaluation plans, donors need to build flexibility into their evaluation requirements. This may require additional financial commitments. For example, when conditions prohibit visiting the site of a particular intervention, it may be necessary to bring people living in those areas to alternate locations to participate in testing and feedback. Moreover, while donors have traditionally requested quantitative research methods that result in easily reportable statistical data, collecting systematic, reliable quantitative data in conflict environments is challenging. Qualitative data usefully complement quantitative findings and are often easier to collect in difficult research environments.

Local Research Capacity

A critical step toward improving the evaluation of media interventions in conflict countries is to learn from, and build the capacity of, local researchers. It is not uncommon for donors and project implementers to contract international (mostly Western) methodologists to evaluate programs conducted in countries about which those methodologists have little previous knowledge. Regardless of their research credentials or past familiarity with the country, international evaluators are typically less familiar than their local counterparts with current safety and security concerns, political power dynamics, and sociocultural issues that commonly com-

plicate every step of the research process in a conflict environment. Local wisdom can be helpful at every stage of the research process, beginning with securing the necessary permissions to conduct research in the first place. In some countries, no formal government permissions are necessary, while other countries have stringent and often labyrinthine application procedures, rendered even more complex in a conflict situation. It is often equally, if not more, important to obtain research permissions from local religious or community leaders than from official sources. A researcher interested in working in displaced-persons camps in Darfur, for example, must obtain government permission from the Sudanese National Intelligence and Security Services. And while it is not dictated by law, they would be foolish to begin any research without also first obtaining permission from the local wali (governor) as well as from various camp leaders. Certain communities may also be resistant or overly conciliatory toward researchers of specific gender, ethnic, or religious backgrounds. Local researchers are often in the best position to advise on these issues. They can also be critical sources of information at the project planning and monitoring stages. In the mid-1990s, for example, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the BBC World Service's Somali Section coproduced a drama series emphasizing reconciliation and humanitarian values. While some audience members embraced the series, others viewed it as part of a plot by a rival clan. Only during the evaluations conducted after the conclusion of the series did researchers discover why. Although the drama was set in an imaginary village inhabited by a diverse population, almost all the actors hailed from the same refugee camp in northern Kenya and spoke with an accent that gave away their clan.³⁷

Therefore, the international community needs to broaden its commitment to training and using local researchers and also doing participatory evaluations. Participatory evaluations, in which project beneficiaries are also asked to collect data, are especially useful in conflict environments. Enlisting the help of project beneficiaries serves a number of purposes simultaneously: it increases transparency, provides a means of checking official data sources, and improves local research capacity.³⁸

The Caux Principles

Along with a sustainable economy, the rule of law, a safe and secure environment, and stable governance, an open and inclusive media system is vital to peacebuilding. The media can play a pivotal role as a conduit for dialogue among dissenting parties and as a purveyor of critical information about available services or potential threats that might make the difference between life and death for those living in conflict environments. Given these high stakes, implementers, donors, and methodologists alike need to provide better support for evaluation in order to expand knowledge about what the media can and cannot achieve in conflict environments. This will improve policymaking and guide future programs.

In recognition of the critical need for improved evaluation, an international group of stakeholders, including media program funders, implementers, and researchers, met in Caux, Switzerland, from December 13 to December 17, 2010, to develop a set of shared guiding principles and best practices for evaluating the impact of media and communication programs in conflict countries.

The Caux participants believe that these principles represent a first step in developing an inclusive community of practice dedicated to improving the evaluation of media programs in conflict countries. We hope that our colleagues will support these principles and, more

The media can play a pivotal role as a conduit for dialogue among dissenting parties and as a purveyor of critical information about available services or potential threats.

An open and encompassing dialogue on how to improve evaluation methods will ultimately facilitate the creation of more tailored media practices that respond to the unique challenges of conflict environments.

importantly, join us in an ongoing process of self-reflection, discussion, and education about how to improve evaluation standards. We believe that an open and encompassing dialogue on how to improve evaluation methods will ultimately facilitate the creation of more tailored media practices that respond to the unique challenges of conflict environments, to the benefit of project funders, implementers, and intended recipients alike.

The Caux Principles, set forth below, are designed to reflect the specific needs of those involved in media programs in conflict countries. That said, designing a list of guiding principles applicable in every context, particularly given the variability and instability inherent in working in conflict countries, is all but impossible. Thus, these guiding principles are designed to be evolving rather than confining or exhaustive. Exceptions can and should be made as necessary to protect the integrity of the research and the safety and security of all those involved. In such instances, we hope that signatories will consult with, and draw upon the wisdom of, the expanding community of stakeholders who have signified their commitment to improving the evaluation of media programs in conflict countries.

In recognition of the benefits of evaluation to this work, and in keeping with the spirit in which the Caux meeting was convened, participants affirmed the following guiding principles:

Principle 1. Expand Financial Support for Evaluation of Media Interventions in Conflict Countries

Improving the efficacy and impact of media-related programs through evaluation requires a serious financial commitment. Recognizing the critical role of evaluation, Caux signatories agree, whenever possible, to the following:

- Dedicate between 3 percent and 10 percent of media program budgets to monitoring-and-evaluation programmatic activities, goals, and objectives.
- In the case of large-scale projects, allocate separate funding for impact evaluation.³⁹

Principle 2. Encourage Flexible Program and Research Designs that Are Sensitive to Changing Conflict Conditions

Fragile states often require flexible and creative approaches to evaluation research. The outbreak of physical violence, unexpected renegotiations of political power, rapid movement of populations, and unforeseen humanitarian emergencies are just a few factors that should influence project activities and their evaluation. Therefore, a project should not only be measured according to whether it achieved the expected outcomes outlined at the outset. Project outcomes and objectives should be reassessed and reevaluated in the face of rapidly changing conditions on the ground. At the same time, for those working in conflict environments, choices in program design can have life-or-death consequences. Consequently, those involved in evaluating these programs assume an added responsibility to collect data in as consistent, rigorous, and ethical a manner as possible.

Before initiating any project, participating entities agree, wherever possible to do the following:

- Develop an evaluation plan and timeline consistent with the political, security, and development environment.
- Conduct a thorough assessment of the media landscape in its political context, incorporating the views of local stakeholders.

- Investigate the dynamics of the local media marketplace (e.g., inflated local salaries or airtime charges) and how the proposed media project might alter those dynamics.

When conducting evaluations, participating entities agree, wherever possible, to do the following:

- Use conflict-sensitive approaches when selecting and training local researchers and enumerators. Conflict-sensitive approaches vary according to the specific nature of the conflict. They may include, for example, paying particular attention to the demographic makeup of the research team if it is working in an area where ethnic or racial tensions are high.
- Make every reasonable effort to ensure the safety and security of researchers and those from whom research material is collected. In particular, research should be planned and conducted with extreme care in areas where investigators have little basic data or advance knowledge.
- Conduct rolling risk assessments to minimize unintended consequences (e.g., physical risks to project staff, risk of inflaming ethnic or sectarian tensions).
- Be flexible in amending project outcomes in light of monitoring reports or in response to changing on-the-ground conditions that may have important implications for researchers and implementers.

Principle 3. Carefully Select Conflict-Specific Media Indicators

Research methods developed in stable environments are often untenable in conflict situations. Researchers should actively work to develop methodologies tailored to conflict scenarios. Methodologists and the academic community can also support better evaluation by developing and using project-level measurement criteria that probe the relationship between media projects and peacebuilding. Accordingly, supporters of the Caux Principles agree, wherever possible, to do the following:

- Encourage and facilitate collaboration between methodologists and academics to develop project-level indicators that link media projects to peacebuilding.
- Design research frameworks that address a range of evaluation criteria (e.g., project relevance, effectiveness, sustainability, consistency with values) specifically tailored to the social, political, and economic environment in question.

Principle 4. Engage and Collaborate with Local Researchers Familiar with Conflict Conditions

Conducting research in conflict environments requires that evaluators foresee resistance to the demographics of research teams, respond appropriately to rapidly-shifting safety conditions, and navigate the often complex steps to securing the formal and informal permissions necessary to collect data. Local researchers are often in the best position to advise on these issues. Therefore, the international community needs to broaden its commitment to training and using local researchers. In recognition of this fact, supporters of the Caux Principles agree, wherever possible, to partner with local institutions (universities, NGOs, private research organizations, and civil society) to help build the skills, knowledge, and experience of local researchers and institutions, thus adding capacity that outlives the project.

Principle 5. Foster Learning, Sharing, and Collaboration about Evaluation

In conflict environments, rapid shifts in the flow of humanitarian aid, the rule of law, and levels of violence present challenges for even the most experienced researchers and program

implementers. For those involved in evaluating media programs, these impediments to robust evaluation are compounded by the constantly evolving global media landscape and the resulting changes in the media ecologies of even the remotest countries. Given the unique challenges facing those involved in media interventions in conflict environments, collaboration and the sharing of research findings is essential. Sharing research findings and lessons learned both within and across organizations helps avoid the duplication of mistakes and maximizes the efficient allocation of the all-too-scarce human and financial resources available for evaluation. In support of this culture of learning, supporters of the Caux Principles agree, wherever possible, to do the following:

- As appropriate and where it does not threaten the safety and security of research subjects or researchers, share with other actors their not monitoring and evaluation reports, lessons learned, data, and best practices.
- Generate recommendations on both project and policy level and circulate these to others involved in related efforts.

Principle 6. Embed Evaluation into the Entire Project's Life Cycle and Beyond

To optimize impact and efficacy, evaluation should inform every phase of project execution, beginning with the design phase including the implementation and evaluation phases and, where possible, follow-up evaluations well after the project's completion. Accordingly, supporters of the Caux Principles agree, wherever possible, to do the following:

- When project funding and timing allow, come to an explicit agreement about the evaluation plan before a contract is signed.⁴⁰ This includes identifying and agreeing on (a) baselines against which project success will be gauged; (b) inputs, activities, proposed outcomes, indicators of success, and supporting methodology; and (c) the roles and responsibilities of each party involved.
- Identify and define the overarching project goals and sets of assumptions (i.e., theories of change) that link program activities to intended goals at the project-planning phase. This includes developing clearly articulated research questions that disaggregate individual-level objectives (e.g., reaching a particular audience) from societal-level objectives (e.g., promoting freedom and democracy).
- Begin each project with a monitoring plan based on a logical framework that includes baseline data, activities, outputs, data source(s), and frequency of data collection, as well as process and outcome indicators.⁴¹
- Monitor all media project activities during the implementation phase to test whether they are effective.

Good M & E can offer helpful insights regarding project design and implementation strategies and uncover changes that may need to be made. Embedding evaluation into the execution of a project can also create a valuable feedback loop that improves the conduct of project activities as well as future project planning. To get the most value from evaluation, Caux signatories should, wherever possible, do the following:

- Encourage interactions between donors, implementers, and researchers throughout the project cycle.
- Incorporate an ongoing review process in the project plan, recognizing that monitoring results, evaluation results, and environmental considerations may necessitate changing how project goals are measured—and even the project goals themselves.

Box 4. The Importance of Honest Evaluations and Realistic Expectations

An example of the importance of promoting realistic expectations that comes from my own experience in the Democratic Republic of Congo is the aim of establishing an independent media regulator in that country, as part of a large media-support program financed by Britain, Sweden, and France. This aim was originally written into the program's logical framework—the road map that is meant to guide the whole program. Three and a half years into the project, we find, to our disappointment, that the DRC government is seriously dragging its heels on promulgating a law which will make this new regulatory body a proper legal entity and with its own budget and staff independent of the ruling elite. This is not surprising given that elections in the DRC are on the horizon later this year, and politicians of all stripes depend heavily on the various TV and radio stations they own and control in their local areas, to win votes and get reelected. They are not particularly interested in fair regulation of broadcasting if it means that the partisan—if not hate—messages they are planning to broadcast are regulated. Such is the norm in many conflict-affected countries that I have observed.

We will have to amend this particular goal, perhaps even cut it. But our media-support program will not have “failed” even if some of these higher goals—sometimes called “impacts”—are not achieved. There are many other achievements that can be pointed out—in the case of this particular program in the DRC, the wonderful Radio Okapi, for one. It's okay not to solve everything, and it's okay not to pretend we can.

—Mary Myers, independent evaluation consultant

- Design research frameworks that measure unexpected or unintended results. This may include incorporating mixed methods, counterfactuals, control groups, experimental methods, or randomized controlled trials.
- Consider using multiple methods to crossverify findings and test causal links.

Principle 7. Promote Realistic Evaluation Practices

Because stakeholders are often under pressure to demonstrate a program's efficacy, evaluation plans are often designed to maximize positive findings in the interest of continued funding streams. But measuring media effects is difficult even in the most controlled environments, and establishing causal links between program activities and outcomes is particularly challenging in conflict environments. Donor organizations must be aware of—and implementers must be forthright about—what can realistically be achieved and measured. Supporters of the Caux Principles, therefore, agree, where possible, to do the following:

- Actively educate all stakeholders involved—including donors, implementers, and methodologists—about what a project can and cannot achieve, and what can and cannot be measured through evaluation.
- Understand the validity of a specific project's theory of change, include both short- and long-term evaluation components.⁴²

Principle 8. Work to Promote Greater Clarity Surrounding Evaluation

The time necessary to navigate complex and unclear reporting requirements is a luxury that those working in rapidly shifting conflict environments can ill afford. Implementers struggle to understand and fulfill the expectations of their different funders. Greater clarity of terminology is needed. Overused jargon and misused terminology often undermine evaluation practices. Terms need to be clarified and standardized across the community of practice involved in evaluation. Developing a better understanding of how to conduct more effective

media interventions in conflict is the responsibility of all parties involved. Accordingly, the Caux Principles affirm that evaluations, where possible, should do the following:

- Adhere to the glossary of terminology outlined by the more general guidelines for evaluation developed by the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee Guidelines.⁴³
- Work toward common intra- and interorganizational codes of practice, vocabularies, and evaluation requirements across departments and bureaus.
- Clearly distinguish project outcomes from impact. Caux delegates believe that outcomes (immediate project-related goals) and impact (long-term consequences, which can be intended or unintended) are often conflated. This definitional confusion can present a major challenge for those working in evaluation.

Conclusions and Future Direction

The rise of the twenty-four-hour global news cycle and the proliferation of mobile phones and other communication devices puts media, information, and communication-oriented development front and center in conflict situations as in all facets of life. While the potential of media and communication development is seemingly limitless and while opportunities abound for creative approaches to journalism, radio and TV technology, and Web- and mobile-based applications as well as for more traditional communication practices, there remains a pressing need for timely and robust research that shows how, when, and why media matter. As this report has stressed, evaluating media effects is challenging under any circumstances, let alone in complex and fluctuating conflict conditions. There remains a paucity of research (both qualitative and quantitative) into the relationship between media interventions and peacebuilding indicators, such as fewer public incitements to violence, strengthened popular support for a peace processes, and increased citizen engagement in the postconflict electoral processes. Thoroughgoing and rigorous monitoring and evaluation, as championed by the Caux Principles, is an important step in expanding knowledge about media and peacebuilding and helping practitioners and donors better understand how to plan for and administer media programs in conflict and postconflict environments. Academics, methodologists, and other researchers working outside the monitoring and evaluation community can also support this process by conducting complementary studies into the relationship between media and conflict, with an eye to informing and improving the implementation and assessment of media initiatives. Research, learning, collaboration, and information sharing within and among organizations involved in media and conflict will ultimately improve program design and project management, and engender a better understanding of media's role in conflict resolution and democratic transition.

Those concerned with monitoring and evaluation of media interventions in conflict countries are at a critical juncture. In the face of global economic downturn, policymakers and politicians no longer have the economic or political capital to fund projects without evidence of their utility. The onus is on the community involved in media-related projects to illustrate the projects' importance and improve their efficacy. To make the most of this pivotal moment for monitoring and evaluating media interventions in conflict environments, this report suggests several key outcomes that can advance the culture of research and learning within the media development community:

- **Apply the Caux Principles:** The Caux Principles represent a step toward drawing together a community of practice dedicated to expanding knowledge about the media's

The rise of the twenty-four-hour global news cycle and the proliferation of mobile phones and other communication devices puts media, information, and communication-oriented development front and center in conflict situations.

role in diffusing conflict and helping bring about peace and reconciliation. The principles should be treated as a living document that is regularly reviewed and updated based on the results of their practical application in the field, changes in the available media and communication technologies, and the expanding knowledge base of media's impact on conflict.

- **Establish a Regular Meeting of Stakeholders:** Building on the momentum begun at the Caux gathering, implementers, donors, and methodologists working in conflict environments should continue to meet regularly to share case studies, discuss best practices, and point to new ways forward.
- **Foster a Community of Practice around Research:** One of the principal challenges for evaluators is how to turn evaluation into a tool of change. Building a community of practice characterized by sharing evaluations across and within organizations is critical. Regular meetings are just the first step toward fostering such a community of learning and knowledge sharing. Those involved in media and conflict research should work to develop mechanisms for sharing and cross-fertilization, whether through circulation of project evaluations or through informal sharing of lessons learned.
- **Expand Donor Engagement:** Rather than lament the challenges of evaluation, implementers and methodologists should regularly seek out their donor partners. Regular interaction is the best way to convey the interest in, and passion for, more robust and meaningful evaluation research.

Appendices

Appendix 1: About the Caux Workshop

An international group of media experts, media development professionals, international broadcasters, methodologists, and NGO and government officials met in Caux, Switzerland from December 13 to December 17, 2010, to develop a shared set of approaches and best practices for identifying the role that media and information programs can and do play in conflict and postconflict countries. The meeting was jointly convened by the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania; the United States Institute of Peace; the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Fondation Hirondelle; and Internews. It evolved out of a common recognition that while evaluation is considered increasingly critical to media initiatives across the board, important debates are ongoing about how to assess the value of media interventions in conflict countries, and about the factors that lead to success or failure. Attendees participated in five days of intensive work and discussion to set forth the Caux Principles, a set of guiding values and best practices that specifically address the exigencies of conducting evaluation research in conflict-affected areas.

The complete agenda for the workshop is available at www.global.asc.upenn.edu/cgi-bin/projects.cgi?id=82&cp=main. The following background papers were prepared to enhance the workshop discussions:

- Bruce, Daniel. "Presumption of Peace: Northern Uganda and Media Development 2006–8." 2010. www.global.asc.upenn.edu/fileLibrary/PDFs/brucecaux2.pdf.
- Gagliardone, Iginio. "From Mapping Information Ecologies to Evaluating Media Interventions: An Experts Survey on Evaluating Media Interventions in Conflict Countries." 2010. www.global.asc.upenn.edu/fileLibrary/PDFs/iginocaux.pdf.
- Taylor, Maureen. "Methods of Evaluating Media Interventions in Conflict Countries." 2010. www.global.asc.upenn.edu/fileLibrary/PDFs/taylorcaux2.pdf.

Appendix 2: Caux Workshop Participant List

Susan Abbott, deputy director for program development, InterNews Network; Gordon Adam, managing director, Media Support Solutions; Claire Adamsick, Robert Bosch Foundation fellow, German Federal Foreign Office; Jean Louis Arcand, professor, Graduate Institute, Geneva; Amelia Arsenault, George Gerbner postdoctoral fellow, Annenberg School for Communication; Steven Assies, programme coordinator, Press Now; Radu Ban, economist, World Bank, Development Impact Evaluation Initiative; Daniel Bruce, media development consultant; Leah Ermarth, research manager, Broadcasting Board of Governors; Jean-Marie Etter, CEO, Fondation Hirondelle; Iginio Gagliardone, senior researcher, Annenberg School for Communication; Anna Godfrey, acting director of research, BBC World Service Trust; Emily Goldman, deputy director for interagency coordination, Office of Communication at U.S. Central Command; Maria Gulraize Khan, project officer, education, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit; Sheldon Himelfarb, associate vice president, United States Institute of Peace; Gordana Jankovic, media program director, Open Society Foundation; Adam Kaplan, senior field adviser, Office of Transition Initiatives, USAID; Bridget Kimball, program officer, International Research and Exchanges Board; Shannon Maguire, program and conferences officer, Center for International Media Assistance; Susan Manuel, chief, peace and security, United Nations Department of Public Information; Frank Melloul, chief of strategy, development, and public affairs, Audiovisuel Extérieur de la France; Mary Myers, development communication consultant; Werner Neven,

head of market and media research, Deutsche Welle; Nick Oatley, director of institutional learning, Search for Common Ground; Russell Eugene Parta, international broadcasting consultant; Raul Roman, senior project manager, InterMedia; Marjorie Rouse, vice president for program development, InterNews Network; Bruce Sherman, strategic planning manager, Broadcasting Board of Governors; Damase Sossou, research associate, Institut de Recherche Empirique en Économie Politique; Christoph Spurr, media researcher, Institute of Applied Media Studies; Andrew Stroehlein, communications director, International Crisis Group; Maureen Taylor, Gaylord chair of strategic communication, University of Oklahoma; Caroline Vuillemin, chief operations officer, Fondation Hironnelle; Matt Warshaw, vice president, D3 Systems; Colin Wilding, senior analyst, performance and assessment data, BBC Global News.

Appendix 3: About the Conveners of the Caux Workshop

Broadcasting Board of Governors

The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) encompasses all U.S. civilian international broadcasting, including the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia (RFA), Radio and TV Martí, and the Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN)—Radio Sawa and Alhurra Television.

BBG broadcasters distribute programming in 59 languages to an estimated weekly audience of 165 million people via radio, TV, and the Internet and other new media. The BBG works to serve as an example of a free and professional press, reaching a worldwide audience with news, information, and relevant discussions.

The Broadcasting Board of Governors is a bipartisan board comprising nine members. Eight, no more than four from any one party, are appointed by the U.S. president and confirmed by the U.S. Senate; the ninth is the secretary of state, who serves *ex officio*.

Center for Global Communication Studies at the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania

The Center for Global Communication Studies (CGCS) is a leader in international education and training in comparative media law and policy. It affords students, academics, lawyers, regulators, civil society representatives, and others the opportunity to evaluate and discuss comparative, global, and international communication issues. Working with the Annenberg School; the University of Pennsylvania; and research centers, scholars, and practitioners from around the world; CGCS provides research opportunities for graduate students; organizes conferences and trainings; and provides consulting and advisory assistance to academic centers, governments, and NGOs. CGCS draws on various disciplines, including law, political science, and international relations, among others. The Center's research and policy work addresses issues of media regulation, media and democracy, measuring and evaluating media development programs, public service broadcasting, and the media's role in conflict and postconflict environments.

Fondation Hironnelle

Fondation Hironnelle is a Swiss NGO made up of journalists committed to creating independent media in war zones and other crisis areas. Founded in 1995, Fondation Hironnelle works in many countries, supplying information where it is missing, countering and correcting rumors, and fighting propaganda. It is one of a handful of organizations in the world with this

kind of experience. By virtue of its quality journalism and through its varied broadcasts, Fondation Hirondelette allows millions of people every day to gain a realistic picture of events in their own countries, form their own opinions, and, above all, get their voices heard.

Internews

Internews is an international media development organization with the mission of empowering local media worldwide to give people the news and information they need, the ability to connect, and the means to make their voices heard. Through its programs, it improves the reach, quality, and sustainability of local media, enabling them to better serve the information needs of their communities.

Internews has worked in more than 70 countries and trained more than 80,000 people in media skills. Working together with local partners, its activities include establishing and supporting media outlets, journalist associations, and broadcast networks. It also has special programs to improve reporting on the environment, humanitarian crises, public health, and women's issues.

Formed in 1982, Internews Network is a 501(c)(3) organization headquartered in California. It currently has offices in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and North America.

United States Institute of Peace (USIP)

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan, national institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent international conflicts; promote postconflict stability and development; and increase conflict management capacity, tools, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by directly engaging in peacebuilding efforts around the globe. USIP operates on the ground in zones of conflict, most recently in Afghanistan, the Balkans, Colombia, Iraq, Kashmir, Liberia, the Korean Peninsula, Nepal, Pakistan, the Palestinian Territories, Nigeria, Sudan, and Uganda.

The Center of Innovation for Media, Conflict, and Peacebuilding focuses on the role of media throughout the conflict cycle: preventing media incitement to violence, protecting media from abuse during conflict, and empowering sustainable peacebuilding efforts in postconflict situations. The Center conducts research, develops programming across all forms of media, and promotes cooperation and information sharing among policymakers, experts, media actors, and peacebuilding practitioners. For more information, see www.usip.org/programs/centers/media-conflict-and-peacebuilding.

Notes

1. The authors wish to thank the many people who helped to create this report. The following pages draw heavily on the wisdom and experience shared by the participants at the 2010 Caux Workshop, "Evaluating the Impact of Media Interventions in Conflict Countries," listed by name in Appendix 2. Daniel Bruce provided invaluable input on the subject of indicators. And finally, this report could not have been completed without Libby Morgan's expert copyediting and helpful suggestions on content.
2. Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Prevention, "2010 Conflict Barometer," University of Heidelberg, 2010, www.hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer_2010.pdf.
3. "Mediademocracy," "medialism," "mediapolitik," "mediacracy," and "teledemocracy" are a few catchy terms used by journalists, politicians, and policymakers to refer to the increasing centrality of media in governance and society. Eytan Gilboa, "Media and International Conflict," in *The Sage Handbook of Conflict Communication: Integrating Theory, Research, and Practice*, ed. J. G. Oetzel and Stella Ting-Toomey (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2006), 596.
4. The BBC World Service Trust employed Darfur Lifeline Journalists with funding from the Department for International Development (DFID) and Christian Aid.
5. Such outlets included Radio Televizija Beograd and the largest newspapers. See Agneza Bozic-Roberson, "Words before the War: Milosevic's Use of Mass Media Band Rhetoric to Provoke Ethnopolitical Conflict in Former Yugoslavia," *East European Quarterly* 38, no. 4 (2004): 395-409.
6. Jeffrey Heyman, "United Nations Information Efforts in Conflict," in *Lifeline Media: Reaching Populations in Crisis—A Guide to Developing Media Projects in Conflict Situations*, ed. Loretta Hieber (Berne: Media Action International, 2001), 56.
7. DFID, "Independent Evaluation in DFID," Annual Report 2009, www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/evaluation/ev-annual-report-09.pdf; Andrew Natsios, "The Clash of the Counter-Bureaucracy and Development," Center for Global Development essay, July 2010, www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1424271.
8. "Monitoring" refers to the routine tracking of program performance. "Evaluation" refers to the episodic assessment of how well program activities are achieving program goals.
9. Al-Hurra is an Arabic-language news and information service produced by the United States Broadcasting Board of Governors. See Committee to Protect Journalists, "Journalists Detained and Broadcasts Jammed in Libya," March 1, 2011, www.cpj.org/2011/03/journalists-detained-and-broadcasts-jammed-in-liby.php.
10. For example, in February 2011, the United States Middle East Partnership Initiative called for projects in Tunisia that work to "establish an independent, professional, and pluralistic media sector that provides information transparently and constructively." Concurrently, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) announced plans to conduct countrywide assessments of the media and communication environments in Tunisia and Egypt in order to guide media law and policy reforms that would best facilitate a smooth democratic transition. See UNESCO HQ, IPDC Secretariat, "Assessing National Media Landscapes in the Mena Region Using UNESCO's MDIs" (project no. IPDC/55 RAB/03), www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CI/CI/pdf/IPDC/ipdc55_bureau_mena_project_final.pdf.
11. Sina Odugbemi, program head of the Communication for Governance and Accountability Program (CommGAP) at the World Bank, describes this debate as an "explanation Olympics": "There are experts who are tremendously certain the Arab Spring is all about social media. Others are quite sure it is all about the price of food. Still others say: it is the youth bulge, stupid." Sina Odugbemi, "The Arab Spring: Welcome to the Explanation Olympics" (CommGAP blog, March 3, 2011, 1:16 p.m.), <http://blogs.worldbank.org/publicsphere/arab-spring-welcome-explanation-olympics>. See also Clay Shirky, "The Political Power of Social Media," *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 1 (2011): 28-41.
12. See, for example, U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO), *Independent Media Development Abroad: Challenges Exist in Implementing US Efforts and Measuring Results* (Washington, DC: GAO, 2005); and UNESCO, *Media Development Indicators: A Framework for Assessing Media Development* (Paris: UNESCO Communication and Information Sector, 2008).
13. See also Rajiv Shah, "The Modern Development Enterprise" (lecture, Center for Global Development, Washington, DC, January 19, 2011).
14. The International Initiative for Impact Evaluation is an alliance of development organizations such as the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), USAID, Save the Children, and the Norwegian Agency for International Cooperation.
15. A counterfactual asks whether the intended beneficiary's well-being would have improved even had the intervention not taken place. The technique relies on comparing what happened among the sample population, with a comparable population not subject to the intervention. While historians, psychologists, and economists have used counterfactuals in their research for decades, the use of counterfactuals in project evaluation is relatively recent. Shah, "The Modern Development Enterprise."

16. DFID, "Working Effectively in Conflict-Affected and Fragile Situations Briefing Paper I: Monitoring and Evaluation" (DFID Practice Paper, March 2010), 10, www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/governance/building-peaceful-states-I.pdf.
17. Laura Mottaz, "US Government Funding for Media Development" (Special Report to the Center for International Media Assistance, December 7, 2010), http://cima.ned.org/sites/default/files/CIMA-U.S._Government_Funding_for_Media_Development-Report_0.pdf.
18. OECD, "Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities," (Factsheet, 2008), 8, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/20/39289596.pdf.
19. This model of media exerting powerful effects was undergirded by the broader modernization theory of development, introduced by such scholars as Daniel Lerner. Modernization theory posited that if structures in the "civilized" first-world countries were introduced into developing countries, those countries would soon reach modernity. According to this logic, once "modern media systems" were introduced into developing countries, they would serve similar functions as they had in their developed counterparts.
20. Gadi Wolfsfeld, *Media and the Path to Peace* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Jennings Bryant and Dolf Zillmann, *Media Effects: Advances in Theory and Research* (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2002).
21. Ross Howard, *The Power of the Media: A Handbook for Peacebuilders* (Washington, DC: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 2003); Monroe E. Price and Mark Thompson, *Forging Peace: Intervention, Human Rights and the Management of Media Space* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002).
22. Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," *International Security* 21, no. 2 (1996): 5–40.
23. Cees J. Hamelink, "Communication May Not Build Peace, but It Can Certainly Contribute to War," *Media Development* 49, no. 2 (2002): 36–37.
24. In experimental research methods, the investigator exposes only part of the target population to the intervention, in a controlled setting, to rule out extraneous factors and understand causal processes.
25. Gilboa, "Media and International Conflict."
26. Eric Brahm, "Latent Conflict Stage," in *Beyond Intractability*, ed. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess (Boulder, CO: University of Colorado, Conflict Research Consortium, 2003).
27. UN, "Summit on the Millennium Development Goals, 20–22 September 2010," www.un.org/millenniumgoals.
28. Richard Blue and John Eriksson, "Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration: United States Government Synthesis Report," USAID, January 2011, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACQ941.pdf.
29. Daniel De Luce, *Assessment of USAID Media Assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1996–2002* (Washington, DC: USAID, Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination, 2003), <http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/1481/PNACR756.pdf>.
30. OECD-DAC, "Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management," 2002, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/21/2754804.pdf.
31. Cheyanne Church and Mark Rogers, "Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programs," Search for Common Ground, 2006, www.sfcg.org/Documents/manualintro.pdf; DFID, "Working Effectively in Conflict-Affected and Fragile Situations."
32. The theories shown here were adapted from: DFID, "Working Effectively in Conflict-Affected and Fragile Situations," 8.
33. For an example of an in-depth metrics framework for assessing an intervention's ability to promote peacebuilding, see Michael J. Dziedzic, Barbara Sotirin, and John Agoglia, *Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE): A Metrics Framework for Assessing Conflict Transformation and Stabilization* (Washington, DC: USIP Press, 2008).
34. Natasha Wanchek and Lynn Carter, "Indicator Gap Analysis: Media Draft" (report, USAID, 2010), <http://mediamapresource.wikispaces.com/file/detail/media+report+final+9-27-2010.docx>.
35. USAID, "Master List of Standard Indicators," 2008, www.state.gov/documents/organization/115255.pdf.
36. Mark Frohardt and Jonathan Temin, "Use and Abuse of Media in Vulnerable Societies," USIP Press Special Report no. 110, 2003, www.usip.org/publications/use-and-abuse-media-vulnerable-societies.
37. Gordon Adam and Raj Thamotheram, "The Media's Role in Conflict" (report prepared for the Overseas Development Administration of the British government, 1996), http://repository.forcedmigration.org/show_metadata.jsp?pid=fmo:2204; Loretta Hieber, *Lifeline Media: Reaching Populations in Crisis: A Guide to Developing Media Projects in Conflict Situations* (Berne: Media Action International, 2001).
38. DFID, "Working Effectively in Conflict-Affected and Fragile Situations."
39. What constitutes a large-scale project varies from donor to donor. USAID, for example, defines a large project as "one that equals or exceeds in dollar value the mean (average) project size for the operating unit" (i.e., implementing body). See USAID, "Evaluation Policy" (2011), www.usaid.gov/evaluation/. As defined by the OECD-DAC glossary of terms, impact evaluation (in contrast to monitoring and evaluation, which

assess whether program targets have been met) measures the “results that lie beyond immediate outcomes or sphere of an intervention and influence the intensity, shape or likelihood of a conflict.”

40. The exigencies of conflict sometimes accelerate project development deadlines. Thus, if a project is deployed to respond to an immediate crisis, there may not be time or resources to adequately develop baselines or project monitoring plans during the proposal phase.
41. A monitoring plan (also called a performance monitoring plan) is a tool that project implementers and evaluators use to plan and manage how they will collect data used to assess the performance of a particular project.
42. “Long-term” refers to follow-up evaluations conducted months or years after the project’s conclusion. The precise timing of long-term evaluations depends on the project in question. See also J. P. Connell and A. C. Kubisch, *New Approaches to Evaluating Community Initiatives: Concepts, Methods, and Contexts* (Washington, DC: Aspen Institute, 1995).
43. OECD-DAC, *Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities*.



ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, DC • **George E. Moose** (Vice Chairman), Adjunct Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, DC • **Judy Ansley**, Former Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. Bush, Washington, DC • **Anne H. Cahn**, Former Scholar in Residence, American University, Washington, DC • **Chester A. Crocker**, James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, DC • **Kerry Kennedy**, President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights, Washington, DC • **Ikram U. Khan**, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, NV • **Stephen D. Krasner**, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA • **John A. Lancaster**, Former Executive Director, International Council on Independent Living, Potsdam, NY • **Jeremy A. Rabkin**, Professor of Law, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA • **Judy Van Rest**, Executive Vice President, International Republican Institute, Washington, DC • **Nancy Zirkin**, Executive Vice President, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, Washington, DC

MEMBERS EX OFFICIO

Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • **James N. Miller**, Principle Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy • **Ann E. Rondeau**, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, National Defense University • **Richard H. Solomon**, President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

In a tight global economy, international development actors face growing pressure to improve evaluation. Evaluators of media interventions in conflict environments face special challenges: collapsed timelines, fluid conditions, and travel constraints. Recognizing this, thirty-four donors, implementers, and academics, all experienced in media initiatives in conflict environments, met in December 2010 in Caux, Switzerland, to improve evaluation of media's impact in ameliorating conflict. This report reviews the state of the art in evaluating media interventions in conflict and outlines the Caux Guiding Principles, established during the workshop. It stresses better evaluation as critical to media's usefulness in conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

Related Links

- *Media in Fragile Environments* by Andrew Robertson, Eran Fraenkel, Emrys Schoemaker, Sheldon Himelfarb (2011)
- *Afghanistan Media Assessment: Opportunities and Challenges for Peacebuilding* by Eran Fraenkel, Emrys Schoemaker, and Sheldon Himelfarb (Peaceworks, December 2010)
- *Crowdsourcing Crisis Information in Disaster-Affected Haiti* by Jessica Heinzelman and Carol Waters (Special Report, October 2010)
- *Blogs and Bullets: New Media in Contentious Politics* by Sean Aday, Henry Farrell, Marc Lynch, John Sides, John Kelly, and Ethan Zuckerman (Peaceworks, September 2010)
- *Advancing New Media Research* by Sean Aday, Henry Farrell, Marc Lynch, and John Sides (Special Report, September 2010)
- *Preventing Media Incitement to Violence in Iraq* by Theo Dolan (Peace Brief, April 2010)
- *Media and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan* by Sheldon Himelfarb (Peace Brief, March 2010)

