Conference Paper
Religion, Nationalism, and Peace in Sudan

U.S. Institute of Peace Conference
September 16-17, 1997

The Challenges of Peace

By Steven Wondu, SPLM

Introduction

As the curtain falls on the last scene of the long Sudanese conflict, some observers predict that without an external enemy to fight, South Sudan will turn on itself. According to the scenario, the Nuer will wage war against the Dinka unless John Garang agrees to share power with Riek Machar. If he does not, then it might be better that the South remains a subordinate appendix of the present Arab-Islamic state.

This paper argues that the likelihood of a south-south war is not supported by the history of ethnic relations in New Sudan. The tribal war theory is inconsistent with current developments in the liberated areas. The author concedes however that ethnic rivalries exist and that there is potential for dysfunctional friction and conflict, but that historical experience, contemporary realities, and the policies of the SPLM would not only prevent military confrontation, but create a harmonious, albeit competitive, society.

Experience

South Sudan has long recognized itself as a single political entity. The many ethnic groups or tribes regard themselves as one nation. Tribal rivalries exist especially between pastoral communities like the Didinga versus the Taposa, and Dinka versus the Murle or Nuer. Limited hostilities occasionally erupt due to competition for pasture or cattle ownership. This happens in South Sudan as it does in many African countries. There are traditional mechanisms for peacefully resolving this type of conflict and they have been used to good effect in the past. The sedentary agrarian communities have not had ethnic wars in modern history. Except for the now forgotten incursion by Zande king Gbudué into Agar country in the distant past, history has no other record of politically motivated tribal war in South Sudan. No tribe has had the desire to extend its territorial boundaries. No chief has attempted to impose his jurisdiction on the domain of neighbors. Domination of one tribe by another has never occurred in Southern Sudan.

The first experience of Southern Sudan in modern political organization was during the Anglo-Egyptian disengagement from the Sudan in the 1950s. The southern leadership at the time fought together for the rights of the South. The parties did not assume a tribal alignment. Similarly, the Anyanya struggle that followed drew its leadership, cadre and support from every ethnicity in the South. The internal Southern resistance spearheaded by the Southern Front embraced the entire ethnic spectrum of the South. Whatever cleavages existed within the Anyanya and the internal front reflected differences of opinion and strategy not tribal groupings.

The real test of the ability of the South to govern itself came during the ten years of limited autonomy under the Addis Ababa agreement. Given the circumstances, it is fair to say that the regional government did a good job of governing the South. Had the central government released the special development funds and grants-in-aid to which the south was entitled under the Addis Ababa accord, the regional government would have achieved more in terms of economic and social development. True to character, Khartoum starved the regional government. Budgetary estimates were arbitrarily curtailed and approved appropriations were never availed, not even for the recurrent components of state obligations in the south. The financial paralysis of the regional government undermined its competence and eroded public confidence in it. Rivalry then developed at the top. The political formations that emerged represented individual ambitions, peer interests, or party loyalties. When shove became push, the weaklings resorted to tribal mobilization for support. President Numairi relished the bickering and encouraged it. But at no one time, not even during the acrimonious debate on the re-division of the South (kokora), did any soldier, politician or ordinary citizen, consider the option of tribal war. Bitter words were exchanged, voices were raised, and feelings were hurt. But no fist was brandished. The pioneers of the armed resistance declared war in 1983 on the real source of the South's agony - the government of Khartoum, not some sections of South Sudan.

The Fiasco of 1991

The Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement started in the predominantly Dinka-Nuer region of Upper Nile. It drew its initial support from those two communities. As a result, the Dinka and Nuer became dominant in the institutions of the organization. But the Dinka and Nuer are not guilty for having been a majority in the SPLM-SPLA. The citizens who responded to the call for sacrifice owe us no apologies. Many paid the ultimate price for the liberty of those who would survive the war. They deserve our unreserved reverence.

It is true that crime exists and that the instruments of the rule of law and the institutions of law enforcement are still deficient in areas under SPLM-SPLA control. But this is not to say that the patriots who gave up their careers and family lives for mother country have resorted to wrecking havoc on their fellow citizens. Those who rise to the occasion and fight often risk soiling their hands while those who sit on the fence akimbo, scanning the battlefield for errors and entertainment remain untarnished.

The emergence of Riek Machar's Nasir faction, alias SPLM/SPLA-United, alias SSIM/SSIA, alias SSDF alias ... was a residual product of a scheme to liquidate the liberation struggle. It was not a Nuer bid for the control of the South. It was not motivated by Southern nationalism either. The 'split' of 1991 was the result of a sophisticated plot. Khartoum successfully misled the intelligence community into believing that they were ready to relinquish control of the South if the SPLM-SPLA laid down their arms. The SPLM leadership recognized the bait for what it was and steered clear of it. Khartoum then agreed with SPLM-SPLA commanders Lam Akol and Riek Machar to revolt, take over the Movement and dissolve it.

This was about the same time in 1990 that the Turabi-Bashir government asked the Bush administration to mediate in the Sudanese conflict. The State Department also believed that the government in Khartoum had finally decided to abandon the South. This was the basis of the Herman Cohen initiative in which former Nigerian president Olusagun Obasanjo and Dr. Francis Deng of the Brookings Institution were involved. Cohen thought that Bashir needed an honorable exit. It did not take him long to discover that this was not the case.

At the same time, SPLM's Lam Akol and Khartoum's Mohammed el Amin Khalifa were engaged in another project that was inconsistent with the decoy idea of letting the south go. Akol and Khalifa signed a memorandum in December 1989 in which they endorsed the resolutions of the 'National Dialogue Conference' chaired by Khalifa in Khartoum in September 1989, as a valid basis for negotiations with the SPLM. This was discretely fed to the US government through former president Jimmy Carter. The gist of the resolutions of the conference affirmed the Islamist orientation of a tightly centralized 'federal' Sudan. The SPLM leadership dissociated itself from the Akol-Khalifa agreement. Consequently, Akol made secret trips to Khartoum from his base in northern Upper Nile to finalize arrangements for the coup. After his return from a long sojourn in England, Riek Machar sneaked an emissary to Malakal to secure the necessary military back-up. Before the announcement of the coup, Akol executed nineteen officers in his brigade whom he suspected might not cooperate in the mutiny. By coincidence or design, the announcement of the coup on August 28th 1991 was graced by the presence of an American congressman and a diplomat. Ema McCune, Riek Machar's new British second wife, and BBC correspondent Collin Blane were in the ceremony. Our poor brothers at Nasir thought and boasted that they had secured the support of the US and HM governments.

In discussing tribal tensions in South Sudan, it is necessary to understand that the events of 1991 did not originate from a Nuer-Dinka rivalry for the control of the Movement or the South for that matter. The Cassius in the plot, Lam Akol is Shilluk while Riek Machar was only the Brutus. The others who joined like Kerubino Kwanyin Bol and Arok Thon Arok are Dinka. The late Joseph Oduho was a Lotuko from Eastern Equatoria. For better or for worse, the faction included personalities from across the ethnic configuration of the South although the Nuer component is dominant by virtue of their proportion in the SPLM-SPLA in the first place.

The Nuer must not be singled out as having collectively turned their back on the cause of the South. The Nuer individuals in the employment of the regime are not different from the Dinka, Bari, Zande, and other southerners who have chosen to hoist personal interests above those of society. Similarly, the SPLM-SPLA cadre and leadership reasonably represent the entire ethnic spectrum of the South including the Nuer. There is a skew but that is not a problem, much less a crisis at this critical moment.

Managing Diversity

The SPLM does recognize however that it must gradually fashion itself into an organization that is capable of meeting the challenges of national responsibility. This entails the establishment of institutions that reflect the ethnic diversity of New Sudan. Transformation by definition, is a process. Most of 1993 was devoted to the organization of a national convention to decide whether, in light of the betrayal of 1991, the war should be continued and if so, what the ultimate goal should be and what structures and strategies were needed. It took a lot of sacrifice, patience, determination, defiance and pain to assemble the eight hundred representatives from all the corners of the South, Kordofan and Blue Nile in one place for the convention that finally materialized in April 1994. Old men and women walked incredible distances. Several delegates died in aerial raids by the enemy. The bombardment continued during and after the convention. Since that historical assembly, the SPLM-SPLA has never been the same again. It took a lot more than desk-top nationalism to realize that feat.

The institutions that emerged from the convention include a legislative Liberation Council and an Executive Council. New resolutions were passed to replace the manifesto of 1983. The role of the military was redefined to focus more on the conduct of the war while political mobilization and civil administration were transferred to appropriate organs. New blood was transfused into the SPLM system. The result was a blossom of fresh approaches, strategies, attitudes, and coping mechanisms. There emerged from the rubble of 1991, a cohesive team of political and military players who proved their prowess in the years that followed. The SPLM leadership has been purged of the detractive elements who had been bogging it down with trivia. They are now infecting Omer Bashir's system with their confusioniosis.

All the reforms that have been introduced since 1994 have, for reasons little known to us, been ignored by the authors who continue to publish one adverse report after another about the SPLM-SPLA. The same phrases have been recycled verbatim for a whole decade. One can be tempted to doubt the objectivity and quality of the research on which so much money has been spent and so much reliance placed.

The transformation did not proceed smoothly. Bottlenecks included human resistance to change, resource scarcity, capacity constraints, and enemy disruption. To resolve some of the problems and flag off the nascent democratic structures, a series of conferences have been conducted since the convention. Top and middle ranking SPLA officers were assembled in September 1995 for reorientation and redirection. In 1996, a civil authority conference was held followed by a meeting between the newly established civil authority and all non-governmental organizations working in the New Sudan. In July this year, a conference between the churches and the SPLM was held to harmonize the responsibilities of the two institutions. A UNDP sponsored workshop on governance attended by SPLM leaders and senior staff is in progerss right now. These meetings and the more that will follow are intended to build the spirit of national responsibility in all our social and political institutions. So far, the results have exceeded expectations, at least in terms of the popularity of these events among our people. The mere availability of legitimized forums makes the individual citizen a relevant component of the national system. It is hoped that similar conferences will be held by women, lawyers, doctors, merchants, students, artisants, farmers, magicians, and other special interest groups. In the long run, conferences, seminars, symposia, and workshops will become normal structures for managing peace and development in the New Sudan. We have to encourage alternative bases of identity to ethnicity. The process of nation building has started. This message is being carried to the rest of the world. UNESCO has hosted two conferences at Basselona in which the SPLM was a key participant. Next month, a round table conference will be held in Germany between the SPLM and the UNDP on fiscal management. The IMF, World Bank, European Union, the African Development Bank and private investors are invited to attend.

The New Sudan has been structured by the National Convention into regions, counties, payams and villages. Decentralization is an appropriate administrative technique for a large multi-ethnic country with poor infrastructure. The localization of authority minimizes friction. Most tribes in New Sudan have strong customary laws in matters concerning land use, natural resources conservation, weather forecasting, pest control, property rights, inheritance, marriage and paternity. They also have institutions and procedures for conflict resolution in these and other 'constitutional' matters like succession in traditional public offices, and family or clan leadership. The recognition of these particularities means that traditional authority must be respected and empowered to play its role with dignity. It is generally understood and agreed that the government at the center, to the extent that meritocracy is not unduly compromised, mirror the ethnic chemistry of the country. It was, after all, the failure of the rulers of old Sudan to recognize our ethnic diversities that led to the war in the first place. It would be a tragic fallacy for the SPLM to practice the very same injustices that it set out to eliminate.

African leaders who have corrupted their political and economic systems to the benefit of their tribes ultimately ruined their countries. Tribalism works against the individual, the tribe, and the country as a whole. The individual patron loses national appeal as a patriot. The individual beneficiary is deprived of the satisfaction and dignity of being an achiever. The tribe attracts the contempt, hostility and wrath of the others. The country loses efficiency when mediocre persons are appointed into positions for which they lack competence. The more able citizens are demoralized. This often leads to the exodus of the very skilled personnel the country needs. The brain drain from Africa is, to no small measure, attributable to tribalism. John Garang has repeatedly warned that whoever resorts to tribalism would be riding a very hungry tiger.

Four Legs

Some 'experts' tend to conveniently collapse the ethnic composition of South Sudan into a Dinka-Nuer dichotomy. While the two tribes are visibly numerous, there is a robust third leg on which the South stands.

In the event that some misguided individuals do actually decide to wage war, our third leg is unlikely to take it very kindly. In 1994, the New Sudan Council of Churches delivered a proposal from Riek to Garang that as a condition for reconciliation between them, the SPLA should cede part of Equatoria to him so that he too would have a corridor to the Ugandan or Kenyan border. This provoked a harsh reaction from Equatorians. Garang did not have to consider the idea except to remind the clergy that Equatoria was not his private estate to trade with. This little episode vaporized whatever sympathy Riek had among Equatorians. Conversely, it boosted Garang's already favorable image as a non-sectarian leader of New Sudan. It was not by accident that the Khartoum army could not dislodge the SPLA in Equatoria.

In addition to Equatoria, the SPLA has an emphatic presence in the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile. These two regions are as much a part and parcel of the New Sudan as the others. They are the forth leg. The hard kicks Omer Bashir and Riek Machar are receiving in Blue Nile, Nuba Mountains, Equatoria and Bahr el Ghazal are not unrelated to the muscles of the third and forth legs. The more Riek's friends talk about Nuer 'right' to power, the more they make it impossible for him to gain acceptance. The principle of civil rights is that all citizens are entitled to participate in national endeavors. There can never be a tribal government in New Sudan. Speaking at the Abuja peace conference in 1993, the SPLM deputy leader, Salva Kiir, observed that the democratic principle of majority rule is applicable only within the context of justice for all. It cannot be used for subjugating individual or group rights.

Again, it has to be remembered that the SPLM/SPLA, more than anybody else, persistently explains the current war in Sudan as a rebellion against the politics of exclusion. The ethic of justice and equality for all is not a mere slogan. It is our legal and rational basis of governance. Those caught subverting this ideal have been punished in the past and those who might be tempted to do so in future would be shooting themselves in the groin.

Economics

Throughout the forty years of post colonial misrule, the state has been the only employer in the formal sector of our economy. Competition for the few government jobs contributed significantly to tribal friction in the civil service. A free New Sudan should be in a position to widen the scope of economic opportunities. Even without considering the oil and mineral inventory, the agricultural potential (livestock, fisheries and crop) would be sufficient to satisfy our people. New Sudan has abundant arable land. If there is a demographic problem, it is that the country is under-populated.

The challenge facing a future administration is the identification of economic policies that would increase production and guarantee equitable distribution of income. The National Convention resolved that the New Sudan shall be a free market economy. Unfortunately, the country is completely undeveloped. Production is still subsistent. Batter exchange is more common than perhaps anywhere else in the world. There is no physical infrastructure. There are no banking, insurance, and credit services. In fact, there is no local medium of exchange. The skills necessary in a modern economy are abysmally lacking. These negatives present a serious barrier to the launching of the development process.

There is a positive angle from which the backwardness of the New Sudanese economy can be perceived. The severe constrains facing most African development planners are absent in New Sudan. These include a bloated public sector, crippling budget deficits, entrenched trade imbalances, inappropriate technology, the burden and conditionalities of foreign debt, and strangulation by giant multinational corporations. New Sudan has a blank page on which to design a novel economic model suitable for its circumstances and in relation to the global market place. It should not be too difficult to set up forward and backward linkages that create economic interdependence between the regions. The resultant symbiotic relationships would weld society closer together in self interest. There is some kind of regional specialization that should help economic integration and peaceful coexistence. Both Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal supply Equatoria with beef and fish. Western Equatoria produces a wide range of fruits and root crops. Eastern Equatoria and northern Upper Nile are the grain areas. The Nuba Mountains and Ingessena Hill have their own uniqueness hitherto unexplored. With a thriving indigenous private sector, public office would become one of the options available to the individual for earning a living.

John Garang

The scary story making the rounds in Khartoum and the West is that John Garang will almost certainly misrule the New Sudan because of his identity and character. As a Dinka, according to the scare crows, he will load the government and army with his kinsmen. The Nuer would then lose their temper and stage a fight. The Dinka, our friends swear, would then go on the killing rampage.

Whatever his share of human limitations, Dr. John Garang is the perfect match for the rulers in Khartoum. He is a formidable threat to those who consider the Sudan their dominion to exploit at will. Garang has demonstrated his ability to terminate hegemony and throw the doors of opportunity open to all Sudanese. But, as Moses found out during his nation's forty years' trek to freedom in the heat of the Sinai, no leader can score a 100% approval rating. Such is human nature. Western democracies consider a 51% majority a decisive legitimate mandate. If John Garang did not enjoy the overwhelming support of our people, he would not have survived the turbulence of the1990s.

The point has already been made that it would be virtually impossible for any leader to successfully impose a tribal government in the New Sudan. John Garang had been openly uncomfortable with the Nuer-Dinka majority in the rank and file of the SPLM-SPLA. Up to a point in time, those were the only people available. As more volunteers came from the other regions, the proportions changed accordingly. No rational human beings would want to monopolize a fatal enterprise like war. Today, the SPLM national Executive Council is composed of sixteen Secretaries; five from each of the three regions of the South and one from the Nuba Mountains. The five governors come from their respective regions. All the county commissioners are local. The National Liberation Council is composed of a number of deputies proportionate to the the population of the districts as they stood during the ten years of 'bad peace'. Every effort is being made to ensure that all public institutions look like the New Sudan.

The case of the army requires greater caution. Ethnic balance in the SPLA at this stage can only be achieved by increasing the number of recruits from the other regions. That responsibility has now been transferred from the military to the politicians and traditional authorities. Much progress has been made and the process in continuing. After the war, the situation will be entirely different. A new peace time army is already being developed. Friendly governments, including the United States, have been asked to assist in demobilizing the SPLA and integrating the veterans in civilian life after the war.

As for John Garang's personality, my reading is that he is a confident person, unintimidated by the arrogance of Arab 'supremacy' or the myth of Islamic invincibility. He is deep and sometimes difficult to understand. He has strong views on issues but admits superior or valid counter arguments.

Garang has long plans, a wide vision, and high goals. Khartoum calls him a dreamer. If he is, then we are truly blessed to have a man whose most important dream holds the promise of coming true. Amen ! He sees the future of the New Sudan in the context of the renaissance of Africa and a new world order. He makes a subtle distinction between achieving peace and resolving the conflict. The SPLM is geared to the search for a just and permanent solution to the Sudanese conflict, not a temporary cosmetic patch-up that would fade out with time. If I were Omer Bashir, I would not bank on John Garang to save my ugly face.

Garang is not particularly excited by his Dinka identity. He accepts it as a natural incident which he does not have to celebrate or regret. For the loyalty, effectiveness, and efficiency of his staff, officers and men, he does not count on their tribal identity. He knows and applies the relevant critaria. Garang is a workaholic. His head is full of projects, ideas, models, and concepts.

Garang and the armed struggle could not have survived, leave alone succeeded, if he had been fickle, easy, ambivalent and panicky. He may not cry in public but is severely tormented by the degradation, retardation, and devastation the enemy has inflicted on our people and country. Garang is a pragmatic down-to-earth human being. Dogma, he says, is for lazy thinkers. He is mercilessly meticulous when it comes to prioritization. It took us five years to persuade him to have a new suit. He finally obliged when we visited Washington in winter. Garang seldom does things merely to please people. He is firm and does not yield to pressure if he thinks it is unfair or wrong. That is why some people do not quite like him very much. But like him or not, he is the guy for the job. We would be foolish not to rally behind him. Such leaders do not emerge very often in any society.

Lessons

Africa experienced destructive post liberation wars in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. UNITA and RENAMO were heavily financed, armed, and otherwise supported by the West because the MPLA and FRELIMO governments in Luanda and Maputo were perceived to be friends communist block. The apartheid regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia provided territorial and logistical backup. Both the Angolan and Mozambican rebellions ended with the cold war and apartheid. Parasites characteristically share the fate of the host. The ZAPU mutiny in Zimbabwe had no external support and ended the way it did in a relatively short time.

The friends of the Nasir mutiny have done a commendable job promoting their 'Garang must go' project. But they have not, to the disappointment of Machar, delivered a single round of ammunition. They are unlikely to do any better in future. It is only Omer Bashir who has been practically useful to Machar and the other fictitious 'rebel movements' scrambling for the crumbs under Bashir's table. But even Bashir is an unreliable ally. At Abuja in 1993, he offered to look the other way while the SPLA 'neutralizes' the Nasir group if we dumped the northern opposition in the NDA. Today, Bashir would be more than happy to amputate Riek Machar in exchange for a public handshake with John Garang.

Peace can only come to the New Sudan in one of two ways: through a negotiated agreement or the removal of the NIF from power in Khartoum. In the unlikely event of a negotiated settlement, Bashir would have to dismantle all his militia. If peace entered Sudan through that narrow path, the eye of the needle will become a boulevard for camels. Genuine peace and the Bashir government are, in my humble view, mutually exclusive. I think the SPLM has finally figured out how and when to fix the Sudanese problem. In whichever way the conflict is resolved, Riek Machar will not benefit from the lap, shoulder and wallet of Omer Bashir. True friends should be advising Riek to avoid the pitfalls of the Nterahamwe, the West Nile Bank Front, and the Lord's Resistance Army. Machar's main problem is that he and his friends are lazy thinkers driven by wishes, images, scenarios, and doctrines. True friends should do a little soul searching for the morality of inciting people in South Sudan to fight each other.

After the demise of Bashirsm, the Sudan shall be governed during the interim period, and its final destiny determined thereafter, in accordance with the NDA Asmara agreement of June 1995 (key protocols appended).

Conclusion

While the SPLM-SPLA is likely to bear the burden of leading the New Sudan through the transitory period after the war, it will not be working alone. We recognize that managing peace will demand different attitudes, skills, and instruments. By his boundless mercy, the good Lord has preserved the lives of a few of our elders. We also have youthful compatriots in the Diaspora and in the country. These people have stood by us, consoled us, encouraged us, and helped us during our difficult times. They advised us whenever we were uncertain. They rebuked us whenever we faltered. They also tackled the enemy in their own ways whenever they could. We are certain that our wise men and women will not shy away from their cultural responsibility. Our youth will not deny the country their contribution to the challenge ahead of us. The challenge ahead of us is a war against poverty, ignorance and disease. This will require many more battalions than we ever needed for the war we are about to win.

The New Sudan is emerging during an era of renewal in black Africa. The philosophy and method of governance in the New Sudan will have to be consistent with the geo-political environment. Moreover, the current trends of global villagization and democratization will engulf the New Sudan no less than it is affecting the countries of the Horn, the Great Lakes and the Southern African regions. The New Sudan will not be an island in space or time.

By far the greatest guarantor of stability, good governance, and prosperity in the New Sudan will be the people themselves. We have a population, or whatever is left or it, that has experienced war, suffering, devastation and death for longer than any society in contemporary human history. I am convinced that when peace and freedom finally arrive, our people will never allow anybody, whoever he is, to plunge our dear country into war again.

Thank you all.

The views expressed above do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.

For More Information

Please contact the Religion and Peacemaking Initiative by e-mail at religion@usip.org. Written inquiries may also be sent to the address listed below.