Event Transcript
Religion, Nationalism, and Peace in Sudan

U.S. Institute of Peace Conference
Wednesday, September 17, 1997

Final Session

Comments by President Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea
Closing comments by panel members

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Bill, excuse me. It is my pleasure to announce that President Isais Afworky from Eritrea has requested the chance to address this assembly and we are certainly eager to here what he has had to say. I have asked Francis Deng to introduce you.

MR. DENG: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ladies and gentlemen, despite what I said yesterday, the story of Mandela being introduced, I have to say again that the great pleasure of introducing a head of state is that in most cases they do not need to be introduced. But in this particular case, I take great pleasure and honor in saying just a word by way of introduction for President Isais Afworky of Eritrea.

We do hear it said these days that there is a new generation of leaders in Africa, leaders who are principled, leaders who are there for a purpose, for their countries, and for their people rather than for sheer power. We also hear it said that Africa is producing a new sense of responsibility manifested by these new leaders within the framework of subregions. We hear it said that in west Africa, ECOWAS has assumed responsibilities. We hear it said that SADIG in southern Africa has assumed responsibility for that region. And in the Horn, we hear IGADD playing a key role and in this conference that role has been pronounced repeatedly. I want to say that President Afworky symbolizes all these new generation of leaders who are leading the liberation of the continent, not against colonialism outside the continent, but against forces within. Leadership that is rejuvenating African ability to deal with African problems within the framework of subregions. And what is more, President Afworky and his country have shown that we can become prisoners of fear and of consequences of dealing with problems of inequities within the framework of nations and rethinking new solutions to our problems without threatening the collapse of the whole.

It used to be said that even against the possibilities of Eritrean independence that any partitioning of any country would be a precedent that would lead to the collapse of the continent. Well, I think we now know that if anything at all, Eritrea and Ethiopia are now more united than they ever were in the independence of Eritrea.

It is a personal pleasure and great honor, being someone who has for some time now watched President Afworky closely and worked with him, it is a great pleasure for me to introduce him to you.

PRESIDENT AFWORKY: May I first thank the U.S. Institute of Peace and thank Francis for the kind words of introduction. I am glad that I have been given this opportunity, even though it is a very brief opportunity I have. I am glad to participate in this forum in my capacity as an observer and party to developments in our region. I would like to be brief on one particular issue regarding the Horn of Africa and the situation in the Sudan in particular.

Unfortunately, when the environment in our region was changing for good with new developments emerging in the Horn of Africa, as was indicated by Dr. Francis, Eritrea and Ethiopia getting more united by the indifferentness of Eritrea. Everyone in the region wishing to see a new era of regional cooperation. The frustration that has come as a result of developments in the Sudan is in my opinion a disappointment in the history of the region. We have for the last 8 or 9 years tried, and we have been very persistent in our attempt to find a solution to the problems in the Sudan. Unfortunately, time has passed and it seems that our friends in Khartoum are postponing the solution of these complex problems by employing tactical tricks every now and then, which is unfortunate in my opinion.

In 1994, when IGADD embarked on an initiative to find the solution to the problem in southern Sudan and came up with a declaration of principles, signs of hope not only in the region but outside the region were so encouraging that people expected early results from the intervention of IGADD through the declaration of principles. Since then, three years have passed and nothing has been achieved these last three years.

Again hope by many after the last meeting in Nairobi, where IGADD again revived its initiative through the invitation extended to the parties in the country to find a peaceful solution to their problems. Again, I would be very cautious to say that, yes, there is a genuine interest now to engage in a peaceful process in Sudan. The parties seem, and particularly the government seems to be looking for alternatives outside IGADD, and tactically engaged in buying time to play one against the other in the Sudan, in south Sudan, in the region and outside the region.

I would like to take this opportunity and remind all those interested in this process in the region and outside the region to urge all parties to the conflict to not waste time by postponing the solution, which should have come earlier. There is no reason why any one party to the conflict should believe or have the perception that tactical tricks and eventually endless trials to postpone the solution in the south will accumulatively get to some victory to one party. I stress on the fact that it is the responsibility of the government in Khartoum. It is not the responsibility of the SPLA above anyone else, even though both share equal responsibilities and a genuine commitment to the initiative of IGADD. But the responsibility of the government in Khartoum seems to be much more emphasized because of the fact that the SPLA in 1994 officially endorsed the DOP, which was not accepted by the government then.

This year, the government has officially declared that it would accept the declaration of principles. Unfortunately, not much has been done because of recent developments which indicate that there are other avenues or other ways of finding a solution to the problem, which in my opinion were initiated by parties who were not cognizant about the complexity of developments in the region who felt that alternative venues or alternative initiatives would be suitable to buy time and postpone the solution again. I would like to conclude by saying that postponing a solution is not going to help anyone. It is not going to help the government. And continually playing the game of playing one against the other, especially in the south -- Dinka against Nuer, one tribe against the other -- the problems in the north also, where the government is trying to find solutions of individually dealing with every opposition group without taking stock of the problems that Sudan and its people are facing these days. In this regard, I would again emphasize the fact that within IGADD the acceptance of the government whether genuine of tactical this time will have to be tested by an invitation which will have to be extended by President Moy of Nairobi in the near future, which I believe will allow every one of us to have an opportunity to exactly find out the commitment of parties to the conflict in finding solutions to the problems.

I am very sorry I have been pressed by time, but I would gladly address some of the questions from the audience.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Are there questions for President Afworky? Yes, sir?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Bruce Fine and I am representing the Embassy of Sudan. I have one observation to make. It seems rather ironic, President Afworky, that after you promoted force and violence as the sole method of trying to solve the so-called problem in Sudan for so many years, to come here under the label of the United States Institute of Peace and suggest that you are a force for peace. You have been in close contact with the SPLA. They have had a headquarters in the capital, and all those long, long months you were insisting that there was nothing but force and violence.

Second -- I am just making that observation. We talk about tactical ploys. One might reasonably suspect that that is what you are engaging in here since it is 180 degrees opposite to what your foreign position is. But secondly, have you received a commitment from Colonel Garang after the July 8/9 summit in Nairobi where President Beshir accepted the declaration of principles as the foundation for negotiating the final chapter to the civil war? Has Colonel Garang communicated to you an agreement that he would meet with President Beshir with face to face discussions under the IGADD auspices at a fixed date instead of displaying the elusiveness of an eel, which has been the past pattern where there has been a longstanding offer for direct/direct peace talks between Beshir and Garang that have never been accepted?

PRESIDENT AFWORKY: I think this is the second time that I am encountered by this gentleman. It is very unfortunate that Khartoum has hired lobby groups who even don't represent the image of the NIF anywhere unfortunately. Peace in the region is not a matter of business for me. I am not here to do any business in terms of peace. I am not hired by anyone. I have a responsibility. The people in the region have the responsibility of finding peace in the Sudan. That is a commitment. It is not an obligation that has come as a result of political calculation. It is not a bargain we are engaging to. We would like to see peace in the Sudan.

Unfortunately, it has not been the making of Eritrea. It has not been our policy -- it has never been a policy in Eritrea to go into any confrontation with the government in Khartoum, irrespective of its ideals. That has never been the case. We have lived as friends. We have worked together. We know each other better than anyone else. We wish to see peace after 1991. We wish to see cooperation in the region. We wish to work together without even agreeing on the validity of the policies of the NIF government. Unfortunately, we fell into the trap of going into a confrontation because of the untenable policies of the NIF government.

I remember telling some of the friends in the NIF, why don't you keep your Islam to yourself. In a multi-ethnic diverse community, imposing your own ideals will not work and unfortunately it is always the case with grandiose ideas of changing the whole world. It is like the Seventh International for me that goes to the 21st Century, where one political group entertains some idea of influencing and changing the whole globe, which has brought havoc to our region and which has brought problems to ourselves and which has brought us at odds with the government in Khartoum. We would not have liked to see that. We don't wish to see this happen in the region and that is why we are genuinely committed to peace in the Sudan. We are not committed because of money. No one is hiring us, as I said. This is not business for us. It is not business as usual for us. It is a commitment for peace. It is a commitment towards our people and it is a commitment to the region. We are not doing it on behalf of anyone, and we would not be blamed if we persist in saying that we will work for peace in the region irrespective of what the position of the conflicting parties in the Sudan are.

So I would like to be understood. I am glad to listen again to people like the gentleman who was talking here. I was in December addressing a forum and the same person came up with the same question. I mean, it is good also to change approaches. I can see you can find out from all the group around that you have been there always and if that is why you have been hired by the government, please do the job well for the good of everyone.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Sulayman Nyang.

MR. NYANG: Mr. President, I remember several years ago when you came to town here. At that time, you were not president yet. You were leading the Eritrean Liberation Movement in a hotel somewhere. You remember. At that time, you were on the other side in the sense that you were fighting against a government that most of you felt was very bad. In the end, the way you were able to get power is you used to fight like Dr. Collins had been suggesting earlier. It was by force of arms that you were able to displace Mengisto out of Eritrea. Now it seems now that you are a president and you live in a neighborhood where you have colleagues who are presidents. Is it the Eritrean solution to self-determination? Is that the option open to the southern Sudanese?

PRESIDENT AFWORKY: I think it would be a mistake to equate one situation with another. I would agree as to the endorsement of the principle of the right to self determination. This principle has to be accepted in whatever form. The definition or the articulation of the right to self determination could be agreed upon. In my opinion, this issue has been postponed for the last 40 years in the Sudan, since 1956. The attempts to bypass this issue and come up with fake solutions to the problem in the south have caused the difficulty we see today in the Sudan.

The question is do we mean secession of the south when we talk about self determination? Do we mean a United Sudan with some form of autonomy for the south? We shouldn't prejudge and say this is the best solution for the Sudan. I think many in the south, including political groups in the north, have had an open approach to this idea of self determination. Yes, it is condition. It is relative. If the circumstances allow and people in the north or political groups in the north admit and accept the fact that living together is the only solution -- if the north and the south are to live under one roof, no one side should impose its ideals or its values or its traditions against the other one. That is a precondition.

While you can engage in any arrangement, if you only agree to live together under one roof. If you don't agree to live together under one roof, there is no reason why you should make an arrangement to live together. That is the philosophy behind the right to self determination. No one is here to prejudge, and it is not a question of discussing whether the interpretation of right to self determination is succession or living together in a United Sudan. I don't bother about how that will be interpreted. If the government has accepted the right to self determination for the south, and if all political groups in the south have accepted this, they have to talk about the modalities. Is it possible to live together? Is it viable? Is it going to work for the benefit of all Sudanese in the north and the south or is it optional and should people seek or look for other alternatives to the problem? For me, in many parts of Africa, trying to evade this issue and preempt any implementation of the right to self determination under any pretext is not acceptable by any standard.

MR. TAISIER: Mr. President, I salute your solidarity. I solute the solidarity of the people of Eritrea with the struggling people of Sudan for democracy and justice. I am optimistic, and I would like always to think of the future, a future that brings hope, stability, and development to our region. I would like to know from you what is your vision for the future of the Horn and the future of peace in the Sudan?

PRESIDENT AFWORKY: Well, I think for me it is a matter of time. My concept of time is a bit different from the concept of others because I have my own experience and my own interpretation of time. The situation in Khartoum is going to change. There is no question about that. It is a matter of time. Some might assume that buying time and postponing the solution would ultimately be a solution in itself, but that is not going to happen.

We are destined to live together in the region. No political group and no ideology will ever divide the region and bring about an endless crisis. My understanding of the situation is, yes, unfortunately it has been postponed and overdue, but that is not going to continue for a long time. Whatever the positions of the conflicting parties, whatever the might of the Khartoum government in containing what it assumes to be a threat to its existence and to its authority in Khartoum is going to pass away anytime down the road and we in the region will have the responsibility. It is not the existing government. It is not this government that exists. It is not Eritrea or Ethiopia or Uganda, Kenya, Sudan, or anyone else for that matter. It is not even NIF. This is a phenomenon in my opinion. It has come as a result of global and regional political development, including the internal political developments in the Sudan unfortunately, but this is going to pass away anytime. And no one should assume that NIF is going to live forever in Khartoum or any other government in the region is going to live forever in the region. The peoples of the region are destined to live together and they will find ways of living together irrespective of the politics and ideologies that prevail today in our region.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you. Yes, sir? The two minute rule is still in effect.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Actually, less than 2 minutes. Mr. President, at the same time I feel proud and honored having you here sharing as a Sudanese our problems as one of the African leaders, but sometimes I feel very ashamed to have one stand here on behalf of the Embassy and telling us what is in the mind of the Embassy while there is an Ambassador and other staff of the Embassy here. So I feel very ashamed to have somebody come here and stand talking on behalf of the Embassy. My question to you as one of the leaders playing a real role in IGADD, I would like you to just shed some light on what is going on in IGADD. This morning, we listened to the Sudanese Ambassador telling us and other people that in IGADD they are very serious about making peace with SPLA and the SPLA is running away of this IGADD. Why is the SPLA and SPLM saying that the Sudanese government is not real about making peace? So we would like you to just shed some light about what is going on in IGADD in terms of solving the problem, the situation with the Sudanese government and the opposition parties.

PRESIDENT AFWORKY: I think I don't know what transpired in this forum, but if I am allowed, I would like to go back a bit and talk about what happened in Nairobi and before Nairobi, this last summit, and what exactly has changed as far as IGADD is concerned.

When the initiative started in 1994, IGADD was very clear about the DOP. It is not a formula that is monopolized by IGADD. Anyone can take this formula. But that is the only way that would lead to a solution of the problem in the Sudan. Unfortunately, IGADD was not successful and many outside of IGADD said, well, IGADD has failed and alternative initiatives need to start somewhere. IGADD was very clear. IGADD said we are not monopolizing any initiative. We are interested and we are committed to peace in the Sudan and any party interested to find an alternative better than what was provided by IGADD is very much welcome. And when it was blamed on IGADD that its initiative had failed, IGADD definitely said IGADD has not failed. The initiative has not failed.

There were attempts from many quarters to create forums outside the DOP, official and unofficial, secret meetings between government representatives and representatives of the SPLA. IGADD was very quiet and calm following developments without getting concerned about how is involved in this initiative. Well finally, this last meeting in Nairobi brought about sort of a breakthrough -- the last 10 or 15 minutes in my opinion after a very difficult discussion with the representatives of the government. The last thing put on the table was IGADD has not changed. DOP has not changed. The government representative tried to explain that the reason why the government did not accept the DOP in 1994 was because of the interpretation given then. Now the interpretation has changed. No. IGADD did not change the interpretation of the DOP. The DOP holds and still is a viable entity for negotiations. At the last meeting, the government officially declared that it has accepted the DOP.

Well again, immediately after that, maybe two weeks, we were told that a meeting is going to be held in Nairobi on the 19th to see the possibilities of any contact -- not formal contacts between representatives of the government and the SPLA but deliberations on how to proceed with the initiative. To the surprise of everyone came an initiative from south Africa. No one in IGADD was informed about this initiative. All governments sent their delegations to Nairobi to discover that Kenya has canceled all the arrangements for a new deliberation on negotiations between the two conflicting parties. It was in the news that the President of Sudan was going to south Africa and John was also going to south Africa to meet Beshir without even anyone knowing exactly what was going on in the area.

How that transpired, I don't want to take the time of everyone here, but why was it a necessity for any one party, be it Garang or Beshir, to look for alternative venues and mediators when IGADD was already engaged in that initiative. Anyway, now IGADD is on its old position. If you like the initiative and if you accept the mediation of IGADD, IGADD is available. IGADD is not getting anything out of this initiative of mediation. If you feel you can find someone else to mediate and find a solution for your problem, so much the better. Why should we be the only ones monopolizing the initiative for peace.

Again, I think the room is open for any meeting in the future. In fact, the point I tried to make in my introduction was it is no use to postpone the possibility of a negotiated settlement when IGADD is fully engaged. Trying to find alternative mediators is not going to help anyone, neither the government nor the SPLA in my opinion. And this time, given the political climate in the region and global encouragement for IGADD to pursue its initiative, hopefully anytime in the near future a meeting might be held to commence or revitalize the initiative of IGADD.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Yes, sir?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you, Mr. President. There was in this panel a lot of skepticism about keeping the different parties signed in Asmara together after any change. I am interested in knowing if you are pursuing right now any kind of leverage or pressure in the future on these parties just to keep them together, in terms of consistency building. What are your plans and your vision about this? Thank you very much?

PRESIDENT AFWORKY: I think it would be very unfair to say that we are there to bring everyone together to stay in one group. It is up to the parties to decide on this issue, and we have been very clear in our policies regarding the NDA, its internal arrangements and its internal relationship. No one from outside can bring about some form of unity. There is no unity there, if that is the assumption. I don't think it would come as a result of pressures coming from outside. That is not going to happen.

We recognize the fact that this is a dynamic process. It takes time. It is not going to happen anytime an arrangement is made between the parties. It dynamically develops and that is what we have witnessed the last two or three years. It is developing. No external interference should be allowed in this process. It might not end up tomorrow down the road. It takes a long time. If people are assuming that unless there is some homogeneity, which will never come in my opinion and it should not come. If homogeneity is desired, we are not facing any problem. Definitely there is a diversity. People have their own independent ideas and their own independent views about political issues, be it the problems they face now or tomorrow. Definitely they will have to live together as political groups having their own independent ideas. Trying to bring this to one melting pot is not going to help and it is not practical in my opinion.
From my judgment, I think the NDA has done better than anyone's expectation in sorting out its own internal affairs without any intervention from outside.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: As I expect, Mr. President, we have time for about one more question. Is that right, depending on your schedule?

PRESIDENT AFWORKY: I don't have any restrictions.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: So you could stay a bit longer.

MR. MALWAL: Mr. President, it probably is unfair to the audience since I am one of the people who often see you much more than most people here and I could probably get my answer to the question I want to put to you privately, but since it is a public question and most of the audience might be interested in your answer to this, there has been talk as Khartoum goes around, as you have said, trying to find alternative forum with which to get a new peace initiative going -- there has been a talk, some of which was quite disturbing to some of us which says that the only reason why Khartoum -- and this talk is coming from Khartoum by the way mainly -- the only reason why Khartoum signed up for the IGADD principles this time around was because the IGADD leaders, the four countries, accepted in a private session that the 21st of April peace agreement will eventually form the basis of the solution at IGADD. What is the truth to this?

PRESIDENT AFWORKY: I think it is disinformation in the first place and in my opinion. Yes, it was an open forum. Everybody was discussing the DOP. I think it was early discovered by -- it was an open tree. Yes, the representative said there are differences between the interpretation given by the Ugandan representative and the Eritrea representative. Or the Ethiopian representative and the Kenyan. Was there any difference in interpretation? The DOP when it came about as a basis for negotiated settlement in the Sudan, there was an understanding in depth as to the meaning of what the right to self determination means and what separation of religion and politics means in the Sudan, because it was very clear. That took a long time. I think it was the last 15 minutes when the government representative tried to say it is because there is a new interpretation to the DOP that we are accepting the initiative. I think it was very clear and President Moy made this very clear to everyone. Nothing has changed since 1994. The DOP is the DOP of 1994. If you accept it and you are willing for IGADD to re-resume mediation, we are prepared. If you are not prepared, it is up to you. We are not imposing it upon anyone's side to accept this. Finally, the government delegation went to discuss this issue and came up with an affirmative answer.

Later on, it was disclosed through the media that there was an interpretation completely different from that of 1994 and this would include the April 21st agreement which was signed between the government and itself and some of the groups who signed an arrangement for the solution. Well, I don't think that is relevant as far as IGADD is concerned. Yes, if everyone -- I mean, if SPLA and the government have accepted the DOP, then they have to come to the roundtable and talk about their positions. How they see the DOP evolving as a solution to the problem in the south. I think that will be the test of the time. It is not the commitment officially declared by any one side that matters. IGADD is seriously interested to know that the two parties are willing to come and sit in a roundtable and talk about their interpretation of the DOP. It is not up to IGADD to persuade anyone to have an interpretation of some sort for the DOP or to persuade both parties to have a common understanding of the DOP. It is up to them to decide and talk about the DOP.

From my understanding, what we see these days is another attempt of buying time and postponing a solution. That is the crux of the matter. The IGADD member states are willing to see even the contribution of other parties to persuade both the government and the SPLA to come to say what we mean by DOP is 1, 2, 3, 4 points. And ultimately, I think the solution will have to depend on their interpretation of the DOP. They accept it as one and only option.

There are other options coming from other quarters, yes. There are quarters who are saying because there are conflicts between Eritrea and Sudan, Eritrea and Uganda, Eritrea and Ethiopia, it is not possible for IGADD to resume the negotiations. This is not a private matter for Eritrea. We wouldn't bother whether we are involved in this negotiation or not. We would like to see a solution. Our problem with the government in Khartoum has nothing to do with the problem in the south. The problem of the government in Khartoum, with Ethiopia or Kenya or Uganda or Egypt or anyone else for that matter has nothing to do with the internal problems of the Sudan. And when we were involved in 1984, we were involved knowing that we have differences with the Khartoum government as far as its policies in the region are concerned. This is nothing new for us. We don't want to mix the two together. Yes, we disagree on the agenda of NIF to Islamize or change the map of the region. That will stay as a problem even when a solution is found for the south. If NIF continues to entertain the idea of expanding its influence in the region and beyond the region, definitely that will bring the NIF problems with its neighbors. But this has nothing to do with the DOP and the initiative underway now.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: We don't want to overburden you, Mr. President. Perhaps we will take one more or one last question. I will give Peter a chance.

MR. KOK: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. President, I would like to add my voice to those who have saluted you and I welcome you to this session, and too I salute the brave people of Eritrea that you represent. My question is brief. We have been told here that one of the greatest obstacles to peace now is Dr. John Garang running away from meeting Beshir and that Beshir is very keen to meet with John Garang and to sit down with him and settle the question of the Sudan once and for all. As someone who has been involved in the IGADD peace process and someone who knows the Sudan and who knows the SPLA, I would like to know whether, one, John Garang is actually running away from meeting Beshir, and two, whether if Beshir and John Garang sit down together will there be a solution. Thank you.

PRESIDENT AFWORKY: This I call the tactical tricks. They don't mean anything as far as the solution to the south is concerned. I mean, the government is trying to make a point by saying we are willing and we are running after Garang and Garang is not willing to meet and talk to Beshir. It is, in my opinion, very stupid to assume that Garang is scared from Beshir. Why should he be scared? I mean in 1994, he officially in a written document accepted the declaration of principles and was willing to sit and talk with any representative of the government -- Beshir or anyone else for that matter.

After three years, the government accepted the declaration of principles, and I think it was very clear from the announcements and declarations that came from the SPLA side that they are willing to meet any government representative under the auspices of IGADD, and that is why President Moy extended an invitation to both parties to come and explore the possibility of resuming negotiations. I mean, trying to make a point by inviting the Malaysians, inviting the South Africans, inviting the Dutch, inviting the Norwegians, or inviting the Americans here to show that you are the good guy and the bad guy is on the other side and they are not willing and Garang is a demon who is not prepared to sit around the table and talk is in my opinion an exercise in futility. It doesn't mean anything. It is a very weak trick even at that. So is it Beshir or anyone -- I don't bother whether it is Beshir, Turabi, Arras Montar, or anyone else who are willing to come and talk about the DOP anywhere and under the auspices of IGADD. I don't think the government will gain any point by showing to the outside world that this old man, the great man in Africa, who did not extend an invitation to Garang. The invitation was declined by Garang. So look, that is a bad guy. Garang is not interested in peace. Garang is against peace. Garang is for war. I think we have lived in this region for so long to know everyone and everyone's tricks, and we are not being fooled by anyone as far as this is concerned.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Well, that is a hard act to follow. The situation with the conference is as follows. We had allowed ourselves a wind-up session in which we would give members of the panel a chance to say concluding remarks and obviously the time has shrunk for doing that. But I still think it is important and I want to give the panel a chance if they have concluding observations or remarks to make those.

Before we do that, though, let me say a word about the purpose of this conference, because we have had a couple of challenges, both constructive and critical. Recall that this conference is what you might call a reflective conference. It is not dedicated to creating the conditions in actuality of peace. The U.S. Institute of Peace has also engaged and will continue to engage in conferences in which it facilitates the coming together of the political parties in efforts to make resolution of conflict. We have done that and will surely continue to do that. The purpose of this conference was not directly to do that kind of thing and therefore it was not assumed that we needed to get all the parties represented as political actors.

The objective, as I have said, was to reflect on the broader questions of religion and nationalism to try to discover whether the religious question or the religious dimension is an important one in the civil war and if it is, how it might be resolved. So it had a rather more specific focus, and I have to say as an observer of the conference as well as a participant, I am very encouraged that that problem has been addressed in very effective ways and our task in reporting on the conclusions of the conference is made the easier because the focus of the conference has been very helpful in that regard.

Mind you, we are concerned to resolve the problems generated by religion and nationalism, and we understand that the resolution of those problems is a much broader kind of thing than simply assuring religious freedom. There has to be an agreement which covers a whole range of questions -- economic, political, legal, et cetera. We have simply determined I think satisfactorily that the religious dimension of the problem is something that has to be addressed and the role of the international standards in guaranteeing freedom of religion and non-discrimination are highly relevant to the final solution. They are not the only thing and just getting those assured is not going to solve the problem. But it is important to remember that that is the focus of this conference and from my point of view at least it has been quite successful in addressing those question.

And now I will open the floor for final comments by the members of the panel. Francis Deng?

MR. DENG: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Since I have been very disciplined and have been quiet all day, I welcome the opportunity to say a few comments that will touch on some things that have been said and which I think are useful to reflect on in conclusion.

I was intrigued by John Voll's comments this morning -- or was it afternoon. He was very forceful and his ideas were very challenging and very intriguing and exciting as always. But I thought they raised two possible lines of thought. One was that every party to a conflict has a point of view that should be heard and that was more or less part of what I said in my introductory comments in the beginning of the conference that when people fight, it means that they have a cause and their cause should be heard. That is one possible interpretation of his urging that people talk.

The other is to say that this power, the NIF, is a formidable one. Whatever the predictions that its demise will come soon are not likely to be fulfilled. Therefore, it is a power to be reckoned with, so you must talk. Now if the meaning is the latter one, then it raises questions also of judgement and there are two aspects of this. One question is is this regime, given its position on principles and its clear commitment to its agenda -- is it in a position to negotiate a reasonably acceptable settlement within the framework of national unity? We should bear in mind that if the problem were simply between the NIF government and the SPLA, and that is the south, it is conceivable that if the government cannot possibly be expected to offer a perspective that can bridge the framework of unity, then it is conceivable that they can negotiate partitioning the country or coexisting in a very loose sort of arrangement.

But if what is envisioned is something that is going to affect all the Sudanese, including the opposition in the north, then the framework that is going to be possible is a framework that can preserve unity that everybody can identify with as a Sudanese, feel a sense of pride in being a Sudanese on more or less equal footing.

It does seem to me that in thinking about the prospects of peace, we have to go beyond simply wanting people to talk and to think about what is talkable and what is doable through talking.

Then there was a question raised by Carolyn Lobban about telling us that the Islam she knows and which she studied -- it is a pity she is not here -- has a lot of very good aspects to it and it is not the Islam which is being talked about here in negative terms. I would have wanted to say that the issue really has never been evaluating whether Islam is good or not or whether Sharia is good or not. The issue has been whether in a country of pluralistic nature where there are different religions, one can expect one vision based on one religion to be the framework to which all must therefore adhere.

When she spoke about the laws relating to personal matters and how humane Islam is, well if that were the issue, there would be no problem because Sudan has always been governed by personal laws of different communities. So it is really the common framework and the imposition of one legal system to the nation as a whole that is raising questions.

And while we are on that, let me say that I do really believe that if we had 99.9 percent secular laws labeled Islamic, the secularists would oppose it. If you had 99.9 percent Islamic laws labeled secular, the Islamists would oppose it. It becomes not a matter of the merits of the law nor a matter of the substance. It becomes, as we have all been saying, a question of labels of models of identities associated with those visions. And therefore, we should go beyond evaluating whether a legal system is good or bad, whether Sharia is acceptable as a matter of principle on its merits or not. It is a question of competing identities as I have said too often.

Then comes the question of language. I was interested in what Bona said. He said it differently from the way I might have said it, but the gist of it was the same I think. That you see it is not a question of a means of communication. We have to bear in mind that in the Sudan several things go together to constitute what an identity is. Religion is one and being Arabic speaking is one, but being Arabic speaking not just as a language but as a culture and as a national identity. It goes with many things that have to do with domestic policy as well as external relations. It is a composite identity in which language becomes a very critical factor.

Let me tell you a little story about a Dinka elder, a chief, whom I interviewed in a study about the past president future, as I think I mentioned yesterday. This man was referring to my father, who came from a border area and in many ways was Arabi and spoke Arabic and wore Arabic clothes. In our family, we have Muslims and Christians. And as somebody said the other day, we even have Muslim brothers in my family. And this man said he saw my father always talking with Arab chiefs in Arabic when he couldn't speak Arabic. So he consulted with God. Mind you, this is a Dinka chief who was also a spiritual leader and therefore he could communicate with God. And he asked God why he couldn't speak Arabic, and God said I don't want you to speak Arabic. He said but by God, isn't Arabic good? I mean, it allows people to communicate. And God said to him, the minute you learn Arabic, you will turn into a bad man. This man was associating Arabic with his image of what he considers Arab, which he associates with such an evil that he is reacting against it. It is not simply a neutral language.

Having said that, we also know that among the most articulate representatives of the SPLM and SPLA and of the southern cause, as has been mentioned sometime today, were people who were educated in the north who are very well spoken in Arabic and that has not changed their national identity and what they think they associate with Arabism and therefore the Arabic language. In that specific sense, it is not Arabic in general, not Arabs in general, not Arabism even as such, but in that specific context.

Finally, Mr. Chairman -- I don't want to abuse your generosity at the end -- Bona spoke about compromise and he referred to what I had said in a way that made me come across as one who would accept compromises even on fundamental issues of one's dignity. That was a total misreading, and I think it was a miscommunication. What I said was if we fit ourselves into the shoes of the other, we understand better why somebody is fighting, killing, and willing to die. And if we understand that person's point of view, then we can develop mutual understanding as to why we are killing one another. For instance, if we understand that for the Islamists in the north Islam is so important to their identity and to their world view that for me as a non-Muslim to come and say abandon your Sharia or your religion from public life is tantamount to negating their identity, then I will be more deferential to that identity. But if he also understands that there is no way I can be self-respecting in saying, yes, because it is so important to you, I accept to be governed by your religion, that person will then understand, my God, he is right. I cannot expect him to accept the indignity of being in a framework governed by my religion. Then we will think of ways of accommodating each other. Whether, as I said before, through some loose arrangement or by friendly partitioning with mutual understanding. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Mr. Wondu?

MR. WONDU: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will take a very short time to just emphasize one point which emerged from the discussions of yesterday and today and that is really the question of the peace process in Sudan. I would like to emphasize that from my experience and contact with SPLA personnel like Danarat and others, the approach to peace in Sudan through the exemption formula is regarded as a humiliating proposal to begin with. That somebody coming from this place, comes to your place and makes the rules and says because I am very kind, this particular one you don't have to obey too much.

We regard this as, again, an overemphasis of hegemony by other people who think that the Islamic context is feasible for the Sudan but people could benefit from the benevolence of the Islamic way of seeing things. In my view, I have a lot of difficulty, as I said before and I would like to emphasize it again, that I am not very optimistic about the possibility of a negotiated settlement between the government of Sudan as is constituted today and the SPLM the way they see things. Basically because the frame of mind of the NIF is unlikely to change fundamentally. Otherwise, they would not really be fundamentalists as they have come to be known most appropriately.

I think that I was charged with discussing the question of the survival of the south itself when the good days come after the war. I think that we must remember that when that time comes, there will be no NIF around in the south to manipulate us or to manipulate our people, groups, tribes, families, friends, and others to fight each other. Therefore, the prosperity and the peace and the management of the south can be helped towards people looking for systems of governance.

Bill Lowrey talked very well about the traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution, and I think those can be assisted, but within the environment where I think that there will be no NIF around at that point in time.

I would also like to say that some of us who, because of this war, grew outside of the Sudan and came back as adults and finding 10 years, 20 years, or 30 years of my life in this Islamic/non-Islamic debate really gets tired of it. We think that there are better issues which I would be happier discussing in my country like development, education, and health, and the longer this debate of Islamic state/no Islamic state continues, we will have no alternative but to reach the conclusion which the SPLM reached in 1992 as preached to the Abuja Conference. The last sentence said this, that it may be better that the Sudan has reached a stage where it better break up before it breaks down. Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you. Mr. Beshir?

MR. EL-BESHIR: Yes. I resisted very much yesterday not to say anything about one big group in the Sudan that had been overlooked, and I waited today and nothing has been said. That is the majority in northern Sudan. In 1986, only 52 people were elected for NIF. That is only one-sixth of the north. So what NIF is doing is to impose on the other five-sixths of the Sudan its interpretation. I thought that somebody would say something. Because some people say, okay -- as NIF says, okay we are going to impose Islamic law on the north and the south will be exempted. And nobody said anything about the five-sixths of the Sudan who do not want political Islam. Otherwise, they would have voted for NIF. So I think it is not only the minorities that their human rights have been violated. My human rights have been violated. I have a different interpretation of Islam, and yet there is one interpretation of Islam that has been imposed on me. So I just want to draw your attention that there is the majority of the Sudanese, Muslims, who have also had their human rights violated. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Mr. Duany?

MR. DUANY: Yes, Mr. Chairman. There has been discussions about the constitutional making. I am concerned really about the place of the ordinary persons or the people. People have been talking about NIF making a constitution, the SPLA or the NDA, really without mentioning the role of the people. I think if the constitution's purpose is not necessarily just to have something on the paper but to find a way of making rules which are binding. If the rules are going to be binding, the people in the country have got to be participants in the constitutional making. I think Peter brought a very good point about distributive or a structural distributive system of constitutional making. I don't know what that means, but I can just interpret it that it is a participant constitutional making, and which I think would be a federal arrangement that would involve people of the grassroots or different cultural groups in the country participating in the local style governance.

Mr. Chairman, the other comment I want to make is that really the peacemaking people talk about peacemaking at the macro level. I think it has not really made the progress necessary for this. The very large group, the civil society, which includes the women, the chiefs, the elders, the people who are custodians of our traditions and who have been resolving conflicts among people have not been appearing in all our vocabulary in trying to find a peaceful resolution to conflict. I think if we are to get a binding and a comprehensive peace and reconciliation, we have to begin talk and go up rather than -- I mean bottom up rather than top down. I think this is where we can hope for rules to be binding among the people you are going to govern. And that will be the viability of reconciliation among our people, both north and south. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Bona Malwal?

MR. MALWAL: Mr. Chairman, let me start by assuring Francis that I am not going to answer his answer to my point, but I am sure glad that he had to answer me 24 hours later because at least it puts my mind to rest that he hasn't changed his position about compromises.

MR. DENG: Now you have answered me.

MR. MALWAL: I have a very quick comment to make about the talk my friend, Professor Voll, gave this morning. I want to say that I know John Voll as an Islamist as a scholar and not an Islamist by conviction, and therefore when he made his remarks about the fact that he has heard about people winning victory and being defeated, if I didn't know him as an Islamist scholar, I might have taken much greater offense than I probably did. Because in fact what has been happening, and John knows this more than anybody else, that since 1956 that he refers to in fact there have been victories. Because I think, John, you were trying to create an impression as if we have had the NIF in power since 1956. In fact, the truth is that the south has been winning victories. Every conceivable government that has come to power in the Sudan has been defeated because of the southern problem. So we continue to defeat and the NIF, I assure you, will be defeated by the south. So as a historian, this is an historical fact. Maybe we have not had the government, but we have been defeating all governments. You can count any number of governments in the north and we have defeated them.

That brings me to the point that I want to say and that is as we look for peace, we have to divide the peace process between those who seek to get to power and that is the powers that be. Some of them are with us in the opposition. Their objective is to get to power and why not. I mean, if they get to power in order to facilitate a peace process that will not get me to continue war for another 40 years, I would cooperate with those to get there.

There are those of us who have been fighting all our lives because we think that the country that we have been placed in is not right and we want to put it right. So we have to look for peace on those two fronts. If you want to solve the piece of the power in Khartoum, how the power would be run, you can get your Islam into it and you can get your Arabism into it. But that is all of those that I oppose. You have to look for a peace that is looking for a structuring of the Sudan. If that is the peace you are looking for, then the discussion that we have had for the last two days here is relevant, and that is where I think we should come back to. That kind of a peace process requires a clarification of commitment to the process. The NIF is not committed to this process. The NIF is committed to a process that keeps Arabism and Islam as the basis of the new Sudan that I have questioned for 42 years. Therefore, for me, anybody who says -- you know, the SPLA has been meeting with the NIF for 10 or was it 12 times -- I don't think I would have gone to 12 rounds with them. I mean, it would take a great deal to take me to one round with them because I don't think that they are bona fide partners to peace. Because their agenda is set for me.
I think those are the issues we want to clarify. And I hope, Mr. Chairman, that your very illustrious institution, with all the scholars that you have in it, will untangle these things. Because we want a peace. Is it possible for us to restructure the Sudan so that there is a Sudan in which we all are at home with our Arabism, our Islam, our Africanism, and what have you. Not the kind of a Sudan that is invincible, if John Voll thinks that the NIF are invincible or the representatives of the NIF that accosted the President of Eritrea today saying that the NIF is invincible. Well, we are in the battlefield still. So the invincibility cannot be decided in one meeting or in one conference. It is a process. And I think that you have to divide this thing. You have to divide the peace that leads people to power without changing the face of the Sudan. And the peace that changes the face of the Sudan. I am interested in the peace that changes the face of the Sudan. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: H.L. Seneviratne?

MR. SENEVIRATNE: Thank you, David. I feel very out of place because I am not a Sudanese scholar, but I want to speak more as a comparativist because I am very interested in the problem. In fact, when I was reading the papers and when I had the chance to come to know about Sudan previously through the USIP seminar held some time ago, it almost occurred to me that this was almost like Sri Lanka, which is a case that I know much better. So it is in that comparative sense that I want to make just this one remark. Particularly in relation to religion, naturally an issue that is of fundamental relevance and of concern to the USIP.

The point I want to make about religion was made much more eloquently by Francis Deng, but I would like to expand it, if possible, a little bit. It is the question of religion and secularism. Because a good deal was said yesterday particularly, but also today about religion and quite naturally. But I thought I heard a strange voice in the conversation about religion. I say strange because all along we had thought religion was not the solution, but the problem. I thought I heard sort of subdued voices here and there that religion in some peculiar way can be used in fostering a solution to the problem. And I think obviously it is not any specific religion because the north and the south are divided precisely on the basis of religion. It is the idea of religion or religiousness or something like that.

My concern is that it is on the basis that somehow the idea of religiousness might have something to contribute to the state, if in some way -- some tenuous way, religion is somehow -- a little bit of religion is kind of involved in the state process, then I think it is a problem. I am particularly struck by the comment made by the respondent, Ann Mayer, earlier this morning when she said the idea of God can be mentioned. She mentioned the south African constitution and that God was mentioned, and she seemed to approve of it. I thought that is not -- that sentiment somehow -- I got the feeling that I had heard it before yesterday or previously somewhere in this conference.

I have a concern about it because in the way that Ann put it that you can have a little bit of it. But I don't think you can have. Secularism has to be a totally clean and pure concept. I don't think you can have a little bit of religion. It is like having a little big of pregnancy. It will grow. It is very difficult to have it. I say this because I would like to relate it to the comparative context that I am talking about, Sri Lanka, where the Buddhist monk, which is celibate -- of course that has nothing to do with it -- but this whole idea that the Buddhist monk is supposed to represent a religion of peace and non-violence and he has been the one factor that has been the most resistant to the idea of a political solution to the problem in Sri Lanka. And after 100,000 people have been killed -- of course it is a lot smaller than in the case of Sudan -- but it is even one person getting killed should not get killed in a situation like this. Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you. Elliot Sperling?

MR. SPERLING: Yes. I guess this is the afternoon of the non-Sudanists. I too am not a Sudanist, but I have very much enjoyed being able to observe this meeting and having taken part in a number of other conferences which the Institute has organized. I am very much impressed with the way we are constantly growing here and the work that we are doing.

I was particularly impressed over these last two days with the different formulations of identity, and particularly with the complex ways in which you cannot simply ipso facto define one or two choices in terms of identity, even within one particular person. Depending upon the situation, that identity can cut in different ways. And when you get down to religious communities and defining oneself in terms of a religious community. One thing with which I was struck was the fact that as identity changes, whether it is religious identity or whether it is in terms of the Arab/African dichotomy or the north/south, and I know that these things are not one in the same, the way in which you look at these and the way in which you try to resolve them ultimately has to be undergirded, as was brought forth by some of the participants here -- it ultimately has to be undergirded by basic human rights norms. And that when you talk about the rights of religious communities, these really can only flourish within the context of what we understand to be basic internationally recognized human rights norms. That is to say a freedom of conscience.

And we are very much concerned here -- a number of us are very much concerned here with religious rights, and religious rights are very much a part of human rights in general. The freedom of conscience must come down to the freedom of individual conscience, and really only in that sort of a context can you build institutions and can you build and environment, and if necessary the state structures, in which you can find some sort of an accommodation for all of these different communities and for all of these different identities. And, of course, bearing in mind the contingent nature of these identities in different circumstances. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you, Elliot. Actually, Jemera wanted to make a comment and we still have time for a few more. I wanted to give people a chance. So, Jemera, please.

MR. RONE: I wanted to say that the international human rights movement has been somewhat dragged into this debate on Islam and democracy in the sense that Islam has been used to hit us over the head by the government of Sudan as a means of criticizing us and defending all their practices and saying that we don't like Islam and that is the only reason that we are criticizing what they are doing.

When we have looked closer at the situation in Sudan, we have found that most of the human rights practices there and violations and abuses and so forth have nothing to do with Islam. They are practices that are typical of each government that seeks to say in power against the will of the majority of the people. The techniques didn't start in Sudan and they won't end in Sudan, I am sure. Torture, the use of security agents, the strict controls on expression of opinion and assembly, all of those things have nothing to do with Islam but are merely means to stay in power.
Nevertheless, as we have looked further into the situation, there is a very troubling use of Islam, going beyond the discussion we have had here about the second class status of women and non-Muslims and apostasy being punished by death and these other unfortunate aspects of formalized religion that clash with international human rights norms. Aside from that, there is the use by the government of religion as a rallying point for prosecuting the war and imbibing the war with religious overtones by giving religious training to people in popular defense forces camps by teaching all kinds of war chants that are religious and trying to make the war against the south into a religious war. That is a very troubling development. Not only denying the rights of the people who are forced to participate in the popular defense forces in the army for their own expression of religion, but having the state adopt a religious crusade against one segment of its population.

I want to say that I have heard here and I have taken seriously the remarks that even if the NIF were totally removed from Sudan, there would still be major problems that have to be straightened out among all the various diverse groups within Sudan, possibly ending in separation or possibly not. I would like to encourage those here who, I guess by now I am sort of probably preaching to the choir, which is excuse me a Christian expression, but specifically speaking to the opposition. I would encourage everyone to really think practically about specific ways to enforce human rights now in liberated zones so that the opposition does not end up accused, as the government has just accused, of using abuses of human rights to maintain itself in power. There is certainly enough territory that is controlled to allow for a civil administration. It is very important to start these practices now. There is no reason to wait for the day whenever the conflict is going to be solved or ended. People living in liberated zones want and deserve really firm respect for human rights, as much as people who live in Khartoum.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you. Mr. El-Affendi?

MR. EL-AFFENDI: I wasn't going to say anything this afternoon because I know that everybody is tired and there is also that sense that one may not say much as usual, but I think if we left the conference in this state of suspension, we probably would not benefit from it as we should have. For a conference which has peace in its title, this afternoon we have been treated to inordinate calls for more war. I didn't hear much protest to this, especially since these calls were also connected with calls sometimes by the same people about the intense suffering that the war has caused. That looks like a peculiar advice to have more of it. If war would solve the situation -- which I doubt it -- but anyway, if it did solve it or it could solve it, we would be out of a job as people who are talking about peace. But unfortunately or fortunately, war doesn't resolve and hasn't resolve and I don't think more of it is going to resolve the problem we are talking about, especially since we are all agreed on the objectives that we want a democratic country where human rights are respected. But we are conscious that this ideal has eluded Sudan for quite a long time and we didn't pause I think sufficiently to reflect over the fundamental problems which have been the obstacle to this. There has been very simplistic concentration on the political situation at the moment and very cathartic statements which relieved people from some of their distress. But still, I think, in the future and present and at all times, the Sudanese and those people concerned with Sudan should try to look deeper into what could be done to bring some solutions.

I have been in Khartoum recently and the people there are suffering. It is not only in the south. Even in the capital. I am not speaking about the shanty towns. The middle classes, there is a lot of suffering there. And if we could do anything to -- if there is any peaceful way of resolving this situation quickly as President Isais has said, there is not reason for postponing this solution. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you. Yes?

MR. ABDELMOULA: I think that Afworky has done us a very big favor, having had the chance to go to Khartoum, which many of us could not enjoy. If he told us how could we peacefully do what he wants us to do with the current regime in power, that would have been useful. People do not result to arms because simply they love war. Nobody loves war. But people are usually forced to take up arms and fight when all other avenues are closed. Since he is in a better place than any one of us, he should have told us about what are the peaceful ways of building a viable nation and state in the Sudan or how the current war could be stopped and so on and so forth. That wasn't my original point, but I just felt that I should respond to what he said.

My original point is about Islam. I say that in the Sudan there is an association of Islamism by the elite of northern Sudan who assumed political power after the independence. However, they didn't find the chance to say that in the Sudan, there are as many Islams as there are Muslim communities. Each Muslim community has its own adaptation and interpretation of Islam and what the Sudanese elite is trying to impose on the state and the constitution is just as alien to the Muslims in the north in the same way that it is alien to the Christians and animists in the south. When people hear about amputations in the west and in the east and among the Dinka Muslims, they are just as equally shocked, because there experience with Islam or their definition of Islam is different. Islam in many of these communities juxtaposes itself with their other cultural elements in their life. It is just one reality out of many others. It doesn't interfere with the way people live their ordinary lives. So that should be made clear.

The second thing is that as we think about solutions to the civil war, I do not intend to minimize the civil war or the beatings that the south has been undergoing profusely during the past 4 decades. However, there are many ways of stopping a bleeding organ. You could just resort to surgical means and amputate that part. That is a solution. I think that should be the last resort, especially if you don't have the guarantee that the rest of the body would remain integrated. This is the case in the Sudan. If we just say that the south should break away today immediately to stop the bleeding, there is no guarantee that the rest of the body will remain intact. That is what I am trying to say.

I come from a region in which people have an equal aspiration to autonomy, just the way the people in the south have. However, they haven't carried arms yet. Some of them would I guess. But that is a threat that is going to continue in the Sudan. And if the south secedes, that would be an encouragement for other people to carry arms. That is all I have.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Peter Nyot Kok?

MR. KOK: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I would like to express my satisfaction with the conference. I think the participation from the floor was good. The interventions are good. The basic deliveries were good. But, Mr. Chairman, allow me to usurp our presentation by expressing my satisfaction with the way you have chaired and run this meeting. I am pleased and I am sure that most of my colleagues are happy with the humane, competent, and fair way you run this meeting. It makes me feel that moral suasion is still a cause in affairs of human beings.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you.

MR. KOK: And I also think that may be the principle of democratic centralism that might disappear with the communism system. It still remains provided that you know what proportion of centralism you are going to mix with democracy, and I think you did mix that in good proportions.

I would like to conclude with the following remarks. Remark number one, I believe that the system that is organized today as the National Islamic Front that is running this religious state is a system of violence. It is a system of war. It is a system of hegemony. This -- I don't say this lightly. I say this after a lot of experience. First of all, it is not a system that is interested in peace, at least not in a just and lasting peace. It is of course interested in peace on its own terms.

Some of us here, Mr. Beshir did, view the NIF government where secret negotiations have been taking place. We have been there. We have asked for what they can offer and we have gotten the same answer that these are people who are not serious. They want to offer federalism with an Islamic system, and we have been disappointed that this is not a regime that would offer us or that they would make to us an offer we could not accept. Even at the time when they had the military upper hand, the NIF did not seize the occasion to make the SPLA/SPLM an offer that the SPLM could not refuse. I was expecting them to make that offer and they never made that offer. It is a war machine. Their civilization project is one based on violence, on victory, and of expansion.

Still, I believe that it is okay that we should continue to talk to them, if for no other reason than to show to the world that these are people who are not freedom speakers, as Jim would say -- they are not capable of a peaceful resolution of conflict. I also say this because I have been with them. I am one of the few southerners who have been with the present generation in power since the secondary school. We have been through the politics of secondary school. We have been through the politics of Khartoum University student union. We have been with most of them through the union of lecturers at the University of Khartoum. We have been with them in the Bar Association of the Sudan. My life has been a close association with most of the present representatives of the National Islamic Front. I had the -- I don't know whether it is good luck or bad luck of being taught by Dr. Turabi. He taught us law. I also have come to the conclusion that they may be pleasant personalities as individuals, but as a political group, there are a group which one would not like to entrust them with the state power.

I also happen to have known some of their major plans. It is unfortunate that this part has not been discussed. What major plans did the NIF have for the Sudan -- for the south and the mountains? There was a major plan that was elaborated by a retired brigadier who is now seeking asylum in this country and who in fact has immigrated to this country and who is settling here. It was a criminal plan for a final solution of the southern problem -- a final solution of the southern problem. That was a plan for liquidating the south, depopulating the south and transferring the population from the south as well as resettling the south with elements from the balance of power. This I have been wondering all along why a sane perspective did not occur to anybody that the plan that the NIF intended to implement in the south was a criminal plan, not less than other plans of genocide and resettlement that we know in history.
Fortunately, God has saved us from the success of this plan, but we should not forget, Mr. Chairman, that such a plan exists and the documents exist and an attempt has been made to implement it.

I therefore conclude by saying that whereas we are still negotiating and whereas we continue to negotiate, it is my conviction that we will not reach a settlement with the National Islamic Front and that the National Islamic Front should continue to be allowed to suffer from a crisis of legitimacy, which it has tried to win or which it has tried to resolve through military victories and pain. It tried to resolve it through economic development and failed. It tried to resolve it by a broken Sharia. I don't think we are going to be in the business of rescuing a fascist regime that should be really attacked and liquidated right from the roots. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Well, I think we have reached the limits of our endurance and I wanted
to --

MR. HIBBARD: Actually, David, could I --

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Yes?

MR. HIBBARD: I would just like to say a few words of thanks to everyone who participated in this conference. I would like to reiterate Peter Kok's comments and thank our Chair for two days of steadfast or even-hand on the keel. More importantly, I would like to thank Francis Deng and David Smock for both of their efforts in helping to organize this. I think it is fair to say that this conference never would have come off without their help. Finally, I would just like to put a little plug in for the Institute staff. Janice Hoggs, Jodie Kaviach and Collen Dowd were all aces in helping us set up or helping us pull this meeting off. But most importantly, I would like to thank Aina Khalalis, who is right over there, for all of her help. She was the first one here every day and I am sure she will probably be the last one here tonight.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: And thank you, Scott Hibbard, for all of your incredibly impressive work. This conference is officially adjourned. Thank you all and go in peace.

(Whereupon, at 6:20 p.m. the conference was concluded.)

The views expressed above do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.

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Please contact the Religion and Peacemaking Initiative by e-mail at religion@usip.org. Written inquiries may also be sent to the address listed below.