Event Transcript
Religion, Nationalism, and Peace in Sudan

U.S. Institute of Peace Conference
Wednesday, September 17, 1997

Panel Three: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy

Speaker: John Prendergast, National Security Council
Speaker: Roger Winter, U.S. Committee on Refugees
Speaker: Ted Dagne, Congressional Research Service
Respondent: William Lowrey, Presbyterian Church (USA)

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: We are a little bit behind time, but we can slip over a little bit at the end since we have no absolute terminus to this conference. The last panel of the two-day conference is on the very interesting subject of implications of what we have been talking about for United States foreign policy. And to help us think through the complexities of that aspect of the problem, we have some very eminent people indeed. John Prendergast presently from the National Security Council, Roger Winter from the U.S. Committee For Refugees, Ted Dagne from the Congressional Research Service, and Bill Lowrey from the Presbyterian Church is going to provide some commentary. I will call upon John Prendergast to open our discussion.

MR. PRENDERGAST: Thank you, David. I appreciate the opportunity to have a chance to articulate in no uncertain terms what United States policy is in Sudan, because I think we have been vexed by mixed messages and mixed interpretations of what the United States intends to do vis-a-vis its policy in the region, the Horn of Africa.

Promoting religious tolerance, the core of our intention here today, is just I think one component of our response to a much larger picture of bigotry and of racism which fuels the ongoing Sudan crisis. Let me be clear, though, about the intentions of the United States Government. It is not our intent to demonize Islam, to demonize Islamic Fundamentalism or political Islam. It is indeed our intent to demonize terrorism, to demonize regional destabilization, human rights abuses, authoritarianism, and ethnic cleansing.
U.S. policy is focused on very specific goals: a just and lasting resolution to the civil war; a return to democracy, an end to Sudanese support for terrorism and regional destabilization; a cessation of the use of food as a political weapon; and a vastly improved human rights environment.

In order to achieve these goals, U.S. policy seeks to isolate the NIF government and contain the threat that it poses to its own people, to its neighbors, and to the international community. We view the NIF government as one of the most odious regimes and the principle threat to U.S. national security interests on the Continent of Africa today.
We are working with all relevant U.S. Government agencies at this juncture to develop a coherent, integrated approach to attaining these goals, including initiatives at the international and the regional and the domestic level. We have made a series of decision in recent months to make our policy more relevant and comprehensive; policy decisions that will become clearer as the Africa team that President Clinton is putting into place is finally sitting in their seats.

Let's talk about these three levels, the international and the regional and the domestic. At the international level, the U.S. Government, as you all know and perhaps preponderantly, focused on eradicating support for terrorism. Initiatives have included -- and Gare Smith articulated some of these things yesterday at the lunch -- placing Sudan on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, which triggers a series of relatively minor, in my view, unilateral sanctions. Then seeking enhanced multilateral sanctions to the UN Security Council. We basically have a logjam between some of the permanent members of the Security Council right now on imposing the sanctions that have been passed on Sudan. So this is -- we are attempting to break that logjam and continue to press as hard as we can to do so. We are trying to expel the government of Sudan from the IMF on economic grounds. That attempt continues. We are trying to counter the supply of lethal equipment to Sudan from countries with which we have influence. So we have all kinds of different initiatives at the international level to try to increase and intensify pressure in our efforts to contain the NIF regime.

The second level, the regional level, perhaps the most important -- I think no question the most important. I think we have to be frank here in terms of the United States policy in Africa and particularly looking at the Horn and looking at Central Africa. The U.S. runs a great risk of being completely and totally irrelevant. To be relevant, I think we must identify and analyze correctly positive trends in the region and leverage these regional trends and these regional initiatives with intelligent support. To that end, the U.S. Government is trying to focus on supporting the neighboring states in the Horn in their efforts to bring stability to the region themselves.

This has entailed the promotion of three distinct regional initiatives on the part of the U.S. Government. The first one is the Front Line States Initiative. We seek to support Uganda and Eritrea and Ethiopia in their effort to defend themselves from Sudan's campaign of regional destabilization by providing defensive non-lethal military equipment to those three countries. We also endeavor to support the front line states efforts to promote equitable and sustainable development in order to counter the poverty which is a breeding ground for extremism and recruitment for some of the groups that the Sudan government is supporting on the soil of those three countries. To this end, we have recently made a policy decision to more closely coordinate and consult with the front line states and more robustly support these goals of the region which we share.

The second initiative at the regional Level is the IGADD Peace Initiative. Again, I want to try to be as clear as possible. The U.S. Government strongly supports IGADD as the only viable interlocutor for peace talks on Sudan at this time. We support the IGADD declaration of principles as the basis for such talks. We do not view the April peace agreement signed between the government of Sudan and the splinter rebel southern factions as a viable alternative to peace in Sudan. We have actively countered the government of Sudan's efforts to utilize other mediators and the April peace agreement as vehicles to divide international support for IGADD.

A third regional initiative is the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative. The Greater Horn of Africa Initiative has provided a forum for U.S. policy to begin to look at how we can support African-led solutions to their own problems. Part of that involves supporting IGADD's regional development goals, which include regional infrastructure and promotion of inter-regional trade. Just as in southern Africa during the apartheid era, a stronger regional economy surrounding South Africa weakened the apartheid state and bolstered the efforts of those front line states in countering that abhorrent regime. The same vision is being developed by the regional leaders in the Horn surrounding Sudan, and I think it is a laudable goal and we want to support it.

The third level is the domestic level. At that level, the U.S. Government has sought an end, obviously, to gross human rights violations including the official tolerance of slavery, famine, and authoritarianism. To these ends, we have undertaken the following. The U.S. Government is the leading provider of humanitarian aid to war-effected Sudanese civilians. Beyond just providing the aid, we have vigorously pressed for humanitarian access to populations in need and respect for humanitarian principles, and that is of all parties in the conflict. We have sought to build the capacity of Sudanese organizations, particularly in rebel-held areas, to respond to food and health emergencies in war-torn areas of Sudan.

Secondly, the U.S. Government has recently decided to increase its engagement with the NDA, with the opposition umbrella, the National Democratic Alliance, to support the non-violent political objectives of the opposition particularly with respect to their efforts to promote democratic change. To this end, we have decided to promote development assistance to opposition controlled areas of Sudan to promote democracy. In my view, this perhaps could be one of the most significant actions that we could possibly take at this time. It gives us an opening to support the development of democratic civil institutions in areas controlled by the SPLM and controlled by SAF. It will allow us the possibility to support those in southern and eastern Sudan to promote the rule of law through the support of local court systems and civil administrations, something that has already been going on for some time now.

A third initiative at the domestic level is the effort to increase unilateral pressure on the Sudan government and vigorously condemn their actions on a consistent basis. The most recent manifestation of this pressure -- obvious manifestation -- is the consideration currently being given by the administration and by Congress to impose comprehensive sanctions against the NIF regime. The U.S. Government has engaged in public and private diplomacy in support of our policy goals. Privately, the Ambassador has carried on an active dialogue about the role of religion in the state, and he has strongly engaged the Sudanese on their excesses. Publicly, the U.S. Government has condemned the NIF regime's human rights violations and religious intolerance and have done and will do so with the SPLA and the other opposition in the east.

We have engaged in a process which aims to expel Sudan from the IMF, as I mentioned before, if they don't comply with basic economic reform criteria. And finally, we have failed, I think though in a couple of areas, to meaningfully address inter-communal violence in the south. We have also failed I think to fully articulate our policy goals and objectives in a consistent manner. I think all of this will change as the President's new team on Africa takes their seats.

What we will do, though, I believe is we will be much more vigorous in publicly explaining our goals and our policy to the Sudanese, to the front line states, and to the international community. We will work much more closely with Congress and the wider community interested in Sudan, including the NGO community, on crafting an enhanced policy which accommodates all of our shared objectives, particularly how to bring about democratic change in Sudan and a just peace for its people. Thanks.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you, John. Roger Winter, please.

MR. WINTER: Before I start my comments, I always have a request from the State Department that I clarify for people that the U.S. Committee For Refugees, for which I work, has no connection to the U.S. Government. It is an NGO. Sometimes they like what I say and sometimes they don't, but I always have to clarify that just to be entirely above board.

First of all, I am an NGO, but I am not neutral in this situation. I want to try to explain why. I want to try to convey how a regular NGO can become convinced of the rights and the wrongs in a situation and then try to react to that appropriately. Let me say I, as one of many in my field, have seen too much in Sudan -- too many old ladies with shrapnel in their brains, too many people with bombs falling on them in the marketplace. I mean, just too much of that. And over time -- I have been involved in Sudan since 1981 -- over time, you come to the point where you make judgments. So I may be speaking primarily for myself here, but I think it will be very clear that it is not a neutral perspective.

First of all, what I would like to say is that I am going to promote the option that Peter Nyot Kok raised earlier, for those of you who weren't here. That is, there are a number of options for resolving the situation in Sudan that people have discussed. The one I promote has to do with the demise of the NIF government. It seems to me that that opens up possibilities. It doesn't guarantee everything, but it opens up possibilities that at least lead in the right direction. What I am going to try to talk about is why I think that that becomes a viable option at this point in time.
Why do I do that? It is really because the NIF government's vision of Sudan is a dying model in today's world. It is inherently unstable and therefore inherently aggressive and inherently authoritarian because it cannot accommodate the diverse aspirations of the Sudanese people in ways that are consistent with the accepted international standards.
Now I would like to make the case that responds to something El-Belshir said this morning, that is, there is a lot of history here and stories to be told, but the fact of the matter is that something different is happening now that we haven't really seen before. The first of these it seems to me is the convergence of interests in promoting the option that I am promoting here today.

The first of those interests -- and I will try not to repeat a lot of what we have already heard from other people -- but the first of those interests is the interests of the people of Sudan themselves. I can remember very well a story that was told to me by Thorvald Stoltenberg. If you don't know the name, more recently he was one of the negotiators for the international community in Bosnia. But earlier on, he was the UN high commissioner for refugees for 10 months in about 1990 or something like that. Stoltenberg had come from a meeting in Khartoum, which had been a very hot meeting, and he told me of a conversation that he had had with the Beshir and that the general idea of Beshir's comments was that the international community was not providing enough money, enough assistance to care for the Eritrean and Ethiopian refugee population that Sudan was hosting. Stoltenberg said to me, I acknowledged to him that we ought to be doing more. But then I said to him, President Beshir, keep in mind however that while we are trying to assist those people that you are hosting that there are 300,000 of your people as refugees in Ethiopia and we are also caring for them. Beshir looked him in the eye and said, they are not my people. That is what is fundamentally wrong with the NIF government in Khartoum and it is why I believe it is not part of the solution, it is itself a major part of the problem.

I approach these issues basically from my humanitarian experience. I am not a Sudan historian and philosopher. But let me say this pattern of not my people is repeated over and over and over again in the context of Sudan. Those of us who spend our lives in this field were thrilled back in 1988 and into 1989 when Sudan seemed to be moving towards a peace process that was viable. The sides came together and they created something at the time we didn't believe we would ever see, and that was something called Operation Lifeline Sudan, where two still contentious parties were nevertheless willing to see humanitarian assistance provided to civilians in need regardless of what sector those civilians were in.

But shortly after that program was implemented, the June 30, 1989 coup occurred. Immediately, our hopes were dashed and have in fact been significantly dashed from that point on. I can remember a meeting that a number of us had here in Washington with Brigadier Dominic Cassiano under the Revolutionary Command Council, and we were trying to talk about what we saw were the manipulations in Operation Lifeline Sudan that were beginning to occur. And he told us quite frankly there will be no humanitarian program in Sudan that does not comport with our security interests, and in effect abrogated Operation Lifeline Sudan.

Since that time, we have seen the regular denial of access and all of the other kinds of things that most of you are familiar with. I was looking at some captured mine field maps within the last couple of weeks. They were captured in the taking of Wei Kayo KajiKaji area. All of them reflect in my view a very twisted approach, both in terms of a sense of what ought to be a responsible government, but even a twisted approach in things religious. And here I rapidly get out of my depth. But the headline or the lead-in statement on the top of each of those mine maps was "In the Name of God", and then a showing of the disposition of the mine pattern. I think everybody understands that we have got over a million and a half dead people in Sudan in the last decade or so. I think everybody here understands that aerial bombardment goes on in Sudan in the south and in other areas day after day after day. It is not at all precision bombing. It is normally rolling these things out the back of an Antanoff. And in terms of aiming, you almost never can see the SPLA from the ground. So what do you bomb? You bomb marketplaces and you bomb displaced persons' camps.

This is a pattern we see over and over and over again. So I would suggest to you that most people in the Sudan, whether in the south or in the north, whether in the east or in the west, most people in Sudan in my view have a vested interest in seeing this government go. Secondly, within the region -- and here I won't dwell in a lot of detail -- but it is clear just to add a little color to the argument that there is a massive change in perspective in the governments of the region when it comes to a judgment about what the NIF government represents to them. Clearly after the splits in the SPLA in 1991, with the SPLA in retreat, the government in Khartoum felt emboldened and did in fact engage in activities in neighboring countries that were problematic. I won't repeat all of that. Let me just say that at the very time, March and April of 1994, that the SPLA was holding in Chukadum its first national convention attended by about 1,000 delegates from all the liberated areas -- at that very same time that that national political convention convened, there was a Pan-Africanist Congress meeting in the Fairway Hotel in Kampala, my favorite hotel in Kampala, and one of the key messages presented at that PAC conference was a message from President Isais of Eritrea in which he did what we almost never saw happen between African leaders that were not at war with each other, and that is he attacked the government in Khartoum. He attacked some of the historic northern problem. In my judgment, he foreshadowed at that point in time a level of hostility that not only related to what was materializing in Sudan itself, but clearly foreshadowed the fact that many of the neighboring countries saw their own vested interest in being rid of this particular government.

So in my judgment, El-Beshir, one of the things you see is a convergence of interest starting to take place. So let me move to my third, and that is the United States. Some of you will recall that in June of 1991, Dr. John -- or as some of us call him -- Dr. John came to Washington.

MR. PRENDERGAST: You are not talking about me are you?

MR. WINTER: No. Not that Dr. John. Sorry. He came to Washington and he had a whole series of discussions that seemed to capture the tenor of the time and the emerging judgment at that point in the American government about the NIF government in Khartoum. You have to remember what the times were. This was just shortly after Desert Storm. The government in Khartoum had thrown in with the other guys. And the Americans were clearly of a mind that the government in Khartoum was not only not an ally, it was in fact an enemy. And they started down a path of what I believed was going to be practical assistance to the south of Sudan. Not military. I don't mean that. And then the splits in August occurred and the Americans for a period of years in my judgment basically walked away. They walked away except for one issue, and that was the issue of terrorism, which became the issue that provided a continuity link between that period I am talking about when the government in Khartoum was identified as an enemy and today, where if you listen to what John said, it almost amounts to that same formulation -- perhaps it does amount to that same formulation.

In April of 1994, the SPLA had been on the defensive, been on the retreat, been marginalized in many senses of the word to the border areas. And when it began its convention, it vowed to clean up its own act so it could be more palatable to the outside world, including the United States. It has since then cleaned up its own act. It has opened up its political process. Not perfectly, but certainly better than it was. It has created civil institutions of government. They are weak, but they are there. It has made improvements in the area of human rights. There is still abuse, but it is not nearly what it used to be. There is more integrity accorded to the relief operation. It is not perfect, but it is certainly better than it used to be. And in general, its clean up of its act has, I believe, provided for a more palatable relationship between it and the United States.

Now my view of the U.S. Government is that it doesn't love the Sudanese people. It is not in the charity business most of the time just because it wants to do good. The U.S. Government has its own interests. And in fact, some of those are human rights, some of those do have to do with humanitarian values, but I believe this is the third leg of the stool. And that is I believe you are seeing an emerging awareness in the U.S. Government that its own interests as well as those of the region and the people of Sudan lead inexorably to the promotion of this one option, which is the demise of that government. And I believe this is a powerful converging of interest.

What is the second factor? I am not going to dwell on it, but what is different, El-Beshir, is the existence of the NDA and the consequent existence of four military fronts at one time -- four military fronts, of which some are tremendously more strategic than what has been the pattern in the past. It is now militarily, in my view, conceivable that this government will experience the demise that I am suggesting is desirable.

Now I said a lot of things that are beyond an NGO type mandate. I am not -- I want, however, to return to my mandate a little bit as I close. If what I suggested is now militarily possible, as well as in my view desirable, begins, in humanitarian terms it is going to be a disaster. I believe the policy of the United States, while I am too small in the panorama of actors here -- the policy of the United States that I can speak to is in the human rights, the humanitarian, and the development sort of vein. First of all, I do believe the U.S. Government should be encouraging. Not militarily, but encouraging the demise of this government. I believe in the short run, however, we ought to be doing our utmost to prepare for the humanitarian catastrophe which is exceedingly in my view likely if the opposition forces try to take their best shot at bringing this government down.

In addition, the war is far from over yet, but it is in my view time to implement the new policy of the United States to begin to provide development assistance in those areas of Sudan which are outside the control of the government. I believe that is in our interest and I believe that is in the regional interest, and certainly the potential victims and the beneficiaries of good development practice right now in Sudan themselves will all be the better off for it. The nice thing about at least the way I am suggesting things could evolve is that the Americans will not be directly involved. Those of you and myself who fear the presence on the ground and have concerns about that and believe it should be very selective -- it is not our fight. This is a Sudan fight. This is a fight in which we have an interest and in which the regional powers have an interest, but if this option that I promote comes to be, it is going to be done by the people of Sudan themselves. Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you. Ted Dagne of the Congressional Research Service.

MR. DAGNE: Let me also thank the organizer for putting together this important and timely conference. Let me also make a disclaimer. The views I am about to express here are my own and do not reflect the views of the Congressional Research or of the U.S. Congress.

Before I start speaking about U.S. policy towards Sudan, I think it is important to remember why we are debating and why we are fighting in this conference. I try to attend as many panels as possible. I hear a lot of debates. I hear a lot of angry exchanges. But I think people forget that 1.5 million people have died, most of them innocent civilians, over the last 10 years. More than the people killed in Somalia, in the Congo, and in Bosnia combined.

In order to understand U.S./Sudanese relations, I think we have to put this in context. But we also have to understand that in this post Cold War era, conditions have changed on the ground. The leverage we had over governments in Africa during the Cold War years is no longer that significant. I think the case of Zaire, the ouster of Mobutu, should teach us some lessons. Africans and African governments, without the assistance of the West, were able to oust one of the most brutal regimes in Africa. I don't think the case is different for Sudan. Regional actors prefer to working with the United States and other allies in the region. But I can tell you also that they are very much determined to bring about change with or without our support.

In order to understand what our policy towards Sudan is, we have to go back and review our relations between Sudan and Washington. As you all know, back in 1967, the Sudanese severed diplomatic relations with the United States because of Washington's support for Israel. We also have to keep in mind Washington's nervousness about security in Khartoum because two Americans, an ambassador and the Deputy Chief were assassinated in 1973.

Of course, relations between the United States and Sudan have always not been bad. I think during the mid 1970's, in the face of Soviet expansion, the United States had good relations with Sudan, but it did not last long. With the takeover of power by the National Islamic Front in 1989, relations began to deteriorate and three issues dominated U.S./Sudanese relations -- the war in the south, human rights abuses, and Sudanese support for terrorism. The war in the south has been and continues to be a thorny issue in U.S./Sudanese relations, although the war began before the NIF regime took power. The Clinton administration has been at the forefront in support of peaceful efforts to end the civil war. However, since the NIF government walked out of the IGADD peace process, Khartoum has been actively trying to undermine IGADD. The so-called peace from within was launched to confuse the international community that the government is serious about the southern problem. The culmination of this deceptive campaign was the so-called political charter signed this year by some southern factions. The United States' lukewarm response did not help Khartoum's attempt to lure Washington. Nonetheless, it is important that they did succeed at least in getting a confused statement of support from the State Department. Some individuals at the State Department took this move by Khartoum seriously, but soon discovered that the charter had no support among southerners and the Sudanese people.

Another thorny issue in U.S./Sudanese relations is Sudan's support for terrorism and terrorist organizations. Sudan has been a safe haven for major terrorist figures. A particularly noteworthy example is the Saudi-born extremist Hoselmo Ben Hadin. He used Sudan as a base of operation until he returned to Afghanistan in mid-1996, where he had previously been a major financer of Arab volunteers in the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Perhaps the most naked aggression by the NIF government was the attempted assassination of President Hosni Mubarek of Egypt. The 11-man assassination team had been given save haven in Sudan to prepare for the attempted assassination of the Egyptian president. The weapons used in the assassination attempt were flown into Ethiopia by Sudan airways. The passports used by the terrorists were also prepared in Khartoum. This is a UN document that anybody can get access to.

The combination of these abuses of human rights, support for terrorist organizations, and the war policy in the south has led Washington to increase pressure on the Khartoum government. A number of important measures were taken by the Clinton administration over the years. The President's policy enjoys a strong bipartisan support in Congress and in the Horn of Africa regime. In May of 1996, the then-U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and the current Secretary of State called Sudan a vipers nest of terrorism. As you know, the United States closed its embassy three months earlier. In late November of 1996, President Clinton announced the administration's decision to ban senior Sudanese government officials from entering the United States as called for by UN Security Council Resolution 1054.
The administration has also been very active in supporting regional actors in the Horn of Africa. Washington's support to these countries could be interpreted as a measure to contain, punish, and facilitate the downfall of the government in Khartoum.

As mentioned by John and Roger, Sudan's support for extremist groups in the Horn of Africa should concern policymakers in Washington, but we should also look closely at what the Sudanese government tried to do during the last two years. Sudan's support for the extremist groups is not limited to the Horn of Africa. It is expanding to other parts of the continent. The NIF regime assisted the former largely Hutu Rwandan Army and Militia responsible for the 1994 Rwandan genocide. There have been several high-level meetings in Nairobi between former Rwandan government officials and Sudanese Embassy officials. Ironically, Sudan had hoped to get French support since some French officials apparently considered the takeover of power in Rwanda by English-speakers as a threat to their traditional sphere of influence. In fact, the French government or elements in the French government in 1994 and 1995 allowed the Sudanese Army to use the Central African Republic territory to attack Israeli positions. The French also provided satellite pictures of Israeli positions during that time.

Notwithstanding the administration's tough stance on Sudan, two areas of U.S. policy have been controversial in Congress. Some critics claim that the administration may have violated at least in spirit UN Security Council Resolutions on Sudan by allowing Sudanese diplomats to travel and meet senior administration officials. In 1996, the Sudanese ambassador to the United Nations, Mahti Mohammed Murwa, whose accreditation to Washington was initially rejected by the Clinton administration because of his alleged role in the execution of four Sudanese US employees in Juba in 1992, was allowed to visit Washington in late 1996. The Sudanese ambassador to Ethiopia, who was there during the Mubarek assassination attempt, was given a visa to come to Washington at about the same time Afworky visited Washington. Again, a violation of the UN Security Council Resolution which Washington supported.
In late 1996 again, the Sudanese foreign minister, the second highest ranking NIF member, met with Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff, although Resolution 1054 called for states to take steps to restrict the entry into or transit through their territory of members of the government of Sudan. The decision to allow senior Sudanese officials to meet and travel unrestricted is consistent with the efforts of some individuals at the State Department who have been pushing rapprochement with the NIF regime. These individuals consistently resisted policy objectives which sought to isolate and contain Khartoum's aggression.

This kind of uncharacteristic behavior has repeatedly undermined the administration's Sudan policy objectives. Most important, this effort has also created confusion in the region among our allies. Another area of controversy is the exemption of Sudan from the anti-terrorism legislation which the President signed last year. This legislation would have restricted all financial transactions with the government of Sudan along with the other terrorist listed countries. In August of 1996, the administration issued regulations exempting Sudan and Syria, inconsistent with previous policy objectives. But I think it is very important to remember that some of the tough active engagement that we have seen by this administration and previous administrations is in large part because of the activism of some members of Congress. Congress, for example, played a key role in the decision to put Sudan on the list of states that sponsor terrorism and to appoint a special envoy for Sudan, even though the State Department had rejected in December of 1993. In a December 6, 1993 letter to members of Congress, the administration said that the appointment of a special envoy would send the erroneous impression that the U.S. is becoming directly involved, since Khartoum has made it clear that it rejects the role by the U.S. in the peace process.

There is, of course, continued strong broad-based bipartisan support for the administration policies. Several resolutions have been passed. In fact, in October of 1993, House Resolution 131 called for and supported the right of the people of southern Sudan for self-determination. Congressman Harry Johnston, former chairman of the subcommittee on Africa, dedicated most of his time to the Sudan problem. Congressman Frank Wolf has also been and continues to devote considerable attention to the Sudan problem. These two members, a Republican and a Democrat, were able to build a strong bipartisan lobby for Sudan.

The accomplishments of these members are significant. In 1993, Congressman Johnston, after a visit to southern Sudan, decided to hold secret talks between the two SPLA factions -- unprecedented in Congressional history. He reasoned that if there is going to be a negotiated settlement between the north and the south, they must first come together. The talks between Riak Machar and John Garang was chaired by Johnston in the presence of senior officials and resulted in the signing of an agreement between the two. While the agreement was held as a major breakthrough by some observers, some of us quietly concluded, though intensely involved in the process, that the peace between the factions was not sustainable.

In a confidential memo dated December 1, 1993, I wrote to the committee chair and I quote myself here, "The absence of a balance of power between the north and the south is a major stumbling block to peaceful resolution of the conflict. There cannot be serious peace talk as long as the government of Sudan believes that it can win the war. Relatedly, there cannot be a balance of power in the face of continued intra-SPLA fighting. The resolution of the southern conflict is crucial to meaningful peace talks between the north and the south."

It is fair to say that our evolving Sudan policy is largely due to this type of consistent pressure from Congress. There have been dozens of letters and meetings between administration officials and members of Congress over the last several years. I think the lack of strong leadership at the Department of State has led to this unprecedented leadership role by the National Security Council under the leadership of Anthony Lake and now under the leadership of Burger.

Despite the strong bipartisan support in Congress, U.S. policy towards Sudan has been inconsistent and at times confusing. The inconsistency is largely due to two competing policies, one pursued by the White House and another pursued by the State Department. White House officials correctly see the NIF regime as a threat to regional stability and U.S. interests in Africa. Some individuals at the State Department argue that the administration should engage the government constructively since moderates within the NIF government are pushing for reform. We are still looking for those moderates.

At the core of this debate is a clear division within the United States Government. This division can be traced to the early years of the Clinton administration, when State Department officials sought a policy of engagement in the face of continued intransigence by the NIF regime, and the White House responded to growing Congressional calls for tough U.S. policy towards Sudan.

This situation is unique in many ways where the stated policy objectives of the President of the United States have been deliberately misinterpreted by mid-level officials at the State Department. Differences of opinion are common and helpful in the formulation of a policy. But in the case of Sudan, these differences became competing policies undermining the administration's tough stance and confusing our allies in the region. Ironically, the difference in opinion is a camouflage for a petty turf battle. The State Department officials resent the fact that the NSC had taken the lead in the absence of leadership.

I strongly believe that it would be a mistake to continue to insist on engagement without tangible progress. Constructive engagement with the NIF regime has been tried and has failed miserably. Khartoum only responds to pressure. Recognizing and assisting the position could bring a balance of power between the government and the opposition which could force the government to seek a peaceful way out of the crisis. Should this approach fail, the United States Government should consider providing direct support through proxy to Sudanese opposition groups to force the NIF government out of power.

Let's remember that U.S. policy toward Sudan by far is the toughest compared to the policies of our allies in Europe and the Middle East. It is important to keep this reality in mind when we discuss and criticize U.S. policy. While some of our Western allies have been impassive, China and Russia have emerged as a major supplier of arms to the NIF regime. Nonetheless, it is important for policy makers to seek answers to the following questions in the formulation of our policy towards Sudan. One, is a negotiated settlement possible in Sudan? Two, is the NIF government a trustworthy peace partner? Three, is it in the interest of peace and stability and in the U.S. interest to deal with a partially reformed NIF government? Four, is the NIF government a threat to U.S. interests and regional peace? I am hopeful that with the change in leadership at the State Department, we will have a focused and well thought out policy. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you, Ted. Finally, some commentary by Bill Lowrey.

MR. LOWREY: I'd like to make just a few comments to affirm or highlight some of the points made by the presenters and also raise a few areas that I think also need attention.

First of all, related to Ted Dagne, I think very rightly pointing out the conflicting and contradicting statements and actions of the U.S. Government during the past couple of years. This has created confusion in the international arena and has made many wonder who is in charge on U.S. policy in Sudan. However, I do think it is quite possible that as Ms. Susan Rice moves towards confirmation as Undersecretary of State for African Affairs, that she will bring an end to the apparent conflicts between State and NSC. I want to point out that just last Thursday, on the 11th of September, as she testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that she said, and I quote, "In concert with concerned members of Congress, we have also recast our policy toward Sudan to apply additional pressure aimed at isolating the Khartoum regime in order to contain the threat it poses to U.S. interests and to compel it to halt its support for terrorism and its grave human rights abuses. We have also provided for the first time defensive military assistance to Sudan's neighbors, which face a direct threat from Sudanese sponsored insurgencies."

I think in John Prendergast today, we have been able to hear the presentation of the emerging refinements of U.S. policy on Sudan, and since John has worked with Ms. Rice at NSC during this year, we should expect to see and to hear the U.S. Government work in concert with a consistency of words and actions and a coordination between State and NSC. There is on doubt that the situation in Sudan requires continuous coordination of a more comprehensive strategy that involves multilateral actors, donor governments, IGADD, aid agencies, religious institutions, and Sudanese organizations. The U.S. Government cannot solve the problems of Sudan. This will be up to the Sudanese people themselves. However, the U.S. Government has an important role to play and that must be built on a clear, coordinated, and unequivocal policy that is articulated as a unified administration policy and implemented in concert with the Congress.

In Roger Winter, we have one of the most impassioned humanitarians, a man with great expertise, with a particular concern for the refugee movements and the displaced peoples around the world and a concern to create a new environment and system of governance where people do not have to flee from the scourge of war and oppression. I believe that what Roger has written in his paper is accurate that in the short-run the prospect is for more war unless the NIF goes peacefully or succumbs to a coup. His call for increased humanitarian support, rapid development of disaster mitigation strategies, support of development activities in areas outside the NIF government control, and utilization of diplomatic assets to bring change in Sudan are all important recommendations and appropriate recommendations for the U.S. Government. And it is important, I think, to highlight here -- as I understood, there was actually an announcement from John Prendergast that development assistance in non-NIF controlled areas is in the works and so that is an important development.

I would like to make a couple of comments related to the framework for policy options. For the most part when we talk about policy, we tend to think of the macro-issues of Sudan with a particular emphasis on removal of the NIF regime. The policy recommendations tend to reflect an orientation that comes more from the realist school of international relations with a focus on the nation state as the primary actor and political, economic, and military assets as the primary tools for the extension of U.S. interests. I think it is an inadequate framework in the present context. And if we only think in terms of the macro-issues, we will seriously miss some of the most important developments that are needed if one is to do nation building in regard to Sudan.

Sudan has really never functioned as a unitary state. It has significant regions of the country which are controlled by opposition groups and liberation movements. It has numerous places where people are suffering from localized conflicts which simply will not be solved with the removal of the NIF regime, although I will acknowledge that that would be a great advance. Identity issues in Sudan are rooted in local, ethnic, cultural, and religious realities more than in national allegiances or political ideologies. I think that is one reason why the antagonists in this war have been in a continuous state of change. I find it difficult to argue persuasively that the current marriage of convenience between the NDA and SPLM can hold together in a post-NIF government. I would be glad to be surprised.

It is also difficult to argue persuasively that the current marriage of convenience between the NIF and UDSF can be sustained over a longer period of time. Therefore, policy needs to address frequently changing alliances and networks of a turbulent society and work at the macro, at the intermediate, and also at the micro levels so that there is work going on to build democratizing systems of governance that can become sustainable in a diverse society.

No particularly I think it is important for us to not simply look at governments, both the U.S. Government and other governments around the world, but to also see that there are other important actors that relate to both policy and also to nation building. This is particularly important in terms of including the network of relationships that cross the lines of the warring parties, particularly the network of religious relationships, religious and moral leaders. That can be found in the New Sudan Council of Churches, in the Sudan Council of Churches among Christians, Muslim leaders among the opposition groups, and grassroots leadership among traditionalists with a particular focus on local chiefs and custodians.

There are times when the government and opposition groups and liberation movements have tried to co-opt the religious communities in their own areas of control or sought to divide them. This must be resisted and governments, international and indigenous NGOs, multilateral organizations and others should work to encourage these religious groups to maintain their linkages and to work at the grassroots level in the difficult work of peace mediation and democracy building.

In the coming year, there will be tremendous stress on both the Sudan Council of Churches and the New Sudan Council of Churches, and it is important I believe for the future of the country that everyone be encouraging those groups to maintain their links with one another.

A couple of other areas just to highlight. In terms of religious persecution, it would be valuable for the international community and governments to raise a cry when there are issues of religious persecution. This needs to be a focal point within the area of human rights. In the last few months since the GOS signed its internal peace agreement with assurances of religious freedom, there have been both churches and mosque in the displace camps that have been bulldozed down and there have continued to be arrests and there have been torture, sometimes for days and actually several weeks, of key religious leaders. The bill in Congress raises some key issues and needs to be addressed. It is important to focus on religious persecution and not the more narrowly defined concern of Christian persecution. As one who is a Christian, I find that if anyone of a different religious persuasion is persecuted, that person's suffering also affects me. Christians must not be so narrow in their intent that they would simply strive to focus interest on Christian persecution, but must always be concerned with the persecution of all for their religious beliefs.

It must be pointed out that in this bill before Congress, there are key references to resolutions from a previous year which have a rather narrow focus on Christian persecution and the recent report of the State Department again responding to the movement in Congress has focused their attention on Christian persecution. I believe that this allows the U.S. to be perceived in nations around the world as having an undue interest only in Christians and not in all people with religious freedom.

Secondly, the automatic sanctions that are currently a part of the bill before Congress raise two key issues. One question I have is is this actually a poison pill in the bill in order to make sure that the bill is not passed? Especially since automatic sanctions on China have already been shown to not be possible to get through Congress. But secondly, if this bill passes as it is presented, won't it actually invite manipulation of the issues by business interests who will want to keep certain countries off the list, even if they are egregious violators of religious freedom. When it comes to an analysis of those who are persecuting people for religious beliefs, it should not be a question of whether or not the U.S. has certain business interests who are active in that country, but it must be an objective analysis which can then be presented to Congress and the administration and they can then decide what should be the policy implications.

A couple of other areas. There is some unfinished business in terms of the Anti-Terrorism Bill and the exceptions that the Treasury Department has allowed related to Sudan. Basically, in terms of current policy, it is business as usual in terms of the nation of Sudan. There is a bill in the Foreign Ops Bill, I believe, and also in the Freedom From Religious Persecution Bill which would end this. There have been meetings that some of us have held with both folks in the administration as well as in Congress saying that this ought to be negotiated out. There ought to be a willingness on the part of the administration to make changes in its policy, and it seems as though from what John Prendergast has said that the change is to show consistency, but this is unfinished business that this administration must see to or Congress must see to.

There is a need for us to focus attention on democracy and development in areas outside of NIF control. There is a need for us to find ways to support grassroots peace mediation and there is a need for us to encourage cultures and communities that have been strongly hit by the effects of war to do some reconstruction of their own customary laws and their own culture and that will then help strengthen the building of a new nation in time. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you, Bill and Roger, Ted, and John for extremely interesting and provocative comments. We are now going to take up some comments by the panel for a certain number of minutes and will abide by the two-minute rule. Are there comments or questions? Yes, John?

MR. VOLL: Just a quick comment. I this morning expressed discontent with possibly being cast in the role of the token apologist, and I had resolved that I would not take on the role of an advocate for or a defender of groups that would be attacked or strongly criticized in discussions. However, I discovered that there was a group that I hadn't expected was going to need defense -- no apology, but defense, and I do feel constrained to do so.
It might have been helpful to have had someplace here where we could hear from those misguided iniquitous turf warriors in the State Department. I must admit that I have often disagreed with my friends in the State Department. However, my own experience has given me great respect for the views of the experienced and dedicated professionals who work in the area of representing the United States in our diplomacy and I find it appalling to have them discussed in the manner that they were discussed right now. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Other comments? Sure, John.

MR. PRENDERGAST: That is important to follow up on because I don't want to feel that the audience walks away and feels that there might be this kind of irreparable division. I don't think there is at all. I would agree with John. There are resounding debates in the administration about Sudan policy that are very, very thoughtful and everyone in the room with very few exceptions has the same objectives in mind, just peace in Sudan and a democratic Sudan. The best debates I have ever had on Sudan policy issues in the 15 years I have been working on this stuff have been in the last six months over at Foggy Bottom. We have a revitalized State Department vis-a-vis Africa and Sudan, even absent Susan Rice, who will certainly provide the direction that I think everyone in this room hopes for.
Tom Pickering, Undersecretary for Political Affairs, is deeply engaged and concerned about the future of this continent and is very knowledgeable about Sudan and has very firm opinions about where our policy ought to go. Ms. Albright herself, when she was Ambassador to the UN, was engaged regularly on Sudan issues and is very knowledgeable. I have been in the room on a few occasions where both of them have been very outspoken in where we ought to be going.

We have April Gelaspie, Director of the East Africa Office, who is relentlessly pushing the IGADD process and declaration of principles as the basis of that process. And single-handedly, I would argue, at least in terms of the donor community, has kept people's eyes on the ball that in fact IGADD is the process that we need to pursue peace in Sudan through, and heroicly at times. Her replacement when she leaves, David Dunn, is somebody that also deeply cares about these issues. And Steve Schwartz, the desk officer in Sudan, is a rising young star in the State Department ranks. We have a great team all throughout this government on Sudan, and it is exciting to work with and for them. So I just wanted to leave that impression. There have been divisions. No one is hiding that. Everyone in this room has read and seen and heard things related to those things, but I think they are divisions of good faith.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Yes, Mr. Beshir?

MR. EL-BESHIR: Yes. I would like to have a follow-up to Voll's and Prendergast's points. Ted's was a thesis that the conflicting policy in the state is just a turf problem -- a silly turf problem. I find it very intriguing and I like it anyway. I think it is very good. Prendergast is kind of very optimistic that these changes in personnel will help put a policy that doesn't give conflicting signals. However, as a former diplomat, I know that diplomacy is bound to international law and to some problems. The point I am trying to make here is that the people in any foreign office -- the State Department or a foreign office in Sudan -- are by nature people who are supposed to solve things by diplomacy and negotiations and all of that.

So what I am saying is that I just cannot see any diplomatic activism in the State Department for one reason. Because foreign policy to a strong country is linked to global strategy, and we know what is the global strategy of the United States of America. So I have a feeling that if anything emerges that is very activistic in the State Department relating to Sudan, it is going to be curbed and curbed quickly. I am saying this. I haven't been practicing diplomacy for almost 20 years, but I would like to hear from people maybe who are more into this.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Yes, Bob?

MR. COLLINS: I have a question for the panel. It is -- well, we have been here two days and we are coming to the conclusion of this meeting and no one has raised this question. It is politically incorrect and usually I have raised it at meetings on conferences on the Sudan in the past six months at Toronto and Tel Aviv and in Cairo. It was not popularly received, and I don't expect it should -- it will be received in the same way in this group this afternoon. Also, it is an embarrassment to me because this is an institute of peace and my question has nothing to do at all with peace.

My question is to the panel here, the conflict in the Sudan has been going on nearly now for almost half a century, beginning on the 8th of August in 1955 with the mutiny of the Equatorial Corps, the Second Battalion of the Equatorial Corps in Torit. And it is still -- for about 10 years there was a little peace in between there, but it has been still going on. There have been masses of mediators, a great deal of discussion, and all kinds of negotiations. I have written about them. There are people in this room who have done the same. My question to the panel is, when you get really right down to it in the grasping and the taking of power, is not this conflict going to be resolved, as Otto Van Bismark put it, only by blood and iron?

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Does anyone want to take that up now or shall we get a few more comments? That seems provocative.

MR. NYANG: Yes. I just want to put questions to the policy makers from the National Security Council and to the people who are concerned about refugees. In light of what he just said, the bottom line really is in the Sudan that you either negotiate or you fight. Now since most of us here would like to see negotiation rather than fighting, it would make good sense for the -- if the U.S. Government is definitely not satisfied with the NIF and learning from the Cold War period, governments that were not acceptable during the Cold War, you tried to replace them by other means. So is that logic going to be the case and do you really have any feeling that the neighboring countries are sufficiently opposed to the regime and that the opposition in Sudan is sufficiently united to facilitate the most idyllic situation?

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Bona?

MR. MALWAL: Thank you. As one who has had to be forced into several running away from my country in the many decades in which the war has been going on, it is difficult to be optimistic or even take comfort in some very excellent presentations that we have had this afternoon for several reasons. I have no doubt that the people who made the presentations here not only are they people of influence and would follow what they say, but I am concerned by one's experiences on two bases. The many times we come here -- if you come in a week where Washington is very upbeat and optimistic, you get away with thinking that there is now an American policy on the Sudan. So you think that it is going to be followed up. Then you come back a month later and you find that there is no American policy on the Sudan. So you say what has happened within the short time that I have been away. So one time I asked somebody in the State Department and said -- I was very frustrated having to run through all these systems of government here. I said, I wish one knew how American policy is made. This friend said, if you knew, you would not like it. So I think that this really sums up this situation that we have in here.

So we really are on the receiving end. For one thing, there would be this kind of very upbeat and hopeful signs, or there may be even the policies-- the diplomatic playdown of what can be down that you get in the State Department. None of this gets us, those of us who are at the receiving end -- none of this gets us out. Because one of the problems that we face in the Sudan, those of us who come from southern Sudan and who happen to be non-Arabs and non-Muslims, there is nothing we can tell those who are the powers that be in the Sudan to assure them that we do not receive any support from the United States in particular and from the West generally. So we suffer the beating anyway, when we know that in fact we never at all have received any support whatsoever. It just plays --

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Bona, two minutes.

MR. MALWAL: Yes. It just plays into the hands of those who dearly want to drum up this fact that southern Sudan, now it is being said through the neighboring countries is getting the support. And of course, as they say, you will wake the sleeping dogs as it were to increase the pressures on the people that are on the field. So my real question -- my real concern really -- not a question -- is are we seeing a serious definition of a policy, not even a policy that should help the SPLA or the south or anybody, but is there a U.S. policy that we can at least know is from a purely U.S. interest that has no relationship with us as a people, so that we can really -- I am sure we can look after our interests and deal with our own affairs, but it is unfair to be lumped with a U.S. policy that is no policy for us. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: John, do you want to respond to a couple of these points? It seems to me appropriate if you are so inclined.

MR. PRENDERGAST: Yes. I think it would be the height of arrogance to believe that with our meager resources left in this post-Cold War era that we could influence whether the NIF comes or goes and who is constituted as the government in Khartoum. The U.S. Government has not made any kind of a policy decision to see the demise of this government. We continue to support democratic change inside Sudan and I think again I would just reiterate or ask you to go back to the words, and I think Bill points out, of Susan's testimony last week. That would probably be the best expression of where the United States Government is heading in terms of its policy.

Bona's question is terribly important. As a person who spent almost his entire life outside of the process and only recently came in, I share very, very deeply your grave concerns about a policy that appears like a minnow in the water just flipping around left and right. I think one of the most important decisions to answer that that we have made in the last couple of months has been this decision to establish a process of direct engagement and direct consultation with the Sudanese opposition and with the front line states and to give that process of consultation a seriousness so that our policy can evolve in light of objectives on the ground.

Now somebody may five months from now overturn that decision, but I don't believe they will because of the personnel we have in place now. I really do believe after watching this thing, not as closely as you but almost, for the last decade and a half, I think we do have indeed something that is going to be followed through on on the long term, at least for as long as this administration is in the White House.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Do you want to comment on the slugging it out on the battlefield question?

MR. PRENDERGAST: My answer is that we haven't made that kind of a policy decision. I think that our relentless support of this IGADD peace process as a vehicle for peace. I mean, there is no opposition to that at this junction. The Sudanese government has sat in Nairobi pushing President Moy to call the next round of talks. The SPLA is supportive. All the front line states are supportive. And I think we have got all the donors on board. Everybody is on that train, and I think that is the best chance we've got. Whether it takes 10 years or two months, there is no way to predict. But it certainly is at this juncture the way to go forward. The United States won't be providing any military aid. Bono is absolutely right that that never has happened and won't happen. Nevertheless, I think that the IGADD process does provide us the opportunity to bring about change.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Change or Roger or Bill, do you wish to say anything?

MR. WINTER: Just to Sulayman. Nothing hurts me to the heart more than the people implications of where I think we are. I take all of that very seriously, and there is no joy in my heart for what I think -- what I am suggesting will be increased hostilities on the ground people. Nevertheless, to respond to Professor Collins, I do think it has come to that and I take no joy in it. But I think that is where it is and I think that is what we are likely to see in the coming few months.

MR. DAGNE: I just want to say that my presentation and criticism was not about personalities or individuals. I think I have made my case and if someone wants to challenge the facts that I have presented about the inconsistency, I think it is important to debate that on that line rather than drag ourselves into who is a hero and who is not.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Bill, do you wish -- Bill Lowrey? Any further comments from the panel or questions? Well, I think we can throw the floor open for general discussion. Let's follow the same procedure. Line up, please, at these two. Is this microphone now working do we know? It is working. Thank you. So there is a third microphone over here that is back in operation. Let's then follow the same two-minute procedure, if you please. I will start in the middle. Yes, sir?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I would like to ask Mr. John about the two reports that came out in the Washington Post about Sudan. The first one about the petroleum company, I believe it was Occidental, and the second one about the businessman in New York, the Pakistani businessman and his role with the White House, I believe the Vice President. In the first press conference held by the Secretary of State, Albright, and she denied this accusation and another response came from the Congress and they confirmed it. Just, I would like to hear remarks from Mr. John about it. Thanks.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Let's get a few of the questions and comments on the table first. Over here, yes, ma'am.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: That you, Mr. Chairman. First, my name is Nora Abdullah. I represent the Sudanese Youth League. Since yesterday, we are listening for something about the problem with minorities. They forgot about the future leader of the youth. In Sudan, the government right now, they teach us that the USA is the real enemy of our country and at the same time, under the care of the government itself, I came to this country with my family as an asylee and I found all my rights here. My question is do you think the Sudanese can sit together and stop fighting and live peaceably and do you think the human rights will be real in Sudan and at the same time, the majority of the Sudanese believe that there is no human rights in countries that have a different culture? Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Yes, sir?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Maurice Dawkins, and I have been working for the last three years at developing a coalition of African American organizations to work for what we call fairness in U.S. policy in Africa. I started down this path in the 1950's as one of the members that organized American Committee on Africa. Then I moved in the Kennedy period to the Negro Leadership Conference on Africa that was headed by Martin Luther King and Roy Wilkins and Whitney Young and Dorothy White. Then I moved to Trans-Africa, and then I moved to Dr. Leon Sullivan. So I have had my hand in looking at this same problem that you folks have from the outside -- outside the beltway, let us say. My concern is that in the sharing and exchanging of information and ideas and policy positions, we come to some consensus at the end of the day about solutions. As you have been pointing in that direction, I would like to focus for a moment on any hope that there may be that this fact that six of the seven groups did sign something of a peace agreement, that the seventh group was invited by Mr. Mandela and Mr. Mugabi and several of the people in the IGADD and the OAU to try talks instead of fights, is there any hope out of this group that there is something that the United States Institute of Peace can do to urge more of the talking and less of the fighting? Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you. Yes, ma'am?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am Linda Dehoyas, EIR. I would like to address myself to the question of U.S. strategic interests in this area. Given that the forces which are being currently arrayed against Sudan militarily include Ugandan and Rawandan troops and troops from Angola and Eritrean troops, which have just been in Zaire, and given that the United States press itself has thoroughly documented the mass killing that went on against Zairian and Rawandan refugees in eastern Zaire, and given that this has also been documented by Dr. Bob Armott of the U.S. Committee of Refugees, and given that it is well known by members on this panel that there is no national institution to replace the NIF government in Khartoum, and therefore the total destabilization of Sudan risks a complete civil war, and given that Kenya is also in a phase of destabilization, I would like to know how it is possible that a policy for a war option in Sudan is not a strategic disaster for the United States, to wit, that it is already the perception of the non-Tutsi population in eastern Africa, which is the great majority of the African population there, that it is U.S. policy which created the holocaust in Rwanda and Zaire. Now that perception is incorrect. We know it is British policy which has done that. But I would like to know how it is possible that a war option against Sudan would not lead to a strategic disaster for the United States in which all of Africa and Sudan's Arab allies, who are committed to its national integrity, would not in fact blame the United States for the holocaust -- not a clean surgical operation -- but the holocaust which is going to ensue if this military operation is carried out. I would like to know how that is not a strategic disaster for the United States. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you. Hang on -- or do you feel a need to address at this point. A couple more and then we will come back to the panel. Yes, sir?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask two questions pertaining to relief work in southern Sudan. I know we have talked this morning and we talked yesterday on political issues and legal issues and so on, but not much was touched on the issues of relief in as far as people who are trapped in the war area are concerned. I would like to address this question to Roger Winter, who has been doing excellent work in the Sudan. After the fall of places like Kayakeje and other areas in Bahr El-Ghazal, many southern Sudanese who are in refuge in Uganda or who are hiding in the Bush in southern Sudan decided to go home or to go back to those towns. I have a brother who was living as a refugee in Uganda who went back to Wei following the capture of Wei by the SPLA, and he had to return to Uganda because he was telling me or he wrote me saying there was absolutely no food for the people who had gone back and I thought that there were relief agencies that are concerned with issues of this kind. My other question pertains to Operation Lifeline Sudan, which was mentioned earlier here, in that it is a very useful and very important organization that would be useful in other areas. But from the reports that I have been reading, Operation Lifeline Sudan would seem to have become a hostage of the Sudanese government. The Sudan government decides where Operation Lifeline Sudan can take food. And you know very well that the total integrity of the Sudan or sovereignty of the Sudan as we understand it is in question. It is being contested. I was looking at a map where almost --

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: I am afraid your two minutes are up.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Okay. I am going to finish. Almost three quarters of the south is controlled by the SPLA. Now why would Operation Lifeline Sudan get permission from Khartoum instead of getting it from the SPLA? Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you. Yes, sir?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Moses Akol. I am with the Southern Sudan Resource Center here in Washington, D.C. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I have to go back to last night's panel because there was not a chance for other people to ask some questions. There were so many issues raised last night, and I think I also add my voice to the people who have expressed their gratitude to the Institute of Peace for arranging this conference. However, I have a little bit of misgiving about the nature of the panel last night. I think there were so many issues that needed to be discussed, and I feel that there were some points of view that were not taken into consideration, namely -- and the reason I bring this up is because of perception is as important as reality in the Sudan. For a long time the SPLA United has been lumped with the southern Sudan independence movement and Lam Akol's name has always been attached to Riak Machar's, although this has not been the case for a very long time. And last night when the SPLM mainstream found it convenient to accuse Lam of having signed a document in 1989, when he was still with the SPLM before the split by them. My question is really the veracity of the speakers on this panel and whether there is really a need for the Sudanese themselves to discuss the character of the Sudan. Dr. Francis has written a lot about the identity of the Sudan, and I think what is emerging -- and having attended some of these conferences in Washington, D.C. for the last five years -- is this idea of we could in any conference could say whatever we want to say as long as it fits our own political purpose. I think this is exacerbating the situation in southern Sudan because the information that is coming out is not really accurate. So I just want to correct the record -- well, in the north too. Many Sudanese yesterday expressed this feeling about there has to be some truth. People have to talk and people have to express the truth. Otherwise, we aren't going to find a solution to what is happening in southern Sudan or in Sudan for that matter, if we on any given panel select the people that we are comfortable with and the other opinions are marginalized. My question to the Institute of Peace is that in the future are you planning -- and I know I have been a part of some of the panels here before and I appreciate that -- but are you planning in the future to invite other factions who also have something to say, whether it is about religion or nationalism in the Sudan? Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you very much. We appreciate having your view. Let's see -- maybe, go ahead please.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Margaret Deng, but I am not Francis Deng's wife.

MR. DENG: She keeps denying me.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My number one concern I am addressing to Jemera, the Human Rights Watch. I think for people of southern Sudan, like 1 million and 500 dead in the war. And the UN is still -- up to today, they just passed a resolution but there is no action. So I am mainly concerned about human rights violation for either the Sudanese government or other factions or breakaway people. So are you going to call for a tribunal for those people like what you are doing in Rwanda and Bosnia and where is the world to protect all of those people?

Second, I am talking about the Islam and war in Sudan. I am from the south. Our war is not with Islam. We are not anti-Islam. The northerners who are actually using Islam as their game, they go to the Arab world to beg and say look at the people in the south. They are killing us. They are Christian. Can you give us this because we are Muslim or something like that. These northerners are using it. Not us. We don't have anything to do with Islam. In the south, even although we suffer for 13 years or 14 years or more, being burned by the Sudan government and the women being raped and everything, none of any southern Sudanese will go and torture the mosques. The Sudan government is doing that for churches in Khartoum. So I want to clear for Arab people, we from the southern Sudan, we are not anti-Arab. Our problem is the Sudan government. So the Sudanese government should not -- the Sudanese government or the northern government should not --

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Two minutes.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: No. Should not put in and use Islam as their scapegoat and come and massacre civilians in southern Sudan. That is another one. And also --

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Really, may I appeal to you?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: The women -- if there is peace in Sudan, the women should be involved to talk. And also, Sudan should be broke up into pieces. Sudan is not a goal. The people in the south will say because of unity -- unity for what? One million and a half is dead. People are looking for us all the day. The government will come and kill us until we are finished in the NIF and then the world will come and realize? We need action.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you very much. I am inclined now to give a chance to the panelists to respond to some of the questions that have been raised. Sorry, I think we need to begin to conclude this session. So let me give -- we may have time for a few more questions after the panelists. But let's go to the panelists now. Jemera, do you want to start?

MR. RONE: I just wanted to respond to the last inquiry about Human Rights Watch taking a position on calling for an international tribunal for Sudan. We are a non-government organization. I am afraid we are being given a little too much credit here as being sort of similar to the UN in status and able to convene these tribunals. But we think that the most effective way to deal with the recurrence of human rights abuses and war crimes in wars all around the world is to form an international criminal court, and that is what we are working on now. We are devoting our efforts to that, rather than trying to get the creation of tribunals on a country by country basis, which is very, very difficult to do. There was one in Nuremburg in 1945 and then there was not another one until Bosnia and then Rwanda was tacked on to the end of that. But the question about accountability is extremely important. As Mr. El-Affendi mentioned yesterday, the government is not accountable to anyone right now. You can do anything -- I mean, the government can do anything it wants and there is no redress. I am afraid to say there is the same situation with regard to the SPLA. There is no effective redress with the SPLA system for any of the abuses of human rights that have been committed there. So we would like to see everyone held accountable, and we would urge that any solution to the war -- a negotiated solution or other solution -- provide a mechanism such as a tribunal to judge all of those who have been guilty of abuses of civilians and others in the war.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you. Members of the panel? Roger?

MR. WINTER: Yes. Let me just focus my response to the question about assistance and OLS. What the gentleman suggested with respect to the Wei Kayakeje area is absolutely correct. When I was there in May, it was an area in which there was literally no food -- I mean none. In fact, you had large numbers of refugees who had returned from Zaire or returned from Uganda. The U.S. policy at that point was in my view very short-sighted. AID was allowing food to be delivered up to a place called Baze, but not beyond that. That meant refugees couldn't return to their home area and begin to plant. Ultimately a policy that was changed, but a self-defeating policy in my sense. That same area is heavily mined. You are already getting a significant number of casualties because all along the principle roads there there were garrisons and those garrisons had normally mine fields laid out in at least the area of those garrisons and a lot of people are getting hurt in that regard. Wei Hospital is not funded. It is being operated by some NGOs on a shoestring. Last I heard, AID has no interest in funding it and the funds haven't been found to operate the medical facilities there.

So what you were reporting with respect to that area is absolutely correct. One of the problems in my view is Operation Lifeline Sudan. Yes, in 1989 it was a very exciting innovation. After the June 30 coup, the capacity of Operation Lifeline Sudan to operate in a truly responsive manner to the humanitarian needs of people regardless of where they were was sharply curtailed. It is essentially in many senses of the word in my view an emasculated organization that is very much dominated by the government in Khartoum. It is not that it does no good because it does do good. The other side of it is that it is not an independent entity and the government manipulates and shuts down access to particular areas based on their military strategy and other considerations. So it is, in my view, a broken organization. It still produces some good, but it is too limited right now.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Bill?

MR. LOWREY: Two or three of the questions that were raised, just to say a word about them. One related to relief. I think the situation in western Equatoria with the return of maybe 80,000 refugees from northern Uganda rapidly without proper preparation is again pointing out that this is a regional conflict and there is regional insecurity. Those refugees would not have moved in that sort of massive movement of people if there had not been great insecurity in the camps around Kivoko and the attacks that have come on the camp. It is very reminiscent of 1991, a time when I was working southern Sudan, and the Mengisto fell and the camps in Ethiopia were attacked and 300,000 refugees suddenly fled back into southern Sudan -- Nassir, Okobo, and Pacella particularly. There was no preparation for that and that is a crisis that even if everyone responds properly is very difficult to catch up with time. And we know that the relief never goes as quickly as we want to. So it is a reminder that this is a much bigger problem than just fighting that might come from time to time inside Sudan.

Secondly, there were questions about the oil development, the Anti-Terrorism Bill, and some of the activities of the administration. The key thing to realize, I think, for us from a policy standpoint is that oil development in Sudan offers possibly one of the greatest opportunities for nation building and peace building at the proper time. When those resources are shared with the people on the ground and the people themselves benefit from it. However, when that oil is going to be developed and then used to fund a military machine, then that is not an opportunity for peace.
A year ago when the Anti-Terrorism Bill passed, there were some questions that were being raised. Those of us involved with the Sudan Working Group here in Washington, D.C. began to look into what was happening with that. I did a basic research paper on that to see what had happened with meetings coming from the Arracas Oil Company in Canada, Occidential Petroleum people involved at times in those meetings, meetings with State Department, Treasury, NSC, administration officials, and the timing was immaculate in terms of the day which that bill was to become in effect was the day that the Treasury Department issued a regulation, which from our perspective in the Sudan Working Group, was a reversal of the stated intent of Congress, which was to not allow financial transactions with the government of Sudan and would keep there from being oil developments and the regulations in a sense reversed that by saying all financial transactions were acceptable except those that transferred resources from the government of Sudan to persons in the United States who wanted to do acts of terrorism here.

For two months, very quietly we in the Sudan Working Group worked with members of the administration trying to get a reversal of those regulations before there was any public information about it. That was unsuccessful in terms of the quiet work of that. Back in those days, John Prendergast was not with National Security Council. Ted Dagne and I were working together on that. It failed. We then allowed the research to be shared with the Washington Post. The Washington Post made a very big issue of that and then people in Congress, I think probably with some selective memory, but nevertheless people began to make their political points and it became a very big issue here in Washington. That issue is still not resolved from the standpoint of legislation. There has been cooperation with the Inter-Church Committee in Canada. Gare Kenna is here for this meeting. He has been very active in that to try to put pressure on the Arracas Oil Company in Canada and also International Petroleum Company in Canada. Our concern has been that U.S. Companies should be blocked from making major development in Sudan apart from a settlement of peace that will allow for the sharing of resources with the people. Fortunately, Occidental bowed out of that. Actually, the Sudan government blocked them from participating and later Occidental bowed out of any participation, although former high members of Occidental then joined the board of Arracas Oil Company. So there seems to be a continuing relationship and all that. Don't let that go away. This is not an issue that is yet finalized.

The views expressed above do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.

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