Event Transcript
Religion, Nationalism, and Peace in Sudan

U.S. Institute of Peace Conference
Wednesday, September 17, 1997

Panel Two: Religious Pluralism, Constitutional Issues and Reconciliation in Sudan

Speaker: Peter Nyot Kok, Max-Planck Institute
Speaker: Adam Abdelmoula, Georgetown University
Respondent: Ann Mayer, University of Pennsylvania

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Well, let us come together again and proceed with the second panel of the day.

As we said, panel two is on religious pluralism, constitutional issues and reconciliation in Sudan, and a number of people have been pleading with us to get down to practice and cases, that is to say, get down to solutions and questions of outcome, and this particular session, of course, is designed to discuss those very questions.

We have a distinguished panel, Peter Nyot from the Max-Plank Institute, Adam Abdelmoula from Georgetown University, with response from Ann Mayer, who is from the University of Pennsylvania, the Wharton School, and has written extensively herself on questions of Islam and human rights. So, we look forward to the comments of each of these individuals.

I'll call first on Peter Nyot of the Max-Plan Institute. Peter.

MR. NYOT: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, first of all for inviting me, and in that sense also I thank the Institute for inviting me to be a part of this process.

I would like to record my appreciation for the good work the Institute has done in providing opportunities for the scholarly reflection and introspection on issues of peace and war in my country.
I look forward to a time when the Institute will be engaged in focusing attention on the issues of peace management, reconstruction and reconciliation in The Sudan.

Second, I notice that the topic is a prime topic, and in a sense it is the topic of the conference altogether, religious pluralism, constitutional issues, and reconciliation in The Sudan, and I was faced with the problem of selecting the point of entry into this big subject, and I found myself in a similar situation in which a district commissioner in my town of Rumbek found himself about 50 years ago, he was a British District Commissioner, had just come to work and wanted, as usual, to learn one of the southern languages, and that language in Rumbek is Dinka.

And, he took on a teacher and he began very seriously to learn the Dinka language. After a week of the learning process, he was told to take a test to determine the progress or the lack of it, and the test consisted of simple vocabulary words, and, you know, command orders and so on.

So, he was doing very well, what is a house, you know --, what is an animal, a giraffe, what is a cow, all this sort of thing, he was doing fine, then the teacher told him now, if somebody wants to enter your office, you know, what do you tell him? In Dinka language, come here is called bartem, bartem, so he said, yes, I tell him bartem. The teacher says fine.

Now, after you've talked with him, and you want to tell him, you know, go out, what do you say in Dinka? He said, well, that's where you get me, but wait a minute, we'll find a solution. He said, well, okay, what I do, I go out myself, and then turn to him and say bartem.

In terms of this topic, I'm not going to go out of the room, but I will go out of my way to find an angle of entry on the issue, first of all, of constitution issues, then I'll come to religious pluralism to discuss how religious pluralism is addressed in constitution making in The Sudan, then I will conclude on the issue of reconciliation and how it could be affected.

There are, at the moment of talking, there are two parallel efforts at constitution making in The Sudan. One is an effort which is underway, and it is being undertaken by the National Democratic Alliance, the Sudanese opposition, and they are drafting an entering constitution for the post-Turabi period. The entering constitution of The Sudan, which will come into effect as soon as the government of Turabi is either negotiated out of office or removed from office.
That to me is not surprising, because the NDA wants to construct a new Sudan during the interim period. This constitution, or this draft constitution, is based on the Asmara, the resolutions of June, 1995, resolutions which as you might have heard deal with the questions of distribution of power during the interim period, the question of separation of religion from politics, although I think it is really a question of separating religion from the state, there's a distinction there which we'll come to. They deal with the question of self-determination for the people of the southern Sudan, and similar arrangements for the people of the Nuba Mountains in a modified form. They deal with the questions of resource sharing and military and security arrangements.

It's -- national consensus of the opposition, and to me I really think that the NDA began seriously to be an opposition in June, 1995. Before then, we were really ex tempore, as it were.

Then, there's a second effort going on in Khartoum. The regime of Khartoum has set up two constitution committees to draft what they call a comprehensive constitution. This move is rather remarkable and instructive, because a government that has been in power for the last eight years is now drafting a constitution, a government that has its own constitution, the government of the NIF has up to now 14 constitutional decrees dealing with all aspects of life, presidency, Sharia laws, federalism, the military arrangements and what have you, financial regulations, and the strategy for the next ten years, curtailment of human rights, you know, curtailment of the Rule of Law, you know, it's a package of 14 constitutional decrees which in the opinion of constitutional experts is the constitution.

But, that it has to write a compressive constitution is a sign that the NIF has realized that it has no secure constitutional legitimacy, despite eight years of power, and to me that's a very serious admission which most of the people have overlooked, but which -- the NDA has not overlooked.

These two approaches to constitution making, the one adopted by the NDA, and the other one adopted by the NIF, are in line with the general Sudanese approaches to constitution making, for which there are basically three approaches to constitution making, which reflect competing visions of nation and state building as elaborated by Doctor Francis Deng in his book of the Conflict of War of Visions for the Nation, three visions of state and nation building in the Sudan, determine also three approaches to constitution making.

The first and the most obvious approach to constitution making in The Sudan is what I call here the conservative hegemonic approach to constitution making. This a conservative hegemonic approach aims at protecting the position of the forces of hegemony in The Sudan, it aims at conserving the privileged position which certain social groups have obtained during independence, and it aims at consolidating and even entrenching a certain identity of The Sudan, which, as we have been discussing since yesterday, is not inclusive.

This conservation hegemonic model expresses itself as the Sudan ruled centrally from Khartoum, the Sudan united by Arabic language, because Arabic is the official and national language of Sudan, the Sudanese nation confessing Islam and united also by Arab culture, and a stringent form of decentralization which is almost a local government system, a foreign policy that lays a lot of emphasis on the relations with Arab countries, and an economic system that conserves the region along the -- axis as the main, as the core region for development of The Sudan, and which privileges this region with services and development schemes, and the belief that the other regions of The Sudan will benefit through a trickle-down effect from this core region, those are the elements of the conservative hegemonic model of nation and state building in The Sudan.

The vision which is being pushed or being promoted now by the NIF is really an aspect of the conservative hegemonic model, which is being executed by all means possible, including the use of force. This vision has a counterpart in what we call the restructural, redistributive approach to constitution making. It's a vision which is entertained by social groups that occupy the Marc Martela Sudan, and it is a vision which is articulated at the moment by the SPLA/SPLM, but before it was also articulated by groups from the Beja, from the For, from the Nuba Mountains. And, in a sense, it was also a vision which was entertained by progressive forces within the core region of The Sudan.

This vision says, well, there's got to be redistribution of power, redistribution of resources. The Sudanese state, which is essentially a state in fundamental disequilibrium, will have to be restructured in a manner that ends once and for all structural injustices that were inherited from the British -- it is a vision which calls for human rights, protected by the Rule of Law as the basis of governance. It is also a vision that calls for -- relationship with all the countries and with the correction of this pro-Arab alignment of a foreign policy. It is a vision that calls for empowerment of the marginalized areas, especially over the resources found in those areas.

There's a third vision, which is in a sense an eclectic amalgamation of the two, which we call here the central bureaucratic model of constitution making. It concedes that, yes, there is injustice in The Sudan, the people of the marginalized areas will have to have bread, they will have to have more power in their regions, there has got to be recognition of their cultures, but then that sort of program should not disturb the dominant position of the center.
And, perhaps, the center should be run by people who are compassionate, you know, and understanding of the problems of the region, but, you know, these regional people should -- their own affairs and have a token representation in the center.

It is an approach to constitution making that was clearly demonstrated or projected on the Nimieri's Rule, especially from 1972 to 1982. As the center's bureaucratic model, it has its own shortcomings, like every center position in politics it is determined by the pull of the right and the left. When the left pulls very strongly, you know, then it tends to shift to the left. If the right pulls very strongly, then the center shifts, you know, to the right. And, in a sense, under an autocratic regime the center's bureaucratic model tends to be opportunistic, and that's how Nimieri behaved actually.

These approaches to constitution making have a direct bearing on the subject of this conference, which is the religious pluralism. The approach number on, the conservative hegemonic approach, as we have said, affirms the position of Islam, Islam as the religion of the state, which is controversial in itself because we believe that the state should not have any religion. People have religions, but not the state. But, that's what this model says.
It has been at the core of the constitution deadlock in The Sudan for almost 40 years, and as if that was not enough, the NIF came and put matters to rest, at least temporarily, by affirming that vision in Article 2 of Decree 7, constitution decree 7, issued in 1993. Decree 7, and this is for those people who yesterday felt that the issue of religious pluralism in The Sudan is still open, it is not open, it is closed.

The decree says that religion is one, Islam is the religion guiding the overwhelming mass of society. It renews itself and transcends apathy, and unites and transcends denominationalism. It is the law which inspires and guides government action, regulations, policies and constitution.

It couldn't be any clearer than this, and if you look also at the action, at least the constitution provisions written in the language of a charter, but if you look at the action, the action is even louder than the words, there is Islam and Islamization, and forced Islamization for that matter, and I use this deliberately, we are not going to be frightened away from using Islamization, Arabization in the form in which some people were frightened away in this country and used liberalism. You know, there is Islamization, there is Arabization, and these are facts of life on the ground.
Under the NIF, that program of Islamization has been pushed to the extreme with impunity. There is, therefore, no room for religious pluralism under the NIF. NIF wants to create an Islamic state and society in The Sudan, and it is doing that under our very noses, and where the human rights reports are replete with -- it also has put in place the penal code, which penalizes an exit from Islam by conversion from Muslim, with -- apostasy. Apostasy is a concern not only for Muslims, but also for non-Muslims, because we know of non-Muslims who convert to Christianity out of different reasons, including getting access to relief supplies, including getting access to certain educational institutions, including the desire to obtain an easy divorce, those are there.

But, we as Christians, we would like these people to come back to Christianity when they have achieved whatever purposes they want to achieve when they convert to Islam. But, they can't come back to Christianity when this sword of Damocles, of apostasy, or of being hanged for apostasy, is dangling on their heads, and that's where the concern for this provision article 126 of the penal code is all crossed in a missionary concern with -- locks all people in, you know, doesn't allow them to come out, and it is contrary to human rights, especially the right of religious freedom, and the right to believe or not to believe in any religion.

So much for religious pluralism and the model one of conservative hegemony model.

Model two of constitution making has no problems with religious pluralism. We stand for the separation of state and -- most state and the -- will recognize the freedom of religion, freedom of proselyzation. We believe, for example, in this model the state should not enact any law based on any particular region. No particular region should be the basis of the Sudanese constitution, and the state has no business being a missionary. These are the three elements of the restructural, redistributive model on religious pluralism.

Anything beyond that, you know, the region is a civil society matter, it could be promoted by civil society organizations operating within the laws of the land, but it should not be the basis for the constitution of The Sudan and the public laws of The Sudan, nor should the state play the proselytizer.

The center's model has also its own approach to the question of religious pluralism, and I also believe it was an inadvertive approach, which also was reflected under Article 16 of the permanent constitution of Nimieri. It recognizes all the regions in The Sudan, Islam, Christianity, and what they call the noble special beliefs, which was another way of speaking about African traditional religion, in African theology, the African belief system, -- African traditional religion, religion -- and these were organized and protected, and the use of religion for political purposes, but for the purposes of obtaining and maintaining power was forbidden. That was the Nimieri constitution of 1973.
And, it held good until Nimieri decided to throw in his lot with the forces of the right, and it collapsed, partly for that, and partly for other reasons.

But, all these models, you know, have no -- they don't enjoy a national consensus. They don't enjoy national consensus, and this is the difficulty of -- and this is the crisis of The Sudan, there's not any constitution model that unites all the political forces, all the social forces of The Sudan. It is my thesis that the say for initial consensus on the fundamentals of a constitution is the greatest challenge that is facing us.

Fortunately, however, what happened in Asmara in 1995 is a good step forward. For the first time the forces of opposition, or the political forces of The Sudan, and the social forces of The Sudan were able to agree on a blueprint of certain guidelines on the question of state and national building. We are, therefore, the NIF was even impressed with what has been reached in Asmara, to an extent that it used it as a basis for the so-called peace agreement which was with certain military and political groups in the southern Sudan.

But, the NIF used Asmara declarations and Asmara resolutions to entice some of the people into believing that it is really -- it has converted, it is a convert to certain concepts, like self-determination, and regionalism, and federalism, and it is a convert also to the question of a fair deal on the question of regional importance in Sudan.
The issue about the new -- the political agreement is the question of credibility. We have evidence that the NIF's record on self-determination, on decentralization in The Sudan, on religious pluralism in The Sudan, is a record that doesn't look credible partner on the issue of building Israeli as a state along fair lines.

The NIF conversion to self-determination, for example, is a conversion which is very, very far from the conversion of St. Paul. It is not a conversion on the road to Damascus, it is a conversion of the very gates of the city. And, it's difficult to believe that the force that has consistently been denying, you know, the minimum decentralization arrangements for the south will willingly concede genuine self-determination for --

The same thing may be said for Umma party and the DUP, but with Umma party and the DUP the SPLM have reached another modus operandi which also puts the SPLM in a position where it is the -- of the entry arrangements, and also grantees of the positive arrangement.

To conclude, what does this all mean for reconciliation? Reconciliation for me has got two levels. Level one is the reconciliation of these three visions of state and nation building. I happen to think that the Sudanese political and social forces up to this moment are -- this is a -- word for forces that are incapable of reaching a national consensus on the fundamentals of state and nation building. There is an element of consensus -- in The Sudan, inability to reach a consensus.

But, we cannot say that this is the end of the road, and that's why under Asmara agreement we have said, fine, if the Sudanese social forces and political forces are unable to reach a consensus on nation and state building in The Sudan, let's give this a trial for the last time. We have the interim period of four years, this interim period will be a period to correct structural injustices, it will be a period to correct things that have been -- injustices that have been lifted on the Marianesque people, and be a period, as it were, to give the -- of The Sudan a chance.

But, once that is over, then the people who are oppressed, the victims of oppression in Sudan and of injustices will have to have a say on whether to remain in The Sudan or to opt out of The Sudan. And, to me, ladies and gentlemen, this is, first of all, a practical solution, it's also a fair solution, it is also typical Sudanese.

The image of The Sudan to most of us is a noble objective, but it is a noble objective that has been pursued with singularly ignoble means, it is an objective that still needs to be pursued, but it cannot be pursued indefinitely. It is not an end in itself. I mean, unity to me is secondary to justice. For me, for example, justice is primary, and if there's no injustice in The Sudan I would rather that the Sudanese find their own ways of getting justice in whatever polities they would like to organize.

But, if you could find justice within a unified Sudan, it's good, you know, but that is a decision which the people of the south will have to make after four years.

Mr. Chairman, I will stop here, partly because of time, and partly because as a human rights activist I believe that talking too long is tantamount to inflicting cruel and --
(Applause.)

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you very much, indeed.

Professor Abdelmoula.

PROFESSOR ABDELMOULA: Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to the Peace Institute for its sustained efforts to bring the Sudanese problems to the spotlight, and thanks for presenting me an opportunity to be here speaking between two of my teachers, Peter Nyot, who taught me and the students of the University of Khartoum 16 years ago, and Professor Mayer, from whose writings my innovation of human rights activists have learned a lot about the problems facing the reconciliation of Islamic doctrines with international standards of human rights.
My perspective on the subject of constitution and religion and constitution in The Sudan, my views in this respect are secular. I want to emphasize that because the word secular has always been shunned by the Sudanese and by the secularists themselves.

What I plan to do is to talk about the politics of Islamism in The Sudan. What I mean by Islamism is the belief that Islam should be part of the identity of The Sudan, part of the political agenda of the political forces, and a source of law.

What happened after independence is that the elites of northern Sudan, who by northern Sudan I mean Dangola, Kosti, admitting to what Peter has just mentioned as the Dangoa, Kosti axis. These forces who have placed in a position both leadership after independence, unilaterally define Sudan as an Arab and Islamic entity.

I will not talk much about the Arab side of this identity, I'm more concerned with the Islamic part of it. In a sense, this definition and this adoption of Islam became the foundation of the ideology of the various political parties.
I quoted extensively from the programmatic and policy statements of the various political parties of the country, but before getting into that let me make one point clear. In The Sudan, people usually distinguish between two types of parties, the so-called national parties and "ethnic and regional entities."

The national parties are usually those formed by northern elites, Umma, DUP, the Communist Party, the Republican Brothers, the various -- nationalist parties, and so on. The regional and ethnic parties, on the other hand, are groups like the Beja conference, the FOR development front, various other parties, united under the general name of USAP during the last -- the Union of the Nuba Mountains and so on and so forth.

This classification in itself reflects the supremacy of one -- over the rest. On the other hand, by making this classification, indirectly those labeled as ethnic or regional groups are relegated to a lesser position, the position of minorities. However, if you take these people, these groups, collectively they are the majority of the Sudanese people, not those who consider themselves the representatives of the national identity.

This, in my opinion, is the basic problem that the elites, who assumed for in The Sudan in the post-independence, have failed to come to grips with it. And, therefore, efforts toward nation building in The Sudan have always been thwarted by this modest view of national identity.

How, did this Islamism express itself into the various Sudanese constitutions, a subject that I'll come to later.
But, before I come to that, I would point out the pattern that keeps repeating itself each time. First, each time there is a political change there is a mass movement in the Sudan, people tend to go back to the secular constitution inherited after independence. That is a 1956 constitution based on self-government at the so-called Stanley Baker model.
This happened after October, 1964, it happened in 1985, and in a way the Asmara declaration repeats part of that. That constitution was a secular constitution.

The reason behind this is that during the revolutions, during social upheavals, during breaking points in the history of Sudan, new forces come to the front which are not truly representative of the elite who dominate the political establishment. With those forces comes the drive toward secularism.

Whenever things cool down and the democratic process starts, that tone of Islamism comes to the front again and it tends to express itself into constitutional provisions making Islam as a source of law, making religion -- adopting an official religion for the state, make Arabic the official language of the country, and so on and so forth.
Let me give some examples about this from the policy statements of our political parties, and then see how those programmatic policy statements have been translated into constitutions.

There is no problem, or I don't need to bring much evidence to prove that the DUP, the Umma and the NIF are Islamist parties. However, there is a caveat that one must make when it comes to the DUP and NIF -- I mean, DUP and Umma. After independence, these parties, which are formed around religious sects, used to have officials, prime ministers, who were non-secularists, however after the emergence of the National Islamic Front they adopted the rhetoric of Islamic constitution, and basically the drive towards Islamic constitution among these political forces is a function of their relationship with NIF.

Whatever the case may be in the programmatic statements of the DUP and the Umma party, let us begin with the Umma party, during the last general elections of 1986 the party put out a comprehensive program which it referred to as Nyada Sattawa. I didn't find a good translation for that, but it was the party's manifesto for Islamic reawakening. In that document, Islam is considered to be the basis of national existence and identity. The supremacy of Islam is absolute, and even a parliamentary majority should not be allowed to transgress or undermine it.

After Sattawa was elected as Prime Minister, in his first address to parliament, he reiterated the same position and referred to the September laws as falsification of Islam and that they must be corrected by truly Islamic laws.
As you will realize, in all these policy statements there is no clear definition of what constitutes true Islam. And, I believe, and I may be suspected of promulgating a conspiracy here, but I believe that Islam has always been left undefined in the programmatic statements of the various political parties of northern Sudan because that serves its original role, to be defined according to context, so that it could preserve the status quo. In that sense, this imprecision is useful as a tool of hegemony --

So, each time Islam is defined differently, as you will see later in constitution attempts, different constitutions, different provisions have been referred to as Islamic, only to be changed the next day with others which are equally referred to as Islamic.

In the DUP program, Islam is considered to be the basic source of law, while customs and principles not contradicting Sharia may also be consulted.

Compared to these two parties, the National Islamic Front, NIF, is a mothering party. All of you know that back in the '50s it was called the Islamic -- it wasn't the Islamic Jaffa Front, first it was the Islamic Front for the Constitution, and then it became the Islamic Jaffa Front, then it became a nameless organization during the next time, then it appeared again as the National Islamic Front.

However, during the '50s, when it was the Islamic Front for the Constitution, it used to have a draft Islamic constitution that it circulated and that it rallied other political forces around. That document was drafted, not by Sudanese lawyers, it was drafted by a Pakistani lawyer, imported from Pakistan to draw up that constitution for The Sudan, something that is reminiscent of the Stanley Baker experience, with the difference that Stanley Baker drafted his constitution based on British experience and the Sudanese experience with the British laws, while this was based on the teachings of Abaral & Monieri of the -- Islam for Pakistan.

It called specifically for the head of state and prime minister to be both Muslims. This position was slightly changed later on, and the religion for the head of state was not referred to. Initially, in the version of the constitution that the Islamic Front for the Constitution adopted, they called for a parliamentary system, but later on they modified that position to call for a presidential system.

After the 1985 uprising and the emergence of the National Islamic Front, it adopted also a very comprehensive constitution, a very cautiously worded program I mean, in which the role of Islam was defined as follows: Islamic jurisprudence shall be the general source of law. The document explains this to mean the following: first, Islam is the expression of the will of the democratic majority; two, it conforms to the values of all the scriptural religions, its legal rules almost correspond to the common legal or moral teachings.

It recognized as a source of law the principles of natural justice and also sheer customs. It specifically recognizes the principle of religious freedom and equality in the manner mentioned above. In a word, this is the basic statement of the Sharia law, that non-Muslims do not have to worry, Islamic jurisprudence, Islamic Sharia law will take care of their rights. All of us know that in the Islamic jurisprudence the status of the -- those who profess Christianity or Georgism, is that of a protected minority, not of full equality.

Let me just pass back to the position of the Republican Brotherhood who espouse a rather universal view of Islam. I don't really find that view to be very relevant in the Sudanese debate for a constitution, except to the extent that it is a universal project for the reformation of Islam and bringing it into harmony with international human rights and standards.

So, if I'm talking about various political forces of the country, the Republic Brothers do not count much, especially after the execution of Sasmahuma Alfad, because the organization seems to have ceased to exist. The position of the Communist Party may be more existent.

But, in the 1960s, in the hay day of the party, it was about the secularists, secularists in its views. However, that position seems to have changed. Today, the party never says that it is secularist, rather, it's leaders publicly said that, we are a democracy and not with secularism, and that to me means that in a way the party has succumbed to the pressures of the other forces, which are calling for this general tendency in the northern political establishment to make Islam one of the foundations of identity has affected the party in a way, because the people are talking about Islamism.

Also, the party has, in many instances, subscribed to this ideology of Islamism in different ways. For example, if people go back to the 1960s, they would find that -- wrote one of his greatest books about the philosophy of the Muslim brotherhood and how it falsifies Islam.

Along the same lines, the -- book issued by -- the general of the party, was a comment about the book written by -- in his --

So, there is this tendency towards giving Islam a major position in the policy and in the party's ideology, and there is a directive to the members to develop kind of a Sudanese liberation theology, which I don't think has been lived up to.
The -- groups are very interesting because they constitute one of the significant ideological perceptions of the Sudanese northern political establishment. They are not politically significant, however, they are ideologically significant, as I state in the paper. All the northern Sudanese political parties tend to see themselves as part of the Arab world, that comes, I feel, in any program, left or right, first comes the Arab world, then the Islamic world, last comes --

However, for many reasons the political establishment of the north has opted to adopt Islamism as the basis of its ideology rather than Arabism, because the experience of various other countries is found out of these regimes, hasn't been a very good one, and it is difficult to emulate, and it is difficult to introduce. The Sudanese people, especially, haven't -- most of the people in The Sudan are not Arabs, or not Arabic speaking and so on.
Also, Arabism has faced a lot of challenges until it is now withering away. The fact that Saddam Hussein rallied the Islamic world by writing, allowing his -- and then allowing himself as the fundamentalist groups around this Islamic world, symbolizes the fact that this notion of Arabism is withering away.

Also, the fact that all these Panarabist groups are presently under the leadership of -- and the so-called Islamic Arabic Conference, further symbolizes the fact that these Panarabists are no longer relevant.

In any case, I have a problem here with the time, but for those of you who are interested in addressing the
constitutional translation of these Islamic programs of the various political parties I have provided a chronology in my paper, in the draft paper, very preliminary draft I must say, is here for distribution for those who are interested, and how Islam has been projected as a source of law in the various Sudanese constitutions.

Let me go directly to my conclusions. I have read the Asmara declaration very much, and I think it is a very serious effort to put Sudan back into the right track, that's the track of secularism without which there could be no united Sudan, there would be no serious nation building in the Sudan. I am a little bit pessimist, I feel some pessimism about and skepticism about the future of the Asmara declaration having the following parts. First of all, past experience shows that during times of opposition Sudan's major political parties, that's Umma and the DUP, signed documents and then they do not honor their word after political change takes place. This happened in 1964, it happened in 1985.
There is no guarantee that this time they would honor their word, and I say this because these are not usual parties that follow the general rules applicable to any political party, these are sectarian parties whose leaders are -- leadership is hereditary in all these parties, so there is no accountability that would make these leaders honor their words. Whether they honor their words or not, they will stay in the leadership of these parties, and this lack of internal democracy is one of the things that makes me a little bit skeptical about the prospects of the limitation of the Asmara declaration.

This type of democracy, by the way, is not only in the Umma and the DUP, all the other political parties of the north, the other two major ones, the National Islamic Front and the Communist Party share the same thing, same theoretical generals for almost three decades in both parties, and I don't think that's a sign of a healthy political presence.
The other thing that makes me a little bit skeptical about the future of the Asmara declaration is its implementation, in no way in that declaration did its brothers mention the adoption of corrective measures, measures intended to redress past injustices, not only pave the way for the future. What we need in the Sudan is a form of Sudanese affirmative action, that would restore confidence, that would restore a sense of belonging to those who have been wronged for a very long time.

The other thing is that the Asmara declaration over stresses the problem of southern Sudan. I think that's one of the things that doesn't do good to the future of nation building in the Sudan. There are a lot of people in The Sudan who are also wronged, who have been marginalized, et cetera, et cetera, and all these forces come together and chart out a nation building program that changed the entire country. This process of fragmentation will continue, the south could opt out after the entering period, and then next comes the west or the east, and that will go on and on.

Finally, let me conclude by saying that what Sudan needs is an extended federal system, a federal system with a serious and real devolution of power. That kind of autonomy will give the various regions of The Sudan, the various communities, the various tribes, the various groups, a sense that they have their due share of power, and with that comes self-confidence, and with self-confidence comes the need to extend an arm and the need to belong to a bigger entity, and this is the tendency all over the world, people who have been divided in the past are now coming together because they feel that they can confidently and on equal footing come into terms with the others. They seek to become members of a bigger family.

But, the first step is to have people feel that they are part, and that they enjoy some powers, and that they control their destiny.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you very much.
(Applause.)

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Ann Mayer.

PROFESSOR MAYER: Thank you.

These are fine, sober, realistic papers on the problems of constitutionalism in The Sudan, and I'm honored to have the opportunity to comment on these.

Let me raise a point that has not come up, the role of the Sudanese women in achieving peace and reconciliation, and the extent to which they will be allowed to play a role in achieving such peace.

It's very problematic to have this discussion without input from Sudanese women, and although I'm not Sudanese I can offer a woman's perspective. The Asmara Accords, with all their virtues, are very problematic. If you noticed Ann Lesch smiling yesterday when she mentioned the Asmara Accords, this was because she knew I was on the program today and she knew she would be absent, and she was very happy to be missing my comments on the Asmara Accords, which she has heard before.

And, I have expressed in a number of forums my concern about these accords. It is true that they seem to provide for the international human rights standards to become the new norms for rights in The Sudan, and I'm quoting from Professor Abdelmoula's paper, they do say things such as, "The human rights standards contained in international and regional conventions and treaties shall become an indivisible part of future Sudan's constitution and any law, decree, decision or measure contravening those standards shall be void and unconstitutional." That is wonderful.
Unfortunately, I don't have my copy of the Asmara Accords here, but if you read a few paragraphs down you will see, in a very inconspicuous position, a provision to the effect that women enjoy rights, not according to international law, but according to the standards of religion and culture. That is one half of the entire population is to be excluded from the purview of international human rights protections. These are only accorded to male Sudanese.

And, I think in so doing the Asmara Accords negate the basic logic of human rights. In so doing, they reject by implication the principle that was grasped by the drafters of the new South African constitution, which is that you cannot guarantee the human rights of any, unless you guarantee the human rights of all.

Now, through the grapevine I have been pleased to learn that there are some Sudanese working on the Asmara Accords who have appreciated that relegating women to such rights as they may or may not be afforded in local cultures or religious traditions is not compatible with the objectives of achieving a Sudan based on justice, and I do share Peter Kok's view that justice must be the foundation of a peaceful Sudan, and I do share David Little's perception that equality is a fundamental requisite of the new order that will be necessary to establish for a peaceful Sudan to endure.

Don't we need both justice and equality for the women of The Sudan? We were asked for constructive suggestions. I would like to make one, let everyone concerned with peace and the well-being of the Sudanese recognize that of all the groups in The Sudan it is women who have the strongest interest in achieving reconciliation, tolerance, justice, and let there be provision in any new Sudanese constitution that will empower women to serve as the cement of a new peaceful and just order in the country.

I am talking about human rights, and I do think in a country like The Sudan we do need to focus first on individual rights, and I'm not being original in this. If you see the examples of constitution drafting in counties like South African and Spain, which have undergone analogous horrific violence and conflicts, they have decided that to establish a new order it is essential to start first with human rights, individual human rights, not withstanding the fact that they also have to deal, of course, with people's rights.

Both of these countries have had to deal with very complex societies, with different ethnic, linguistic, racial communities, and to accommodate people's rights, not just the human rights of individuals. South Africa has also had to deal with very peculiar combinations of ethnic, racial, religious divisions that are not present in Spain.
It is extraordinarily difficult, and the drafters of the Spanish and South African constitutions did find this a task of enormous complexity, to achieve a new order which recognizes diversity. But, this can be done, and South Africa shows it can be done, where there is good will and good faith and a determination to reach a new just order, a new order that will be more equitable and more democratic.

But, question is, I think, can skillful constitution drafting accomplish anything where the will to reach accommodation is only feigned? Excellent arrangements on paper are not necessarily always supported by a sincere commitment to the principles that they represent, and I share Peter Kok's interest in the decision by the NIF regime to sponsor a new constitutional project.

I think the regime is justifiably worried about its very shaky legitimacy and sees this constitutional project as a belated means of shoring up its constitutional legitimacy.

But, if it drafts a constitution that looks excellent on its face, can we imagine that it will actually be the basis under a NIF regime for a truly democratic Sudan, one that is respectful of the Rule of Law and human rights? I think that Peter Kok's very fine article, which I recommend to everyone in Orient, in 1995, beginning on page 673, that goes over the history of NIF treatment of constitutional issues is very sobering and should be kept in mind by anyone who is disposed to trust the NIF regime in such efforts.

I do know that secularism is a bugaboo in many countries, and certainly it seems to be in The Sudan. There are many people who think that it's impossible to have a secular constitution. One possible compromise that might work is to have a constitution that is not secular in the sense that it does not eliminate references to the deity, for example, the constitution of South Africa does invoke God in the preamble. It is not a godless constitution, it affirms religious values in the text of the constitution. And, this is meaningful for many people, just as it is very meaningful for any Americans to include in the Pledge of Allegiance the phrase, "one nation under God," on the assumption that if we do not have that phrase "under God" we are affirming a godless polity.

Although I think it could make sense possibly to have affirmations of faith in God in the new constitution, I agree with others that it is essential that this constitution not include provisions guaranteeing the application of Sharia law. These have been demanded, insisted on indeed, in so many quarters, but this would be sure to be destructive of any prospects for peace in The Sudan.

I don't want to be misunderstood. I'm not saying that Sharia law has to be the kind of law that we have seen under Nimieri. It doesn't have to be the kind of law that we've seen under Beshir and Turabi's regime. But, one cannot escape history, and Sudanese who are seeking to impose Sharia at the national level cannot escape the reality that due to the way Sharia has been imposed in The Sudan in the last decades, Sudanese have every reason to associate Sharia law with denials of equality, and cruel and inequitable treatment.

Sharia has become central to the problem of equality in The Sudan, and this is a central problem in the whole conflict. Insisting on a constitutional provision guaranteeing the application of Sharia law at the national level will, I think, simply ensure the perpetuation of the current conflict and will lead to the south breaking away.
(Applause.)

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you, Ann.

We have a bit more than a half an hour now to have discussion.

Before I open the floor to the panelists, let me suggest that I'm going to impose what Peter Kok might call a restructural, redistributive constitutional revision in regard to the general audience.

People have expressed to me some frustration about length of time being taken by individual speakers, so I'm going to propose and try to enforce a two-minute rule on each questioner or commenter. I realize that's an inconvenience for the speaker, but it is a convenience from the point of view of other people who wish to speak, and there always are more people who wish to speak than are able to.

So, in the interest of justice and fair redistribution, I will impose that new constitutional arrangement.
The floor is now open for comments by the panelists.

Steven Wondu.

MR. WONDU: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just wanted to make a short comment on something which I hoped the -- raise in his discussion, but I suppose he was too kind to raise this important point, and it is the point about the legal possibility of exemptions of some people from some constitutional provisions in The Sudan, for example.

I recall when we were in Abuja negotiations in 1992 and '93, there was an attempt by the government to argue that the
southern part of the country could be exempt from certain provisions of Sharia law. And, these were particularly referring to the criminal aspects of Sharia law. The legal minds in our delegation were able to argue, I remember, that while it may be theoretically possible to exempt some parts of the country from some provisions of criminal law, there was like a body of law that was indivisible constitutional law, the law of contract, business law, capital formation, profit, banking, so that, even if you exempted Wei District from application of present law, if I from Wei District live in another district by virtue of my job, which is not exempted from that law, I would be subject to this.
So, how can a country be one, given the demographic mobility for economic, social and so many reasons, and still have these exemptions. I am raising this point because the government of Sudan, everywhere they go, keep talking about, look, yes, there is diversity in the country but we are taking care of this through exemption. Is this possible, Mr. Chairman, I would really be very happy if this -- was to be --
CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you very much.

(Applause.)

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Yes, Sulayman Nyang.

MR. NYANG: Yes. I just want to raise a question for the group to think about. Maybe the next panel will be in a position to deal with it, and that is, I want to make it very clear that religion and race or ethnicity have become two important issues with regard to modern constitution making with regard to groups.

South Africa just came out of Apartheid, and I remember when I was part of the UNDP delegation to go to Namibia to address the question of Namibia, one of the funniest things we found in Namibia, as U.N. group of so-called experts who went in there was the fact that in Namibia you have a situation which falls very much in line with what Steven is trying to suggest, the Apartheid engineers created a system whereby the Swanas could go to other parts of Namibia, so you have five or six Swanas in one place, they would be given some kind of system of education for themselves. And, this was from the Apartheid regime.

The problem you have in a multi-religious situation, and you want to privilege one religion over others, is to create an Apartheid-like situation, because what happened is people have area mobility, and if they have area mobility you cannot guarantee their equal treatment when they move outside of areas where they are from the majority, and I think that's a big problem for the Sudanese, how can you really structure the society in such a way that I can be free wherever I go, even I am a minority. And, that is a big problem for modern states.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you, Sulayman.

Yes, Carolyn.

MS. FLUEHR-LOBBAN: I don't like to refer to my own work, I find it's disingenuous, but I would like to say that I conducted research in the Sharia courts, just on the eve of the Islamization and September laws in 1983. So, there's a book called, Islamic Law in Society of the Sudan, which was published in 1987, and really documents how the Sharia was applied in Sudan on the eve of the September laws. And, believe me, take a look at it, it was not this cruel system which is being described here, it was a very human system, quite enlightened on many of the personal status issues leading the Islamic world in many respects.

What has happened since 1983 is really retrogressive, but it doesn't represent the spirit of the way Sharia had developed specifically within The Sudan. So, we really have to separate these periods and account for the politicization of religious law that has taken place, and we hope, perhaps, we can return to that period where Islamic law had its place as a personal status law, applicable to Muslims only.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you.

Mr. Beshir.

MR. EL-BESHIR: Yes. I would like to thank the three speakers, three legal scholars, for their clarity. Definitely, I have learned something. It's very clear, however, I would like to say something to Peter, I think that by talking about the three visions of constitution definitely this means that there are some people in the north who do not want to impose Arabization and Islamization.

Why I'm against Arabization and Islamization, because it gives the impression that all northerners want to impose Arabization and Islamization. But, when I speak about human rights, I mean that the people in power, the elites, are trying to impose that. So, that's why I want -- I prefer this.

To Adam, I want to say something about his skepticism about the Asmara declaration, and I think that it seemed like he ignores that there are some very important developments. Now there is SPLM with its force, the strongest fighting the government, and also there is SAF, that's Sudan Allied Forces, they also have their guns, there is no way that the Al-Mahdi and Al-Mirghani will go back on their words. There is some change and this change should be taken into consideration.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you.

Mr. El-Affendi.

MR. EL-AFFENDI: Yes. I think the problem with constitution making in Sudan has always been that it has been conducted by people with vested interests.

Now, the added problem with the Asmara declaration of the government, proposed constitution of the Khartoum, is agreeing to that, not only they are trying to suppress vested interests, there are also war documents, not peace documents. They are part strategy of war, and they can only be enforce by military means, which will have an additional problem.

Now, if we are talking of reconciliation or reconstruction of democracy in Sudan there has to be, as Peter suggested, some reconciliation of these visions. And, this reconciliation, or whatever is going to happen, is going to happen in Sudan, in the country, by creating a movement which is going to be the guarantor of this democratic spirit.
This movement -- Taisier has suggested yesterday what the modern forces, now there's nothing magical about the modern forces or their capabilities, the only thing that the modern forces, which are an assortment of various political groups, they are a multi-homogeneous group, was that they used to provide moral leadership and courage in opposition to oppression, and they formed a beacon for the people so that the people could rally around them, and as a result, because they do not have that vested interest which they see so as a drawback, but I see as a positive aspect, they manage to offer this leadership.

Now, at the moment if you want to supply this leadership there has to be some groups who are non-partisan. There has to be people who are prepared to condemn abuses and best interests from all sides.
Now, if I am going to form this group today of such consensus objectives, I'm afraid there's going to be a one-man movement.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you.

Further comments? Perhaps we should give now the panelists a chance to respond.
Would you like to begin here?

PROFESSOR ABDELMOULA: Yes. Three quick remarks. First, as to the question raised by Steve, I remember raising the same question with Doctor -- during his 1992 visit here. I was a discussant in one of his public lectures.
And, he said that public law cannot be applied on a personal basis. That is basically a common law doctrine, and I don't think that that should necessarily be the case in Sharia law. However, that is a position he took. I asked whether a southerner, who lives in the north, should be subjected to the same treatment, and he said, yes, because public law is going to be applied on personal grounds.

I say this because this issue is part of the legal programs of the various political parties that I have discussed. All of them say that a system of legal pluralism may be considered. However, legal pluralism does not solve the problem you just raised, so that's my answer to that.

Second, as to whether the SPLM, SPLA and SAF are really a guarantee that the traditional forces of the north will not retrogress to their original positions after they change, I don't think that these two forces are the only ones carrying arms.

Now, the Umma Party has its own militia, and the DUP has its militia, and everyone these days in the Sudan is forming his own militia. When people stick to their original programs, that means that the conflict in The Sudan will assume a new form after the removal of the NIF regime. And, militarization is rather a problem than a guarantee for the future peaceful implementation of the Asmara declaration.

Final point, about El-Affendi's point that the constitution being drafted right now is based on vested interests. Every constitution is based on vested interests. It's not a technical action, you can't bring lawyers from The Sudan to draft a constitution for the U.S., or vice versa.

I know that the NIF has done this throughout its history -- Pakistan -- to draft the first constitution that it rallied behind, but I don't think that's a good thing to do.

I think people should draft a constitution because they have vested interests in doing so, because they have experienced other types of constitutions, they have experienced other forms of constitutionalism, and based on that experience they are drafting a new constitution that will meet their future needs and solve the problems that they are wrestling with.

That the Asmara declaration is going to be implemented through military means, I don't think that's a problem either, because the forces that are rallying behind the Asmara declaration right now tried to achieve the same goal peacefully but were preempted by the NIF. They were preempted by the June 30th coup. So, the only means available for them right now is to impose that agenda by force.

Second, the NIF itself is implementing its agenda, legal and otherwise, through sheer force, and that happens everywhere you have a liberation movement, you have -- opposition, you have people who are implementing their programs by military means. I don't think that's a problem at all.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you.

Peter.

MR. NYOT: Thank you.

First of all, the comments of Professor Ann Mayer taken on board, I'm sure both of her colleagues in the national and political lines, including the Leadership Council, is aware of this provision on women, they are aware of how inconsistent it is with the basic guarantees of international human rights norms.

As one of the members of the constitution drafting committee, I'm glad to notice that the constitution we are drafting has fully taken care of this position, however, it remains for the leadership of the NDA to see whether the constitutional draft has effectively cured these vast defects.

On the question of -- I did not omit the exclusion of the south from the provision of Sharia, in fact, there are two pages here dealing with that situation exclusively, I think that the exclusion of the south from the implementation of Sharia penal provisions is a very deceptive maneuver.

First of all, it is craftily worded. It says that the Haddud penal provisions will not apply in the south. The Haddud provisions are about eight in number only, and they are penal provisions, complications, you know, lashing and so on for drinking, for adultery and so on. But, that does not solve the problem, because the offenses are defined from an Islamic point of view, and that has implications.

When you define adultery from an Islamic jurisprudential point of view, it is not the same like defining adultery from a customary law point of view, and that's where the southerners have been cheated in this clever formulation of exemptions.

Adultery, definition of property, definition of drinking, you know, in Islamic jurisprudence is radically different from the provision of these offenses or acts, or omissions in the customary law, common law tradition, which is known to us.
Second, and most serious, I think the exemption of the south from these eight penal Haddud provisions can cause very big tension in north/south relations. For example, I don't see a southern authority being ready to repatriate to the north, a convict who has been convicted to amputation of the hand, if he escapes to the south I don't think the south is going to bring that person back to be amputated in the north.

I don't think an apostate, or somebody who has renounced his government feats and skips to the south would be to -- to the north to effect or to stand trial for apostism. I don't think the southern custom officials at the border between the north and the south, -- what country, would be keen to enforce rules against smuggling of liquor into the northern Sudan. These are some of the things, you know, that can cause tension in north/south relations, and I think the whole exemption business was, you know, typically the NIF trying to show the world that the southerners have nothing to suffer from Islamic law.

The conquest -- exemption, it is the legal system to the center of assumption that the predominant law is Sharia law in Sudan. The question of that they the noblests, or the Muslims in the south are exempted too, I mean, if you are a Muslim in the southern Sudan you are exempted from the provisions of Sharia, the penal provisions, but if you are a non-Muslim in the northern Sudan you are subject, you know, to the full range of Sharia in offenses. That can also cause tension, because if southerners are being maimed, you know, or non-Muslims are being maimed in northern Sudan, while the Muslims we have in the south, whether they are southerners or northerners, enjoy the liberal criminal justice system, but because of time the question of equal treatment would definitely become central in north/south relations.

Final point on reconciliation, it's true, despite my orders of visions about the nature of regime in Khartoum, which I think is a regime that cannot be reformed, it is an Islamic fascist regime. It is not Islamic fundamentalism, it is Islamic absolutism, and that's a different debate altogether, but I don't think it has anything to do with fundamentalism.

Despite this, I think that the exercise of reconciling various visions and approaches to nation and state building can continue, but at the same time I think that the regions that have been elaborated so far under the Asmara Accords offer a bit of hope for the Sudan during the interim period, knowing very well that we are not unaware of the bad faith or the possibility of relapse. Those things have been taken into account, I'm not relying on the Umma Party, or the DUP to be the only guarantors of Asmara arrangements, no, we are relying on one international opinion, our own capability to police the arrangement, and the good will of all the other people, which I think would not be in short supply.

The final point still would be the question of whether the south is the only beneficiary from the Asmara Accords. Even though I say no, the Nuba Mountains is also treated fairly under the Asmara Accords, the Ngusene Hills is treated under the Asmara Accords, in the enlightenment of the alliance, you know, the representative of the western Sudan have been coming in, the representatives of the Beja are also part of the alliance now, and I would assume, I will end with an appeal that, perhaps, the greatest danger with the first implementation of the Asmara Accords is the inability of the Sudanese to the inability of the Sudanese political forces not to -- what am I saying -- the lack of the determination to deNIFify the state of the Sudan. If the NIF still remains a vital factor in the ordinance of governance, then the ordinance of the economy and the banking system, in the finances, in education, then the Asmara Accord cannot be implemented.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Ann Mayer, did you want to add anything?

PROFESSOR MAYER: No, thank you.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: All right.

Well then, the floor is open for comments according to the two-minute rule that we are now imposing. I'll start at the left here.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. I don't know if this is on.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Oh, try again.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Should I try another microphone?

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Try once more.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Testing, hello, do you hear me? I hate to hit microphones.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Maybe, apparently, it's not working. Try it now.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: This is on?

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Yes, there you go.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you.

I'm Richard Jones from Virigina Seminary, a friend of the Episcopal Church in Sudan, and through them of the whole Sudan.

I want to ask a question about a more long range ingredient of unity that I've not heard mentioned, and that is language. I want to know if anyone believes that Arabic language has a role in unity of Sudan, anything analogous to Swahili language in other regions.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Yes, sir.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, I was really surprised and amazed by the comment of Ahmed El-Beshir and Adam, regarding Al-Mahdi and Al-Mirghmi. If you go to the older the practices what will happen? And, Ahmel El-Beshir said that the guarantee is that there is some armed forces, the guarantees are not going to go back to the older practices. It is really unfortunate, instead of saying that Al-Mahdi and Al-Mirghmi have a new program for a new democratic Sudan, still you are going to use the same means of undemocratic things.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you.

Yes, sir.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I thank the Chairman for giving me this chance, but what I want to say is, my purpose in this hall, I am representing my own self, and I'm representing the Southern Sudan Independence Movement, kindly Chairman allowed me to have some minute of expressing our views?

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Oh, you are asking for more minutes?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Well, that's hard, no, we're already taking up time. Go ahead, I'll give you two minutes from now.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Okay.

What I want to say is, our purpose in this hall is to examine the situation in civil war which has been going on in Sudan. To me, the real cause or the main root of the problem are put aside and then people are working beside them.
The question of religion in Sudan is not a new thing -- it is all over, all parties in northern Sudan are committed to the Islamic law in the '60s and '50s, even if when some people are going to school it was the condition that if you are not a Muslim, if you do not hear your name you cannot be educated. The past generations of southern Sudanese after the independence, they all have Islamic names as a means of getting an education, that was the -- policy of the government.

If you want to go back to the solution of the problem, that was not the NIF regime at that time. It was the same traditional parties of northern Sudan or today, when you -- the responsibility of Islamization and Arabization on one party in the north, that means you are postponing the war for another generation, that means that if the NDA took over today they are going to play the role of making Islamic law in such a way that has caused a war for 40 years or for 30 to 40 years.

We in the south, especially the parliamentary southern Sudanese who are putting the case of the south straightforward, we agree with the present Islamic government which is putting their own point of view, Islamization and Arabization by force. If they fail, let the south go, we are for that.

It is clear, instead of moving around --

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Could you conclude, please? I'm afraid your time is up.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Okay.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you.

Yes, sir.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you.

I guess what I might say might be considered not politically correct by the tone of the meeting. I agree with one of the earlier speakers that there's been a bias of overtones against Islam, against Arabs, against the current regime in Khartoum. Of course, I'm not Christian or Islam, and I believe in ecumenical conception, man is created in the image of God.

In my discussions with El-Turabi he agreed with that conception. I visited many churches in Khartoum. I visited the Sudanese Church of Christ in Kadugli in the Nuba Mountains, which I don't know many of you have been there, and there is problems, but there is progress. People are trying to work things out.

I saw in the six churches we went to many people participating in Christianity. When we met with Doctor Gazzi, of his National Congress, one whole constituency organization, it's for women, there's 20 women in the Congress. So, I think if people look at what's going on, there's progress. This is a government. I think some of the language here has been unfortunate, deNIFication, what's going to happen when we get rid of Turabi, what's the next regime going to look like. These people are elected, you may not like it, there is a government, you may not like it, but there's something that's been left out, maybe by fallacy composition on the question of religion, which is, there are outside forces using the cover of religion to destabilize Sudan, and I point to the Christian Solidarity International, which I'm sure all the panelists are familiar with, and Carolyn Cox who is Deputy Speaker of the House of Lords of Great Britain, and she's come into the country illegally many times, she has met with the SPLA, she's worked with the NDA according to -- when I talked to him last time he was here, and that this is a British force that's working through the Christian Solidarity International.

Okay, you can say what you want, as soon as you are done there is a democracy still here in the U.S., right?
Carolyn Cox has met with and organized the pentecostalist move in the United States, including Diamond Pat Robertson, who was trying to make money in Zaire recently. She's worked with various forces to whip up the Christian -- so-called Christians of the United States Against Sudan. She's worked with --

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Sir, your time is up.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: -- okay, well let me just ask my question then.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Yes.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: In this discussion, how can we be discussing religion in Sudan when we don't discuss the role of a pseudo religious group Christian Solidarity International in destabilizing a sovereign government like Sudan? I
would like answers from Mr. Deng and others if possible.

Thank you for your courtesy.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you.

Yes, sir.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me this opportunity.
What I want to say actually is in support of what Peter has said about the constitution, of the building process that is going on, and I want to say that, as Peter did put it correctly, that the problem is not in the lack of a permanent constitution that the Sudanese can respect, but rather in formulating common convictions, something we don't completely have in The Sudan.

And, I want to refer to what one of the audiences said yesterday, and I guess, well, let me forget about his name and say what he did say yesterday, that, you see, nobody can change what the northern Sudanese think about themselves, or about their convictions, or about their religion, Islam, or what Islam tells them that they ought to do.
And, I'm here to tell you that nobody in this hall is going to say that Islam should do this and that, that is for the Muslims to decide for themselves. And, I'm not here supporting them, but I'm rather saying that it is also for the southern Sudanese to see to it that they protect their interests.

And, since nobody is going to change the mind of Muslims as to what they should do or should not do, then it is about time that people come to the realization that nothing, nothing at all is going to work, unless people genuinely come to this conclusion that the only thing to do would be to be candid and be straightforward and say, well, enough is enough.
Let's do something different. Let us partition the country.

(Applause.)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: And, I guess that is what we ought to talk about. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Yes, ma'am.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My name is Muriel -- Mosbach, and I'd like to say something about the discussion of the peace processes that's gone on.

I've had the opportunity to take part in the peace process in the Middle East, and also have been able to talk to members on both sides in Sudan.

The Oslo Accords were signed by one Israeli government, and its successor, however, has violated these accords and threatened to abandon them.

The Palestinian authority, which also signed the Oslo Accords, finds itself not supported by the population today, the Palestinian population, not to mention the PLO rejectionist front groups which violently try to oppose these accords.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Is this relevant to Sudan?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, yes.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Oh, it is.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yet, regardless of this fact, we are committed, rightly I believe, to mobilize political support from the United States to implement this peace.

The April, 1997 peace treaty in Khartoum was also signed by two sides, the Sudanese government and authoritative leaders of the former rebel forces, who were included founding members of the SPLA. And, the peace treaty, which may not be familiar to everyone in this room, has incorporated, indeed, many of the clauses that John Garang, the sole rebel leader of the SPLA still fighting the government, says he is fighting for in his war.

These include the referendum, after an interim period, on unity or secession of the south, and the IGADD initiatives recently have also introduced the question of secularism, which I understand our Ambassador there is part of.
I would like to propose something concrete for the United States Institute of Peace, and that is that you convoke a meeting of some form, in which you invite the signatories of the Sudanese peace treaty of April, 1997, among them -- Aruk, -- Tarroe -- Doctor --and others, and representatives of the Sudanese government signatories, and Mr. John Garang, to give the forces of peace a forum, and I'm sorry to say that here there have been neither representatives of this peace front, nor representatives of the Sudanese government, to my knowledge, and also to bring the reluctant Mr. Garang, who up to the present has refused any such meeting, to come to terms with this peace process and to confront openly, in an appropriate forum, the issues of peace.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you.
(Applause.)

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Yes, sir.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Chairman, I'm Paul Donoghue, a representative of the -- Missionaries, and I have a question that I'd just like to raise kind of refocusing the discussion on what was said earlier, you know, what are some of the local dynamics shaping the conflict in Sudan, and I seek to understand if this nomenclature, local dynamics, is another terminology for a clash of universal principles espoused by the various components in the conflict.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Yes, a final question.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I have a couple of comments to make. I am very disturbed the way Islam has been equal to cruelty, injustice, whatever. There is a clear distinction must be made between Islam in theory, which is stated in the Koran and -- the prophet Mohammed, peace be upon him, and Islam in practice, which is asynchronyzation of the old culture with the Islamic culture, which depends on that particular society's historical background, social, cultural structure and so on.

So, what you see in most so-called Islamic societies is not Islam. The true Islam is not in practice, so I'd like to make that distinction, that Islam is just, and Islam is compassionate, and Islam is equalitarian.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you.
We have five minutes until we need to go to lunch, so I'll ask if any of the panelists wish to make some final remarks.
Peter?

MR. NYOT: My final remark is that when we have been speaking about Islam here, it has been Islam as implemented -- as conceived and implemented by the National Islamic Front in The Sudan.

If any of you think that that is the real Islam, then, of course, we have to have another session altogether to see to what extent the Islam implemented by Turabi and -- is the Islam of the Koran and the Sunna. Most of us who are here have also studied Islam.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I would like to take you to it.

MR. NYOT: Okay, that's good, so we leave it at that then, but we have not been attacking Islam, I know more about Islam than, you know, I don't claim to be anybody else, but I believe that we make a distinction really between the practices of NIF and what is in the Koran and the Sunna, and the Muslims themselves have confirmed that what NIF is doing is really an abuse of Islam.
(Applause.)

MR. NYOT: The second point -- you know, the government of Sudan to the Peace Institute, of course, I mean, the Peace Institute is an institute that is fairhanded and has a record on its approach to the problems of peace and war in The Sudan. But, I would like to remind the speaker that there is a forum called the IGADD which recently the government of Sudan has turned to, and IGADD is a forum which is responsible for -- negotiations.
Unless you have another dimension in mind, I would like to remind you that the personalization of the SPLA in the form of Garang, you know, doesn't do good either the peace process of the SPLA, and it seemed to be an indirect way of holding him responsible for the war, which is really not the case. What is responsible for the war, and who is responsible for the war is the government of The Sudan, and that is --

AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Inaudible).

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: I don't think there's any difference between you really.

MR. NYOT: Then I agree with you right, left and center.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: I think you are in agreement, which is a good place to be.

MR. NYOT: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Yes, go ahead.

PROFESSOR ABDELMOULA: As to the role of Arabic language, my own observation is that Arabic language has been the Lingua Franca in The Sudan. It has been served by peace, not by war.

During war times, you have hundreds of thousands of Sudanese exiles in neighboring countries that learn to speak Arabic too. These are people who grew up in exile, they will go back to the Sudan, they never become fluent in Arabic.

Had they stayed in the country during this same age or period, they would learn Arabic, which is the Lingua Franca, even among southern tribes.

The deNIFication question, in fact, it might be where I suggested that unless the NIF is excised from the body politic in The Sudan, none of these programs is going to be implemented at all. I don't think that what is needed is to dismantle the NIF regime. What is needed to create NIF just the way fascist parties were created after World War II Europe, unless that happens this phenomena of going back to Islamic agenda imposed through the barrel of the gun will continue. And, the role of Islam in the constitution, whether as a source of law or single region in the country will continue, because this has been created by NIF itself, and this agenda surfaced to the Sudanese polity after the NIF was created.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Bona Malwal wanted to make a brief final comment.

MR. MALWAL: Yes, a very brief one on language. I think you know in the context of The Sudan there is nothing called language as an innocent being. It is not an innocent being, and so you cannot expect that Arabic would be Lingua Franca in the context of the conflict that goes on in The Sudan. The people of southern Sudan will make a choice of a language that does not create linguistic or cultural hegemony, which Arabic is associated with. No matter how much I am fluent in Arabic, I'm not going to choose it as a medium of communication within southern Sudan. It may be a medium of communication between me and northern Sudanese, but I would certainly not recommend it to southern Sudan.
(Applause.)

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Finally, one of the latter questions I think was addressed to me, in the use of this local dynamics language to describe situations like Sudan, the role of nationalism and nationalist competition in regard to the place of religion.

I had introduced that language yesterday in contrast to the kind of claims you have from Samuel Huntington, who describes the large civilizational clashes as the basic explanation for so many of the fault line wars that he talks about in his book.

I think the question was, is this local dynamics of nationalism a competition between universal religions? I don't view it, that's precisely the reason for using the local language or the localist language, it seems to me to provide a very sharp contrast between the way in which religion functions in a local area such as Sudan from the larger claims, the normative claims of traditional religion like Islam or Christianity, and that point, of course, has been made in a variety of ways in the panel this morning. I concur very much in that.

So, it would seem to be incorrect, in short, to call the conflict in Sudan a conflict between Christianity and Islam, as those traditions are known historically or traditionally.

Well, with that, let us break for lunch. Same applies, the panel is invited to that room, the general audience, I'm afraid, must fare for itself. There is a restaurant in this hotel, as you are aware, and there are some other restaurants outside.

We reconvene at 2:30 back here.

(Whereupon, the meeting was recessed at 1:21 p.m., to reconvene at 2:30 p.m., this same day.)

The views expressed above do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.

For More Information

Please contact the Religion and Peacemaking Initiative by e-mail at religion@usip.org. Written inquiries may also be sent to the address listed below.