Event Transcript
Religion, Nationalism, and Peace in Sudan

U.S. Institute of Peace Conference
Wednesday, September 17, 1997

Panel One: Western Perspectives on Religion and Politics in Sudan

Speaker: Kate Almquist, World Vision
Speaker: John Voll, Georgetown University
Respondent: Jemera Rone, Human Rights Watch

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Good morning and welcome back to the second day of our session on Religion, Nationalism and Peace in Sudan. Yesterday, as many of you who were here know, we had an extremely lively interchange and raised a number of questions, which we will try to address, to some degree at least, today.

I wanted to make a few opening remarks,if you'll indulge me, in order to provide my reflections on what happened yesterday, and to try to set the stage for today's discussion, bearing in mind that this conference is not only dedicated to the solution of Sudan's problems, though it is certainly dedicated to that, but it's also an approach to or a part of a wider project that the Institute of Peace is conducting under the general rubric of religion, nationalism and intolerance that I outlined yesterday, and, therefore, we are interested in the conclusions or results from a case study like Sudan for broader questions and implications.
In regard then to the subject of our conference on Religion, Nationalism and Peace in Sudan, a proposition I laid out for consideration and assessment yesterday was, I believe, abundantly confirmed. The proposition, recall, is of particular interest to this broader comparative study of religious nationalism that we are engaged in.

The proposition is this, and I repeat it, human rights protections, especially those guaranteeing tolerance and non-discrimination based on religion or belief, have a worldwide reach. They are as pertinent, in Samuel Huntington's language, to the West as they are to the rest. Huntington, of course, argues the opposite, that human rights norms are pertinent to the West but not to the rest, I'm suggesting quite the contrary.

Working out a political and legal settlement of the Sudanese Civil War, whereby the rights to freedom of belief and non-discrimination can be assured equally to all citizens of Sudan is, as was mentioned over and again yesterday, central to the resolution of the conflict in Sudan.

The crucial question, and the question we will be taking up today quite directly, is exactly how do you do that. Again and again yesterday the question arose, what are the appropriate solutions to this problem of equalizing religious rights within Sudan.

Which arrangement, a unified secular state, which was mentioned yesterday, a federal system with subdivisions differentiated according to religion, that was mentioned in the discussion, a separation of north and south premised on religious difference, that was mentioned many times in the discussion, all these are proposals attempting to solve the knotty problem of according equal religious rights to all Sudanese citizens.

The fact that there are many other dimensions to the conflict in Sudan, and those have been eluded to and those are certainly of great importance, the fact that there are many other dimensions to the conflict should not obscure the simple fact that the problem of religious equality has to be solved or there can be no lasting peace in Sudan. Nothing I heard yesterday refuted that central statement.

It was said at one point that the problem in Sudan is a question not of religion but of power. That might mean that people are more motivated by political interest than by spiritual commitment, and that is undoubtedly a very important thing to remember. It's important to keep religious motivation and political motivation separate, to the extent that that is possible, because the consequences of those different motivations can be very important in regard to communal life, peace and so forth. That is a very important point, and I am agreeing with it.

On the other hand, and this is a demurrer in regard to that statement, the problem is surely not as simple as it sounds. Sudan is a problem of power, not of religion. For example, insofar as the Christian groups that Marc Nikkel so eloquently described yesterday, the extent to which they, as he said, are passionately concerned with their own survival, on religious grounds Marc Nikkel was arguing, surely that is a question of power. That is to say, these fervent Christians who are interested in their own survival in the right of practicing their religion as they believe they should be allowed to do, is a question of political power, because what is the implication of that fervent desire, it is that they be part of a political system in which their rights to religious expression and practice are guaranteed. That's a political problem, that's a legal problem, that's a problem of power.

So, religious people, even on religious grounds, conceding for the moment Marc Nikkel's assertion that there is spiritual motivation at play here, even such a fervent commitment to spiritual values can imply matters of political power in a very direct and very important way, and even if, turning to the north for the moment, even if the political forces in the north, including the NIF government, are motivated, as was suggested several times yesterday, by sheer political, pragmatic interest.

Nevertheless, their conception of political power, and I'm speaking here of all the forces in the north, including the NIF government, is apparently very closely identified with Islam. It is that fact, whatever their motives for making the link between state and Islam, whatever the motives, it is that fact as to why it is so difficult to resolve the question of religion and state in a way that is equitable to all the citizens of Sudan. That point was made again and again.

If Mr. El-Affendi's point is right, as I understood him he was suggesting that the NIF regime is pragmatic and not that devoted to the principles of Islam, if he is right then the implication of that might be that there is, in fact, more political flexibility for a solution that would accommodate equal rights for all citizens than we might otherwise have thought. But, if, on the other hand, they are not willing to give up that close connection between Islam and their vision of a political system in Sudan, then contrary-wise there is not that degree of flexibility and the problem remains and the solutions are that much more difficult.

Secondly, if there is new thinking in the north, among the non-NIF forces, the so-called new forces or the NDA forces, if there is, in fact, new political thinking going on about the necessity of accommodating the south in a new way, in a way that is historically unique, while that may well represent some new flexibility for political solutions, and new agreements, on the other hand if, as was suggested by some, there isn't really a new commitment to such an accommodation then the problem remains even if the NIF falls. So, we are still stuck with the problem of settling this question of equal religious rights for all citizens, and it doesn't seem to me that it is gone away.
In short, the problem of religion and nationalism, the central theme of this conference, is still there, it's still very much at the top of the agenda, and very much must be addressed and dealt with if we are to make any contribution to the solution of the problem in Sudan.

And, fortunately, today's discussion is addressed more to the practical solutions than it was yesterday, though they kept coming up here and there.

We are going to take up, as you know, in the first panel the Western perspectives on religion and politics in Sudan, in order to clarify the political situation as it has existed and predictions, I suppose, as to how it might proceed, then we will turn to religion pluralism, constitutional issues and reconciliation in Sudan, the legal and political solutions that make sense given the dynamics of the situation there, and then the third panel this afternoon will be implications for U.S. foreign policy, that is, how does the U.S. appropriately, properly respond to the situation as it exists in the Sudan.

Well, with those introductory remarks, which I hope provide a framework within which to continue to think about these problems, I will now turn to the first panel, and to the first speaker, who is a representative of World Vision, a Christian humanitarian group, very active over the years in Sudan, Kate Almquist, who will begin.

Again, our procedures will be as yesterday, roughly, 20 minute presentations, roughly, ten minute comments, then comments from the panel, and then, I promise you, an opportunity for public interaction.
Kate.

MS. ALMQUIST: Thank you, good morning.

My task this morning is to provide you with a perspective of an international Christian relief and development agency which is working in Sudan. In particular, how does World Vision understand the conflict in Sudan and the role that religion plays in this conflict, and what implications does the role of religion have for resolving the conflict.
The argument that I wanted to give this morning is not based on a particular antipathy towards Islam or out of a particular sympathy that I have for Christianity, but rather it's based on the reality of what we see happening in Sudan from our vantage point as a humanitarian agency, and I hope you all will bear that in mind as I go through my remarks this morning.

World Vision began its commitment to Sudan in 1972, working through partner organizations, and then in the early '80s we moved in with an operational presence ourselves. In the late '80s, we were operational around Khartoum, working with displaced persons, and in 1988 we were asked to leave the country by the Sudanese government, which declared several agencies, Christian agencies, persona non grata at that time.

Since then, World Vision has been working in southern Sudan, and we have been a founding member of Operation Lifeline in Sudan, the consortium of international agencies and U.N. agencies working to provide humanitarian assistance to the south, in this particular case.

World Vision has conducted ground operation and interventions in all the major regions of the south. Early initiatives involves infrastructure development in Western Equatoria, between the towns of Yambio and Tamboura, and a major food program in Wao, in the Province of Bahr El-Gazal, requiring the cooperation of both the GOS and the SPLM.
In 1989, World Vision began operations in eastern Equatoria, primarily in the towns of Kaputa and Torit. Eastern Equatoria operations continued until 1992, when they GOS launched a major offensive in that region.
In 1993, World Vision was invited by the SRA and Ras, the humanitarian wings of the two primary movements at the time, into Yambio County in western Equatoria, and later to Wao in the Upper Nile. However, World Vision was forced to leave Upper Nile due to logistical and security constraints, due to heavy interfactional fighting which forced us to evacuate and to leave a nearly completed feeding center.

Since then, World Vision has been operational in Tonj and Gombrio Counties in Bahr El-Gazal, and Yambio County in western Equatoria. Prior to World Vision's arrival in Tonj, this area had not received any outside assistance for over ten years.

The communities targeted for assistance by World Vision lack regular access to markets, essential commodities, clean water and health services. This condition of chronic need makes them all the more vulnerable to the caprices of fighting, drought, flooding and disease.

In 1997, World Vision has targeted an estimated beneficiary population of over 250,000 southern Sudanese. Our $8 million program focuses on food security, primary health care, clean water, agricultural recovery, income generation and emergency relief needs for these populations.

In addition, World Vision provides support to churches and indigenous organizations engaged in advocacy and reconciliation activities. These sectors are designed to both focus on recovery and rehabilitation wherever possible, while maintaining an emphasis on local capacity building and infrastructure development.

Now, I'll just say a few words on the present humanitarian situation in Sudan, which is very sobering. Years of war, famine, drought, flood and under-development have produced a crisis of enormous proportions across southern Sudan, resulting in massive population displacements and regional insecurity. Some sources estimate that up to 1.5 million southern Sudanese have died as a result of the war, either as a direct result of the conflicts, or of malnutrition, or of simply neglect by the government or rebel forces.

U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that there are presently 209,000 Sudanese refugees in Uganda, 110,000 in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 78,000 in Ethiopia, 28,000 in Kenya and 27,000 in the Central African Republic. The U.N. also estimates that there are approximately 2.5 million internally displaced persons in Sudan, including 1.8 million in and around Khartoum, 350,000 in the Transitional Zone and government held garrison towns, and 150,000 in camps in Equatoria and elsewhere.

Of the estimated 4 million people that live in the provinces of Equatoria, Upper Nile and Bahr El-Gazal, the region informally recognized as southern Sudan, 4.2 million of the most vulnerable people targeted by the U.N. Interagency Consolidated Appeal for Sudan, of those 3.36 million live in these three provinces of southern Sudan.
In 1997, over 2.65 million persons will require emergency food assistance, and these numbers likely do not reflect the vulnerability of the marginalized populations to which the International Community has been denied direct access, such as the people living in the Nuba Mountains.

Thus, hunger is a weapon used by all parties to the conflict, and the composite result on food security is devastating. Civilians are forced into camps in order to draw food into areas for exploitation by military groups, food aid for vulnerable persons, especially women and children, is forcefully diverted by armed men, and humanitarian access is denied to food deficit populations, often reducing them to the point of starvation, as a tactic to achieve military victory, or simply to terrorize the civilian population.

In June of 1997, World Vision began to notice malnutrition, severe malnutrition in Tonj in one particular area that we are working, and even death of children as a result, all of which could have been prevented if critical food aid had been delivered in a timely fashion in April, following an assessment which indicated this might happen in March. The reason why the food aid couldn't be delivered in April is because the government refused to clear the humanitarian aid flights into the area, so no food was delivered and deaths do result from that.

The hampered relief efforts are expected to further exasperate food insecurity due to natural causes in the coming months. In many areas of southern Sudan, the prolonged dry spell in May and June has destroyed early plantings and is likely to severely affect crop yields in Bahr El-Gazal lakes area, and also around Juba, Kapueta Counties and Equatoria in the coming weeks and months.

Although pasture and herd conditions are generally good, NGOs estimate that the dry spell, which also rendered crops more susceptible to damage from insects, pests, and disease, will reduce first crop harvest for about 300,000 persons by as much as 65 percent. Prospects for the second -- season crop, which represents 60 to 75 percent of annual production, depend on the current rains, which arrived late at the end of June and will last until October. Crop assessments in November and December will be critical to ensuring that necessary food aid reaches these populations in a timely fashion.

And now, I'd like to turn to the role of religion in the conflict in Sudan, and make some remarks about that.
All parties to the ongoing conflict in Sudan must share the responsibility for the chronic humanitarian emergency engulfing southern Sudan, the Transitional Zone, and increasingly areas in northern Sudan. The role which religion plays in perpetuating this conflict, and the associated humanitarian emergency, is however quite different in the north and the south.

In northern Sudan, religion is a primary motivating factor in the government's conflictual relations with the southern opposition forces. To the extent that the National Islamic Front is waging war against the south in an effort to forcibly Arabize and Islamicize the south, religion is playing a negative role in Sudan.

While I do not pretend to be an expert on Islam, or on the National Islamic Front, it is apparent, even to the non-expert observer, that the imposition of Sharia law and the entire country, including the predominantly Christian and animist south, is a major source of contention between the warring parties. This agenda to Arabize and Islamicize the south extends back into Sudan's history, well before the advent of power of the NIF regime. However, it is the zeal with which the Sharia is espoused and pursued or protected by the NIF that makes this particular time in history unique, in my observation.

This is manifested in several ways. First and foremost, the government is waging a brutal war against a significant proportion of its population in order to maintain power and forcibly impose Sharia on the entire country. Civilians, particularly in the south and in the Transitional Zone, are targets of war. GOS planes indiscriminately bomb civilian targets. Government militias terrorize villages, often employing scorched earth tactics, which involve killing to a large degree the men in the villages and taking the women and children and forcing them into slavery, and entire villages are also reportedly relocated into concentration camps referred to as peace villages.

And finally, humanitarian aid is routinely denied to vulnerable populations as a tactic of war. In some regions of Sudan, the government's actions have been described as being tantamount to genocide, and, in particular, the Nuba Mountains region must be considered in this light.

In addition to these important tactics of war, the government of Sudan grossly violates the human rights of Sudanese who refuse to subscribe to the NIF's particular interpretation of Islam. Christian, animist and Muslim alike are victims. Among the abuses documented by human rights observers are slavery, forced conscription of children, rape, arbitrary detention, torture and execution.

It is a capital offense for a Muslim to convert to Christianity in Sudan, and the government has refused the permits, to allow permits for building of new churches in northern Sudan since the early 1970s.

Finally, the NIF's agenda of Arabization and Islamization is also apparent in its regional and international relations. Regionally, the government of Sudan is pursuing an aggressive strategy to destabilize its neighbors to the north and in the Horn of Africa. Governments of Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda have been the primary targets of this destabilization campaign.

In each of these countries, the Sudanese government has provided financial and material assistance to extremist Islamic groups working to overthrow these democratically elected governments. As a result, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda have severed diplomatic relations with Khartoum and are now actively working to contain the threat from Sudan.

Internationally, Sudan is also the source of considerable terrorist activity, through its direct support to some of the most radical Islamic terrorist groups in the world. In response to the NIF regime's willingness to harbor terrorist groups in Sudan, the U.S. State Department has placed Sudan on its list of official state sponsors of terrorism, a designation which ensures that the country will be treated as a -- state by the U.S.

While it would be simplistic to attribute the Sudanese government's actions against its non-Muslim population solely to its desire to Arabize and Islamize the country, certainly these goals play a major role in motivating the NIF regime to treat portions of its populations in such a deplorable way.

In certain respects, religion plays a contrasting role among the southern opposition movements. On the most basic level, these movements can be said to be fighting for freedom of religion, for the right not to live under Sharia law, and to choose the religion by which they will live, if any. In political terms, this has led to cause for a new non-religious and enlightened Sudan, in which the state is neutral on religion, or barring that, to cause for a separate Sudan.
However, southern Sudanese are clearly motivated by more than a desire for religious freedom. Even more fundamentally, they are seeking the right to determine the form of government under which they will live, and then to be able to govern themselves.

Thus, the question of separation of religion and state has become a symbol of the struggle for political self-determination among southern Sudanese and other marginalized populations in Sudan.
In this sense, the southern factions are also incited to violent conflict by the religious impositions of the government of Sudan.

In other respects, nevertheless, religion is playing an increasingly unifying and reconciling role in the context of intrasouth conflict. Religion is not the divisive factor among the various factions vying for popular supports among the populations opposed to the NIF regime.

Rather, the church is bringing people together across tribal and factional lines, thus, playing a key role in grassroots efforts for peace.

Allow me to offer two recent examples of the church's role in this manner. First, in March of this year World Vision supported a pastors' conference, which brought together church leaders to support each other and celebrate their unity in Christ. This conference brought together over 150 Sudanese Catholic priests and Protestant pastors and their wives to Yambio County for one week, the first such meeting in south Sudan since 1974, and the first time ever that an ecumenical meeting of this nature had taken place in Sudan, in this part. The pastors increased resolve to continue meeting together occasionally and to work through their congregations to seek peace and reconciliation with each other.

More recently, the new Sudan Council of Churches and this Young People's Liberation Movement met for an important dialogue on the future of church/state relations in the new Sudan. This forum considered how to build unity among southern Sudanese, and the church was charged with playing a lead role in seeking to reconcile the various southern factions.

In addition to these two specific instances, the new Sudan Council of Churches and various individual church leaders have been a persistent voice for justice and peace in Sudan for years, often at great personal risk to themselves. Certainly, the church is an integral component of the vibrant grassroots movement for peace and reconciliation in the south.

What then can we conclude from this cursory look at the practical role of religion in the conflict in Sudan? First of all, let me suggest that it's imperative that any peace agreement address the question of separation of religion and state in a just manner for all Sudanese, irrespective of their present religious tradition. Thus far, the Declaration of Principles offers the best hope for addressing the root causes of the conflict, including the debate over religion.
All parties to the conflict should recommit themselves to sincere negotiations within this framework. Recent initiatives of the NIF regime to pursue peace talks should not be treated as sincere until and unless the government offers more than words as a sign of its commitment to negotiate a comprehensive settlement to the conflict.

To this end, an important confidence building measure the government could take would be to stop impeding the access of humanitarian agencies and human rights monitors to vulnerable populations inside Sudan.
Since the creation of Operation Lifeline in Sudan in 1989, the government has manipulated it and repeatedly denied access to humanitarian agencies, often resulting in the deaths of many thousands of people inside Sudan.
This is a violation of the spirit of the tripartite agreement that is the framework for Operation Lifeline in Sudan, and would be one positive step that the Sudanese government could take to show its good will in truly seeking peace in Sudan to abide by the agreement they've already committed to.

Similarly, the admission of human rights monitors to all parts of the country would go a long way towards enhancing their credibility as well.

And, for its part to the SPLM and other southern factions should also be held to the same standard as the government and should ensure unimpeded access to the areas that controls for the purposes of delivering humanitarian assistance and for monitoring human rights.

And secondly, let me suggest that the efforts of the churches to foster unity and reconciliation should be supported and further encouraged by the international community.

Although I'm more familiar with the activities of the church in the south, the constructive role of religious institutions in the north, Muslim and Christian, should not be overlooked and efforts should be made to link these institutions in the north and the south to a much greater extent.

The positive role of religious institutions in Sudan should receive further study and attention from the international community, as an integral component of the grassroots movement for peace and reconciliation.
Finally, let me conclude, this presentation has attempted to suggest that, viewed from a humanitarian perspective the role of religion in a conflict in Sudan is profound, and it can be both constructive and destructive. Religion is not the sole cause of the ongoing crisis in Sudan, as many of the panelists have already demonstrated, but a just and comprehensive solution to the crisis will not be found without addressing this critical issue.

Finally, let me just state that World Vision considers all parties to the conflict responsible in some way for the immense humanitarian tragedy which continues to unfold in Sudan, and all parties are culpable of human rights abuses. Thus, it's incumbent upon the government, upon the government's allies and upon all the opposition forces, to take measures to ensure the fundamental rights of the civilian population and to ensure, at the very least, that they are provided the assistance they need to survive.

Ultimately, a negotiated settlement which all parties to the conflict subscribe will be the only real hope for lasting peace in Sudan.

As an international humanitarian agency working in Sudan, our immediate goal is to help alleviate suffering and improve the quality of life among the targeted communities that we work with.

Our larger interest, however, is to see the conflict end through a comprehensive and just settlement among all parties, which respects the basic needs and freedoms of all Sudanese, Muslim, animist and Christian alike.
In the words of my co-panelist, the challenge for both Muslims and Christians alike in Sudan is to provide, not reasons for continued fighting, but visions for a new reality in which Islam and Christianity provide the basis for community, rather than the excuse for conflict.

Thank you.
(Applause.)

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you very much, Kate. John Voll.

MR. VOLL: I think to avoid the problems of the mike, unless it really screws things up, I'd rather just use my own amplification system, which might mean maybe standing up, and that way I can see other people as well. Now, does that screw up anything?

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: No.

MR. VOLL: The cameras can't hear me. Now can the cameras hear me, and the tape, and everybody else?

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Yes.

MR. VOLL: Super.

It's a pleasure to be here, and I apologize for not being here yesterday. I won't go into the narrative of the technological woes of air conditioning systems and computer breakdown at the Office of the Center for Muslim/Christian Understanding, which meant that I was shepherding concerned staff, rather than being here.
But, it is a pleasure to be here, and it's also an interesting challenge. Kate Almquist and Jemera Rone present and represent important Western perspectives, and the panel title is an ambiguous one, Western Perspectives on Religion and Politics in Sudan.

Now, it's clear with Kate what her task is. She represents an operating institution and does work that is terribly important, and does work with bravery that is terribly important. Human Rights Watch does the same thing, operative people. And so, parachuted into this operative panel is an academic.

Now, if I were just simply cold, given the subject, Western Perspectives on Religion and Politics in The Sudan, I would give an analytical, scholarly discussion of how Western perspectives have changed over the centuries, particularly, the last century or century and a half. But, that would be a discussion of Western perspectives, not a presentation of Western perspectives.

Now, thank goodness for the introduction and for reports of the discussions yesterday, because my initial suspicion was that I was put on this panel because I was probably one of the few people in this town who might be expected to say something good about NIF, and so I could become then the token apologist for the hideous Islamic regime in Khartoum, and try and defend the regime against the analysis that Kate has given.

That simply isn't my intention. There are some specific things that I might disagree with, but most of what she said represents a kind of perspective that I have no difficulty with.

Now, what I want to do, however, is to mix, perhaps, my assignment. I have the advantage and the disadvantage of having looked at, studied, lived in, lived with The Sudan, modern Sudanese history, for a very long time. And, every so often, in discussions like this, my problem, and I suppose my function, is to say, you know, I've heard that before. If I had $100.00 for every time that I had heard that the anti-Khartoum government forces in the south were about set to achieve victory I could retire. I first heard it when Patrick Seale first reported the hidden and forgotten war in the southern Sudan back in 1963. The Abboud regime was on its last legs by early 1964, there was about to be a victory, and I've heard it many times since.

And so, I think that in one sense I have this feeling that maybe it is worthwhile from time to time to say, I've heard certain things before.

The other theme that I would just like to suggest a little bit is a very historian-like theme. A little more than 100 years ago, actually, now it would be 110 years ago, 112 years ago, Punch magazine published a cartoon that has been reprinted in a lot of text books and so on. It was just after the fall of Khartoum to a hideous religious fanatic who was persecuting everybody, and poorer St. Chinese Gordon has just been massacred by the invading hordes, and the cartoon is Britannia, with smoldering Khartoum in the back, Britannia like this, too late.

Well, if I had to have one theme about the relationship between Western perspectives and Western policies with regard to The Sudan and with regard, especially, to the subject of the relationship between religion, politics, power and national identity, it could be summed up in that sort of Britannia punch word, too late, too many sort of missed opportunities, too many lessons learned too late, too late for Gordon, 1885.

But, there were many chances, as I listen now, there were many chances for Western policymakers to encourage secular nationalism not identified with particular specific religious organizations. The identity of particular religious organizations with political parties is not something that is just the product of Muslims in The Sudan, but it's also the product of lessons learned too late. The British didn't want the political parties to be identified with the sectarian movements of The Sudan, but when the non-sectarian politicians, when the young educated members, leadership of the Graduates Congress presented the memorandum in 1942 saying we want a suggestion for a statement that The Sudan can be self-determining and independent, the British said, you are a small minority, malcontented, educated elite, you don't represent the masses, and the lesson was learned.

You go to those people who have mass support and political parties develop then on the basis of those organizations that had mass support. The Habmiatorika, led at that point by the Father of Mohammadus Monmirgini, now the head of the EUP, and the Umma party, whose primary support came from the Mahdist, at that time led by the grandfather of -- Sadiq Al-Mahdi, and when people woke up, when the British woke up and said, let's encourage a non-sectarian party by 1952 in the first elections it was too late, and you had religion identified with specific parties.

Similarly, when there were non-sectarian alternatives that provided leadership for the October Revolution in 1964, the United States was pleased with the restoration of parliamentary democracy but very concerned because at the heart of the non-sectarian modern forces were people who were members, heaven forbid, of the Communist party. There were leftists and communists who had been involved in the revolution, and in 1964 American policy was not terribly excited about encouraging leftist revolutionaries. And so, when that leadership, when that leadership was pushed aside by the sectarian political parties in the era of transition of 1964-1965, the United States was not in opposition, was, in fact, quite happy, and that pattern repeated itself in '84, '85 and '86.

World Vision has a policy paper that I recommend to all of you to read on Sudan, prior to the divided country, and part of the analysis of the context in Sudan, it says, in the north there are three important political forces, the traditional sectarian parties, the fundamentalists and the modern forces. The modern forces are represented by the unions, student organizations, progressive women's groups and so on, and it's nice that we discover the modern forces now in the late '80s and early '90s, but I can say from direct experience that trying to persuade people in this town that our friend Khatmiyya, or that our friends who were suspiciously leftist, would be deserving of support was very difficult.
And, in that sense we're operating too late, or I can remember, as we now look, first in Africa Watch, Abdullah Naim, when Abdullah's teacher, Mahoud Mohamed Taha, was alive, so it was worthwhile defending him, it was very hard to get people who were willing to defend him.

I was at a smaller meeting than this, that had a similar kind of composition, however, and I remember being alone in arguing with Hassan Turabi about the validity of Ustas Mahmoud Mohamed Taha's doctrines and teachings. There weren't many liberal Americans who recognized the potential for that human right, for the human rights involved in the teachings of Ustas Mahmoud, and there were an awful lot of people who were willing to defend Mahmoud when he was a martyr, who would say nothing to defend him when he was the lion.

Now, as we look at then this current situation, as we start with the question that Doctor Little reminded us of, you know, how can we do, how can we achieve settlement, how do we do things, well, as a historian I always remind people I can be 100 percent sure of my predictions because as a historian I don't deal with the future. I can be 100 percent sure that Henry -- I can predict that Henry VIII is going to break with the Papacy, and I'm right every time in my prediction when I get there. I can be sure that Gamel Abdel Nasser is going to lead a revolution in 1952 every time I predict it, it happens in the text books. So, I'm not going to predict, but I am going to suggest, as a cranky old man, that there are things that we might want to learn so that this time around 20 years from now somebody might not say, well, we were too late.

And, in that sense then, what I would suggest is that the question of relations with the National Islamic Front and Hassan Turabi is an important one, and I am pleased to hear the practical orientation of some -- reports of the practical orientation of some of the discussions from yesterday.

I'm less pleased very often when I'm discussing things with my Sudanese friends to hear reflections of the kind of conversations that I had in the mid-'70s with my Iranian friends. All we have to do is get rid of the Shah and paradise will come. All we have to do is rid of NIF and we can then -- that's the big hurdle, after that everything can fall into place. And, I simply don't think that's the case.

Abul Alir in June in Cairo reminded people after Sadiq Al-Mahdi had given a stirring jihad kind of proclamation, the next night at the International Sudan Studies Conference Abul Alir reminded people that probably the best way to get a settlement was to try and get people to talk to each other, everybody to talk to everybody.

And, part of that then is the next sort of question. We can all guess motivations. You can all figure out why it is John wanted to come and give a talk, why does Kate want to come and give a talk to this thing, and we can invent all sorts of plots, but the fact is that I'm here, and I think that if we are looking to the future we have to start by taking advantage of whatever is happening. If the NIF government at this point says it is willing to talk, then we talk, and so on.

I think bottom line, if we wait to discover the Archangel Michael and the Archangel Gabriel, and if we wait until it's possible to build the Garden of Eden again, another 1.5 million will die, and I think that that what I would suggest in terms of Western perspectives, 100 years ago, 1997 is the centennial of the completion of the railroad between Wadilhalfa and Abulhamed. There was an end brought to the last Islamic regime, but it was bought at the price of the Battle of Obdurman with the slaughter of 10,000 Sudanese in a very bloody war. I hope we can avoid that and not be too late.

Thank you.
(Applause.)

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you very much, John.
And now for some comments, Jemera Rone.

MS. RONE: Thank you very much, and thank you for inviting me here. I've been very struck by the quality of the participation in the conference so far, both by the panelists and by the comments from the floor.

I have listened with great interest to what both of the preceding panelists have said, and I agree with almost everything, the points that they've made. I'd like to stress or to underline Western perspectives on what's happening in Sudan on nationalism and religion and peace in Sudan by referring to the broad Western tradition and perspective that came out of World War II and created the human rights instrument that we now apply across the world, and are applicable across the world.

I think the discussion of, for instance, the Rules of War, the Geneva Conventions, which were written in 1949 to avoid the experiences of World War II repeating themselves, and the International Covenants on Human Rights, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, these came out of World War II. They were addressed to the excesses of World War II, and one of the chief excesses of World War II was nationalism run rampant.

The European Community or Nation States were able to form their Nation States at an earlier time in history, and they took nationalism to its extreme form. The human rights instruments that now exist are designed to prevent that kind of recurrence, that is, from the creation of a nation where there is an ideology of a master race, where one group has all privileges and everyone else is a second class citizen and is subjected to everything from legal restrictions on their conduct to physical elimination of the people.

The instruments such as the convention against torture, the convention against preventing Genocide, the civil and political rights conventions, the economic social and culture rights convention are all the products that are drawn from this European experience in World War II. And, these lessons learned, these very hard lessons learned in the most devastating and longest lasting -- well, maybe not the longest lasting, but certainly the most devastating worldwide conflict of the 20th Century, have application to struggles today in The Sudan and in other countries with the issue of how religion, and ethnic origin, and race, and national origin fit in to the definition of nations and of peoples.

These instruments seek to protect broadly three different classes of people that are somewhat overlapping. One are civilians who are caught in wars. Other protected groups specifically protected are ethnic, racial, national, religious and other minorities, who are defined largely by their condition at birth, that is, by things over which they have no control. They are born into certain class -- well, race, religion, to a certain extent sex, color and so forth, and over most of those people have -- over their condition at birth people have no control, and the idea is that they should be protected and given equal rights and protected against discrimination on these grounds over which they have no control.

A third class that's protected, particularly of the civil and political conventions, are political actors, that is, people who act in the political arena who have opinions which don't necessarily come from their condition at birth. Their activities are protected even though they are maybe a political minority within a country, that is, they cannot be excluded from political participation because they have unpopular opinions. Their rights to expression of their views, to publication, to write about their views, to publish newspapers on their views, to participate in political associations freely, to assemble, to petition the government for redress of grievances, as we say in this country, all of these rights are guaranteed to political actors, including those who are in the minority, so that they may have the opportunity to persuade others of their point of view, and so that they may not be cast aside from the political system and have no representation or chance of getting representation.

These three groups that are broadly protected by the international human rights instrument that were codified after World War II are also guaranteed equal treatment in the sense that they are subjected to rules that apply to everyone, or are supposed to under the international system apply to everyone across the globe, and the universal nature of the rules is an extremely important component of the system. It means, basically, bringing it to the discussion of Sudan, that religious minorities are protected. For instance, non-Muslims in a Muslim country are protected, a religious minority in a Muslim country has to have equal rights in international law, and those rights have to be effectively protected by that government.

The converse of that is that in a non-Muslim country Muslims have equal rights with all other religious groups in that country, even if it is not a Muslim country, even if it doesn't have a Muslim majority, even if it has a secular, or Christian, or other religious government, Muslims in that country have to be protected in their equal rights, and rights against discrimination.

There cannot be, in the international system, an opt out provision for a country because they have a particular ideology, or because they have a particular religion, or because they are in the majority of one race or another race. The international system won't work that way, it can't work that way, it will be undermined, and we will be provided with a pretext, as Hitler took advantage of prior to World War II, to protect German minorities in other countries in Europe. His form of protection was to invade the country and assimilate the entire country under guise of protecting German minorities there. This system is designed to prevent that excuse by providing effective protection for minorities, any type of minorities, in every country.

This system is simply reinforced, the need for it is simply reinforced by current conditions in the world. At the end of the 20th Century there's vast movement of people, very few nations are of one race, religion, ethnic origin, et cetera, there are minorities within countries throughout the world, people that are a majority in one country often end up as minorities in other countries. Economic forces cause people to migrate, and there's no prospect for this migration to where economic opportunity lies to seek and, therefore, with the growth of population we'll simply have more and more minorities within states, even as the states break down in sizes, as they have done in the former Soviet Union.
Therefore, the use of religion, or ethnic origin, racial origin, or any of these exclusive group concepts as the basis for forming nation states in the 20th Century is not desirable, it is forbidden in international law, and is also very impractical because as we have seen in the former Soviet Union and in many other places in the world there is a backfire effect to the exultation of one group over another group. That is, one group here that's in the Republic of Georgia, the minorities there, and there are Armenians, Alsacians, all kinds of people I never heard of before, who are minorities in the Republic of Georgia and the former Soviet Union, they listen to the Georgian nationalist rhetoric. Georgians were two thirds of the population, perhaps, and they thought, well, if they can feel this way about their own national group that they have pride that they should have first place, that they should come before all others, what's wrong with us, we want first place too. We are no less worthy than they are. So, this backfire effect of nationalism, it's as dangerous as the rampant nationalism itself is, that is carried beyond certain understandable pride in one's origin.
So, this also makes it inadvisable and infeasible to form -- to try to form national identity based on exclusive notions of belonging.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you, Jemera, and thank you all for pointed and provocative comments. We, unfortunately, have just about a half an hour now, because we lost a half hour by starting at 9:30, and we must try to make that time up as best we can.

So, the floor is now open for comments or responses by the panel for about ten or so minutes, and then we'll open it up for general discussion.

Yes, Mr. Beshir.

MR. EL-BESHIR: Good morning. I find it very disturbing that, not from this panel, or even this conference, but for some time the persistent use of old language, old terms are still there. You find that, and I think John Voll has said something about that, you still hear, especially from the Christian religious groups and humanitarian groups, still the old British anthropology and sociology terms of Arabization and Islamization, which can drive somebody crazy. It's just, every book you open they talk about that.

Then you find the conspiracy of NIF of the Christian Zionist conspiracy against Islam and against all that. Unfortunately, the Western mass media still uses its own terms also, the Arab Muslim north versus the African Christian south, and then you find that people in the social sciences, and I think Francis is doing very well in getting some new terms of identity and dynamics of power which people are not, you know, using that very much.
The human rights groups, and Jemera I think today referred to that, the talk about the conventions of the United Nations, but all of them, in my opinion, ignore the development that took place in 1995 in Asmara, where for the first time the southern and the northern groups sat down and started talking. Unfortunately, my friend, John Voll, didn't say anything about that talk, which created a new Sudan as a matter of fact.

And also, in January, 1997, this year, the southerners and the northerners are fighting together, and we find southerners in Khartoum talking to NIF, and southerners in Asmara talking to the traditional parties and fighting side by side.

So, what I'm saying, there is a new Sudan emerging, and it's really, you know, very confusing to see the old language, the old fixation on Arabization, Islamization, Christians versus something new is happening, and, you know, in a conference like this I wish, or maybe in the future, there would be something about studying and looking into these terms and how we are being biased by our own perceptions, you know, old perceptions, and I'm not seeing the development that's taking place in Khartoum, and all around, there is a new development after 40 years of fighting and independence, something is happening and it's a shame that we are still using the old terms.

Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Yes, Carolyn.

MS. FLUEHR-LOBBAN: Thank you.

I want very much to follow what -- Amin has said, because the importance of dialogue like this is that, not only do people from various parts of the Sudan speak to each other, but Westerners and non-Westerners speak to each other as well. And, I think we have to also acknowledge that some important things are happening in the West and in Western scholarship as well.

We bear a terrible responsibility that we must rectify, and scholars like John Voll and others are helping to rectify this by taking a very critical examination of our own views of the non-West.

The Western world is the one which has orientalized Islam, and has made it into a religion that is objectified and that now so easily can be associated with terrorism, and aggressiveness, and being a religion that is against the fundamental principles of human rights, which we know is not possible.

The West has also offered us racial categories that place blackness, or being Negro, or central African being less than Arab and less than White, this hierarchy that has got to be fundamentally challenged, reconstructed and redone. So, we must bear, we must accept the responsibility for a part in this, and by revising and reconstructing our own paradigms and being very critical of them we can, in a sense, engage in this global discourse.

Now, Sulayman Nyang has made a very important point yesterday, that both Christianity and Islam are not indigenous to Africa, they both exert a kind of hegemonic influence, and to the detriment, to the forgetting of indigenous African traditions.

Sudan is in a unique position because of its immense borders and immense cultural diversity to speak to new paradigms that are African in origin, and that challenge, and that can confront the Western stereotypes of religions that are not Western and of peoples and cultures that are not Western.

So, we have an enormous responsibility in this. Things are changing in the West as well, but the dialogue is extremely important. This discourse is really in its very early stages of development, but is something that can be a great result in the next century.
(Applause.)

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Bob Collins.

MR. COLLINS: I just have a question for my esteemed colleague, Professor Voll. Just parenthetically, I'm probably one of the few people in this room that has actually traveled on that infamous railway from Wadilhalfa to Abulhamed, and I also would like to remind my esteemed historian that Brittania, the execution of Charlie Chinese Gordon on the 25th of January, 1885, which elucidated Brittania weeping, occurred in Punch, which is the British humor magazine.
My question for Professor Voll is very simply this, am I correct in understanding your comments that you would continue to advocate the policy of the United States government in what is called in this provincial capital constructive dialogue with the current government of The Sudan, in light of its actions and policies over the past ten years?

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Perhaps, oh, yes, Doctor Taisier, and then we'll allow the panelists to respond, as they will.
Yes.

DOCTOR TAISIER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to make two comments. One is directed at your earlier remarks, the opening remarks, and the second regarding the panel.

You have mentioned this morning that northern based political parties have never differentiated themselves to any great extent in regard to the issue of Islamist Sharia. I thought it was made clear yesterday during the discussion that the track record of the liberal secular modern forces points to the contrary. I just wanted to reiterate that.
This panel, I thought, is very interesting, and it is most exciting, because for many of us Sudanese, I cannot speak on behalf of my countrymen and women, but certainly for me, it reflected the duality, the dichotomy that we see in Western perspective.

Kate and Jemera, true to their organizations, they expressed the voice of the voiceless, and I really shared the appreciation of many people back home to the great work they have been doing.

Mr. Voll left me confused. He advocated that we should take advantage of what is happening, I quote, when what has been happening from the government point of view is really just talks about talks. There hasn't been any constructive thing for us, any constructive move for us to take advantage of.

He also, unfortunately, built his statements regarding the modern history of Sudan in a very selective fashion that surprised me. I'm a student of Sudanese politics, I have studied Sudanese politics for the last 20 years, and I do not see any of the things he mentioned about the Graduate Congress as really happening. The Graduate Congress never advocated self-determination, at least not the memo of 1942 that he specifically refers to.

Also, the claim that the British had built or had pushed the budding elite away from, or pushed them into the form of the sectarian forces is really contrary to the way I and many of my colleagues see it, in the sense that, actually, the British had effectively built the religious aristocracy, and there was a logic for that. The British thought that they were creating a political -- a religious vacuum after defeating the Mahdist movement, so they actively granted the religious sectarian groups -- I mean, secular groups, tenders for government projects and they effectively built them up.
So, we cannot ignore the fact that the British played a contrary role than he would want us to believe.

I also really am very confused by his advocacy to take advantage of what is happening, and I don't see much happening. I see what he had done before in the past, in 1992, shortly after the NIF targeted the University of Khartoum, and I suppose Mr. Voll was true to himself by taking advantage of what is happening, he accepted an invitation from the NIF regime to come and give a talk at the Afro-Asian Institute in the University of Khartoum, at the time when academics at the University or Khartoum were purged, at the time when many of them were in jail tortured.
Mr. Voll's visit at the time was a slap to the integrity of Sudanese academicians. I hope we do not fall into the trap again, and accept what he thinks is taking advantage of what is happening, because the past experience shows that that advice was, indeed, misplaced.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you.

Well, John, you should get a chance to respond, and then some of the other panelists may wish to respond, and I'll make a brief comment as well.

John.

MR. VOLL: Well, I think one of the things in taking advantage of opportunity, actually the 1992 invitation did not come from NIF. The invitation came from the United States State Department to at least get some better sense of what was going on, which was a continuation of what I did in 1984 to try and get, again, some sense of what was going on and wrote, at that point, a rather extended report.

Yes, quite frankly, Taisier, you and I disagree. I do think, I do think that we should take advantage of every opportunity that we have, and I do think that constructive dialogue, as represented by former President Jimmy Carter, represents an important initiative and way to go.

MS. RONE: I guess I wanted to pick up on something that was said about Western scholarship and the efforts that are now being made in the West to amend our past incorrect thinking, and one theme that's particularly strong right now in the United States and people struggle a lot with, is respect for diversity and tolerance of other people's cultures.

I just wanted to echo what's already been said about that. I, when in Sudan, I did find in my discussions with the political class in Khartoum, really, a lack of appreciation for other people's cultures, and lack of knowledge about them also.

I'm not, of course, I'm going from the Western self-criticism to what's going on in Khartoum, but I wanted to add that there did not seem to be a respect for other cultures, and that's been pointed out on this panel before, and there was, indeed, people had the feeling that there was a vacuum, and that by, for instance, taking children from southern villages and war zones and bringing them to the north they were separating them from their families and so forth, they were actually doing these people a favor, because they were giving them a culture, and a language, and a religion and everything, and by implication of where they came from they had nothing. They were a clean slate, and were free to be written upon by a more developed culture.

I think that is one area that stood out to me very much in my conversations with government officials, in that some of the terminology used was the same that I had heard in the United States 30 years before, during the civil rights movement, when people referred in similar or parallel terms to the African-American community in the United States.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Kate, did you want to comment?

MS. ALMQUIST: Well, I'll just simply say in response to the comment on using old language, that we are very much in a learning process in World Vision as a humanitarian organization, that our primary focus is operational, and we look forward very much to becoming more sophisticated in our language, and to more accurately reflect the reality on the ground, which we are very aware is changing dramatically with the north/south alliances.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you.
Before we go to the audience, let me just respond briefly to Doctor Taisier's comment in response to my opening remarks.

I take your point. In fact, my comment about what I called new thinking among moderate Muslims in the north, along the lines of a new way of accommodating diverse religions, is intended to support that point.

I just was registering also that there was some undercurrent here and there in comments that have suspicion as to whether the deep commitment to that new way of thinking was there, or whether the capability effecting it is there. That, it seems to me, is an open question, and that's all I'm pointing to. I'm not enough of an expert myself to have an opinion about it, but I was simply trying to reflect what I thought the sentiments expressed were.

Now the floor is open to the general audience. Let's follow the same procedure, lining up and keeping your comments to the point, and rather succinct if you please, because we are limited in time.

I'll start over here, yes, sir.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Doctor Crocker, I have a question or two for you, but before I do so I want to commend Professor Voll for the courage of his conviction, his objectivity and pragmatism, and regret very much he was singled out for criticism.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: To whom are you addressing these?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm sorry?

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: To who -- you said "Doctor Crocker," who -- oh, you mean me?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Right.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Of course.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Crocker is someone else. He's not here.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Oh, I'm sorry.

All right, Mr. Chairman, on April 22nd -- I mistook you for Doctor Crocker, I'm sorry -- on April 22nd, a significant peace agreement was signed. Yet, this Peace Institute has seen fit to ignore that agreement and, indeed, one of your colleagues, Mr. Smock, referred to it as a so-called agreement, and I ask Mr. Smock, is the Oslo Agreement so-called, is the Dayton Accords so-called, or is this just applicable to African agreements? And, why has this institute seminar been so one sided, with just mostly one point of view?

It seems the U.N. Congress enacted this legislation after many years of struggle, they perceived an institute that would talk about peace and reconciliation, not issues that are divisive. In the two days that I've been here I have not heard one constructive view about how we ought to solve the problem of religious conflict and the war, rather it has been criticism of the Arab north, et cetera, et cetera.

So, I hope that this institute will maintain its integrity to be partial, to be fair, in order to be credible.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you.

Let's accumulate a number of the comments and then the appropriate people -- David Smock is here, so he can defend himself, but let's get a few more comments.

Yes, sir.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, my question is to -- maybe I will not ask you right, because some of your words I didn't hear, Kate Almquist, about the aid that is going to the Sudanese suffering people around the countries, but not in Sudan, it is totally something that is not happening, and I'm a voice of -- and that is my job, and I'm trying my best to know exactly what is going on, and, in fact, at last it's become that it is the Europeans who is using the war for their interests, but it is here in America also that the NGOs are trying, at least -- they don't want us to know that there is people suffering by the day, their aid is not reaching, and I document it by videotapes and I have it right now here.
And, in front of all this audience I will guess there is no help that is going there, the help is only on the paper, and also to present to the donors in the paper, but the people are dying as before. People are eating the roots of the trees in southern Sudan and in the countries bordering Sudan. There's no help.

In my investigation with the Congress, I found out that they also investigate in their way why people are still dying when there is help being sent in their own organizations, according to them, that those people say the other NGOs says that because the law says that Sudan government is being, I don't know, sanctioned, or what laws, that there's no food or whatever, I don't understand a little bit. But, according to their own detective who sees the refugees, the Sudanese refugees through Sudan government, but the question remains there is people, there is Sudanese in Uganda, in Ethiopia, in Eritrea, why do you want to go through the Sudan government, you go through Ethiopian government, go through Ugandan government, you need not to go to Sudan government, and the people are in Ethiopia, the people are dying in Ethiopia, people are dying in Uganda.

And, the other thing is, for the refugees in Uganda, in fact, all of them have gone back to Wei, nobody is there, all the camps is closed from Arrora, that is out of there this month. All the camps are closed, Arrora -- all those camps are closed already, that is the latest.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Can you conclude, please?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. The thing is, in fact, we listen to you people a lot, but we are coming here to tell you exactly how we feel like, but you have been telling us, we are not coming here to listen, in fact, we come to solve it.
So, the other thing is to John Voll, for your case, you inferred that one take the advantage, but Jimmy Carter flew to Khartoum on his way to Wei, the same Khartoum government had wanted to kill him, you know what I mean to say. He -- he thought Jimmy Carter is going to fly there to talk to Garang in secret peace talks, which people I won't take that advantage, which doesn't work, because the peace that the Sudanese people, or the southerners, or the northerners want is through referendum, through democracy, through the people of The Sudan to accept, not through our politicians who are being barriers and authoritarians, and they send people who are, in fact, creating the problem -- also to solve it. I don't see that way, but I see that the Sudanese people will be the one, the citizens who are the victims for all these 40 years to be the one to solve it.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you.

Yes, sir.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just wanted to reinforce the point that was made earlier. I think that since yesterday we've been hearing a lot from the panel, and a lot of the people who are here have also opinions to express, and I think that you should really give us --

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Could you speak a little louder, sorry.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, I was trying to make a request that you give us more time so that we can also make comments. I think we heard enough since yesterday and probably this morning.

I have one straight question that I would like to ask, but before I do that I would like to make a comment on an issue that was raised by somebody from the panel about the use of all the terms, like Arabization, Islamization. I don't know what the intentions are, are there any better words that we can use?

When children from southern Sudan are being rounded on the streets of Khartoum and taken to camps to be converted forcefully into Islam, or being taught Arab culture, are there better words that we can use?
I wish that the gentleman who made this suggestion would give us terms that he thinks are appropriate for us to use.
My question refers to the discussion of yesterday. There was a lot of talk about the forum in The Sudan that will require democracy, we need secularizing would be applied in The Sudan in the post-NIF regime, and somebody who -- I don't know if he represents the modern forces, spoke a lot about this, and I think Bona had asked a very pertinent question about the problem of the modern forces. What is the agenda? What program do they have? In 1964, the modern forces -- in The Sudan. In 1985, or around there, they did the same thing, and they were pushed out of the way.

Now, besides the problem of the modern forces, I would like to ask, what is the base of support of the modern forces? I have heard this in this conference, I heard it in 1993 when this Institute and Congress hosted a meeting in Congress, where the modern forces in The Sudan who are willing and who are working very hard to make changes, but my concern is, what is their support?

If democracy is going to be applied in The Sudan, and democracy means numbers, how big are these people, the so-called modern forces?

My other concern, and this is the last one, deals with the issue of self-determination or independence for the south, because for southern Sudanese, at least for me, I use those words -- they mean the same thing, synonymous. Here, they talk about here from northern Sudanese it's smooth talk, they will not want to discuss issues to do, if things are not going to change in The Sudan, as it was raised yesterday, then Islam, or this government, the present government -- Islam is going to continue to be an issue in Sudanese society.

And, if there are people in The Sudan who are not willing, who are not willing to accept that they should be converted into Islam, or that they should be in an Islamic state, what is going to be the option?

I think those of us from the south have other options, but our brothers from the north have never been open minded. When it comes to the issue of independence for the south, whether it is an option, you don't hear anything from them.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Good, thank you.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you very much.

I'm afraid we are only going to be able to take one more question at this point, because our time is pressed and we, obviously, need to allow some time for response, but there will be further time when the general audience can raise questions and comments.

Yes, sir.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you.

I just have a few succinct questions. The first one is for Ms. Almquist. You mentioned very briefly the Nuba Mountains and the "genocide" which has been occurring there. I'm not really refuting that by any means, I mean all of the evidence seems to imply, particularly from a Human Rights Watch, that there is, indeed, a massive genocide occurring in the Nuba Mountains.

But, as I understand from a government source, someone who was recently there and supposedly spoke with World Vision personnel in Sudan, your organization found no evidence of genocide in the Nuba Mountains.
So, if you could just clarify that for me.

The other questions are a lot more general. How much leverage does the U.S. actually have with the Sudanese government? It seems as though we more or less played all of our cards, and at this point there does not seem to be a lot of attention being paid to the U.S. efforts to force the Khartoum government to change its immediate policies.
The other question is, is there a real understanding in our government of the complexities of the problem in Sudan, particularly in the south? As was mentioned yesterday, there are numerous ethnic groups within the south, it's not just simply a Christian population of animist population. If there is secession, then will we have a similar Somalia situation, where you have a breakdown of tribes and other groups that would then further complicate the U.S. involvement?

And finally, I would just like to comment that relief agencies working in Sudan often take the inherent prejudices and views that we hold in this country, thus, when we provide relief it seems as though there is just this inherent belief that anything Arab is bad, anything Christian is good, and I would just like to stress that that, indeed, is not the case. I was there a few years ago, about two years ago, under the auspices of Catholic Relief Services, I was in a camp in Nukush, which is a refugee camp -- I'm sorry, displaced camp, and right before I was to leave that day members of the army -- the rebel army were attempting to take the native workers of this camp to forcibly constrict them into the army. So, I would just like to just stress, as I'm sure everyone knows, that there are abuses occurring on both sides, and that we should be very careful when we publicly sort of portray Islam as being this very evil force in The Sudan.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you.
(Applause.)

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Now, we need to give time to, I think, Kate, there are questions for you. John Voll will probably want to make a comment, David Smock will, and I'll say something -- oh, and Mr. Beshir as well, yes, so at least those four or five people.

MR. VOLL: I'll give my time to Ahmed.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: All right. Why don't you start off then.

MR. EL-BESHIR: Thank you, John.

Just a question about language. I was challenged to find some new language to replace Arabization and Islamization. I will try, but I just want to emphasize that I am not saying that Arabization and Islamization will not force some people, all I'm saying, the human rights movement are now using some new sophisticated language about violating the human rights of the southerners. And, I think that's more appealing and being understood more than Arabization and Islamization for the general public, because these are big, you know, hollow terms, but when you speak to them in terms of human rights.

Also, political science has its own terms of civil society and all that, so I was talking about that, I wasn't relying
anything on -- I just was saying that we should be more sophisticated and using the new language, which is more forceful and more expressive of what's happening.

Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Kate Almquist.

MS. ALMQUIST: I'll be brief. First, in response to the concern about aid not going to suffering people in Sudan, let me just say that certainly there are many, many needy people in southern Sudan and in northern Sudan as well, who are not receiving the assistance they need. That's in part due to the constraints placed on the operational agencies.
There is aid getting through within the frameworks that are permitted at this time, primarily through Operation Lifeline Sudan in the south, I've been there, I've seen it myself, so I know that our aid is reaching people. I've interviewed them and talked to them, but I've no doubt that there are many other people who are not receiving that aid. So, it's a mixed picture there.

Secondly, on the questions of sanctions on the government of Sudan, my understanding is that development assistance is not permitted from the United States to the government of Sudan at this time, but relief assistance is. I can't speak for how that's channeled through Khartoum to beneficiaries in the north, but in the south it does not go through Khartoum, and when it goes to refugees in the region it does not go through Khartoum. So, I think there's a false impression there.

Finally, let me address Kevin's point on Nuba Mountains. World Vision, to my knowledge, and I'm pretty sure that I'm accurate, has not done an assessment in the Nuba Mountains. We've not considered being operational there at this time. So, I would want to dialogue with you a little bit more about the specific source of that comment from World Vision.

And, I think that's it.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you.

David Smock.

MR. SMOCK: I want to respond to the comment regarding my reference yesterday to a so-called peace agreement. In using that phrase, I was neither reflecting on the content of the agreement, nor on the sincerity of the parties who signed it, but the fact that the agreement was not between the principal adversaries.
If the Oslo Agreement had not included either the Israeli government or the PLO, I think we'd refer to that as a so-called peace agreement as well. SPLA was not a party to that agreement, and so it's a little hard to call it a peace agreement.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Jemera.

MS. RONE: I just had one comment on language also. With regard to the Nuba Mountains, Human Rights Watch is not the author of the study that described the condition there as genocide, but, frankly, partly because it's extremely difficult to get access to the Nuba Mountains because of government limitations and restrictions that are imposed on groups like our's and relief groups that want to go there, but with regard to the term of genocide, what is happening in the Nuba Mountains is quite bad enough. We should talk, as Beshir was saying, about, you know, what is actually happening, the forced displacement of people, scorched earth policy, the using food as a weapon, the separation of children from their families and putting them into schools to reorient them and denying them their original culture and so on and so forth, all of those things are really hideous.

To talk about whether or not the term genocide applies in a way avoids the issue of what is actually going on there. So, let's not get caught up in semantics, is it or is it not genocide. It is a gross violation of human rights.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: On the comment about fairness and so forth, let me simply say that we have attempted at least to include people who have varying perspectives on the problem. John Voll, while obviously not a defender of the NIF government, represents a slightly different perspective from those that have been represented here. In fact, I think the speaker or the questioner complimented John Voll by implication. Mr. El-Affendi represents a position that's rather distinctly different from some of the other positions here.

We have made an attempt, perhaps, that can be broadened in the future, but the attempt is there and we are sensitive, of course, to this particular problem.

As to whether we have been addressing practical solutions, that, I think, is not a correct perception of the discussion yesterday or the intent of the discussions today. Actually, a number of practical proposals for resolution came out of the discussion yesterday and were discussed at some length, and I would assume that some more proposals and discussions along those lines will take place in the next session.

So, it certainly is not our intent, nor I think our practice, to have avoided the really interesting and important question of solutions to this conflict.

With that, I will call a halt -- oh, sorry.

MR. HIBBARD: David, I would just add that the next panel is specifically on that topic of finding, you know, or identifying what the requirements are for reconciliation. So, even though you may not have gotten into it in as much depth as we could have, again, the rest -- you know, the next panel is dedicated just to that topic.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: That's the point of it, right.

Now, let's declare a five-minute break, assuming that it will be longer than five minutes.

(Whereupon, at 11:16 a.m., a recess until 11:36 a.m.)

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