Event Transcript
Religion, Nationalism, and Peace in Sudan

U.S. Institute of Peace Conference
Tuesday, September 16, 1997

Panel Three: Intra-Regional Conflicts and Implications for National Reconciliation

Speaker: Wal Duany, Indiana University
Speaker: Steven Wondu, Sudan People's Liberation Movement
Speaker: Taisier Mohamed Ahmed Ali, University of Toronto
Speaker: Ann Mosely Lesch, Villanova University
Respondent: David Smock, U.S. Institute of Peace

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: I'm going to declare the last session in order, and I think we'd better proceed or we'll overshoot our time.

This last panel for the first day, as you will notice from the program, is dedicated to intra-regional conflicts and implications for national reconciliation. We're varying our pattern a little bit by having a few more presenters, Wal Duany, Steve Wondu, Taisier Mohamed Ahmed Ali, and Ann Mosely Lesch, with David Smock responding.

What we're interested in dealing with in this session is the complications of the conflict, complication in the sense that it's not just any longer, if it ever was, a conflict between north and south, but has introduced some new players or partners, parties who are breaking in some respects that standard, rather simple paradigm. That is to say there are parties in the south who are aligned with parties in the north, and parties in the south are in conflict with parties in the north. The same is true in the south.

It's that complication that we want to try to address here, and we've asked these five individuals to help us do that. I'll try to urge them to stay within the 15 to 20 minute range each, and then David Smock, the five to ten minute range, if possible.

Let's start with Mr. Duany.

MR. DUANY: Thank you, David.

I'm happy that I'm given this opportunity to share with you some of my experiences and what I think are the major problems among the southern factions in this national struggle.

It is a complex problem and one doesn't even know where to start. However, you can go back into history very long, but I don't want to go that far.

After the Addis Ababa agreement was signed in 1972, when we went to Juba, Southern Sudan, running the regional government with colleagues, '73, '74 emerged certain patterns and certain perceptions among southern Sudanese, and they formed themselves into groups.

Two groups were underground. Others were open. One of the groups was movement for total liberation of the southern Sudan. It was an underground movement in Juba and in other parts of the southern Sudan.

The other group was National Action Movement, also operating in Juba and other parts of the southern Sudan, but underground.

When the northern Sudanese started talking about the division, or not necessarily the northern Sudanese, but when there was talk about dividing the southern Sudan into smaller groups and smaller regions, in Ecuatoria there was another group called Ecuatoria Central Committee for Division of the Southern Sudan.

Opposed to that was another committee called Committee for the Unity of Southern Sudan.

These groups came later to be known differently when in 1975 there was a mutiny in Akoba, my home town, of the absolved Anya One officers. These officers went outside and gave themselves a name called Anya Two. Those officers were members of the Movement for the Total Liberation of the Southern Sudan, they called themselves, but I mean when they were in the country, they were members of that Movement for the total Liberation of the Southern Sudan, but outside they were Anya Two.

They were talking. They started fighting, hit and run, against the government of the Sudan, and a number of officers also or people started to defect from the police and from the army to join them. So the forces increased, and it was a group that was disturbing and fighting the government of Sudan.

In 1983 or '82-'83, there was an election. The Committee for Ecuatoria or Ecuatoria Committee for the Division of the Southern Sudan succeeded in election, and the southern Sudan was redivided or divided into three smaller regions of El-Ghazal, Ecuatoria and Upper Nile.

This became a catalyst for some officers to leave the country and went out to the border of Ethiopia, and they established what we know now as the Sudan People Liberation Movement. In there, they made contacts, and of course, this group that left was associated with the National Action Movement when they were inside the country, and the National Action Movement knew themselves as or called themselves as socialists or progressive persons. It became the SPLM/SPLA.

Members of the Movement for the Total Liberation of Southern Sudan were people who were searching, who were dissatisfied. They became later when they were joined by others to talk to self-determination. They were fighting for the south to be either separated from the north or at least the southern Sudanese to be given an opportunity to express their preferences.

The members of the National Action Movement, which became the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement, was dedicated for the unity of the Sudan under the leadership of the socialist group.

El-Ethiopia, the government of former president of Ethiopia made his choice. Those chose to support the SPLM/SPLA because they have certain commonalities, the idea of sharing the ideologies of Marxism.

The SPLA from that time, they started fighting against Anya Two, and most of the leaders of the Anya Two were killed off or liquidated. Some of the people, however, joined SPLA/SPLM, and others continued to fight.

SPLA, therefore, carried on the fight as the only single movement in the south. That was one conflict, that conflict as to the ideas about being socialist -- I mean, unity, maintaining unity and those who were looking for total liberation of the southern Sudan. That was Phase 1.

In 1990-'91, a split occurred within the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement, and one group was then the Nasir group and Torit group. Those groups also started to quarrel. The Nasir group again rekindled the idea of self-determination.
The reason for this, according to what they gave, was the realization that the SPLM-SPLA was, in fact, looking to take over the power in Khartoum, to place in power the socialists, and using the grievances of the southern Sudanese against the north. This was the justification for that split, and they continued to do this.

But later on, because of the pressure, then the SPLA united, started at least in Washington, D.C. -- they came to agree on the idea of self-determination, but nevertheless, this agreement is still dubious because -- okay.
The other problem has been the -- the reason the rise of secular religion in the south, the socialists who became dominate in the SPLA more or less took over, and the rules of the movement, rules of law, whenever one place was, for instance, Koba was captured, in a state of getting the citizens to run their own affairs. The officers from different groups took over and began ruthlessly to torture the people.

The people themselves in Kaposa and in other places, in fact, started fighting against the SPLA itself. The group that was supposed to liberate them began to fight them. So that meant the leadership was then questioned.

The third problem among the southern Sudanese also is that there is regional crisis. The conflict in the southern Sudan is both regional and indigenous. This, therefore, does not only provide reinforcement for contending belligerent parties, but also poses a problem for the building of a general consensus among key members of the region, and I'm referring to IGADD and other groups on the Horn of Africa.

There is evidence. Training from the beginning was taken in some states in the region or outside the region, but assisted by entities within the region. Supply lines, positions and centers which provide the funds to sustain the war are all based in neighboring and other countries in the subregion.

Until the region reaches a consensus on an approach to the resolution to the Sudanese crisis not only will the anguish of Sudan be prolonged, but the logic of the violence which confronts southern Sudanese daily as a result of war will unavoidably take the war incrementally into other parts of the region.

Forging cooperation among southern factions, one, there is a trap of Dinka majority dominance. People have been talking about the Dinka domination. Dinka must gain dominance over instruments of force and to exercise control over others. Nuer (inaudible) Dinkaism. This leadership is seen by the Nuer as open to all.

It is the indigenous civil society and international community that must press to end the conflict and forge cooperation. It is our people, the southern Sudanese leaders and the civil society that must take up the leadership. These two factions are unlikely to come on their own to agree.

First things to be one, one, the civil society must press for a cease fire because our people are suffering. They are dying daily. People must cease hostilities among themselves.

Two, because of our concern, the civil society and world community must work to disarm child soldiers and integrate them. We think that if the civil societies strive to gain access to all parts of the country where child and women are languishing.

I think in a state of trying to leave it to international agencies, the indigenous people must work harder than we have done to stop or to see that we see where the children and women are languishing in indignities.

Four, the civil society in the southern Sudan and Sudan and international community must establish a system of monitoring these things, what is happening.

Do I have a minute?

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: One minute if you would, yeah.

MR. DUANY: The north-south reconciliation and its viability. I think there is no impasse between teachings of Christianity, Islam, and other religions in the region. They can coexist only if the religious principles to which all must assent remains as a command: do unto others what you would want them to do to you. Love your neighbor as yourself. Love God above all else.

If there is a willingness and capacity to forgive individuals for what it has done or failed to have done during the war, I believe the Sudanese have the capacity to sit down and talk and forgive each other.
Openness of government. Government to be more open to different kinds of ideas, of different language, religious, and cultural groups which are autonomous part of the Sudan.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you.
Mr. Steven Wondu.

MR. WONDU: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
(Applause.)

MR. WONDU: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I wish to add my gratitude for the good organization that you have done and by bringing the Sudanese case to this discussion. I take your advice that we should not bring the war in Sudan on this floor, but I also take inspiration from the wisdom of the U.S. Secretary of State, Madame Madeleine Albright, that in times of crisis like this, it is important to say things as they are.

Although I'm an official of the SPLM, I'm going to be speaking here my own mind and the way I see things. Perhaps my being associated with the movement will have some bearing on my remarks, but the remarks are my own.
Last year at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Sudanese Ambassador to Washington declared that the war was virtually over, that they had won the war, and that the Sudan was now experiencing peace.
I did not agree with him at the time, and since then we have seen more bloodshed. We have seen the frankness (phonetic) of the Sudanese state under the Islamic regime shrinking, and we have seen the expunction of the neutral (phonetic) SPLM and the people of the south in general have been struggling for for years.

But as the curtain falls on the last scene of the long Sudanese conflict, some observers predicted that without an external enemy to fight, south Sudan will turn on itself, and according to this scenario the Nuer are expected to wage war against the Dinka unless John Garang agrees to share power with Riak Machar. If he does not, then it might be better that the south remains a subordinate appendix of the present Arab-Islamic state.

I am here to present to you that, yes, the Sudanese war is coming to an end, but that, no, history does not support this hypothesis. The theory that we are going to go into war if we become free from the conflict, I think, is not supported by our own experiences in the past.

I do agree that there is potential for dysfunctional friction and conflict, but that the contemporary realities and the policies of the SPLM would not only prevent confrontation with the tribes, but clearly harmonious albeit competitive society.

South Sudan has long recognized itself as one nation, although it is made of very many tribes. We have had experiences in the past where tribes can rival over land and pasture, especially the tribes that keep cattle, the Kaposa, the Dinka, the Nuer, and the others, but this has always been resolved through traditional mechanisms which other administrations which governed the Sudan have put to good use in the years that followed.

Our real experience in south Sudan of self-governance was in 1972 a defeat period. I think that to be fair those who governed the south at the time did a good job, and they could have done better if the government of Khartoum had given them the funds and resources that they were entitled to, but they were held back.

But as they were stubbed financially, problems began to develop and their authority was undermined. At some stage it did translate itself to some tribal failings, but this I must say here that was developed and made worse by the encouragement of the government in Khartoum. The government in Khartoum enjoyed it and used it as a mechanism for undermining the autonomy that was in the south at the time.

I know that I have been asked to speak here basically because of divisions in the south, and I would like to say this: that the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement started in the beginning in the Dinka-Nuer area. That is true, and that, therefore, it drew its first support from those people.

As a result, the Dinka and Nuer became dominant in the institutions of the SPLM, but I would like to say again that the Dinka and the Nuer are not guilty for having been a majority in the SPLM. The citizens who responded to the call for sacrifice owe us no apologies. Many of them have died in the process. They have paid the highest price. They deserve our reverence.

It is true that crime exists, as has been mentioned, in the areas controlled by the SPLM, but that is not the same thing as to say that those who sacrificed their family lives and those who gave up their careers have now decided to turn to wreck havoc on their fellow citizens.

I would like to say that the emergence of the Riak Machar's faction, which became called as SPLA United and began SSIM and began SSDF and so on, was never -- it was never an attempt by the Nuer to dominate the south or take over the movement. It was not even domestic. It was not motivated by southern nationalism.

The so-called split was the result of a very sophisticated plot. Khartoum was successful in misleading the international community, the intelligence community that they were ready to relinquish control of the south if the SPLM/SPLA laid down their arms.

The SPLM leadership recognized the debate for what it was and steered clear of it. It was then that Khartoum agreed with the SPLM leaders, particular Lom Akol and Riak Machar, to revolt, take over the movement, and dissolve it.
The same message was believed even by the United States government. It was on the basis of the United States' belief that Khartoum was willing to relinquish control of the south that the initiative by Hamman Korhan in 1990 in which former President Illusa Basango and my elder brother here Francis Deng were involved. It was based on the premise that Khartoum was willing to relinquish control of the south.

Mr. Hamman Korhan found out very soon that this was not the case and that Khartoum was just bluffing.
At the same time some southern Sudanese leaders within the SPLA continued to collaborate with Khartoum. I know that Haleva and Lamoch signed an agreement in Nairobi, that the SPLM was willing to negotiate with the government on the basis of the conference in Khartoum which was called National Dialogue Conference.

This was not approved by the SPLM, but the collaboration between the two parties continued for a very long time.
What I'm trying to say is that in discussing tribal tensions in south Sudan, it is necessary to understand that the events of 1991 did not originate from a Nuer-Dinka rivalry for the control of the movement of the south, for that matter.
I would like to point out that the (inaudible) in that plot, Lam Akol, is a (inaudible), and the Nuer in that plot, Riak Machar, was on the Brutus of that organization. For better or for worse, the revolt of 1991 included southern Sudanese from other tribes, like those of Arroch Pen Arroch was a Dinka. Joseph Hadour who joined later was an Ecuatorian. Benjamin Bull was a Dinka.

For better or for worse, the faction included personalities from other parts of the south. The Nuer must not, however, be singled out as having collectively turned their back on the cause of the south. The Nuer individuals in the employment of the regime, and are different from the Dinka, the Bari, Dezunde, and the other tribes who are working for the government.
(Applause.)

MR. WONDU: Similarly, the SPLM kader (phonetic) and leadership reasonably represent the entire ethnic spectrum of the south, including the Nuer. There may be askew, but it is not a crisis.

I would like to assure you that the SPLM does recognize that it needs to develop itself with a national character. This entails the establishment of institutions that reflect the ethnic diversity of the new Sudan.

Transformation, by definition, is a process. Most of 1993 was devoted to the organization of a national convention to decide whether in light of the betrayal of 1991 the world should be continued and, if so, what the ultimate goal should be and what structures and strategies were necessary.

It took a lot of sacrifice, a lot of patience, a lot of determination, a lot of defiance, and a lot of pain to realize this. It certainly took a lot more than Desktop nationalism.

I am sure that those who died in the process of getting that convention will remain in our memory as having given us a direction of building a country that is truly representative.

All the reforms that have been established since then included lots and lots of conferences. As I'm talking here today, there is a conference going on in south Sudan about governance. We've had an NGO conference. We have had a conference of civil structures. We had a conference with the churches, and today we're having a conference by NDP on governance. We hope we have a round table conference in Germany next month.

So the process of building a consensus and building the country is already taking on. Transformation is never smooth. There were difficulties, but those difficulties represented the constraints that are there.

I would like to say that there is a tendency by our friends and enemies alike to always try to collapse the ethnic diversity of the south into a Dinka-Nuer dichotomy. We have a third leg which is very strong, a robust third leg, and that is the leg of the Ecuatoria. We have a robust fourth leg, which is the Nuba Mountains and the Ngusene Hills, and if some individuals from wherever they come should decide to wreck what we are trying to build, the other people of the country will never allow this to happen, and they will insure that peace is achieved and harmony is established in the country.

I think one of the sources of rivalry is that the government has always been the only employer. We are hoping that in future, as the private sector develops, people will have an opportunity to find livelihood in other sectors.

I have heard that one of the problems that is challenging the future of the south is the personality and the origins of a man called John Garang. Well, whatever his shell of human limitations, I think that John Garang is one of our citizens who has risen to the occasion and is capable of bringing a real change in the country. He is a person who is not intimidated by Arab supremacy or Islamic invincibility. He is a person who will not do things just to please somebody if he thinks it is wrong, and that is why some people don't quite like him.

But like him or not, he's the guy for this job in this time of crisis, and he has led us, I think, and will continue to lead us to the days of freedom, and when his time comes, when his mission is accomplished, people of our country will be in a position to choose their own leadership for the management of peace.

In conclusion, I would like to say this: that we do not see the need for cosmetic solutions that will wear away with time. We believe that our people have suffered for so long that what they require is a resolution of the conflict as opposed to just stopping the war for the moment, for the time being.

And we believe that this generation has a responsibility of carrying out the struggle to its logical conclusion instead of passing it on to our children and perhaps grandchildren or great grandchildren if we are lucky enough to have them.
In conclusion, I would like to say that while the SPLA is likely to bear the burden of leading us through the transitional period, I want to say that we have by the good grace of God elders whose lives have been preserved. They have stood by us. They advised us; they counseled us; they have touched our shoulders during difficult times. They have also rebuked us whenever we erred.

I think that when peace finally comes, our elders, some of whom I'm honored to be with them on this desk, will not leave us by ourselves, but guide us as they have always done before.

We also have compatriots, young men and women in the diaspora, in the country, in enemy controlled areas, whose responsibility it shall be to manage the peace because the SPLA does recognize that the management of peace, unlike the management of war, requires many more battalions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
(Applause.)

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Mr. Ali.

MR. ALI: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to thank the U.S. Institute of Peace for this opportunity.

Mr. Chairman, I know everybody is tired. This has been a long and difficult day. Therefore, I promise to be very brief, almost telegraphic in my delivery.

I was asked to talk about the political parties in the north, and instead of providing a catalog of political organizations in the north, I decided to focus on one political force, which in my mind is the most underrated force in the country, and although it has played a very important role in the struggle for peace and democracy in Sudan over the last 30 years.

I mean by that the modern forces. Now, this could be a very ambiguous term to many people, but in politics in Sudan the term "modern forces" has generally understood meaning. Originally the term was used to identify organizations associated with or engaged in modern economic activity. More recently the term has come to have a more specific meaning in that it refers to liberal and secular groups in the country.

The modern forces include trade unions, professionals, universities, student organizations, and women associations. These segments of Sudan society are generally referred to as the modern forces.

What has often been overlooked is that since the early 1960s the modern forces have been the most active and vigorous agent for change in Sudanese politics. For example, it was the modern forces that overthrew both of Sudan's first two military dictators.

Both the military regime of General Abboud, '58 to '64, and General Nimieri, '69 to '85, survived numerous attempted coups by the army. General Nimieri even survived a 1976 Libyan backed military attack by elements of the Umma, DUP, and the Islamists. However, neither dictator survived campaigns of civil disobedience and general strikes led by the modern forces, which toppled both regimes in '64 and '85.

Historically then the only effective force against military dictatorship in Sudan has been the modern forces. Since they first burst on the stage of Sudanese politics in 1964, the modern forces have remained remarkably consistent in pursuing a two-part national agenda.

Part one has always been end to the civil war, and part two has always been to maintain the secular state. This consistent loyalty to peace and a secular state can be seen by very quickly reviewing the history of involvement of the modern forces in Sudanese politics.

In 1964, a civil disobedience campaign was sparked by student protests in Khartoum against the civil war. The students were immediately joined by the professional associations and trade unions. As a result, General Abboud was overthrown and the round table conference was convened to discuss an end to the civil war.

After 1983, an umbrella grouping of modern forces, the Trade Union Alliance, led opposition in the north against Nimieri Islamist laws. This resistance finally culminated in the general uprising of April 1985, an uprising that was orchestrated by the modern forces and which resulted in the overthrow of General Nimieri.

In certain instances in 1986, the Trade Union Alliance, by then the main political vehicle of the modern forces, on its own initiative sought a political settlement to the civil war through direct contact with the SPLM/SPLA, leading to the ground breaking 1986 Koka Dam Declaration, which called for restoring secular laws to the country.
Throughout 1986, '87, and '88, the Sudanese Bar Association and Trade Union Alliance continued to lead the fight to restore a secular constitution to Sudan. They repeatedly and constantly pressured Prime Minister Mahade to carry out his unfulfilled 1986 election campaign promise, quote, to sweep the Islamic laws to the dust bin of history as they are not worth the ink used to write them, end of quote.

In 1988, the Trade Union Alliance supported the process leading to and final outcome of the DUP/SPLM Sudan peace initiative. Subsequent civil disobedience action by the Trade Union Alliance in the late 1998 and early '89, in coordination with pressure from liberal army officers, forces reluctant Prime Minister to dissolve his coalition with the NIF and to form a broad based government of national unity, which included a Ministerial Peace Committee given a mandate to seek a negotiated settlement to the civil war.

On June 30th, 1989, the cabinet was scheduled to meet and sign a peace document prepared by the Ministerial Peace Committee, a document which included provisions to retain Sudan to a secular state and to end the civil war. Early in the morning of June 30th, NIF secret serfs (phonetic) in the military staged a coup to abort the cabinet's formal acceptance of the peace agreement.

That action is an important reminder to those who imagine that the NIF desires peace or can be reformed. Those who conspired against peace in the past are unlikely to be working for it in the present.

Although the new Islamist dictatorship dismantled or banned all non-NIF organs of civil society, the NIF targeted the leaders and organizations of the Trade Union Alliance with unparalleled vengeance. This should not be surprising, given the deep commitment to a secular, democratic, and peaceful Sudan that the modern forces have always demonstrated.

Understandably, dictatorship's purges and the terror campaign have for some time reduces the power of the modern forces. Yet new forms of resistance are emerging with new organizational methods, and the modern forces have regrouped in different forms not seen before in Sudanese history.

Most threatening of these new developments for the NIF was the creation in 1994 of the Sudan Alliance Forces. This armed political movement included many of the former leaders from the army, trade unions, professional associations, and student bodies who orchestrated the successful 1985 popular uprising against General Nimieri.
For the first time in Sudanese history, modern Sudanese history, major segments of the modern forces have now organized themselves into both a political movement and an armed force in the north. This will have important ramifications for the future of Sudan.

Political parties are easy to see, especially the traditional parties with their highly colorful flags and costumes. This visibility has caused them to be overrated as political agents of change.

The real engine of change is elsewhere, and it takes more than the conventional reading of Sudanese politics to understand this. Unfortunately many observers fail to identify the most dynamic political valuable in modern history of

Sudan, i.e., the modern forces.

Many debate whether after the downfall of the NIF regime the northern parties will be willing to embrace an interpretation of Islam and Islamic laws consistent or not consistent with international human rights standards. The answer to this and similar questions is brief and is straightforward. Without a secular state, the war will continue.
Today the primary dividing line in Sudanese politics is no longer between the north and the south, although for some it will always remain as such. Instead, the real fork line is now between those who aspire to a new Sudan and those who want to preserve the old status quo.

This line places the NIF on one side and the modern forces, including the SPLM/SPLA, on the opposite side. Evidence of this is strategic shift can be found in the opening of a new military front on Sudan's eastern borders by the combined forces of SPLA, south, and the Bijar Congress. These groups, as one SPLM fighter had remarked, quote, are fighting together, bleeding together, and ultimately will build a new Sudan together.

I thank you.
(Applause.)

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you very much.

Ann Mosely Lesch.

MS. LESCH: Thank you.

I think I'm the only one on the panel who in a sense doesn't represent a particular political perspective on this, but I appreciate being placed on this panel with very interesting people.

I would like to talk about some of the issues involving the National Democratic Alliance and compliment some of the comments that Dr. Taisier has said. I want to talk a bit about the particular problems with the NDA leading up to the Osmir agreement, some of the reasons for people to still wonder whether the issue of religion and state has been laid to rest, and then some of the ways in which this for the future might be dealt with in the event that a new regime does come to power in Khartoum.

First, on the developments within the NDA, when it was announced in the fall of 1989, it's the alliance of political parties and trade unions aimed to overthrow the newly established military dictatorship, to freeze the public Islamic laws, and to form a transitional government that would finally hold the constitutional conference that was supposed to have been convened in September '89, that Dr. Taisier mentioned was aborted by the NIF coup in the end of June. They were basing it on the DUP/SPLM agreement of November '88.

This led then to an agreement between the NDA and the SPLM in the spring of 1990 that they would unite their efforts to overthrow the regime and restore democracy, but in these statements and agreements that year, there was no specification of what the content of a future constitution would be. The DUP/SPLM agreement had said that the decision on the constitution would be made at the conference, and similarly, the SPLA/NDA accord did not say what kind of democracy there would be in the future.

Of course, there was a high degree of distrust. The SPLM was fearing that the sectarian parties still wanted to create an Islamic Arab state that would marginalize Africans and many people in the north feared that the SPLM really wanted secession even though that was not part of its stated aims.

About a year later at the first summit of the NDA, there was a statement issued that citizenship would be based on birth, not on religion, but again, they did not spell out the terms of a future constitution because both the DUP and the Umma leaders wanted to delay that until after the regime would be overthrown.

In the coming year, you get more discussions within the south about separation, the SPLA starting to talk about the possibility of self-determination, including the option of separation, very much related to the split within the SPLA, and so this began to be of concern, particularly for northern secularists because if the Sudan were split into two countries, then the secularists in the north would be in a more beleaguered situation with a more homogeneous Islamic country in the north, but it also served as a wake-up call for northern politicians in general that they faced, in fact, a very stark choice. They could have unity based on a basically secular constitution or they could have separation if they insisted on a religious based system.

So the Umma and DUP had to start to grapple with an issue that they had hoped to postpone.

Nonetheless, still another meeting of the NDA in about January of 1992. Although it completed a lengthy constitution, it failed to agree on two articles which dealt with the sources of legislation, and again, decided to delay debate on those two articles until the NDA would assume power and hold the constitutional conference.
This problem within the NDA again accelerated, I believe, the SPLM's decision to press for self-determination in the Abuja conference that summer, the skepticism about where the sectarian northern forces in opposition were really headed.

During the following winter -- and I need to be brief -- there were further efforts to try to come to grips with at least a declaration of principles on the constitution and potential statements that were very secularist were rejected by the Umma and DUP also had reservations, and it was only in April '93 on the even of another round of SPLM negotiations with the government that what's known as the Nairobi declaration was issued, which seemed to meet the needs of the sectarian and secularist forces.

This endorsed the concepts of equal rights and nondiscrimination by basically upholding international human rights instruments and covenants and saying that these would be integral to the laws of the Sudan in the future, and that any law going against international human rights instruments would be null and void.
Secondly, it said that the law would guarantee full equality of citizens, and there would be no discriminatory legislation that would be allowed. So this rather vague formulation and without using the word "secular" was one that the different parties in the north that were part of the NDA could agree to.

The issue of self-determination, however, still did not go away because this was still viewed as too vague, the fact that the sectarian parties were not fully committing themselves to a secular constitution. So the SPLM was still very much emphasizing self-determination for the south as fundamental to its plank.

Finally, there was agreement in the two set of Osmir declarations in December '94 and then in June of '95 that there should be the nonuse of religion in politics, which was a stronger phrase than there had been in the Nairobi declaration of the spring of '93.

So the nonuse of religion in politics was viewed as an acceptable statement, getting around the sense of the word "secular," which at least for some of the sectarian parties is seen as a term that means atheist, as anti-religion rather than as a neutral term, as I think in English we tend to use it. So the nonuse of religion was a formula that people could find acceptable.

And on this basis a consensus could be reached in the very important meeting in Osmir in June of 1995, where that was one of the key provisions and also, of course, called for the prohibition of political parties on a religious basis and also called for the formation in the future of a confederation which would basically have two regions in which most of the powers would be devolved on the two regions, and there would also be a referendum in the south at the end of a transitional period which would be at most four years, and that referendum would include the option of independence.
I want to reinforce Dr. Taisier's comment that the presence of the northern secularists within the NDA and the opposition political movement in general has been reinforced with the formation of the Sudanese Allied Forces, which as he said is not only a fighting forces, but also includes these modern forces of the unions, the students, and so forth.

However, the fact that it is a fighting force, I think, is significant in today's context because the weight of the SPLM comes from its fighting ability, and the northern secularists through the SAF have been able to assert themselves in the eastern Sudan and on the political scene through the NDA because they do have a fighting force and are not only a debating club of intellectuals and of trade unionists.

The NDA has also brought into it certain other groups which would have a more secularist or sort of regionalist emphasis, such as the Nuban Sudan National Party, the Duraja's Movement in Kordifan, and the Sudan Women's Movement, though there the whole issue of the rights of women as articulated in the Osmir declaration is still very controversial, very problematic, and unfortunately has not been raised as part of this conference.
Now, despite this apparent consensus at Osmir, I think there still are a lot of fears that should the NIF regime be overthrown or negotiated out of power, the non-religious constitutional system articulated in Osmir might not, in fact, be set up, and I don't have time to go through the history of why there should be that kind of distrust, but I think we can see from essentially the disappointment coming out of the 1964-65 period where the modern forces were essentially pushed aside by the sectorial political movements with their large vote and similarly, after 1985 where, again, the National Alliance by not having its own political party and political weight became scattered as a political movement, the sectarian forces went back to the fore.

This also relates to the question of what is a democracy, which was alluded to earlier. If a democracy basically means majority rule and that minorities always have to accept the outcome of the majority vote, then you have had the situation that was alluded to earlier, that if you have a majority vote in an elected parliament in Khartoum that says that Sharia should be reinstituted, then that is, after all, a democratic decision, and that makes automatically the African, Christian, secular, and so forth political forces permanent minorities because we had the situation in the '86 election where partly because there wasn't vote in the majority of the south, but also just because the general weight of the population, the non-Arab and secularist groups compromised only 17 percent of the members of the parliament. So they were automatically outvoted.

And so at that time at least and in the past, there have been no safeguards for minority rights, and that would seem to be extremely important in the future.

We also, of course, do have the question of what the Umma Party as well as the DUP, in fact, stands for, and I can't go through the history of what happened in '87, '88, '89, and yet we do certainly know that Said Sar Kamalthi, as Prime Minister, was talking about alternative Sharia laws. He was talking about having Sharia perhaps not totally enforced in the south. Hudud might be temporarily suspended in the south, but much of what he was talking about in '88, in particular, and even prior to bringing the Islamic Front into the government, was very close, in fact, to what the government did after 1989.

We also know that when the DUP/SPLM agreement was signed, he was quite critical of that agreement and delayed as long as possible trying to go along with it. That was one reason for the kind of civil uprising, in a sense, that Dr. Taisier talked about, the cooperation between elements in the military command and the modern forces, to try to make sure that the DUP/SPLM agreement was actually in place.
And when the vote took place in April in the assembly to shelve debate on Sharia until the constitutional conference, not only the Islamic Front members stormed out of the assembly, but also Said Sadiq and some of his relatives did not attend this session because they felt this dilemma as leaders of the Ansar. How could they be participating in that kind of vote?

So very genuinely I think this is a problem still within the sectarian parties which one must be concerned about.
Now, last spring and summer I heard Said Sar Kamalthi speaking here in Washington and in Cairo, and he did try to address this issue head on. He spoke about basically the trauma of the current regime leading to rethinking on the part of the sectarian parties and particularly himself and the Umma party, the government taking the Islamic assertion ad absurdum, as he put it. This catalyzed the opposition to reach a consensus on national unit at Osmir, which he argued would, in fact, resolve the religion-politics issue.

Nonetheless, I was interested in the questions from the audience, which was questions from Sudanese in the audience, who basically asked, for example, "You're saying this now. You're not in power. What are you going to say when you are in power? How can we be sure that you will, in fact, hold to this even though this is a declaration of principles, a consensus of the NDA? How can you guarantee to us that you won't come out with something else should you or even not you, the sectarian powers come back to power?"

So I will just at least raise three ways in which it's been proposed through the Osmir system for there to be certain guarantees written into the system, and I know there are people in this room who are more intimately involved in this process. So they can contradict me or elaborate further on that.

One is the concept that even prior to changing the regime, the constitution should be agreed upon, essentially signed beforehand, and that this would avoid the problem that was faced in '85 and '86, where the elections took place for the assembly prior to a consensus on what kind of constitutional system should be established and, therefore, allowed for a great deal of jockeying for power and the failure, in fact, to establish a consensus system.

Therefore, it would be harder for a given Prime Minister or a given political party to try to revise the agreed upon system or to try to pretend that they hadn't, in fact, already agreed to it. So an effort to make a kind of watertight arrangement prior to coming into power instead of afterwards, which is a major shift, as I said, from the talk in 1991 of saying all of that has to be postponed until after the regime is overthrown.

A second kind of guarantee would come in the concept of the two confederal states. Since in effect this would potentially enable the south and the north to have somewhat different legal and constitutional systems within those two regions, so long as the federal law, including the capital city, would be based on nondiscrimination and legal equality.

For I think most of the participants in Osmir, this is in a sense a partly fall-back position if in the north there was such strong movement to have some kind of involvement of religion with the constitution. At least in the south and in the federal structure there would be non-religious guarantees.

Of course, this would still pose major problems for the secularists within the north and for non-Muslims living within the north. So, as I say, it is not the preferred solution.

Thirdly, the right of self-determination for the south would certainly provide an escape clause for the south. So as has been articulated by many people, the idea that if a nonsectarian system were not established for the whole country, the south would have a right to say, "Well, this has failed and now we can opt out of the system."

This, of course, poses problems for the north, for people who might be unhappy in the north, because although the Osmir accord talks about the right of self-determination for all of the peoples in the Sudan, at least my understanding of the operation of it is that basically it's Abier, the Nuba Mountains, and the Ngusene Hills, in addition to the south, which would be allowed to conduct referenda on self-determination, basically giving them the choice of joining with the south if they don't want to stay with the north, whereas other groups in the north are not at least explicitly yet being offered that option.

This makes it very interesting to me that in the areas that are coming under control of what is being termed "the new Sudan," there are efforts by the Beja, by the people of the Ngusene Hills, by the SAF to establish civil structures, governing structures in those areas which are indigenous, which are building on the peoples of those areas so that in the future if the new Sudan moves to Khartoum, as well, there will be a very strong local base for the indigenous people of the east and of the Ngusene Hills on the margins, and also I should say the Nuba areas and the revival of fighting in that area, so that they will not be able to be marginalized in any future regimes, so that they will have the power bases, both politically and militarily, for that.

So we end with a rather complex set of relations, the secularists in the north essentially working with the SPLM to sort of box in the sectarians, and still with some question as to whether, if this NDA comes to power, will the interests of the SPLM and the northerners in the NDA diverge and will there also be tensions within the northerners inside the NDA? Will there again be a marginalization of the secular parties within the north as occurred in the mid-'60s and after the mid-'80s?

Thank you.
(Applause.)

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you very much, indeed. A rich set of descriptions, I think.
Finally, David Smock will conclude with some commentary.

MR. SMOCK: Thank you.

Just some somewhat random reflections and thoughts on what has already been said.

Looking at the new political configuration in Sudan, you might think that the religious factor has been seriously changed or compromised. You have the SPLA in coalition as part of the NDA with not only the modernist forces in the north, but also with the DUP and the Umma parties.

On the other hand, you have SSIM, now called in coalition, called UDSF, in a form of coalition with the NIF. So you have Christian and Muslim partners in opposition to each other. It looks like quite a new configuration, and it looks like the religious factor has been minimized, but clearly it has not been totally eliminated, and might only have been suppressed temporarily.

It looks like it might have been moderated, but these interreligious coalitions veil the degree to which religion is still basic to the conflict.

Both of these coalitions mute their religious differences for immediate strategic advantage on each side, but the unresolved religious issues will also tend to undermine the trust within each of the coalitions, and it's not only religion, but the ethnic and racial factors as well.

And as Ann was suggesting, it seems almost certain that the religious factors, even though each side has seemed to come to some kind of temporary accommodation and agreement on this, at least each of the coalitions, religious issue will almost certainly reemerge once it is clear which of the two coalitions will ultimately be ascendent.

Neither the SPLA nor the UDSF is fully confident that their northern partners will keep their respective agreements in relation to religion. On the other hand, these tactical alliances have forced the northern parties to make some religious concessions, which they may or may not keep in the end.

These divisions, however, within the north and within the south also reveal that religion is not the only basis for conflict. While it is clearly a very important, possibly the most important issue, there are also issues over ethnicity, over political agendas, over aspirations for political power, and these are factors that generate the interregional conflicts and rivalries.

One thing that seems clear to me is that the split in the south between the SPLA and the UDSF make it harder for the NIF and the SPLA to bargain in good faith, I mean, assuming the IGADD process gets reignited. While SSIM thought it was promoting the peace process by signing that agreement, it's certainly arguable that it set the peace process back or at least it made it more difficult for the SPLA to engage in significant bargaining or to come to a deal with the NIF.

What you have is you're asking the SPLA to buy into a deal that's already been struck between the NIF and the SSIM, neither of whom the SPLA trusts, and this is clearly a dynamic that was not lost on the NIF when it came into agreement with the so-called peace agreement last April.

One oddity and irony and a paradox in the Sudan equation is the fact that while John Garang leads the strongest, most popular opposition movement within the south, Garang also espouses, while he accepts the principle of self-determination, he clearly seems to also hold to the idea of the integrity of the Sudan, despite the fact that the vast majority of southerners, I think, clearly want independence.

It's not quite clear whether in taking this position John Garang is adopting a tactical position or whether it's a position based upon true conviction, and it's probably a combination of the two.

On the other hand, Riak Machar, who advocates clearly independence for the south, is in alliance with the NIF and fights against the SPLA. So the situation is clearly filled with continuing contradictions and paradoxes.

Finally, let me just mention the degree to which the religious factor plays into not only the interregion conflicts and the intra-region conflicts, but also Sudan within the wider regional context of East Africa. Religion is clearly a factor there.
The animosity that Eritrea has for the NIF government in Sudan is in large part based upon what it presumes to be the Sudanese support for the Eritrean jihad, and if, as is assume, Sudan is supporting Eritrean jihad and provides a base for operation, this is seen by Eritrea as a major threat of religious, political, and military threat against the Eritrean people and government.

Not dissimilarly, in Ethiopia, the opposition, very strong opposition to the NIF government in Sudan is in large part based upon what Ethiopia sees to be the Sudanese support of the itihad, the Somali-based Islamist movement based right across the border from the Aggadan, and Ethiopia is seen as a very major threat to the Aggadan and ultimately to the survival of the government in Ethiopia. So, again, a religious movement seen as a threat, a movement being supported by Sudan.

And the opposition and growing animosity between Sudan and Ethiopia clearly in large part based upon different religious ideologies with the political implications of that.

Of course the one great anomaly in the situation is the relationship between Sudan and Uganda, with Sudan giving support for the Lord's Resistance Army, a Christian group, I mean, again, only pointing up how the situations get turned around and seem to be paradoxical, but nevertheless, religion being a factor time and again not only in the internal dynamics of Sudan, but also in the regional politics.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you, David, and thank you all.
(Applause.)

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Now we have around half an hour or perhaps a little more for concluding conversation. First I'll throw the floor open to panelists who might like to respond to comment.
Yes.

MS. FLUEHR-LOBBAN: Well, I must say I like very much the presentations that I heard this afternoon that we all enjoyed and especially if it can help us to move towards the reconceptualization of the Sudan and try to move away from the simplicity of the north-south dichotomy to one that politically makes more sense, which is those who favor the old order or the status quo or the old parties and those who are willing to engage in the struggle, intellectual, physical, emotional, and cultural, that is involved in creating a new politics for a new Sudan.
And if that is truly the lines that can be drawn, then I think we can imagine all sorts of alliances that are already in place and those that have not yet been imagined.

Now, it seems to me that a focus really has to fall on the Muslim secular intellectual. What I heard here in terms of some of the potential alliances, the SAF alliance with the SPLA, the struggle that it took to put together the NDA, the deep distrust, the deep suspicions that continue to exist, this it seems to me represents a special challenge to the Muslim intellectual who is a secularist and who is for a unified Sudan to reach out and to make these kinds of alliances which are very, very difficult because of the bitter history that has existed, but it nonetheless means that the struggle is necessary and well worth the effort.

It also means that the secular Muslim intellectual needs to engage in an intellectual struggle with the Islamist in a dialogue, as well, so that those who perhaps historically have benefitted somewhat from the colonialism and from the historical forces which have shaped Sudan now have, I think, a very harsh and sharp light shining upon them and a great opportunity that should not be missed in this moment.

We had a glorious flowering of democratic forces, modern forces, especially from '85 to '89, that was frozen in the last period, and the only thing that I can see good about this period which has created this crisis is that so many diverse people are in exile and are able to speak with one another and engage in the kind of intellectual struggle which is necessary, including women. An unprecedented number of women are in exile and are thinking creatively about what to do for the 21st century in the Sudan, and what I've heard today is quite encouraging, but it is really just the beginning of what needs to be done.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Bona Malwal.

MR. MALWAL: First, I have two matters of point of facts to make and clarify and then a couple of comments.
The first point of fact is in Dr. Taisier's account I am sure he didn't mean to leave out others, but you know, for the purposes of record, since these are public discussions, it is important to note that it is not just the south, the Sudanese Alliance Forces and the Beja that have joined the SPLA. In fact, there are the DUP, the Democratic Unionist Party, and the Umma Party that also have forces in the east, and so it is important to know that, you know, more people within the NDA have actually taken up arms because otherwise one can leave misleading information as if SAF and Beja alone have joined the SPLA.

And we're talking really basically here of relative terms, I mean, you know, between old forces that have joined, and also Gretcha's Movement. Gretcha's Movement has got also armed people. So that's a point of fact to establish.
But in all this context, I mean, you know, political, I mean, military organizations take time, take resources to build up, and so, you know, we are talking really basically of no more than, you know, maybe 20 percent, you know, as a general speaker of all these forces put together. So still, you know, the conflagration of forces is, as is natural, still dominated by the SPLA because the SPLA has been 15 years, you know, in the military field. These other forces since they started organizing only have a year to go. So there is a lot of ground to cover in building up these forces.
The second point I wanted to make as a point of fact is Ann seems to feel that, you know, people have not moved forward. The NDA has not moved forward with the constitution, drafting of the constitution, because of the political disagreement.

No, I don't think that is the case. In fact, democracy being what it is, and you people in the United States know this, I mean, your government breaks down because the budget was not -- I mean closes down because the budget was not passed. That doesn't mean that there will not be a budget for the American government.
It's just the process of democracy. You know, people have to mediate and negotiate, and I think it should go for the NDA that these things are being thrust out in processes of negotiations and discussion so that nobody feels that his point of view has been left out.

So there is a draft constitution that is being put into detail because, you know, there was a committee that brought up a draft constitution which is there, which was passed by the NDA in principle, but in details each party is making its own comment and so forth. So the process is going on.

Whether that process will be caught up by the change of government or not is something none of us can determine. Of course, if the issue becomes that there is a change of government and the NIF was overthrown, we would not delay the overthrow of the NIF in order to get a constitution. I mean we would rather have a constitution in an atmosphere without an NIF. So that's the point of facts I wanted to clarify.

I want also to comment about the issue of modern forces. You know, it's a very difficult thing to discuss what is modern and what is not because within this, although I agree with Dr. Taisier that the modern forces are there, I think you can also identify that within these modern forces they are also members of the sectarian and traditional forces, and so you cannot call -- you will not call on a modern force that would really be against, you know, the traditional forces or, for that matter, against the NIF because they themselves -- in fact, the NIF sort of got itself as if it's a modern force within itself.

So really to relate what happens, it is true that, you know, the trade union movement, the professional groups and all, it is because of their organizational nature and because they are also working, you know, classes of people. It is easy to organize a strike. It is easy to organize civil disobedience, but I think that the biggest failure of the modern forces which Dr. Taisier maybe doesn't want to talk about is the fact that when they bring about these changes, they do not have a political program, a political agenda to implement, and always the modern forces end up by accepting a short interim period and to go for election after one year.

Even during this one year short period, there is no political agenda. There is no political content of an agenda that has to be carried out, and so you get into a situation where the traditional forces come in and say, "If you are looking for democracy, we'll go to the people," and when you go to the people, invariably the traditional forces win the day, and in fact, the most striking failure of the modern forces is twice, while they overthrow the military dictatorships, twice they failed to restrain the traditional forces from going to election without the south.

In fact, invariably, you know, nilly-willy, they have been forcing to having an election in the north that invariably brought the traditional forces into power and, therefore, leave out the modern forces.

So I don't see; personally I haven't seen a discernable political agenda that brings the modern forces of the north, which in themselves need to be defined very clearly for some of us to see. There is no political agenda that builds a collision between that and the south that has been struggling for the last 40 years, and so you are asking to put together, you know, forces one of which is struggling all of the time. I mean that's all the south has been done all its life is to struggle against whoever comes up in the north, and unfortunately one has to say that includes also the modern forces during those interim periods when they have had one year after the overthrow of the Abboud regime, another year after the overthrow of the Nimieri regime.

If the modern forces set an agenda in place before overthrowing a military regime which actually perceives of a way by which we would end the civil war, maybe the political situation in the Sudan would have changed. Unfortunately we haven't had that.

So there's a great deal of debate still to be got into about what constitutes a modern force in the Sudan today.
Thank you.
(Applause.)

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Yes, yes. Let's let Peter and then you may.

MR. NYOT KOK: Thank you very much, Chairman.

I'll address two issues briefly. One is the question of Dinka domination in the southern Sudanese and now in the Sudanese political discourse.

As far as I know, and I'm a Dinka, I don't know of any conference where the Dinkas organized to lay down a strategy of domination. If that has been done, I would definitely know about it.

What has happened, especially as far as this conflict is concerned, that is, a conflict between various factions of the SPLA, was a struggle for power, and what the churches sat down from November 1992 -- no, 1991 until later in 1992 to try and reconcile the various factions, the findings of the churches -- and these were independent groups, you know. They had nothing to do with the Massa group (phonetic). They had nothing to do with the Tourid group as it was known then, but they had interest of the people at heart, and they wanted to stop bloodshed.
The findings of the churches were that the source of conflict was the contest over leadership. They never mentioned at all that there was a problem of Dinka domination. That is important to register because it is easy to fan up feelings against a nationality for what is really not the case.

We had that before during the 1993 Kokora politics, and later on some of the prominent politicians admitted that it was one of those slogans which you need, you know, to wipe out feelings, you know, in order to obtain your objectives.
Second, the question of division. Francis put it today correctly, that a great part of the intra-southern Sudanese fighting or division is caused by the interference of the dominant forces in the northern Sudan. The oppressor is usually the divider, and in all politics, most of the politics of domination and super domination the question of what the oppressor does to maintain his rule over the oppressed, it has an element of perpetration of division among the ranks and files of the oppressed people.

It was none other than the former Civil Secretary, James Robertson, who during the Sudanese nationalism was so impressed with the divisions among the northern Sudanese political forces. (Inaudible.) But, yes, in the Sudan, the northern political forces divide, and we, the British, we rule.

Once the northern Sudanese were able to unite their ranks as a result of the Egyptian interference and a number of things, once they were able to unit, the same Robertson was realistic enough to say, "Well, what can we do now?
They're united, and there's little we can do."

That, I think, is the challenge that's facing the southern Sudan today.

The final remark is on the religious element. David Smock was right in saying that it has not been resolved. It had probably been swept under the carpet or has been diffused. It's correct, and I have a feeling that once, you know, the National Islamic Front is either driven from power or negotiated out of power, there will be likelihood of religious issue being resurrected, but I have a feeling that this time it will also depend on how much of the National Islamic Front remains in the Sudanese politics.

There's a question here, and I'll raise this tomorrow in my presentation; there's a question of whether if you negotiate NIF out of power in Khartoum or even drive it out of power in Khartoum, what are you going to do with the rest of the NIF that is now imbedded in the Sudanese state, in the Sudanese economy, in the Sudanese education. Do you have to have a program of de-NIFify?
(Laughter.)

MR. NYOT KOK: De-NIFification of the NIF, how far can it go and how far can it be achieved? This is a very important challenge to whatever plans we have for the interim period.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you.

Mr. Ali.

MR. ALI: Just very, very quick response to Bona, which, of course, this has been a long debate. It's not the first time we've engaged in it, but I think it's unfair to say that the modern forces never had programs because if we look at the past 20 years, all of the programs that were in place for change came from the modern forces, the chapter of the uprising, the Koka Dam agreement, the fight against the September laws, the economic reform programs, the programs were always there, but the modern forces has always taken a very conscious decision not to be part of the political game.

They always -- definitely in '85, none of the leaders of the modern forces contested elections or there was a forum identified as one of the modern forces that contested the elections. So there was a conscious decision to disengage from the political process.

I think the largest, the greatest majority of the modern forces felt that their role was really to provide the plans to operate the state machinery, and there was a lot of naivete in that perception that they can change the regimes and then leave, but this is precisely why the modern forces or sectors of the modern forces have taken the very difficult decision of taking up arms. It was not an easy decision.

So I don't think Brother Bona is being fair in underlining facts which I'm sure he knows very well. I don't think there is any evidence of the modern forces deciding to contest elections and then losing. They haven't did that.
But anyway, as for the talk about the armed groups and the relative composition of the forces engaged, we are talking about a very relative issue in a very general way.

I was not asked to list every individual that was engaged in the armed struggle. Certainly there are a lot of people engaged in the armed struggle, but we are talking about a trend, about a new development that has emerged in the scene, and we should draw lessons from that.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Mr. Beshir.

MR. EL-BESHIR: Yeah, when my friend Peter was talking about denying the existence of any Dinka conspiracy, I sympathize with him. I can understand that very well, that he said if there was a conspiracy he would have known about it.

However, the Dinka being the largest tribe in the south, what is more important that there is a perception among the elites of smaller tribes that there is a Dinka conspiracy.

I liked that part of his talk, but he turned around to speak about the oppressor, the oppressor being me, and that there is a conspiracy, a northern conspiracy, and, Peter, if there is a northern conspiracy, I would have known about it.
(Laughter.)

MR. EL-BESHIR: I don't know about it.
(Applause.)

MR. EL-BESHIR: I have been hearing this since I was at the University of Khartoum 30 years ago, that you are the oppressor.

I came from Akbar where the railway station workers are there, and my people, before they came from Akbar, they came from the north, and they were peasants.

MR. NYOT KOK: And that's where (inaudible) Beshir come from.

MR. EL-BESHIR: And they are peasants.
So what I'm trying to say here if you are from the majority, then there will be a perception, and this perception arose. So I'm glad that, you know --

MR. NYOT KOK: Mr. Chairman, point of order. I never talk of northern conspiracy.

MR. EL-BESHIR: No, no, but you --

MR. NYOT KOK: It is a technique of inventing a slogan to shoot them down. I never talked about --

MR. EL-BESHIR: No, no, no. I didn't mean to say that. I said that you talked about the oppressor, and then from there I extended that. I said some other southerners say that. So I apologize immediately.
(Laughter.)

MR. EL-BESHIR: But what I'm trying to say, you know, it really makes so many of us in the north, you know, when we hear about the conspiracy, about, you know, the enemy and the oppressor and all of that, we really feel bad, and I'm not saying I'm glad that our Dinka brothers are finding themselves in the same situation.
(Laughter.)

MR. EL-BESHIR: But maybe -- maybe that people will start to understand. You know, sometimes you find yourself in a different situation and you will be accused of so many things, but the problem is perception, and I think we are dealing with perceptions here, and I wish that some people would elaborate on this, maybe tomorrow.
Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Mr. Duany.

MR. DUANY: Yes, I would like to say something about what Peter is saying about Dinka domination. I was the one who raised it, and I should be expected to know because I was in the cabinet of Abboud Ellar and not you.
We know one of our problems is faith in facts and being honest about mistakes. We all make mistakes, and there were mistakes in terms of locating cabinet positions, ministerial positions in the regional government which caused a lot of other minority groups to be dissatisfied.

Even Abboud Ellar would in your private discussions admit that there was an oversight or, you know, a mistake committed by appointing more than half of the cabinet Dinka, and you know, as you did mention or somebody mentioned, that the government is the only employer in a poor region like the southern region.
We recognized at that point, those who are supporters of Abboud Ellar, that a mistake occurred and we must admit that. I think if we are going to move forward, we must admit our mistakes, and we have to be honest to each other in order to find a way to live together.

The other thing is to blame this onto the northerners is to escape from our responsibility by refusing to face the fact that I have committed a mistake. All the evils are not committed by the north. It is north committing or dividing us. It is our weakness to commit crimes, and we do not apologize or admit to our constituencies that we have committed a mistake.

I think you are not perhaps aware of this or you want not to look at it as it happened in Juba.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Hang on just a minute. I'm going to call on Ms. Rone, and she's been eager to get in, and I'll give you some time.

Yes.

MS. RONE: I just wanted to jump in on one point. There's been a lot of talk about democracy and there seems to be an unclear definition of it, and there also seems to be the notion that it's simply majority rule, but as Ann Lesch was pointing to, democracy really does include minority rights and makes specific protections for minority rights. I know there's not just one definition of democracy, but if you look at international human rights instruments, this is really what's meant.

Therefore, there are a lot of rights that don't go up for a vote by the majority. You cannot have a majority vote on whether anybody has the right of free speech. They have the right of free speech, and even one person has the right even if they are saying things that nobody else wants to hear.

The same thing for nondiscrimination. It is not within the purview of the majority to relegate a minority to a second class citizenship under international human rights law, and the same goes for religious rights, as David Little pointed out at the beginning of this.

This is basically the framework for democracy, that there are certain inalienable rights, as we have called them in this country, but that are recognized as international human rights, and in a democracy or in any form of government, they're not supposed to go up for a vote, and they cannot be challenged or changed by the will of the majority.
So I think what we're talking about here, and I can't speak at the level of appointments of people to cabinet positions or anything like that, but at another level there have to be formal guarantees for protection of minority rights and these essential rights of free speech, free assembly, free association, all of the things that make a democracy go.
And if you don't have those guarantees written in and specified somewhere, then there will always arise, well, political chaos, misunderstandings, jealousy, allegations that one group is dominating another group, but if the rules of the game are spelled out ahead of time, that goes a long way toward a framework for a governable society.

I would particularly be interested in seeing the NDA work this out and apply it actually in some territories under its control because if we look at the governments of the neighboring states that are helping out in moral and other ways the arms struggle inside Sudan now, what we see in Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda, in particular, are states where there is single party rule and not very much freedom of association or press or assembly in most of those that are run by people who have come to power through military means.

I'm uneasy about this becoming a model, which is I don't think what's intended, but it would go a long way toward allaying apprehensions if the rules were clearly spelled out ahead of time before taking power.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you.

Mr. Wondu.

MR. WONDU: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just wanted to clarify two points raised by Mr. David Smock in his brilliant presentation. One had something to do with the complications that would arise because of the confusion of the dimensions of the conflict, some northerners aligned with southerners and southerners aligned with the northerners, and how that is going to affect the peace process between SPLM and the Beshir regime.

I would like to make this house know what I feel about this, that I have a lot of difficulty imagining a situation where a just, lasting perceive as perceived by the SPLM can arise from a negotiation between the SPLM and this regime.
I have had the misfortune of attending virtually all the negotiations with this regime since 1999 (phonetic), and I really cannot see a possibility of a -- 1989, and I still have a lot of difficulty seeing a situation where the opposition and this regime can come into an agreement and reach a political settlement that would be satisfactory to the way we see it.
I just wanted to make that very clear.

The second thing which David raised is the question of the vision of the SPLM or (inaudible) for that matter as to whether the main concern of the SPLA is the integrity of the Sudan or an independent south Sudan. I would like to say this: that the SPLM that I know of is more interested in certain principles of a society where there is peace, justice, equality in its diversity in all situation; that unity of the Sudan is not a goal by itself. Division of the country is not a goal by itself. What is, indeed a goal is a harmonious society where everybody can live in peace.
And, therefore, the mechanism that has greater promise of creating the society or the societies that can live in peace, can live in prosperity with dignity and equality and justice would be the preferred option.

So there is no document here, and that is what the SPLA is pushing about. Whatever come out of this process as long as it guarantees this would be acceptable.

Another thing which comes out of our experience in the last 40 years is that as a southerner I can say this. The moment I begin talking about fighting for the separation of the south, I would not last very long before I go to Khartoum or before my movement collapses. This is our experience.

Anybody, name it, who comes out in public and begins complaining about the independence of the south, the independence of the south, doesn't last a year. This is our experience, and we know that road. It leads nowhere.
Finally, I'd like to turn to my good friend, Jemera Rone's comments about the meaning of democracy and the right of the individual, the rights of the groups, the rights of women, the rights of society.

I would like to mention that this process of reform that we have embarked upon, but unfortunately have been neglected or not seen by the authors of human rights reports on the Sudan is addressing this issue. Since 1994 up to this day, we have done nothing more than reorganizing our society in such a manner that every little group, every individual is taken into account.

To demonstrate this, and I'll maybe also address what Mr. Wall (phonetic) has mentioned, we had a reshuffle of the leadership of the SPLM recently, and I noted that we had out of these extreme top positions, five were from Bahr El-Ghazal, five were from Ecuatoria, and five were from Upper Nile. There was no counting of fingers because once we do that, you may eventually compromise meritocracy in society.

I would also like to mention that the regional context that you're talking about is being affected by the dynamics of the modern age in international politics. Time was in Africa and elsewhere where malgovernance and dictatorship and corruption could be tolerated by the international community. I think that time has come to pass. It is no longer possible.

I hope, and it is my good belief, that it is no longer possible for anybody with common sense in this world to do the things that our predecessors used to do and still survive in a position of leadership in the modern society, and this is not lost to those of us struggling in the Sudan, and if it is lost to them, it is time for them to realize this, and I think they do realize this, that it is necessary to go in tandem with the democratization, good governance, transparency. That is the word of modern management.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you. Ann Lesch.

MS. LESCH: Just a brief comment. In my effort to stay within the time limit, I may have been too brief, and in response to Bona, I just wanted to say that I do think that there is, in fact, a process taking place since the Osmir accord as a DUP. I know that there are extremely serious discussions taking place to draft a constitution, and I think it's very important that all the different political forces are involved in this discussion, and what I was simply saying is that the degree to which a firm commitment to a constitution that is acceptable on the basis of national consensus can be reached the better that will be for the Sudan of the future, the more likely that that will be held to in the event that the NDA should take power.

So I didn't want to underestimate the process taking place, but in fact to, I think, urge the acceleration of the process.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Yes.

MR. EL-TINAY: I'd just like to say that it's clear that all the Sudanese governments since independence have dismally failed their mission. We have to admit that bravely and clearly.

I think I subscribe to Wal Duany's point about being candid and being frank and being honest in terms of trying to work for a renewal of our society.

I think there is a challenge, as Carolyn said, to the southerners to put their act together, to have one project of renewal of the south of Sudan based on the authentic culture of the south starting by the spiritual traditions of the south, Christianity, Islam included.

I think the same also is a challenge for the northern Sudanese, and I think if this is done in both sides, the question of reconciliation will be at hand.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you.

I think in view of the hour -- it's now two minutes past six -- and we have had a long day and we yet have one more day tomorrow, I realize that I haven't quite been fair with the audience, but since we have spent a lot of time in discussion today, I think maybe we are due a break at this point.

And we'll resume, of course, tomorrow at nine o'clock, and I promise that I will give due consideration to the audience tomorrow.

Let me conclude by thanking each of the panelists this afternoon and David Smock, the discussant, and the lively exchange that took place. This particular panel generated a good deal of concern obviously among the participants up here.

So thank the panel. Thank all the presenters for today, and thank the remnant of the audience for your participation, and we'll see you tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 6:07 p.m., the meeting was adjourned, to reconvene at 9:00 a.m., Wednesday, September 17, 1997.)

The views expressed above do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.

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