Event Transcript
Religion, Nationalism, and Peace in Sudan

U.S. Institute of Peace Conference
Tuesday, September 16, 1997

Welcoming Remarks and Introduction

Chester A. Crocker, U.S. Institute of Peace
David Little, U.S. Insitute of Peace
Francis Deng, Brookings Institution

MR. CROCKER: Good morning, everybody, and welcome. I'd like to welcome you on behalf of the U.S. Institute of Peace to today's meeting on religion, nationalism, and peace in Sudan. It is a modest working title, noncontroversial, designed to pull people together. My name is Chester Crocker. I'm Chairman of the Board of the U.S. Institute of Peace, and this is an honor for me to be asked to introduce this event. It's an important two-day conference at a very important time.

Just a few words of introduction. Today's conference is part of a continuing series on religion, nationalism, and intolerance, a project designed some years back by the gentleman to my right, David Little, who will speak after me, in order to better understand the interplay between religion and nationalism in a diverse series of countries. This is the sixth conference in David Little's series and the second one on Sudan.

I would also like to say that it's one of a number of programs hosted over the years by the Peace Institute in order to better understand the nature of the conflict in Sudan and possible options for ending the war there.

I would recall that in October of 1993, this organization co-hosted with the Subcommittee on Africa of the U.S. House of Representatives a two-day symposium to explore options for resolving tensions and promoting the negotiating process, which led directly to talks between the two principal southern parties at that time, those talks being chaired by then Chairman of the House Africa Subcommittee, Harry Johnson of Florida. In April of 1994, the Institute convened a subsequent meeting, again bringing together a wide number of prominent Sudanese representing various positions, a wide spectrum of positions. That was a most useful meeting, and we put out a report on that event. These efforts were organized by another Peace Institute colleague sitting several places over to my left, David Smock, who is the Director of our Grants Program and also spends much of his time on our African activities.

Now, I've been asked simply to kick this event off, to provide a little introductory chapeau, if you will, not to cause any trouble, and to leave the event in the safe hands of its functioning chairman, who is sitting to my right. So I will keep my comments to a bare minimum.

The next two days will differ from some of these earlier efforts organized on Sudan in that we're going to be focusing specifically on the role of religious ideological issues as they relate to the civil war and what can be done to address this specific dimension of the conflict, if indeed it is a specific and separable dimension of the conflict. Conflicts, as we all know, are generated by a wide range of factors: ambition, the struggle for power and resources, but also on occasion by ideas and by values that legitimate such struggles. So we have to figure out ways to analyze the interplay of these various factors and forces, and that's what our discussions will be focused on.

Just to make a couple of obvious points of issues in Sudanese affairs which have a directly religious dimension, obviously the role of Islamic law, hotly debated; the debate of political structure; and the debate over discrimination and what could be done to deal with discrimination. All of these have a clear religious dimension, as well as other dimensions.

Now, in the first day of our conference, we'll be talking about how and why this has happened in Sudan and the latest developments in that regard, and then in the second day, we'll be focusing a bit more, if you'll look at your program schedule, on what might be done to address this complex mix of religious, political, and economic issues. Starting today then we'll be focusing a lot on religious attitudes, how they shape individual and communal identity, and how governmental actions have promoted or suppressed those attitudes.

Just a couple more comments that I think might be worth bearing in mind. I think it's awfully important as we look at issues of war and peace to distinguish between conflict, on the one hand, and war, on the other. There is a difference, and we look at the role of religion in a conflict situation, and it's very straightforward how that can come into play, and we'll be talking about that. But what causes war is sometimes an additional set of variables which have to do with immediate triggers of the outbreak of violence, and of course, the same thing can be said about what causes peace.

So we'll be in a position, I think, to talk about all of that, to talk about some key changes that have taken place since, David, the last time you held a meeting of this kind. There have been some important changes. There have been a number of peace making and mediation efforts of various kinds since the earlier conference. There have been some dramatic political realignments in the country. There have been various forms of external intervention that have developed in that time, and so I guess the question is: is the religious dimension the same or is it changing or is it being put to one side?

A final word on the Institute. The Institute of Peace, which is now, I believe, in its 13th year, ending its 13th year of operation, does not engage, as such, in advocacy. That is not its purpose. We are a research, analysis, training, and educational institution. We engage, as well, in facilitation, bringing parties together, convening parties to have dialogue, and we support the development of policy thinking and policy options.

All of that, I think, is pertinent to what we're doing here today, but we are not either a partisan or an advocacy organization. With those few, brief comments, I'd like to turn the podium over to Dr. David Little, who is the Institute's senior scholar for religion, ethics and human rights, and who, as I said at the outset, has been running this series now since 1991. David Little.

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you very much, Chet, indeed, and we appreciate your participation in this to the degree you're able to and also the leadership you've provided the Institute in special regard to the questions in Africa.

Let me echo Chet's welcome to you all, both those people around the table and all of you who have seen fit to participate in this, I think, important event. I'm grateful to all of you, and we at the Institute are grateful to all of you for taking the trouble to participate.

I wanted to spend a few moments sketching out the context within which this conference needs to be seen. I want to say a few words about the approach that we have taken to the subject of religion, nationalism, and intolerance and pose a few questions of a general sort that might help to guide our thinking over the next two days. At least I hope these general propositions will guide our thinking, and I will do my best throughout the course of the days to so guide it.

The approach of the religion, nationalism, and intolerance project is to take up now eight cases. We started with seven, and we recently added Bosnia, because the Institute in its various manifestations is doing considerable work in Bosnia, including the project in religion, ethics, and human rights, and because of that on-the-ground work that we're doing in Bosnia, I had thought it was wise to add Bosnia as a case in our series in order to reflect in a more general way on the kind of practice that we've been engaging in and the experiences that we've been having in regard to attempting to build interreligious cooperation in that troubled place.

Our approach is to take up these eight cases. Let me mention them: Ukraine, Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Sudan, Nigeria, Tibet, Israel, and Bosnia. It is to take up these cases case by case, to host a conference, such as this one, to invite a panel of experts, working group people, individuals who are expert regionally in regard to the country, who have perhaps human rights background, who have religious studies background, political science, sociology background, bring these people together, and let them ask and explore a range of questions in regard to the topics under consideration. Then we take the results of this conference and produce a report. We've already published three reports, one on Ukraine called "The Legacy of Intolerance," which appeared in 1991; Sri Lanka, "The Invention of Enmity," which was published in '94; and then a smaller report on Tibet called "Sino-Tibetan Coexistence, Creating Space for Tibetan Self-Direction." That was also published in 1994. We have a report on Nigeria that is now being prepared by Rosalind Hackett, who is down at the end of the table, an expert on Nigeria and particularly religion in Africa and in Nigeria. We have for the moment decided to put aside the subject of Lebanon for reasons that I won't go into here. We may come back to it; we may not. But that leaves us with conferences yet to be held on Israel and on Bosnia and then a final conference in which we look at the series and try to derive certain general conclusions and perhaps even some recommendations for dealing with this problem of religious nationalism.

Now a word about the specific approach that we take. The approach of all of the reports -- if you have a look at them you will see this -- is basically a human rights approach. I am senior scholar in religion, ethics and human rights and, therefore, feel that I am fulfilling my mandate by relating religion and human rights as best I can.

The human rights focus particularly takes up those provisions in the international human rights documents that focus on freedom of religion and freedom of religious exercise, as well as nondiscrimination based on religion or belief. Those two principles, freedom of exercise and nondiscrimination based on religion or belief, are primary foci of the kind of work that we have been doing.

There's a third feature here to be remembered, and it will be important as we proceed throughout the next two days. That's the protection of religious minorities within a wider political setting. I emphasize here that tolerance and nondiscrimination, those are the two terms that occur again and again in the international documents. Remember one of the U.N. declarations has to do with the elimination of all forms of intolerance or discrimination based on religion or belief.

I emphasize here that the two terms are in the articulation of the U.N. documents interrelated. That is, they're mutually supportive. Tolerance exists on the basis of nondiscrimination. Nondiscrimination requires tolerance in order to complete it. That interconnection is very important in my view because it follows that people are protected not only against governments and other groups from being picked out and mistreated because of their religious beliefs and practices. They are also protected, and this is equally important, I think, from being picked out and mistreated because someone else's religion says that they belong to a race or a linguistic community or a gender that is inferior.

So it's not just people being persecuted or ill treated because of their religious beliefs. It is also because someone else's religion may designate their race or language or gender as something below standard and not privileged to participate on an equal basis within a political community.

For example, in American history there are many instances, of course, of people being mistreated or persecuted because of their religious beliefs, but there are also many, many examples of people because of their race, because of their language, because of their gender being picked out and treated as inferior beings because of someone else's interpretation of the Bible, the Holy Scripture.

That's an important distinction to bear in mind, and I think it calls to attention the significance of nondiscrimination, as well as tolerance, in the international documents.

We ask four primary questions as we approach each of the various cases that we are taking up, including, of course, Sudan. One, do human rights violations, particularly of the sort I've mentioned, tolerance, nondiscrimination, but others as well, do the violation of those human rights contribute in a significant way to the conflict under consideration? Second, would in all probability compliance with these particular norms as they are articulated in the international documents, would compliance with these norms likely reduce conflict and encourage peace?

Three, if the answer is yes in regard to the first two questions, yes, violations contribute to conflict, yes, compliance contributes to peace, then we're interested in finding out who are the groups, what are the agencies, NGOs, religious, educational, governmental, legal, et cetera, who are, in fact, contributing to the creation of tolerance and nondiscrimination based on religion or belief within the settings that we are taking up. And the fourth question is: beyond the efforts of particular groups and particular policies and agencies to promote these particular human rights, what are the broader causes and conditions for creating and maintaining tolerance and nondiscrimination? What political, legal, social, educational, economic, as well as religious conditions are requisite for promoting the kind of norms that are in view here?

So it's a wide array of questions, and it involves much more than just focusing on this or that religious group, this or that religious teaching. It involves a much broader, I think, and encompassing social analytical approach to a problem of conflict, such as we have before us in the case of Sudan.

I wanted to mention, if I may, two tentative findings from our work so far on Ukraine, Sri Lanka, Tibet that may help to orient our thinking as we proceed in this conference. These two findings may involve, as a matter of fact, a kind of test for our work in the next two days. As I read these two findings -- and, by the way, I speak here entirely for myself, not for my colleagues who have been on the working group, nor certainly for the Institute. These are tentative; they're interim; they're personal, but I simply throw them out for your consideration -- as I read them, they do not support I would have to say Samuel Huntington's now famous thesis about a clash of civilizations. Neither one of them does.

The first one is this. Contrary to the clash of civilizations thesis at least as Huntington articulates it, our results so far tend to show that cultural, religious, political conflict do not result as the inexorable product of some vast, tectonic, civilizational conflict, Islamic or Confucian versus Christian, et cetera, the way in which Mr. Huntington tends to portray things, but our findings seem to suggest that these conflicts are much more the result of localized, distinctly conditioned states of affairs that are shaped by the dynamics of nationalism, the local dynamics of political competition for national dominance. That's the significance of the term "nationalism" in our general title, religion, nationalism, and intolerance. It provides a context, we think, for understanding the way in which religion functions in regard to conflicts such as this.

A couple of quick examples. Buddhism, for example, in the case of Sri Lanka, takes a very different form from the shape it takes in the case of Tibet, two cases we have looked at. I don't have time to elaborate on that, but those of you who are knowledgeable about these affairs will certainly understand that.

Secondly, in the case of Bosnia, it's been emphasized again and again that though religion is important and plays a role, it plays a role in regard to the efforts of what are called nationalistic entrepreneurs for directing the various groups towards particular national objectives and goals. Again, in Bosnia surely one begins to see the interrelation of national competition and religious commitment and belief.

And I wanted, if I might, to quote finally a statement from Francis Deng's indispensable book called The War of Visions, in which he comes to the same conclusion in regard to Sudan. He says on page 403 of that book, "In the process of becoming a single political state, Sudan emerged as a deeply divided society in which ethnicity, region, and religion were frequently used to organize political competition." The national context or nationalist context within which religious conflict begins to take place, it seems to me, is an enormously important suggested finding from the work that we have done so far.

A second finding, and again one that's contrary to Mr. Huntington's thesis, is that human rights and particularly those human rights bearing on tolerance and nondiscrimination and the protection of religious minorities, as well as the related principles of the rule of law, governmental impartiality toward religion, along with those principles -- and, by the way, which principles are according to Samuel Huntington derivative from and pertinent to the West, really exclusively pertinent in the West -- all of those principles, I'm suggesting, contrary to Huntington are, in fact, central to the disputes that we've been analyzing, and the satisfaction of these norms is, I think, an important part at least of bringing peace to the conflict in these areas.

If I had time I could talk about Tibet, about Sri Lanka, about Bosnia, and the way in which these particular norms, in my view, are directly related to both the conflict and the settlement. One thinks by way of anticipation of the Addis Ababa Accords in Sudan in 1972, which as you're all fully aware made full provision for the protection of religious free expression and some degree anyway of nondiscrimination based on religion or belief in the political and wider sense. Also, the recent declaration principles, which provide some kind of platform for peaceful negotiation, has explicit provision for the very same norms.

So I'm suggesting, in conclusion that the norms, contrary to Mr. Huntington's thesis that the norms apply to the West and not the rest, apply equally to the West and to the rest at least so far as I can tell.

Let me in conclusion add a couple of notes. One note in passing about the relevance of this conference to the general discussion taking place within the United States and, more particularly, in Washington right now on the subject of religious persecution. I dare say one reason this conference has attracted so much interest is precisely because of that discussion and the role of Sudan in that discussion.

You're aware that the State Department has recently issued a report on religious persecution with special focus on Christians, and Sudan is, of course, among those countries referred to. You're also aware that the State Department last year appointed a 20-member Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom Abroad to look into and advise the Secretary of State on questions bearing on religious freedom and religious persecution.

And you're finally surely aware, if you live in this city, even if you don't, that pending before Congress right now is legislation entitled "Freedom from Religious Persecution." That is being discussed and marked up virtually as we speak and will be voted on very, very soon. It provides for an office of monitoring of religious persecution, and if the officer decides that religious persecution reaches a certain level, automatically a vast array of sanctions will be triggered to meet the situation.

As I say, since Sudan is frequently mentioned as one of the allegedly leading offenders in regards to religious persecution, there is a necessary or an interesting connection between the work of this conference and the general climate in which this conference is being held.

You will notice that we have set aside a policy segment in the second day of this conference, and we very much hope that the subject of religious persecution, especially as it bears on questions of peace, will be addressed, and we would entertain certainly suggestions, creative ideas in regard to dealing with the problems if they are in effect judged to be there. I should say, by the way, that we have invited to this conference all of the members of the Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom Abroad, and many of them or at least representatives are present and taking an interest in your deliberations.

Finally, I wanted to say a word about procedure. In our better moments, I'm sure all of us would agree that it is not useful to try and reenact in this room in the next two days the Sudanese civil war. Much better, I would suggest, to try on this occasion a relatively neutral spot, to try as collaboratively and creatively and dispassionately as we can to think some new thoughts about the subject of religion, nationalism, and peace in Sudan. And I'm sure you would want me as chair to help to restrain intemperance, to encourage civility, and to promote focused, productive discussion of the various issues before us. I shall try to do these things, but I can surely only do them with your cooperation and support.

I do not have at my disposal, and perhaps it's a good thing, means of enforcement other than moral suasion and appeal, and at this point I am thereby appealing to you all to enter into a spirit of collaboration and mutual reflection which one hopes will move the discussion forward somewhat.

We will proceed, and we are now about ready to proceed after Francis Deng has set the stage for us with the program as you have it. We will have basically or generally two presenters. They will be asked to speak 15 to 20 minutes, no longer, if you please, and there will be one respondent who will be asked to reply with a comment no longer than five to ten minutes. I will issue reminders during the period of time with increasing desperation as the time draws to a conclusion, and I will hope that everyone of us can meet those obligations.

At the end of that formal set of presentations, we will throw the discussion open for participation around the table here, and we will reserve the last 15 or 20 minutes of each session for questions and comments from the public audience. Again, I would urge that you recall my exhortation that you try to be to the point, dispassionate, brief, and focused.

Now, it is my happy task to thank several people for this conference and then to introduce very briefly Francis Deng. I want to thank four people, in particular, Francis Deng to begin with, who has been invaluable in giving us advice and guidance on people to invite and how to structure the conference. David Smock, who has already been mentioned, has been invaluable also in helping us think this conference through. David has vast experience, as all of you know, in Sudan and in Africa more widely and has been very helpful. Amina Khaalis has been extremely helpful in helping to organize the conference. And finally, my associate, Scott Hibbard, who has done yeoman's service in covering and carrying for all of the details that go into a complex logistic affair of this sort.

Now, I'm done, gratefully you'll say, and Francis Deng is the next person we need to call to the microphone. Francis needs no introduction. Surely he at present is the senior fellow in charge of African studies at the Brookings Institution. He has a long and distinguished career as a diplomat in the name of Sudan, has written widely and very importantly, in my view, on the subject. He's a constant counselor and a friend of the Institute's for a long period of time. He was, in fact, a Distinguished Fellow in the first class of fellows at the U.S. Institute of Peace. Francis, we're delighted you're able to open this conference.

MR. DENG: Thank you very much, David. Your very generous introduction reminded me of an encounter I had recently in South Africa where President Mandela was addressing us, and he told a little story of how he was walking when he was a couple, and the man was sort of whispering to his wife and said, "Mandela, Mandela." And the wife turned and said, "Who?" He said, "Mandela." "Who is he? Who's Mandela?" And that moment the woman got impatient and walked over to Mandela and said, "What are you famous for?" (Laughter.) MR. DENG: And Mandela said, "I just couldn't handle that."

So if Mandela could need introduction, I gracefully accept your very generous introduction, David, and your exhortation that we try to make this a civil interaction and not play our conflict here obviously challenges me as the first speaker, and I'll try my best to be calm about it all, even though we realize that this is a conflict that involves emotions.

I have to apologize to those of you that I know know very well the situation in the country. As I look there, many of you have been involved for a long time, and those of you who will have heard me talk will take this as an old record, but of course, the conflict continues, and so we continue to talk, and I apologize if I'm repeating myself to many of you too much.

Again, I'd like to begin by saying something which David's exhortation sort of makes me feel it worth the emphasis. When people get to war, when people get into a violent conflict and are prepared to kill and risk their lives, it does mean that they both, if we're talking of two parties, have causes that they feel very strongly about.

On the other hand, I think it's fair to say that causes cannot be seen in absolutely relativistic terms. Rights and wrongs cannot be absolutely equal, and this is where the normative framework that David has just presented to us is very important.

But while there is a scale of rights and wrongs, I think it is important to know that there is a degree of right on the other side because it is by thinking hard about the position of the other person and fitting or trying to fit oneself into the shoes of the other person that you might find some ground for giving and taking and, therefore, for constructive compromises.

Having said that, I think it is also fair to say that religion has always been at the core of Sudanese sense of identity, sense of nationalism, and therefore, the political processes. It is fair to say that while we all tend to spotlight this present regime that is more or less now identified with the National Islamic Front, it is also true that all political parties in the Sudan have in one way or another endorsed their religious agenda. This is one of the reasons, I think, for trying to apportion responsibility for what is happening rather than putting it all on one party. Again, the degree might differ. The responsibility for the gravity of the situation may differ, but it is important to know that this is something that is widely shared in the country.

In Washington, I'm sure many of us here tend to be aware of the Sudan more in relation to its image in international terrorism, its linkage to terroristic circles and, therefore, the order of priorities seen in terms of the policy image of the Sudan internationally, its destabilizing role to the countries of the region, and, last, we think about the situation within the country. I believe that the order is reversible, should be reversed because the ground on which whatever problems emanate from the Sudan is domestic, and whatever linkages the regime has to terroristic elements outside is a search for alliance or associations in order to reinforce its primary role at home and next in the region. We will come to that.

And so if I comment on the situation in the Sudan, I would reverse the order, talk first about the domestic scene, its implications for the region, and finally for the country. And in talking about the domestic scene, I'd like to break it up into north-south conflict, south-south conflict, and north-north conflict.

David was kind enough to cite a book that reveals the focus I have given to trying to interpret the conflict between the north and the south in the Sudan as primarily one of a crisis of national identity, and here, again, I am not be saying anything new to those of you who are familiar with the country, but talking about north-south is obviously an oversimplification, but it's an oversimplification that is also justified to a degree by the realities on the ground.

When I speak of the crisis of national identity, I am thinking of two aspects which are clearly very controversial. One has to do with the way the northern Sudanese perceive themselves in terms of Arabism, as Arabs, whether that is purely cultural, linguistic, or ethnic, racial, and the objective realities that we see about the country, including the north itself, when we use the criteria, whether we are thinking in terms of subjective feelings of race as opposed to what might be objectively identifiable, or in terms of even one's perception of one's culture.

What the Sudanese believe themselves to be and what they by some objective criteria can be said to be leaves something of a discrepancy. There's a gap between some perceptions and objective realities as far as northern Sudanese are concerned.

The other aspect of the crisis comes from the fact that the common framework is contested. If the northern Sudanese perceived himself/herself as an Arab primarily, culturally Arabized, and genetically or genealogically identified with the Arab world, and that had no consequence for anybody else, this would be a purely subjective issue that would be a matter of personal interest to the individuals or the groups concerned. But to the extent that the national framework is then defined in those terms, it ceases to be a matter of subjective interest for those concerned. It becomes a matter of common interest.

And since in the Sudan even within the north, let alone the south, there are elements who do not identify themselves in those terms, it means that the definition of the national framework with reference to the identities of one group or one set of groups that are racially, culturally, and religiously identified becomes the common framework, and by definition, what is implicit there is a system of discrimination where those who do not fit the label assume a secondary status in their own country.

Where you have a choice, clearly that is not acceptable. Where you have no choice and you are either dominated or subordinated, then of course you make compromises and do the best of the situation you cannot help. But in a part of the world where the nation-state is in the process of being full and where people are still thinking in terms of their self-determination and whether to belong or not to belong, certainly one cannot speak in terms of given majorities and minorities the way one does in more established frameworks.

It's also important to bear in mind that the formation of identities as far as the north and the south are concerned is part of a historical process that was inherently stratifying and discriminatory. Being Arab and being a Muslim gave one a higher status, and in a culture that was tolerant and to some extent allowing passing, so that if you became a Muslim, you were Arabic speaking, and in due course claimed some links to some Arab genealogical origins, whatever your color of skin and whatever the realities of your genetics, then you were elevated as compared to those who were perceived as black, Negroes, potential or actual slaves, and occupying a position of indignity which, if you had a choice, you wanted to get out.

I always like to give the example of a master having a child with a slave woman. In the Muslim Arab tradition, that child automatically become free and equal to the children begotten by mothers who are free, as compared to the Anglo-Saxon experience where a father could beget a child with a slave woman, and his own child would be a slave, to serve as a slave or even be sold.

Now, you can see how the opportunity of passing and elevating oneself from a position of indignity clearly favored the Arab Muslim line of identity in the northern Sudan. There are elements in the north also that were less touched and were less assimilated into the Arab Islamic mold, but by and large the line was drawn between the north and the south where the south became the confrontation line, where the northerner was primarily interested in invading the south for slaves, not interested in assimilating or converting the southerners into the Islamic mold. That would clearly have prohibited their being a legitimate target of slavery.

And it also means that the southern Sudanese did not see in the north a model that was worth emulating or symbolic of values that were considered of higher moral order. That was the situation that colonialism found, reinforced by administering the country as two separate parts within the new Sudanese framework of the nation-state or of the state, and you know the history, that this was the state of affairs until virtually independence came.

Whereupon, the northern Sudanese felt that in order to unify the country, quite apart from being the dominant element, virtually assuming the role of the colonial masters, they thought that what the north had gone through provided something of a model that could be applied to the rest of the country and thereby unifying the country through uniformity, which meant that the policies of Arabization and Islamization could in due course create a homogeneous country which would then identify itself fully with the Arab Islamic identity of the north. Well, we know that because of the history and the legacy of animosity and because of the reinforcement of that by the colonial legacy, the south reacted, and that is what has been going on since then.

Now, when we look at what is happening today and we say the National Islamic Front is the primary or shoulders the primary responsibility for the way the country has been polarized along religious lines, I think this is only partially true because since independence, the country has been struggling with the question of whether it should adopt an Islamic state or not.

Granted, and as David said, there was no uniformity of perceptions on this issue. Parties differed in their degree of commitment to the Islamic constitution, and there was an old motto which was taken as gospel truth, attributed to some of the more senior religious leaders in the Arab world. The motto was (speaking in foreign language) religion to God and nation to all.

Clearly, that was a wisdom from religious evils, but it was accepted. In due course, and I believe because of the internal conflict and especially when the time came for the southern movement to raise its demands from either a pull for autonomy or separatism to want to reshape the country as a whole and along the lines that would unite, which would mean putting aside the divisive elements of religion and notions of Arabism and discover a Sudan that would be if not more Africanized, at least de-Arabized and with religion non-neutral, this was seen by the establishment in the north as a threat. It would be easier to grant the south separation than to have the south come to reshape the country into an image from which the north was, in the first place, saved and elevated to a superior status.

Now you want to pull them down to being Africans, blacks. Clearly not only is it threatening the loss of an advantage position; it is also threatening to pull people down to a position of indignity, which then allowed the extremist elements in the name of religion to mobilize their forces to counter this threat coming from the south.

The stronger the SPLA, particularly with the support of Mengisto (inaudible), the more the rightist elements, the more the radical Islamic elements were reinforced in their extremist response, and I think we all know what actually happened in terms of the military takeover was explicitly to stop what they saw as a threat to the Islamic identity, which in the Sudanese case is very closely tied to the Arab identity, both as a cultural phenomenon and in the mind of many subjectively as a racial and ethnic concept.

And so if we go to the north-north dimension of this conflict, what we see is simply a degree of differences in the sense that there is clearly a contest for power. Who is going to occupy the seat of power? And there is a difference in the degree of commitment to the Islamic agenda.

The National Islamic Front says very explicitly that the traditional political parties were wavering between accommodating the non-Muslims and thereby compromising the cause of Islam, while at the same time exploiting the ignorance of the masses in the name of Islam. Therefore, they came, allegedly much more modern, much more forward looking, and at the same time unequivocally committed to Islam. That is the real divisive issue in the north. It's a matter of degree, and it's also a matter of power struggle.

I think this is important to emphasize because if the south were to demand that the north totally dismiss religion as a factor in politics, it is going to meet with tremendous difficulties in getting a national consensus on that issue, and I think if we talk in terms of options, there would have to be some recognition of some compromises that would be made on the role of religion in the country, and maybe in my concluding comments I will say a word or two about how that might be accomplished.

But to expect that the dominant political forces in the north can totally disassociate religion from politics, I think that would be a tall order, and I think we are going to have a hard time finding a political leader who will have the moral courage to stand up and say, "This is a divisive issue for the country. Let's put it aside."

Quickly, let me comment on the south. If, indeed, there is some degree of commonality in the position of the north when it comes to the main elements of its identity, religion, culture, maybe even nationalism in terms of the Arab cause, it is also true in the south that there may be differences that have to do with ethnicity, tribal competition, rivalry among leaders who mobilize their people on tribal grounds, but on the whole the south shares the same cause, and it is a cause which overshadows, overwhelms the internal differences, except to the extent that differences can be manipulated for personal, for exclusive group interests or individual interests.

Otherwise the south is like any African country where there are tribal groupings. The disadvantage of the south is that there are elements who are interested in manipulating the differences in order to weaken the south and, therefore, force it into positions of compromises that they would otherwise not accept.

This is not to say that there is no cultural characteristic in the south that is formidable in terms of differences. Most of the people who are involved in the internal conflicts within the south come from Nilotic cultures, which anthropology stellars are known for their asophomous (phonetic) character, which is based on lineage segmentation where the structure is autonomous right to the level of the family and even to the level of the individual.

You could call it indigenously very democratic. It's a society where even as a leader, you are a leader among peers. You are respected and persuasive because of your wisdom and power of words of persuasion rather than because of your might, and as a result, it's a very difficult society to govern within a central authority.

It is a society which is governed through consensus and very, very difficult to dictate upon. These factors are there, and the south may be called upon to find ways of administering an otherwise very difficult situation.

But in degree it may differ from any other African countries, only in degree, but in essence it's the same problems that Africa faces everywhere, compounded only by the conflict in the Sudan and the extent to which it has been manipulated.

Now, the regional dimension. Clearly, if the Sudan is set on an Islamic agenda which is ideologically or philosophically based on the assumption that the cause of Islam was interrupted by colonialism and the might of Christendom with Western imperialism, and this is very explicitly stated, then the new challenge, a challenge Sudan has always stated since independence, is to invigorate the cause of Islam in the continent, and they see the south as the first step in moving southward to other parts of the country.

It is an agenda that wants to empower the Muslim communities that have been seen to have been marginalized by colonialism, and if you empower them through various means, whether education or financial, economic status, eventually the goal has to be politics, and to reverse what they see as the marginalization of the Muslim community that is inherently, if you look at it, whatever the justification, whatever the reality of the colonial marginalization of Muslims throughout the continent, the fact that you want to awaken these communities, many of whom are quite sizable, sometimes as large as half a population; the fact that you want to mobilize these groups politically on a religious agenda is inherently threatening to the order of things in those countries, particularly when those countries have decided that religion would not be a factor in politics.

And if you extend that same logic internationally, while again I agree with what David said about there not being a globalizing ideological or cultural confrontation, there is also a recognition that the status of Islam today in the world and particularly in those countries is the outcome of a power confrontation in which the West has been dominant.

And, therefore, if you are going to revive Islam, if you are going to empower the Muslim community, you must counter those elements that were responsible for it in the first place. This has to be done very delicately in that you have to know that there is inherent enmity and confrontation, but you must be diplomatic enough to deal with these forces that are not possible to confront and to defeat.

Therefore, the Islamists have adopted a very pragmatic, very clever way of knowing who the enemies are, but at the same time recognizing that the realities, the pragmatic realities of the world are such that you have to cooperate. I think it is important to recognize these dilemmas, which in fact they do try to reconcile by the way they operate.

What does all of this say? I see that I'm out of my time. It means, first of all, we have to put the order of priority correctly. As far as the Sudanese situation is concerned, Islamists are thriving on the internal conflict, which has bred, polarized extremism on both sides.

It also means that the Sudanese will have to make tough choices, and the choices I say are if we believe that what we have been molded to be, wrongly or rightly, is something we are proud of as Arabs and Muslims, and this is our identity and that is what should shape our country, then we have to be courageous enough to know that it has consequences, and those consequences are that others, to the extent that they're not defeated, are not going to accept to be second class citizens.

Therefore, if you are to live and let live, devise a system whereby either through some loose coexistence or recognizing that unity is not an end in itself and that there are greater causes to be achieved, partition the country in a friendly way; negotiate a friendly partition. I personally prefer unity, and I think most of us would prefer countries like Sudan to remain united. That is give it its status, its strategic importance on the continent. Particularly the fact that it brings Africans and Arabs together, to work together in building the nation, that is clearly a higher aspiration which one would give higher priority. But if it cannot work, then we should also recognize that it cannot work.

Let me say that in this process, the role of the regional powers is very important because for the first time these people are not simply saying, "Talk, and let's hope that when you are talking you will come to some agreement." They're saying, "We know the conflict. We know the roots of the conflict, and we have to address those roots if we're going to find a solution, and we have a vested interest in finding a solution because what happens within your borders also affects us in our countries."

Therefore, the declaration of principles which says that the south has the right of self-determination, but that we should give unity priority, give it a chance, and that giving unity priority means creating conditions within the country that would allow for unity to be sustained, and if you fail to achieve those conditions that would sustain unit, it will be for the people of the south to choose whether to remain in unity or to become independent.

These are very tough choices to make, but I think after 40 years of fighting, there is reason to expect that Sudanese on both sides are beginning to give peace higher value than continual war, wherever it leads, and the role of religion will remain central, even if moderated, and the centrality of it could be that you have a framework, a national framework, where the spirituality and the religiousness of the people is not affected, but the political framework becomes neutral so that people can practice their religion in much the same way they used to when the motto was "religion to god and nation to all."

Thank you.
(Applause.)

CHAIRMAN LITTLE: Thank you very much, indeed, Francis. We appreciate those remarks deeply.

The views expressed above do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.

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