

## SSR & DDR

*Handout for the USIP Program, "The Role of Civil Society in SSR and DDR,"  
August 30-31, 2006  
Kathmandu, Nepal*

**Security Sector:** "In broad terms the security sector comprises all those responsible for protecting the state and communities within it."<sup>i</sup>

### Core Security Actors

Armed forces; police; paramilitary forces; gendarmeries; presidential guards; intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); border guards; customs authoritative; reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, national guards, militias)

### Security Management and Oversight Bodies

The Executive; national security advisory bodies; legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, financial audit and planning units); and civil society organizations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions).

### Justice and Law Enforcement Institutions

Judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; customary and traditional justice systems.

### Non-Statutory Security Forces

Liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private body-guard unites; private security companies; political party militias

ii

**Security Sector Reform:** "SSR addresses the wider security infrastructure that exists within states. SSR programs seek to ensure these security agents function according to higher national planning priorities, democratic policies and principles, sound legislative frameworks, adequate capacity and resources and an acceptable degree of civilian oversight....The reform of all agents responsible for establishing a democratic rule of law must be addressed simultaneously. ... Comprehensive approaches to SSR programs involve efforts to decrease the availability of small arms and light weapons and efforts to strengthen civil society institutions."<sup>iii</sup> SSR can also include issues such as DDR, access to justice, civil-military relations, accountability and transparency, institutional reform, oversight, public safety, and the rule of law.

"SSR recognizes that states suffering from a lack of democratic and professional security forces – particularly during post-conflict transitions – need to be rebuilt, transformed, or reformed immediately following the end of the a conflict. These security forces include not only the military but also the police and other law enforcement agencies, the intelligence forces, the judicial system and the legislative functions and oversight mechanisms."<sup>iv</sup> "Peace agreements offer a window of opportunity to begin restructuring the security sector by disbanding and disarming armed forces and merging rebel forces into a new national army. These 'surface' level

reforms can help to put an end to fighting. More fundamental reforms will usually not be possible until conflicts have been shifted from the military to the political arena and until basic administrative capacity in the area of planning and implementation of policy has been restored".<sup>v</sup>

**Defining End Vision and End Results:** "It is important that security sector [reform] is about fundamental change towards clearly defined results. The main issues that should be addressed during security sector transformation processes are governance of the security services (with an emphasis on democratic control, civil oversight, accountability and transparency), role and definition and structure, the legislative framework, efficiency and delivery, professionalism, cultural alignment, collective security arrangements and DDR."<sup>vi</sup>

To determine the aims of SSR, the needs, the roles, and the realities, the following questions are essential to ask:<sup>vii</sup>

- What are the security forces for? How is their role defined?
- What constitutes suitable security policy?
- What constitutes affordable and sustainable structures?
- Do appropriate legislative frameworks exist not only for the security services but also for national administrative, budgeting and fiscal policies and practices?
- How is efficiency defined? How does the concept apply to part-time forces and reservists?
- Is there an adequate level of overall management? Is this management strategic?
- Do performance management measures exist to measure the attainment of required outputs?
- Are the security services carefully aligned with national cultures and values?
- Are moves towards professionalism sufficiently supported by civic education, leadership, command and management practice, and a learning culture?
- Is thinking being channeled towards collective security and how this may involve regional and sub-regional organizations?
- How is civil society contributing to the security debate?

**Pace and Sequencing of Reforms**<sup>viii</sup>: "The starting point for security sector reform will differ from country to country. In many cases fundamental institutional reforms may not be possible until there have been changes to mind-sets and political values. It is necessary to: take account of resource limits; take account of human capacity limitations (especially if other political and economic reforms are in train); build on existing institutional capabilities; priorities; be politically realistic.

The reform agenda will usually need two prongs:

- a) direct engagement with the military and other security and intelligence actors to improve technical proficiency;
- b) reinforcing the civil and political management of the security sector to improve effectiveness and accountability.

**Training:** The following stages provide a general framework for training of the security sector, particularly the security forces. These stages include elements designed to strengthen democratic governance, human rights, law enforcement capacity, and military and policing capabilities:

- Initial training – basic and necessary skills such as enforcement techniques
- Continuation of training – strengthening skills
- Peacekeeping training – includes familiarization with working with civilian agencies and NGOs, impartiality, and the use of minimum force
- Command and staff training – to educate officers staff managerial functions<sup>ix</sup>

**Security and Development:** Security is required for development and development is required for security. At the state level, the provision of state security was necessary for human development, and, at the individual level, local grass roots security provisions were essential to promote confidence in the state structures. Both security and development are enablers for a country's foreign and domestic policy agendas, as well as for fulfilling the principles of good governance.<sup>x</sup>

Security is central to effective and durable development, but requires well-managed and competent personnel operating within an institutional framework defined by law. A badly managed security sector hampers development, discourages investment, and helps perpetuate poverty.<sup>xi</sup>

DEFECT	CONSEQUENCES
➤ Government unable or unwilling to control the military and other security actors.	➤ Coups d'état; democratic, accountable government unable to take root; human rights abuses; other abuses of power.
➤ Government unable or unwilling to control military expenditure and defence procurement.	➤ Public money wasted on unnecessary and/or over-priced equipment; corruption
➤ Governments enact repressive internal security measures for narrow political gain.	➤ Excessive military expenditures; democracy under threat; human rights abuses.
➤ Defence strategy based on unreal or inflated estimate or threats.	➤ Excessive military expenditures; possible inability to deal with the wider threats to security.


SSR is an important instrument to establish a national policy that includes the security-development connection. Following a peace settlement and agreement between all parties, the objectives of longer-term development priorities – which in most cases lead to a stable security situation – should be discussed in conjunction with security plans. Failure to do so risks providing a secure and stable environment for the same pre-conflict vulnerabilities to flourish.<sup>xii</sup>

“Countries in an immediate post-conflict situation remain the most difficult to strategically plan around security and development priorities, and their plight is often exacerbated by ambitious donor expectations that yearn for short-term, tangible results. Therefore the country must return to first principles and establish the basis for national security reform and development strategies, through a broad consultative process. The new national agenda must be values and interest – based and shaped by the views of local actors. It is also important to work for ‘quick-wins, or short-term successes, as well as long-term strategies.<sup>xiii</sup>

- 1) Clear articulation of the country's core values and interests.

- 2) Strategic Environmental Assessment, which defines how values and interests should be projected, pursued, and defended. This process should also identify barriers and opportunities for security and development.
- 3) Strategic Objectives can be drawn from the assessment, which can then be reflected at the macro-level of government policy by being encompassed in a cabinet-level framework – the National Security Framework.
- 4) The National Security Framework should articulate ways of consolidating, activating, and sustaining certain levels of economic, social, and internal and external security, and should place equal emphasis on development and security.
- 5) Portfolios – once the framework is established, then the focus can be geared to each separate portfolio or program areas

This process is illustrated below<sup>xiv</sup>:



**Entry Points for Reform<sup>xv</sup>:** Entry points will vary according to local circumstances, but these are the most likely:

- a) Building public awareness and engagement
- b) Building strategic planning capacity
- c) Strengthening legal and constitutional frameworks
- d) Strengthening civil oversight mechanisms
- e) Strengthening financial management systems
- f) Facilitating war-to-peace transitions
- g) Improving human resource management

**Sector Assessment and Strategic Review<sup>xvi</sup>:** Prior to appraising the security sector, it is useful to identify the context in which reform will take place. Some of the issues to consider include:

- What is the security context?
- What is the political context?
- How are relations between the military and civilian policy sectors, and between the military and police?
- Is there a social demand for security sector reform?

The strategic review will help identify the internal and external threats and is a comprehensive assessment of security needs and options for addressing them. The review should be civilian-led with the participation of a variety of stakeholders.

**Governance Review Framework<sup>xvii</sup>:** It is important for an assessment or review of the security situation and the government's ability to respond. Some of the key questions include:

- How far is the government able to maintain security throughout the country in a lawful and accountable manner?
- How free is the country from the operation of paramilitary units, private armies, guerrilla forces and 'warlordism'?
- How well is the government informed, organized and resourced to decide and implement defence and security policy?
- How effective is civil control over the armed forces and security services, and how free are the political and judicial systems from their interference?
- How much confidence do people have in the state's capacity to maintain their security?
- What measures, if any, are being taken to remedy publicly identified problems in this field, and what degree of political priority and public support do they have?

**Political and Policy Challenges<sup>xviii</sup>:** Some of the challenges that the government will face during SSR include:

- Military disengagement from politics
- Military disengagement from other non-military roles
- Re-definition of security roles
- Civilian policy-making role
- Re-professionalization of the military
- Military restructuring and demobilization
- Regional frameworks for peace
- Managing relations with donors

Political strategies, constitutional and legislative frameworks, developing skills and systems within the military, strengthening regional bonds, and ensuring that foreign assistance does not undermine the national policy-making process are all necessary to meet these challenges head on.

**Constitutional Review<sup>xix</sup>:** This review is particularly important in post-conflict countries. This should include the following questions:

- How 'national security' should be defined and implemented

- How to get the military out of internal security roles more appropriate to civil police
- The channels through which the security forces and the military, in particular can become involved in politics
- The nature and level of public and parliamentary participation in the development of security policy
- International legal conventions and laws to which the country is a party and which govern the conduct of the security sector.

**Accountability Systems<sup>xx</sup>:** Accountability systems and redress mechanisms should ensure against abuse of power by the security forces. The effectiveness of these mechanisms will depend in large part on how free the political and judicial systems are from interference by the security forces. Human rights abuses and other forms of serious misconduct by the security forces are usually investigated and tried through internal mechanisms. In cases where a civilian is involved, those guilty of misconduct may be tried in a civil court. National constitutions, supreme court rulings, or other jurisprudence determine which courts have jurisdiction. International tribunals and truth commissions can serve both to deter violations of human rights by security forces and to build public confidence.

**Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)<sup>xxi</sup>:**

**Disarmament** – involves responsibilities such as weapons surveying, collection, registration, storage, destruction and monitoring.

**Demobilization** – may include the management of temporary camps and the provision of holding grounds for ex-combatants, or perhaps a large-scale logistical effort to return these individuals and groups back to their home localities. If held temporarily in camps, this second phase of DDR may necessitate medical and educational screening as well as training provisions. It may also include social counseling, particularly for the marginalized groups.

**Reintegration** – can involve multi-donor efforts and work with the local authorities to create opportunities for these groups and individuals in order that they are accepted back into their communities and deterred from rearming themselves. Past experience proves that this final stage is by far the most challenging and, if mismanaged, can lend to the resurgence of violence and conflict

Efforts to address the problems associated with the destabilizing spread of small arms can be addressed in the disarmament stage. Strategies include:

- restoring effective mechanisms to maintain public security and regulate gun ownership, including within the security sector;
- increasing state capacity to monitor, check and prevent illegal arms transfers and to collect and destroy surplus weapons.<sup>xxii</sup>

It is important that as DDR progresses there are quick wins along with long-term objective. These should be balanced during DDR. This balance is important to provide successes rather than establishing unreasonable measures for success, which could result in reverting back to the gun. More easily measured wins can include changing legislation, and public awareness campaigns on arms control.<sup>xxiii</sup>

The demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants underpins the restoration of political stability. Demobilization saves money, and tends to be a high priority given other post-war demands on public resources, e.g. from the social and economic sectors, as is down-sizing the military, but this could create discontent if reintegration is not fully implemented. But that reintegration process is costly and for that reason is often neglected. The success of reintegration efforts will have a large impact on the sustainability of a peace process. If demobilization is poorly implemented, former troops can become a major source of lawlessness, posing in turn a significant obstacle to security sector reform and restoration of the rule of law.

Reintegration remains the most challenging element of DDR and because of length of time that it requires; it can be affected by a changing donor climate and donor fatigue. Some of the problems faced during reintegration can be staved off if there is comprehensive planning at an early stage. Early research on the number of former combatants, for example, can help create a more accurate cost estimate and future needs for reintegration. In collapsed states, DDR programs must adamantly and actively support development of a national agenda that equally includes security and development.<sup>xxiv</sup>

**Role of Civil Society:** Civil society organizations (CSOs) can play a greater role:

- Encouraging signatories to peace agreements and neighboring countries to live up to their commitments
- Establish focused monitoring and lobbying strategies
- Assist in addressing SSR questions such as ‘safety for whom?’ and ‘security from what?’
- Work more closely with the people to define the threats or challenges they face in their daily lives
- Take the civilian population’s feedback on what security agencies can do to reduce their fears back to decision-makers
- Suggest how this can be done
- Advise on what resources may be required
- Address the attention given to the security sector in national budgets, in which reform may not be actively supported.<sup>xxv</sup>
- Facilitate dialogue on SSR
- Monitor the activities of the security forces
- Express views and provide policy advice on security policy
- Advocacy
- Carry out awareness campaigns on SSR and DDR issues
- Participate in the reintegration of former combatants into their local communities
- Organize trainings for the security sector to improve effective civil control and relations with the public.<sup>xxvi</sup>

**Resource Management and Funding:** The determination of an acceptable level of security expenditure should be a significant part of the strategic planning process. If public resources are constrained, security forces may resort to crime and corruption. The military should be funded from government revenues; a self-funding military has no reason to submit to civil government control. Security Sector Reform may require an increase in security spending to achieve reform objectives, and the rapid reduction in military spending could result in governments resorting to ‘creative accounting’ to hide military expenditures.<sup>xxvii</sup>

It is widely accepted that past SSR programs initiated and funded by the International Community, have neglected the investment and training required in handing these programs over to local authorities. Financial and budgetary neglect is also shown towards criminal and dissident networks, as well as the anti-corruption and narcotics agencies required to help combat these activities. Donors sponsoring SSR programs in the future must pay due regard to the need for these 'hybrid' or support mechanisms, development, and local transfer. The government may also need to initiate a security tax or peace tax on such things as flights, alcohol, tobacco, or clothing in order to create revenue for SSR, DDR, and Development..<sup>xxviii</sup>

- 
- <sup>i</sup> "Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform," Department for International Development (DFID).
- <sup>ii</sup> "Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform," Department for International Development (DFID).
- <sup>iii</sup> Fitz-Gerald, Ann, "Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone," Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, (GFN-SSR, Cranfield University, United Kingdom, 2004). 3
- <sup>iv</sup> Fitz-Gerald, Ann, "Addressing the Security-Development Nexus: Implications for Joined-up Government," *Policy Matters*, (vol. 5, no.5) July 2004.
- <sup>v</sup> "Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform," Department for International Development (DFID).
- <sup>vi</sup> Roux, Len le, Joao Ricardo Dornelles and Rocky Williams, "Establishing a Common Understanding of Security Sector Transformation," *Networking the Networks: Supporting Regional Peace and Security Agendas in Africa*, eds. Ann Fitz-Gerald and Anicia Lala (GFN-SSR, UK) 2004.
- <sup>vii</sup> Roux, Len le, Joao Ricardo Dornelles and Rocky Williams, "Establishing a Common Understanding of Security Sector Transformation," *Networking the Networks: Supporting Regional Peace and Security Agendas in Africa*, eds. Ann Fitz-Gerald and Anicia Lala (GFN-SSR, UK) 2004.
- <sup>viii</sup> "Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform," Department for International Development (DFID).
- <sup>ix</sup> "Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform," Department for International Development (DFID).
- <sup>x</sup> Fitz-Gerald, Ann, "Addressing the Security-Development Nexus: Implications for Joined-up Government," *Policy Matters*, (vol. 5, no.5) July 2004.
- <sup>xi</sup> "Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform," Department for International Development (DFID).
- <sup>xii</sup> Fitz-Gerald, Ann, "Operationalizing the Security – Development Debate: A tool for post-conflict security transitions."
- <sup>xiii</sup> Fitz-Gerald, Ann, "Operationalizing the Security – Development Debate: A tool for post-conflict security transitions."
- <sup>xiv</sup> Fitz-Gerald, Ann, "Operationalizing the Security – Development Debate: A tool for post-conflict security transitions."
- <sup>xv</sup> "Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform," Department for International Development (DFID).
- <sup>xvi</sup> "Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform," Department for International Development (DFID).
- <sup>xvii</sup> "Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform," Department for International Development (DFID).
- <sup>xviii</sup> "Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform," Department for International Development (DFID).
- <sup>xix</sup> "Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform," Department for International Development (DFID).
- <sup>xx</sup> "Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform," Department for International Development (DFID).
- <sup>xxi</sup> Fitz-Gerald, Ann "Introduction to DDR." (GFN-SSR)
- <sup>xxii</sup> "Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform," Department for International Development (DFID).
- <sup>xxiii</sup> Fitz-Gerald, Ann, "Operationalizing the Security – Development Debate: A tool for post-conflict security transitions."
- <sup>xxiv</sup> "Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform," Department for International Development (DFID).
- <sup>xxv</sup> Williams, Ishola and Dent Ocaya-Lakidi, "The Role of Civil Society in Influencing the Security Sector Reform Agenda in Africa," *Networking the Networks: Supporting Regional Peace and Security Agendas in Africa*, eds. Ann Fitz-Gerald and Anicia Lala (GFN-SSR, UK) 2004.
- <sup>xxvi</sup> "Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform," Department for International Development (DFID).
- <sup>xxvii</sup> "Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform," Department for International Development (DFID).

---

<sup>xxviii</sup> Williams, Ishola and Dent Ocaya-Lakidi, "The Role of Civil Society in Influencing the Security Sector Reform Agenda in Africa," *Networking the Networks: Supporting Regional Peace and Security Agendas in Africa*, eds. Ann Fitz-Gerald and Anicia Lala (GFN-SSR, UK) 2004.