Special ReportContentsPART TWO PART ONE Expert Analysis of the Brahimi Report Shortcomings of the Brahimi Report Changing Nature of UN Peacekeeping Current State of Affairs in Sub-Saharan Africa From USIP Press13 February 2001 | Special Report No. 66, Part Two Peacekeeping in AfricaPART TWO Current Peacekeeping Operations in Africa: Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL, 1999-present)Since the beginning of conflict in 1991, Sierra Leone's population has suffered greatly at the hands of the marauding Revolutionary United Front (RUF). During nearly a decade of fighting, the RUF has systematically killed and maimed tens of thousands of Leoneans. At the start of the war, Sierra Leone's army, with support from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its military observer group, ECOMOG, tried to defend the government and beat back the rebels. The following year the Sierra Leonean army toppled its own government and held power until February 1996 when it relinquished control to the newly elected president, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. Yet the military spent little time in their barracks, staging another coup in May 1997, this time joined by the RUF. Following extensive negotiations and numerous broken peace agreements, the UN Security Council imposed an oil and arms embargo on Sierra Leone on October 8, 1997 and authorized ECOWAS to ensure its implementation through ECOMOG troops. After the continued failure of negotiations and repeated attacks on ECOMOG forces by the RUF, ECOMOG launched a military offensive that led to the collapse of the junta and its expulsion from Freetown. On March 10, 1998, President Kabbah was reinstated as president. In June 1998, the Security Council established a UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) that documented human rights violations and war atrocities. Yet fighting in Sierra Leone continued, and by January 1999 the RUF held control of much of the countryside and most of the capital, Freetown. UNOMSIL personnel were evacuated before ECOMOG forces again retook the capital. By May 1999, negotiations between the government and rebels were underway and on July 7, the controversial LomÈ Accords were signed, creating a government of national unity in Sierra Leone. On October 22, 1999, the Security Council authorized the termination of UNOMSIL and the creation of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), a new and much larger mission with a maximum of 6,000 military personnel, to assist the government and the parties in carrying out the provisions of the LomÈ peace agreement. This group has been steadily reinforced since its creation and now carries a Security Council mandate to increase its numbers to 20,500. Nevertheless, the UN mission has been plagued by missteps and failure. During the spring and summer of 2000, several UN soldiers were killed and hundreds more were captured and held hostage by the RUF. Only through the dubious support of Liberian strongman Charles Taylor (and the dramatically more effective bilateral military intervention of British forces acting outside of UNAMSIL) was the humiliating episode brought to an end and the UN presence rescued. In recent months, UNAMSIL has been hit with further bad news: India, source of the largest multinational contingent, announced the withdrawal of its 3,150 soldiers by February 2001 after several of its soldiers were killed and its commander, Major General Vijay K. Jetley, became involved in a dispute with the mission's Nigerian leaders. Shortly after this announcement the Jordanian contingent, citing the conspicuous absence of Western soldiers in the mission, also announced the departure of its 1,800 soldiers by the end of the year. The impending departure of nearly half of the UN forces on the ground in Sierra Leone is a blow to UNAMSIL, and will leave Bangladesh as the sole non-African actor involved in the mission. While Bangladesh and Ghana have offered to replace the lost troops and maintain the current level of 12,500, it looks unlikely that the Security Council and the secretary general will be able to increase the number of forces to the 20,000 mark. And many Leoneans worry that the pull-out of the departing forces along with the start of the dry season-typically a time of intense fighting-will lead to more bloodshed. Together, these events cast further doubt on the future of this important peacekeeping mission. Ethiopia-Eritrea In August, the UN Security Council adopted Kofi Annan's proposal to send a strong contingent of 4,200 Blue Helmets to oversee the implementation of the June 18 Algiers ceasefire agreement. This agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea halted two years of intermittent war that killed tens of thousands. The treaty followed Ethiopia's ferocious May offensive that pushed deep into Eritrean territory and forced a million Eritreans to flee at a time when regional drought threatened thousands of lives. The United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) was established to monitor the cessation of hostilities in this border dispute, and the redeployment of forces to respective sides of a demilitarized zone. The UN mission of 4,500 is currently deploying. Building a durable peace in the Horn of Africa is yet to be accomplished, although the peace effort received good news in the fall when both sides signed a formal peace treaty on December 12 in Algiers. Congo (MONUC, 1999-present) The 1997 ouster of Zaire's long-time despot, Mobutu Sese Seko, brought Laurent Kabila and his Rwandan backers to power in the new Congo. But fighting once again erupted in August 1998 when rebels, backed by Rwanda and Uganda, accused President Kabila's government of harboring Hutu militia who had fled Rwanda after committing genocide in 1994. On July 10, 1999, the DRC along with Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe came together in Lusaka to sign a ceasefire agreement to end hostilities in the DRC. Conspicuous in their absence from the talks were several Congolese rebel groups. Nevertheless, the Security Council proceeded with the peace process and in August 1999, authorized the deployment of up to 90 UN military liaison personnel to the capitals of the signatory states and other strategic military locations. Since then the mandate of MONUC has grown to a maximum deployment of 5,537 military personnel, including up to 500 military observers. Nevertheless, the UN Security Council and Secretariat have not proceeded with this second phase deployment due to the failure by Congo's government, rebels, and neighbors to implement their commitments under the Lusaka Agreement. The war in the DRC thus continues unabated. Western Sahara (MINURSO, 1991-present) The mission to Western Sahara is the UN's oldest on the continent. This protracted conflict between Morocco and the Frente Popular para la LiberaciÛn de Saguia el-Hamra y de RÌo de Oro (Polisario Front) over a stretch of land southwest of Morocco began after the withdrawal of Spain as colonial administrator in 1976. At that time, both Morocco and Mauritania affirmed their claim to the territory, a claim opposed by the Polisario Front. The United Nations became involved with seeking a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the Western Sahara after fighting broke out between the Moroccan army and the Algerian-backed Polisario Front. By 1979, Mauritania had renounced its claims to the territory, leaving the two sides to battle for control. In cooperation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the UN secretary general initiated a mission of good offices that led to "settlement proposals" between the two sides that were accepted in August 1988. By 1991, a tentative ceasefire was established and the UN Security Council decided to establish the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). The settlement plan called for a referendum in which people of Western Sahara would choose between independence and integration with Morocco. At full strength the mission was to consist of approximately 1,700 military personnel and a security unit of 300 police officers. According to the settlement plan, the referendum was to take place in January 1992, but it was never held. At issue still for the two parties is the composition of the electorate. The United Nations has tried to intercede and facilitate the process of voter identification, but the exercise has been fraught with problems. Kofi Annan's personal envoy to the Western Sahara, James A. Baker III, continues to seek a negotiated settlement between the independence-seeking Polisario Front and Morocco, and UN-mediated talks on the referendum continue.  U.S. Policy toward AfricaCataloging contemporary conflict and tension in sub-Saharan Africa is a difficult task. The array of conflicts facing Africans today is long (the risk of increased conflict remains high in Algeria, Angola, Burundi, DRC, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe) and presents Western policymakers with a daunting task: how to design foreign policy toward a region with the breadth and depth of socio-economic trouble and political instability that is currently found in Africa? Conference participants agreed that the "lack of political will" by Western powers is the major impediment hindering the deployment and success of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. Yet as one conference participant said, "It is just not here in the United States where political leaders have to sell peacekeeping missions to their populations, it happens in all democracies." In short, few foreign leaders are willing to risk the loss of soldiers in poorly understood lands where there may be no perceived national strategic or economic interests. The aversion to peacekeeping among the American military and policymakers runs deep. American critics of peacekeeping missions, and of conflict prevention programs in general, often chastise the United Nations for its unrealistic planning, weak mandates, and feckless command and control procedures. For these critics the ill-fated UN mission to Somalia (1992-94) confirmed their cynicism and became emblematic of international peacekeeping efforts. Moreover, the death of 18 Army Rangers in the streets of Mogadishu had a profound and traumatic effect on the way American foreign policymakers in general looked at peacekeeping, especially in Africa. Since the tragedy in Somalia, the trend has been for Western nations to refuse to send troops into Africa's hot spots. Jordan recently underscored this point when it expressed frustration with the West's failure to commit soldiers to the UNAMSIL mission as a reason for the withdrawal of its troops from Sierra Leone. America's aversion to peacekeeping in Africa also reflects broader U.S. foreign policy on the continent. Africa occupies a marginal role in American foreign policy in general (a point highlighted by conference participants). Today, the foundation of U.S. policy toward the vast sub-Saharan region (with its 48 states) is being built on relations with South Africa and Nigeria. Secretary of Defense William Cohen stressed the importance of these two relationships earlier this year on a trip to Cape Town when he said: "South Africa and Nigeria will be critical for the stability and the future prosperity of African nations, . . . and we estimate that their participation in maneuvers and joint training programs, seminars, exchanges in military personnel and also academic exercises aimed at military/civilian relations will strengthen ties between these nations" (Armed Forces Journal International 138:2, September 2000, p. 30). Despite the apparently fruitful cooperation between the United States, South Africa, and Nigeria, the road ahead for broader U.S.-Africa relations is unclear. The future for much of Africa looks bleak. As war and humanitarian disasters continue to unfold across the continent, they are accompanied by growing numbers of refugees, spreading instability, and in some places anarchy. The rise of lawlessness and stateless societies in Africa brings the risk of the development of new terrorist and drug networks. Weak economic growth, the AIDS pandemic, the degradation of Africa's physical environment, and the spread of humanitarian crises in sub-Saharan Africa combine to create a depressing regional portrait. Each of these realities poses a unique threat to peace everywhere on the continent. Thus, conference participants agreed: Given the menacing socio-economic setting in Africa today, the United States must be encouraged to re-engage in both the United Nations and African affairs. ConclusionConference participants were unanimous in their conviction that the Brahimi Report is a landmark document on the American foreign policy scene. Not as a source of seminal theory or original analysis of peacekeeping operations-indeed, much of what is contained in the report has been known and talked about for years-but rather for its straightforward simplicity, candor, and ability to synthesize timely and urgent issues. The report should thus be seen as more than a plan for improving the technical capacity of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; it is also a project around which the multitude of concerned actors can coalesce to construct a unifying vision and effect change. In the atomized and unharmonious world of international policymaking, one must seize upon the rare opportunities to work together and concentrate resources in pursuit of a common goal. While conference participants were unable to reach a consensus on what next steps should be taken by U.S. and international policymakers in support of Brahimi, numerous recommendations were put forward. One former government official argued for a direct link between poverty and conflict in Africa and advocated a redoubling of aid and development efforts on the continent by Western governments. Others from the academic community suggested that the United States adopt a policy of selective engagement in Africa that focuses on vital interests and achievable goals. Several participants recommended that U.S. policymakers should continue to strengthen key African allies (such as Nigeria and South Africa), support regional organizations (like ECOWAS and SADCC, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference), strengthen the American embassies and diplomatic corps, collect better intelligence on the continent, and bring economic and other pressures to bear on warlord governments. Although none of these proposals received unconditional support from the group, consensus was reached over the continued importance of the democratization process in Africa. The group also agreed that the agenda put forth by the Brahimi Report offers numerous points of entry for members of the international community. As the report states, "Peacekeeping and peacebuilding are inseparable partners" (p. ix). The U.S. Institute of Peace and other concerned organizations have a longstanding record and ongoing programs that have taken concrete steps toward conflict prevention on the continent. The Brahimi Report both confirms the importance of this work and illuminates new areas of need. About the ReportThis report presents the major questions and themes brought to light during the United States Institute of Peace conference "The United Nations, The United States, and Peacekeeping Operations: Africa," held on October 24. The conference was organized by the Institute's Research and Studies Program as a one-day forum for leading policymakers, diplomats, and academics to discuss the "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations" (known as the Brahimi Report). This Special Report synthesizes the presentations and discussions from the conference with the major themes covered in the Brahimi Report. This report then places the most salient points raised at the conference in the broader context of peacekeeping activities in Africa today. It concludes with a brief discussion of participants' suggestions for mitigating conflict on the continent. This report was written by Tim Docking, program officer in the Jennings Randolph Program for International Peace. ParticipantsJ. Brian Atwood Kurt W. Bassuener Daniel Benjamin Richard Bogosian Donna Boltz Allison Boyer Holly Burkhalter Mark Clack Roberta Cohen Chester A. Crocker Patrick Cronin Tom Dempsey Steven A. Dimoff Tim Docking Carlos dos Santos William Durch Stewart Eldon Heather Flynn Paul Foldi Christopher Fomunyoh Jendayi Frazer Patrick Hayford Harriet Hentges Herbert Howe Dennis Jett Judith Karl Edwin King Hall Alex Laskaris Jeff Laurenti Edward Marks Raymond Marutle Douglas Mercado Mike Miller Sheila Murphy Susan Myers Catherine O'Neill Robert Oakley Robert Orr Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah Francis C. Record Donald S. Rothchild James A. Schear Kamalesh Sharma Thomas Sheehy David Smock W. R. Smyser Stephen Stedman William Stuebner Toby Trister Gati Matt Vacarro Kathy Ward Barbara Wien Eric Witte James Woods Ken Yates I. William Zartman Of Related Interest
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