Special Report

7 November 2000 | Special Report No. 63

Europe in the 21st Century: A Strategy for Achieving Stable Peace

Lauren Van Metre

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Summary

Introduction

In November 1999, members of the Future of Europe Working Group met to discuss the prospects for a "peaceful, undivided, and democratic" Europe (synonymous with a Europe "whole and free"). Participants agreed that the concept, although the mantra of successive U.S. presidential administrations, had never been clearly defined, nor had an acceptable transatlantic strategy for its achievement ever been prepared. The task of the study group was three-fold: to assess whether a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe is feasible and desirable; to identify the likely scenarios for achieving a stable peace in a Europe inclusive of Russia, as well as the elements necessary for achieving it; and to articulate policy options for its attainment. The Institute also sponsored three separate meetings on Russia, since Russia's role in Europe is critical to achieving a Europe at stable peace.

In January 2000, the U.S. Institute of Peace, with the Aspen Institute/Berlin, organized a meeting with experts from Europe to present to them many of the same issues. Despite different national, political, and historical perspectives, participants at the meeting in Berlin recognized the desirability of a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe, but held widely different views as to its shape and the likelihood of the United States and Europe achieving such a vision.

What Might a Peaceful, Undivided, and Democratic Europe Look Like?

Possible Scenarios

Participants agreed that the future shape of a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe was not easily defined, nor was it necessarily useful to reach consensus on this issue. Several different associations of states might form the basis of a stable peace in Europe. Some participants envisioned a "fuzzy tripolarity" corresponding to North America, the European Union, and a revived Russia, with other states freely, or not at all, associated with one or all of these three centers. Alternative scenarios included: (1) relative autonomy of the three major power centers with each maintaining their own cultural heritage and satisfying their particular interests; (2) skillfully imposed cooperation in a system where the United States is dominant and there is little or no opposition to this arrangement; (3) North America and Western Europe working as partners on economic and security matters, while Russia, failing in economic and democratic reforms, becomes increasingly hostile towards the West; and (4) cooperation challenged at times by coalitions opposing U.S. policies.

Important Qualities

These and other scenarios might accurately describe a Europe of the future that was stable, at peace, and committed to democratic governance. A careful comparison could yield a strategy for achieving the more plausible and desirable scenarios, while suggesting policies to avoid the more undesirable outcomes.

Participants agreed that the preferred models for Europe shared several common elements, which are discussed below. One common element was a Europe in which the countries would be differentiated according to their membership in Europe's multilateral institutions. However, as countries developed stable democracies and practiced good relations with neighbors, such differentiation would be determined by national choice and not institutional inclusion or exclusion. Participants felt strongly that differentiation offered the most sophisticated and stable model for Europe's future development. In the interim period, it allows: (1) Europe's institutions and core countries time to adapt to new conditions and members, and (2) flexibility in the event of political reversals in newly democratic states. And, at the end of the day, differentiation allows countries to maintain important national priorities and precedents in order to retain domestic support for the institutional affiliations they select.

Of course, transitioning to a system of differentiation based on national self-selection requires a major commitment by European countries to: (1) help the countries of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union achieve the current membership criteria, and (2) ensure that European institutions have the capacity to include new members. And, it means political leaders must be able to accept ambiguity--the eventual shape of a Europe in stable peace cannot be predicted today. Participants cautioned, however, that this ambiguity must be a thoughtful strategic decision. It cannot be employed as a crutch for failing to identify long-term goals and policies consistent with those goals.

A second important quality of a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe would be a stable peace among European states. That is, the resort to armed force would not be among the policy options any European government would seriously consider as a method of resolving differences with other states within the system. Participants acknowledged, however, that internal conflicts would be difficult to eradicate even in a Europe in which state-on-state aggression was obsolete. Therefore, conflict might exist even within a system at stable peace. Statecraft in such a system would rely predominantly on diplomacy to create a predictable, orderly relationship among states-a cooperative security order or a security community. Military calculations would be less dominant in the relations among states, which would be influenced primarily by economic and political factors. In this context, participants emphasized that the process of "de-nationalizing" former communist states was just as important as democratization. Societies must be drained of ideological and national passion, and governments must exist primarily to satisfy the well-being of their citizens and not to venerate the state.

Participants also agreed that a Russia distinct from Europe inhibits the vision of a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe, and that it is also in the interest of Russia to be a part of the new Europe. The price Moscow would pay for competition with Euroatlantic structures would be a tremendous draw on its resources--resources that are currently needed for Russia's economic, democratic, and cultural development. Meanwhile, Russia's close association with a Euroatlantic security community would enhance its role in the world and ease the hardships associated with its current transition.

A more equal relationship in Europe and globally between the European Union and the United States is inevitable and a desirable element of a Europe "whole and free." The recent introduction of the European joint currency--the euro--will require greater and more balanced cooperation between the European Union and the United States in international financial affairs. Some participants also felt that the European Union was ideally positioned to take the lead in creating the possibilities for a stable peace and a security community inclusive of Russia. Europe has a smaller strategic vision that is more palatable to Russia than that of the United States, which has extensive interests ranging from geographic (the Caspian Sea Basin) to functional (nuclear and arms control issues). And, through forming the European Union, European leaders have refined conciliation and consensus-building skills that are useful for engaging Russia.

Many thought that the best contribution Europe could make today for its future peace is to develop a coherent political structure. This structure would no longer be based on a common desire to share power in order to avoid war, as was the goal of Europe's institutions. Instead, European states and institutions must focus on building a strong community that can manage Europe's interaction with the global economy. One speaker at the Berlin meeting noted that dominant powers embrace globalization in order to have a say in the ways of the world and to spread their values. For lesser powers, exposure to global culture and economy feels like a loss of control--an attack on state institutions. The European Union is a way for the states of Europe to pool their resources to manage, and not simply react to, globalization. It offers a sense of empowerment and self-confidence that will help the European Union become an actor, and not merely a presence, in global affairs. And, if the United States and Europe manage well Europe's increased power and influence, Europe will be a strong partner not only in European affairs, but in other global matters.

It is important that the United States also be engaged with the new Europe. There are several factors, however, that will condition future U.S.-European relations. On the domestic front, neo-isolationism has been and may continue to be a limiting factor. Most participants agreed, however, that despite the occasional questioning of U.S. global engagements, the United States is a nation whose population is overwhelmingly in favor of multilateral organizations and collective approaches to international problems. Domestic concerns regarding U.S. overreach will, however, begin to constrain its international actions. Policy leaders on both sides of the Atlantic must begin to accept that U.S. priorities and restraints will limit its leadership and participation on some issues. In these cases, the Europeans may have to fill the void and the United States will have to accept that, in these cases, the outcome may not be entirely favorable to its interests.

Opportunities for Achieving a Stable Peace in Europe

Participants agreed that a good starting point for determining a strategy for achieving a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe was an accurate assessment of where Europe is today. In this regard, it was noted that, since the fall of communism (and with the exception of the Balkan wars) none of Europe's worst case scenarios had occurred:

• Russia has not experienced a violent social and political breakdown.
• The countries of East-Central Europe (such as Hungary and Romania) have not gone to war with each other.
• NATO and the EU have adapted to the new political and security environment and remain core institutions.
• The Balkans conflicts were contained and did not escalate to include the Great Powers (as they did in World War I).

Others saw the outlines of a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe already emerging. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Paris agreement with Russia and the United States, the EU enlargement process, a robust NATO, and the EU's attempts to improve internal cohesion, were considered elements of a Europe "whole and free." Participants agreed, however, that the structure in place--the foundation for a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe--is not yet secure:

• Not all states have access to all institutions.
• Opportunities for cooperation with the East, especially with Russia, have not been fully exploited.
• While the European Union is contemplating institutional reform, it may not have the wherewithal to implement its difficult aspects.

Governments can take steps to further this process, but are often distracted by periodic crises and the public's adverse reaction to the effects of globalization. And, leaders may not be up to the task. The current group may lack the determination of the leaders of the Cold War era, and tend not to be savvy or interested foreign policy actors. Participants thought that non-governmental factors--economic trends, the attraction of free markets, increased cultural diffusion, and the still vaguely defined process of globalization--are more likely to deliver a Europe in stable peace than formal government policies. This is not to say that governments have no role in constructing a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe--they do. The obstacles to a Europe at stable peace, however, are more likely to be the short-sighted policies of national actors, as discussed below. If the barriers to a Europe "whole and free" are to be overcome, if they are overcome at all, it will most likely be the result of the effects of globalization, rather than the policies of national governments.

Obstacles to Achieving a Stable Peace in Europe

The future of democracy in Russia remains uncertain. Russia has failed to incorporate constitutional liberalism within its political structure and practice, and the practice of democracy remains superficial. Some working group members argued, however, that Russia has traveled far from its rigid authoritarianism. There has been a significant (and not always constructive) devolution of power to regions and localities. While democratic processes have not necessarily accompanied this development, at least decision-making is spread among more actors. The executive and legislative branches of government do share power. Even though the constitution gives enormous power to the president of the Russian Federation, the legislature has been able to redress the imbalance to a degree. Furthermore, in every political crisis since the disaster of October 1993, the fundamental rules of the present constitution have been observed.

Others argued that Russia's successful democratization is not assured. For many working group members, the election of Vladimir Putin as president of Russia is a disturbing development. Putin seems to stand for a strong, authoritarian Russian state; his popularity with the Russian people calls into question their support for pluralism, due process, and the rule of law. In the current environment, where crime is prevalent and Russia's wealthy work and live beyond the law, order and a firm hand are quite appealing to the average citizen. Support for authoritarian rule is also tied to the public perception of democracy, which is generally understood in Russia as a power grab by the wealthy and powerful.

Putin's election, therefore, may result in the emergence of an authoritarian regime with significant social and political support. Western governments will consider this a cause for concern; Russians may welcome the inauguration of a "strong" central government. How can Russian perception of "good" government differ so significantly from the West? At issue, participants thought, is Russia's conception of state consolidation. After the fall of communism, East Europeans looked to limit their political leaders through a system of checks and balances, which would also create space for the development of an active civil society. Russians, on the other hand, wanted a strong central government to dictate reform from above. Civil society in Russia remains weak and citizens are generally passive regarding political and economic reform. Russia's political system, therefore, has both democratic and authoritarian elements. Unfortunately, the democratic aspects of the system have been increasingly discredited, leading to a creeping authoritarianism at the regional and national levels of government.

Public disappointment in the recent experiment in democracy has affected Russians' perceptions of their national identity. Frustration with its economic and political backwardness is causing a backlash not unfamiliar to Russia experts. In the past, a Russian opening to the West has often introduced a sense of inferiority and eventually a sense of futility. Realizing that parity with the West would take decades to achieve, Russians, in the past, have rejected Western political and economic models in favor of a unique "Russian" path to national well-being. The current flirtation with the idea of Russia as a bridge from Europe to Asia represents a similar rejection by Moscow of integration with Europe and the West. First, it suggests that Russia does not share European values--a necessary criteria for membership in Europe's institutions. And, as the dominant power in Eurasia, Russia will demand special consideration by the West--a process that would weaken decision-making within Europe's institutions and make smaller states insecure. Finally, Russia's Eurasian identity signals an intent to counterbalance the United States in Europe. Russia's support for European integration, according to some participants, is a way to further contain or counterbalance preponderant U.S. power. In this way, the U.S. proclivity for unilateralism will be limited by Europe's multilateral institutions and approach to foreign policy. Some participants in the working group, therefore, questioned the utility of Russian integration with Europe given current attitudes in Moscow. As a member state of Europe, would Russia be a detriment to or a defender of its institutions?

A peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe inclusive of Russia, therefore, requires Russia's successful transition to democracy. Will Putin promote democracy in Russia? Does public support exist for democratic concepts and institutions? Working group members were not able to reach consensus on these issues.

Most participants agreed on the impediments facing Russia and its integration with Europe, such as setbacks in democratization, too much "uncivil" society, nationalist trends, disillusionment with the West, the popularity of an archaic foreign policy mentality, the war in Chechnya, and especially continuing economic crisis. But discussion yielded no consensus as to whether Russia could overcome these obstacles. Those who thought Russia was on the right path believed it was important to judge Russia not by what it had achieved, but by the catastrophes that it has avoided--violence, social and political breakdown, authoritarian rule, and so forth. The correct measure of Russia, they thought, is not the West, but the Russia of yesterday. Others fear Russia is not progressing politically or economically, and might, in fact, be backsliding.

Improving U.S.-Russian Relations

When asked the key to improving U.S. relations with Russia, participants agreed that the single most important determinant was Russia's internal development. However, while healthy developments in Russia are necessary to improve relations with the United States, they are not sufficient. For a number of reasons, the United States could disengage and lose interest in Russia, regardless of events unfolding there:

• The present trajectory in U.S.-Russian relations is toward greater disengagement, or selective engagement.
• Yeltsin kept U.S.-Russian relations on an even keel. It is likely that Putin will not be as attuned to the external environment, or able to balance internal-external affairs.
• There is need for long-term strategic patience with Russia. Yet for the next U.S. administration, Russia fatigue will be a factor.
• The United States has come to expect that Russia's problems will remain pressing, but never urgent. With Russia stuck in its transition and the United States suffering from fatigue, continued disengagement is likely.
• The United States and Russia may share many of the same interests, but there is a discrepancy in priorities. Economic issues are of higher priority for Moscow, while the United States is interested primarily in Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR).

There was consensus among participants that the United States and Russia are currently stuck in a non-productive relationship, but that the West needs to find a role for Russia now that it is no longer a superpower. Participants agreed that it was important for the United States to ensure that Russia completes its transition and does not end up as a poor, weak state on the periphery of Europe. Although Russia may be hostile to external support, the United States must remain actively engaged.

Participants agreed, however, that the United States must change significantly its approach by seeking cooperation on issues of mutual interest, but it must also take a strong stand in defense of interests conflicting with Moscow. This means making it clear to Russia that it is not a partner to the United States on certain issues. In fact, on issues where their interests conflict, such as the Caspian Sea Basin, the United States will not seek accommodation with Russia. On some issues, such as European integration and enlargement, cooperation with Russia is helpful, but not necessary. Both the United States and European countries should work towards Russia's integration as they build a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe, but the ultimate future shape of Europe should be left undefined as Russia works on its internal reforms. Other issues, such as arms control and "loose" nuclear weapons, require cooperation between the United States and Russia. Participants agreed that the United States must prioritize its interests; a weak Russia does not have the resources to cooperate on all issues.

Adopting the aforementioned approach would shatter the current image of a U.S.-Russian strategic partnership, but would reflect the reality that Russia is not a partner to the United States on certain issues. To perpetuate such a myth damages future relations; it undercuts Russian reformers and creates cynicism in the Russian populace. To improve relations, the United States should decide how much it will accommodate Russia and how much it should stick to its interests and be clear about them. The United States should not sacrifice vital national interests for a shaky partnership with Moscow.

Participants agreed that the United States must examine its long-term interests in Europe in order to guide its current relationship with Russia. The United States must not try to resolve quickly the role of Russia in Europe and NATO. It must be made clear to Moscow that NATO will evolve as Russia evolves. Until Russia defines itself as a democratic state, NATO remains a military alliance and does not lay down its Article 5 commitments. Yet it must also be made clear to Russia that Europe wants a working relationship and a constructive dialogue. And it must be made clear that Europe and the United States desire Russia's membership in Europe's institutions, including NATO, based not on geopolitical considerations but on meeting membership criteria.

A central part of the January meeting at the Aspen Institute was a discussion on the division of labor between the United States and Europe on integrating Russia. It was suggested by some Americans that Europe ought to take the lead in working with Russia following a strategy developed in coordination with the United States. Europeans, for the most part, felt that they had enough on their plate with European Union reform and enlargement. They preferred that the United States maintain a leadership role in relations with Russia. For American participants this was cause for concern. If this meant that the United States should do all the heavy lifting and bear all the burdens associated with dealing with Russia on difficult issues (nuclear weapons, Iran, Iraq), while Europe gets to deal only with the affirmative aspects of the agenda with Russia, then this is not particularly attractive to the United States.

Leadership issues aside, both European and American participants agreed that any approach to Russia must include the following elements:

• a vision of a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe of which Russia's integration is an integral part;
• rules of the road for ordering relations with Russia in the aftermath of NATO's military campaign in Kosovo;
• expanded consultations with Russia on its new national security documents, in order to stem the increasingly anti-western character of those documents and prevent them from becoming official Russian policy; and
• an agenda for active engagement among the United States, the European Union, and Russia, so that relations with Russia don't revolve entirely around NATO. A trilateral agenda could include, for example, sharing information on social issues such as health and the environment.

Participants agreed that more engagement with Russia is necessary, but the nature of the West's relationship with Russia must change. Members of the working group also thought that relations with Russia must be expanded beyond state-to-state to include non-governmental, societal, and business associations. Much needs to be done to strengthen civil society in Russia and to create institutions that would curtail a strong central government. Judicial reform is one such area that the United States might support; others would include educational exchanges and bolstering Russia's non-governmental organizations.

The Challenges of an Enlarging Europe

The vision of a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe does not mean that every European state needs to be a member of every European institution. Rather, there can be considerable flexibility of form in the way this single community arranges itself. The European Union is increasingly talking about differentiated structures and variable speeds of integration. A peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe would be no different. At the same time, greater attention and focus needs to be given to the shape of Europe and the differentiated structures that will support it. The goal is to avoid a new division of Europe between the haves and the have-nots, whether in terms of security, political development, or economic prosperity. A differentiated structure of relations simply reflects the reality that the various nations of Europe are in different states of development of a democratic civic culture and that for the transition period different patterns of institutional relationships will characterize the European landscape. Participants agreed that the ultimate architecture of what a Europe at stable peace would be simply cannot be decided at this time.

What are the obstacles to Europe achieving a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe? Integrating former communist countries will require the dedication of tremendous resources and attention over an extensive period of time. Participants worried that Western capitals might not have the political will to oversee this project through successive generations and political administrations. Challenging the West's endurance is the fact that the first round of integration is likely the easiest. Successive integrations will undoubtedly be more difficult. These subsequent entries--Bulgaria, Romania, and the Yugoslav successor states--are in most cases descendants of different political and religious cultures--the Ottoman millet system and the Orthodox Church. Can the United States keep the lid on by working on the Balkans and the integration of Russia while the European Union enlarges to central Europe? Progress on integration is currently helped by the strength of the global economy. What would be the effect of an economic downturn on European policy and the pace of integration?

A second challenge facing the establishment of a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe is a successful reform of the European Union itself. It was the consensus of U.S. participants that the administration in Washington often underestimates the role of the European Union in building the foundation for Europe's future. NATO has kept the peace, but the European Union has removed the conditions for war through a quiet process of socialization. Enlarging the European Union may weaken relations among the all-important core states. If enlargement or internal reform falters, leaders may become increasingly insecure about their ability to continue the EU's political and economic evolution and to sustain public support for reforms that require giving up important aspects and symbols of national sovereignty.

The transition to a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe will also require a shift in leadership responsibilities from the United States to Europe. Are European leaders ready for this added responsibility? Will the United States accept its new and rather uncertain role in Europe, which would require it to lead on some issues but not on others? Since a stable and peaceful Europe is a fundamental security interest of the United States, Americans have expressed concern regarding the enlargement process. It is not yet clear that the Europeans have a vision or a realistic program for enlargement that goes beyond economic cooperation to include political participation in the European Union. If Europe is unwilling or unable to change its governance structures, enlargement will not happen. Americans also worry that Europe may do too little in critical areas such as the Balkans. If the Balkan Stability Pact establishes a regional free trade zone, for example, but fails to integrate the regions with Europe, the Balkans will continue to be the poor relative of Europe and suffer continued instability and economic deprivation. Participants also expressed concern that Europeans will not define Europe broadly enough--that they will not include countries such as Albania and Turkey. Participants believed that the United States must become more engaged in the European Union development process. Deepening and widening the European Union are legitimate elements of the transatlantic dialogue and must be given priority by Washington.

Europeans reminded the working group that, while issues of enlargement are critical, EU leadership must not lose sight of its core issues and constituents, or it will risk the progress it has made to date. While Europe's leaders have accepted the pooling of national sovereignties, public support is uncertain. At issue is not only how well the component institutions of the European Union govern, but how well they represent their publics. It was suggested that the European Union could be more responsive to its publics by adopting common electoral districts and cross-national voting districts in order to build political coalitions across national borders, and by increasing EU transparency and accountability.

The State of Transatlantic Relations

U.S. involvement in Europe has been justified in the past by a hegemonic threat to the continent. While Europe remains a strategic concern (especially issues such as Balkan instability, Ukraine's position between Europe and Russia, and competition with Russia in the North Caucasus), U.S. involvement is not as compelling as in the past. The United States may experience the pull of strategic challenges other than those emanating from Europe. China, instability in northeast Asia, corruption, and drugs are issues that might vie with Europe for U.S. resources and attention. The lack of a hegemonic threat to focus U.S. attention will likely result in a less coherent American position on European security issues. Without a strategic threat from Europe to unite factions in Washington, transatlantic policies will increasingly be the target of partisan struggle; Congress will feel less constrained to intercede. A weakening of transatlantic relations will have an obvious impact on Europe and its shared strategic objectives with the United States. It will also have an impact beyond Europe on Russia. While the West cannot compel Russian integration with Europe, a healthy, constructive transatlantic relationship could act as a magnet for drawing Russia into Europe.

Both Americans and Europeans agreed that the preponderance of U.S. power in the world has frequently led to an arrogant assumption that wisdom accompanies power. The U.S. must be less overbearing in its approach to Europe, and forgo so many unilateral actions and policies. While participants agreed that transatlantic relations remain strong, they could be improved even more with increased consultations and a willingness on the part of the United States to change its position based on such consultations.

That said, Europeans must accept that unipolarity in security will exist for a long time. The United States spends more on defense than the next five major powers combined. If U.S. unipolarity ceases, it will most likely be self-imposed, as the United States becomes more selective in its engagements abroad. Participants noted that this current phase of U.S. internationalism coincides with an economic boom; an economic slowdown would likely result in a review of U.S. engagements and commitments abroad. As demonstrated recently by the general lack of public support for the U.S. engagement in Kosovo, new generations of Americans are not as interested in European affairs. Given the U.S. proclivity for restricting its engagement abroad, participants felt it unlikely that others will feel the need to counteract U.S. power. In general, states that exercise restraint find that others don't "bandwagon" against them. The United States' geographic location and its relative disinterest in dominating other states politically has forestalled the formation of alliances against it.

Europeans and Americans also worried that independent thinking by Europe on security issues, if not handled well on both sides of the Atlantic, may also weaken transatlantic relations. Participants raised a number of concerns:

• the divergence of U.S. and European policies toward the Middle East;
• that the lesson learned by Europeans from Kosovo was not the indispensability of the United States, but the need for European independence;
• American perceptions that Europe will be more inclined to adopt the French-German economic model, which is not as "friendly" to the United States;
• that preoccupation with domestic issues, such as immigration and reforming the social welfare state, will result in an insular rather than an enlarging Europe; and
• that European support for the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) will not be backed by adequate defense spending, leading to a decoupling with the United States, or that European ESDP programs will duplicate NATO's.

Participants agreed that European leaders have a lot on their plate--EU reform and enlargement, NATO enlargement, Balkan stabilization, and the formation of an ESDP--that may require a balancing of or a trade-off in priorities. The United States must be conscious of the trade-offs. For example, if Europe widens faster than it deepens, it may not be the kind of partner in crises that the United States wants. There may be a competition for resources between paying for ESDP and paying for widening.

The United States should support Europe in its effort to develop real military capability and give the Europeans some breathing space to do what is necessary to build political support for this effort in Europe. The United States should recognize that Europe is trying to do what the United States has asked Europe to do for decades--namely, to accept more of the common defense burden. European allies have given the United States grounds for optimism that they will develop the ESDP in a way that provides the appropriate relationship to NATO and a continuing U.S. role in Europe.

For its part, Europe should pursue the ESDP by focusing on developing real military capability, while avoiding an abstract fight with the United States over the U.S. role in Europe and the ESDP's relationship with NATO. Such an abstract fight can only alienate the United States from Europe and ultimately reduce European security--especially if Europe in fact does not enhance its real military capability as part of the ESDP.

Conclusions

Creating a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe inclusive of Russia and the United States is feasible, but extremely challenging. One of the first challenges for the United States is to accept that, while Europe may share its vision, it may have different strategies for achieving this vision, differences of opinion on whether Europe or the United State takes the lead on certain issues, and different priorities. This is why an integrated and shared U.S.-European concept of the future shape of Europe is absolutely imperative. It is also necessary to identify fall-back options if progress toward a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe is uncertain. This will require setting priorities. It will require recognizing where the obstacles lie, and how best to overcome them.

A shared strategy would expose the fundamental differences and provide an opportunity for their resolution. It would also do much to allay U.S. concerns that it carries too much of the burden in Europe. A comprehensive strategy would make clear that the United States will carry the burden in some areas, but that Europe will also do its share. For example, the United States might take the lead on integrating Russia with Europe, but with the understanding that Europeans are indeed preparing for a Europe capable of including Russia. Europeans, on the other hand, would publicly commit to U.S. leadership on a number of specific issues, while explicitly stating their own role, thus reducing fears of American unilateralism.

Finally, more attention needs to be given to the role of globalization in building a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe. Globalization may overcome obstacles presented by national policies and interests. In the end, governments may best further the process of a Europe whole and free by not standing in its way.

Recommendations

• Develop and maintain a vision of a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe as the common objective of U.S. and European policy in Europe. When dealing with "second order" issues, keep in mind the overall goals that underlie common U.S. and European efforts.
• The impact of globalization must be better understood, and governments must be more open to the prospects globalization offers for greater integration in Europe.
• Greater attention needs to be given to the form of a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe and the differentiated structures that are going to characterize this emerging reality. The goal is to avoid a new division of Europe between the haves and the have-nots. A differentiated structure of relations reflects the reality that the various nations of Europe are in different stages of democratic development. The ultimate structure of a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe cannot be decided at this time.
• There are a number of things that the United States and the European Union can do to encourage a Europe whole and free:
  • The United States must be less overbearing in its approach to Europe.
  • For its part, Europe should pursue an ESDP, but focusing on developing real military capability while avoiding an abstract fight with the United States over its role in Europe and the ESDP's relationship to NATO.
  • Europe needs to continue its effort to expand the European Union to embrace new members. The prospect of EU membership is a key element in encouraging the economic and political evolutions in the rest of Europe that will provide the critical foundation for achieving a Europe whole and free.
  • Accompanying the process of NATO enlargement must be a parallel process of transforming NATO and redefining its role to fit the new security environment in Europe (and to reassure Russia).
  • The United States, the European Union, and Russia need to work together to examine the roles of other European political, economic, and security institutions and to refine the roles they now play, accepting that a certain institutional untidiness is inevitable in this transition phase.
  • It is important that the United States and the European Union not take for granted the commitment of their publics to democracy, much less a commitment to a vision of a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe. Future generations need to be convinced of the virtues of democracy, and the importance of a Europe whole and free.
  • Attention needs to be given to developing policies on how to encourage the civic culture that will support democracy and a Europe "whole and free."
• Be clear to the Russian people and government that they have a place in Europe. There is a long way to go before the vision of Russia as an integral part of Europe becomes a reality, and the United States and the European Union must develop a common strategy to implement this vision. But the ultimate vision ought to be articulated clearly and often to Russia, particularly in this difficult period of transition.
• Any approach to Russia must include the following elements:
  • a vision of a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe of which Russia is a part;
  • "rules of the road" for ordering relations with Russia in the post-Kosovo world;
  • expanded consultations with Russia on its new national security documents, in order to seek to preclude the emerging anti-western character of those documents from becoming the reality of Russian policy; and
  • an agenda for active engagement among the United States, the European Union, and Russia; on certain issues (such as nuclear safety, the environment, and public health), working on a trilateral basis may be more effective.
• U.S. bilateral relations with Russia need improving. The United States must ensure that Russia completes its transition and does not end up weak and isolated on the periphery of Europe.
• Despite "Russia fatigue," the United States must remain engaged on a bilateral basis with Russia, although it needs to change its approach:
  • The United States must be clear with Moscow on which issues it seeks cooperation. On those issues where U.S. and Russian interests conflict, the United States must strongly defend its position.
  • The United States must abandon the myth of a U.S.-Russian partnership, which creates false realities and confuses discussions and negotiations on critical foreign policy issues.

About the Report

The United States Institute of Peace organized a Working Group on the Future of Europe in 1998 made up of 15 American experts on Europe and Russia, and co-chaired by Stephen Hadley and Anthony Lake. The task of the group has been to develop a long-term vision for Europe that is in the best interest of the United States, while laying out the appropriate policies and programs for its achievement.

The report is based on a series of meetings held by the working group in late 1999 and early 2000, including a conference with Europeans at the Aspen Institute in Berlin in January. (For a summary of the recommendations of the Berlin meeting, see Defining the Path to a Peaceful, Undivided, and Democratic Europe, by Stephen Hadley.) This report was written by Institute program officer Lauren Van Metre and is based on comments by participants in the Future of Europe Project, but does not imply unanimity of opinion on every point. The Future of Europe Project is a major effort of the Institute's Research and Studies Program, which is directed by Patrick M. Cronin.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policies.

Of Related Interst

• Defining the Path to a Peaceful, Undivided, and Democratic Europe
• Europe Undivided: The New Logic of Peace in U.S.-Russian Relations
• USIP Program: The Balkans Initiative
• USIP Press: Europe
• On the Web: Transatlantic Relations

See our complete list of reports.