Conference Summary

Report from Breakout Sessions

Back to Part I: Executive Summary, Table of Contents, Welcome and Introductions, Setting the Scene

Back to Part II: Securing the Theater of Operations: Peacekeeping Communications, Luncheon Presentations

Back to Part III: Improving Humanitarian Assistance Through Enhanced Communication

SPECIAL REPORT 21

Managing Communications
Lessons from Interventions in Africa

Conference Summary

Stanley Roth
United States Institute of Peace

As two of the opening speakers warned, communications and technology alone do not represent a magic fix. That is, these two ingredients do not in and of themselves guarantee the successful management of humanitarian crises. Rather, communications should be viewed as a tool being put to use in very complex situations. After "communications," the one word that was heard repeatedly during the conference was "complex." All of the conference participants understood that there are many dimensions to the problem and that communications and technology are only one aspect of a complicated issue.

Furthermore, because communications is a tool that has to be adapted to the specific dimensions of each crisis, there is no single uniform package. During the conference, participants were able to identify other key components in managing humanitarian crises successfully. For example, the issue of political will featured prominently in most discussions. That is, players frequently do not act on the basis of the information at hand. This is not purely a problem of communications. It is also a problem of groups lacking the political will to stay invested and involved for the duration of a crisis.

Another dimension of the day's discussion was the issue of resources. For instance, participants heard about the dilemma of a greater role for UN and other multilateral activities. At the same time, they heard from Senator Paul Simon and others about decreasing support, at least within the United States, for financing UN and multilateral activities.

There was also considerable discussion about the importance of individual players. Although most observers would accept the assumption that "personalities matter," it is nonetheless a difficult matter to build this notion into a mature, operational concept.

During the day, participants identified a number of useful concepts:

• It is a given that there are many different levels of communication and that an attempt must be made to dissect the problem. As technology facilitates and increases access to information and communication for an increasing number of people, it becomes harder to hide information than it was in the past. The Internet is one of the most obvious sources of information, making it easier for people to communicate. No longer is it necessary to have the backing of a single large institution.
• One of the results of technology is a tremendous increase in the volume of information, which has both benefits and drawbacks. Although the phrase "garbage in, garbage out" was not used, there was an acknowledgment that there is a lot of garbage out there along with the vital information. This problem must be addressed as technology improves.

In addition to these concepts, six levels, or forms, of communication were identified:

• Communication within organizations. It is interesting that different organizations all highlighted the same problem. The military in the field has to speak to military headquarters, which has to speak to the bosses back in Washington. They have to talk in both directions.
• The same was true of the NGOs. The NGO worker in the field has to report to a middleman, who then reports back to headquarters; information headed in the other direction has to go through a middleman as well. The NGO representatives all pointed to problems of ensuring that accurate information was reported, avoiding such problems as double-counting.
• The United Nations reported similar difficulties in coordinating activities between the various departments with overlapping responsibilities.
• Communication between organizations. Once again, "complexity" was the dominant description. This was not simply about relations between the military and NGOs; for example, 26 militaries were active in Somalia, and there have been numerous operations involving large numbers of NGOs. Two different relief cases cited involved more than 100 NGOs.
• Communications among organizations can involve different militaries, large numbers of NGOs (not necessarily organized around a central, unifying theme), multiple UN components and specialized agencies, and U.S. government agencies other than the military. The U.S. agencies that received particular attention included the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), but other agencies are involved. In talking about the United Nations, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees were emphasized; however, there are other offices to consider. Clearly, communications between these myriad organizations is vital and must be improved.
• Communication with local leaders -- the "Aideed Factor." Although to some extent local leaders may be part of the problem, they may also be part of the solution. It is crucial to talk to these local leaders, not only to know what they are thinking, but also to manage and avert future conflicts that could impede the humanitarian operations.
• Communication with and between decision makers. In the pre-crisis phase, there is preventive diplomacy. That was not the focus of this conference per se, but it is the focus of a tremendous amount of work in the Institute and in the Carnegie Commission as well as in academic institutions around the world. How is support mobilized? How can intervention be made before crises happen, when some of the horrible costs in both lives and resources can be saved?
• The second phase of communications with decision makers is during a crisis, which relates to the issue of crisis management. How can information be distributed in a timely fashion and decisions returned in a timely fashion? Later, there is communication with decision makers after the crisis. What lessons can be learned from the experience? What can be done to ensure that the next operation goes more smoothly?
• Communications with the media. One issue was termed by a participant "information warfare," defined as the struggle to provide accurate information and to counter inaccurate information. Another issue that attracted attention was how to deal with hate radio: Should technology be used to try to shut hate radio down or to try to counter its messages? This becomes a question of whether the intervenors -- the international community -- should manage the media in a crisis situation.
• The media were also discussed as a means of influencing opinion makers back home. The media help determine policy; they capture the public's attention, focusing attention on issues; they are powerful tools. Again, participants discussed the complexity of the issue and were reminded that it concerns not just the American media because there is more out there than just the Cable News Network.
• Communication among the parties in the conflict itself. Ultimately, the humanitarian operation deals with only a symptom of a particular crisis. If the crisis is unresolved, it may have to be entered all over again. Thus, communication is the key to real, lasting reconciliation.

During the plenary-session discussions of lessons learned from specific interventions, conference attendees discovered that operations did improve from Somalia to Rwanda, even if they were still less than perfect. Several presenters expressed their support for the Civil-Military Operation Center (CMOC) and for the idea of building in coordination between the U.S. military and all the other players.

Participants also heard praise for the role of OFDA and DART in serving as bridges between the NGOs and the military; even more praise was given for the On-Site Operations Coordination Center established by the DHA in Rwanda. The satellite uplink provided by the Swedes proved invaluable, as did the general notion of having communications outside the country. The Rwanda information center set up by the United Nations was felt by presenters to be much better than the system in Somalia for disseminating information, both classified information to policymakers and unclassified information to the public.

In terms of technology, the consensus among presenters and participants was that standardization of equipment, protocols, and platforms is crucial. Interoperability and a common operating environment must be promoted and developed. It was astonishing to find out, for example, that there were literally thousands of frequencies used in Somalia. During his presentation, one member of the military suggested putting DHA in charge of frequencies; still others suggested an NGO consortium. It became clear that someone needs to address that particular part of the problem.

The need for rapidly deployable communications was also discussed. This would be a communications system that could be put in place at the start of an operation so that communications did not have to be reinvented during every operation. More resources, probably UN-centered, are needed for a deployable communications package.

In conclusion, the day's discussions ranged from broad concepts to nuts and bolts. In every area that was addressed, many good suggestions for future work were put forth -- in theory, in structure, and in implementation. In the same way that there was a great deal of emphasis on the need for joint training and joint assessments -- bringing multiple groups together to try to identify the lessons from various exercises -- the Institute welcomes ongoing comments about this event. It is very much the beginning of the process, not the end of it. Much work remains to be done. Discussions will continue during the April 1-2, 1997, conference on Virtual Diplomacy in Washington, D.C.

Report from the Breakout Sessions Including Background Report and Lessons Learned

Overview

At the conclusion of the sessions -- the military perspective was presented in the morning and the humanitarian perspective in the afternoon -- conference attendees divided into assigned breakout sessions to discuss the significance of the day's lessons and to propose next steps in improving information-sharing and communications practices among groups responding to complex emergencies.

Breakout discussions were divided into three categories:

1. Conceptual approaches to information sharing: Is information sharing beneficial to the operation?
2. Examination of the structures for information sharing: Are the organizational structures adequate as they now exist? Are they interchangeable and sufficiently inclusive?
3. Developing useful communication systems: Should equipment be interoperable? Should emergency groups share standards and protocols?

Common Themes

First, and most important, all the breakout sessions emphasized that every organization engaged in a humanitarian operation must acknowledge the humanitarian intent of the operation -- the care and protection of the local population -- as the primary mission. As a corollary, participants emphasized that operational organizations should work to provide means for local populations to aid in solving their crisis. Without the local population's participation, attendees said, the lasting effectiveness of the operation was precluded.

All breakout sessions agreed that information sharing between operational actors in the field helped to save lives, reduce risk, and cut the costs involved in complex humanitarian operations. Although it is not a panacea for bad management of personnel and resources, participants posited that improved information transparency and dissemination could enhance field activities and employ personnel and financial resources more efficiently.

Participants noted that high costs, erratic reliability, and complexity of operations impeded the effectiveness of high-tech communications solutions when the local infrastructure was destroyed or undeveloped. Moreover, they argued, if high-tech communications undercut personal relationships among field staff and between them and local populations, access to information "with a face" was jeopardized.

In spite of these qualifications, participants recognized that using faster, broader, and more consistent information-gathering and-disseminating methods and tools enhanced the overall goal of the operation -- saving lives.

The report that follows is a synthesis of the participants' observations and recommendations based on the three focuses of the breakout sessions. Although statements are sometimes identified by session, more often common views have been merged into broader recommendations. As such, the report reflects the interests and the emphases that participants infused into the discussion. The varied experience of the audience accounts for the breadth of issues and the incisive perspectives contained herein; however, time constraints worked against an even and in-depth treatment of a number of issues critical to managing communications in complex humanitarian interventions.

Forging a Culture of Information Sharing

Recognizing a common mission

All the breakout sessions agreed that the overall objective -- the common mission -- of a complex humanitarian operation must be securing the safety of local populations. If the primary mission were explicitly acknowledged by all actors on the ground and in headquarters, participants argued that a common mission objective would drive the process of information sharing and focus the content of information being shared. Once mission priorities are clearly stated and accepted, participants proposed that communications would flow in all directions simultaneously. Top-down, bottom-up, and lateral information sharing would reinforce the participation of all organizations in the mission -- from international policy development to local oversight of human rights.

Obstacles to a common mission: Institutional diversity

The most cited difficulty for actors in complex emergency operations was a lack of understanding about how their respective roles contribute to a common, overarching mission and about how that mission could respect institutional autonomy, yet compel unified, coordinated participation. Each organization defines its particular role in reducing suffering and stopping the loss of lives in a complex humanitarian emergency, but each may remain uncertain, confused, and even hostile toward other agencies with which it finds itself working in the field.

Confusion about what others are doing in the field can translate into mutual suspicion. In such cases, only reluctant communications and accidental coordination among the many organizations rushing to and operating in the emergency can be expected. Communication and coordination among diverse humanitarian organizations tends to occur (1) when working together means the survival of participating organizations for the duration of immediate danger, (2) when an organization is dependent on other organizations' resources for continued activity in the field, (3) when a significant proportion of the organizations by force of necessity recognize a common purpose and agree to cooperate.

Some participants argued that because NGOs must appeal to their constituents and international and civil funding agencies (donors) for financial support for specific projects on the basis of their unique capacities (missions), cooperation among them to the extent needed to develop routine communications and information sharing was unlikely. Proprietary tensions about operational resources and reporting requirements and autonomous work styles foster a climate of mistrust and institutional secrecy.

Participants insisted that however difficult the task of consolidating the missions of these disparate groups, cooperation in critical activities would strengthen each organization's performance in ameliorating the humanitarian crisis. One of those activities, they agreed, is establishing reliable communications among them for the purpose of sharing critical information about the population at risk and the events that endanger them.

Improving interorganizational understanding

To dispel interorganizational suspicions, breakout participants proposed a systematic inquiry into the respective institutional features that caused misunderstandings among them. One fundamental area of misunderstanding is the role the military plays in complex emergency operations: By virtue of strength and know-how, does it, should it, lead the operation? Or should the military assume a support role to safeguard and facilitate the humanitarian effort? Several participants pointed to a fundamental contradiction on the part of the humanitarian organizations in their attitudes toward the military: On the one hand, humanitarian groups expect the military to play a minimal role in operations; on the other hand, they expect it to provide immediate and absolute security when they are threatened.

Participants agreed that the predominant or subordinate positions of organizations in the field -- military, international organizations (IOs), NGOs -- depend on the different needs of each operation, noting that no one organization is always in the lead. Participants wondered whether the military and humanitarian organizations could construct an overarching strategy and plan that would result in a coordinated use of military, political, and humanitarian resources.

All breakout participants voiced unambiguous support for NGOs, IOs, and the military developing joint communication structures and training and for joint pre-deployment exercises. They believe the independence of NGOs and the security focus of military organizations could complement each other in crisis management, maintaining and allowing the different treatment of classified and open-source information. Moreover, most participants concluded that a formal division of labor between military and humanitarian organizations would maximize scarce resources and clarify operational roles.

The consensus among participants was that in the field, humanitarian and military actors must operate as a single team, from personal relationships to shared high-tech capacities. No single organization or method of communication provides a sole solution to effective coordination or information sharing; each actor and communications system should complement and reinforce the others employed throughout the field.

Improving intraorganizational and interorganizational communications policy

Complex emergencies exacerbate problems related to the lack of intraorganizational communication planning or policy development. Participants familiar with information management practices observed that if agencies developed explicit internal communications policies, they would be better off than they are now. Organizations could efficiently direct, manage, and disseminate critical message traffic between the field, agency headquarters, and other agents such as logistics or relief suppliers. An open, cooperative and forward-looking communications policy can thereby ensure a well-informed mechanism for intraorganizational decision making and action.

Interorganizational information sharing is more problematic because of characteristic autonomy and institutional differences among organizational cultures. Organizations may be thought to have too flexible a structure, relying on word of mouth and faxes, with no verification of common terms. Conversely, other organizations may be thought to treat routine information as proprietary or classified, "stovepiping" it to a select few.

Completing the loop: Field to headquarters, operation to policy, and back again

However imperfect information sharing is in the field, "stovepiping" information begins at home, in government and other donor agencies and in organizational headquarters. Participants voiced a strong need for officials of international, governmental, and NGOs at higher levels to meet together regularly prior to, during, and after operations to share information.

Because of the exposed role of their personnel, military and NGO headquarters tend to respond more decisively and with greater clarity about the situation in complex emergencies than their governmental counterparts. Better information sharing among the military, NGOs, government agencies, and IOs would go a long way toward familiarizing policymakers with credible, experienced based approaches to the complexities involved in a humanitarian emergency.

Because humanitarian operations would not occur without funding from donor nations and agencies, participants argued that donors were accountable for the conduct of the mission and ultimately for the mission's success. Accordingly, donors need to insist on specific requirements regarding the organization of the mission and the management and use of resources to support it.

In summary, participants acknowledged that a common "information culture" during complex emergencies is critical to the overall success of an operation. Such a culture promotes an evenness of purpose, greater familiarity, trust, and flexibility among organizationally disparate actors. Participants agreed that good communications practices produce efficient coordination. And, during a complex emergency, time and money are wasted if there is no coordination.

Structuring the Dissemination of Information

In breakout sessions on communications structures, participants with operational experience described an effective (commonly relied on) communications system as one that provides transparent, accurate, and consistent information about the field (country, culture), and the actors (who's there, with what). It also provides up-to-date information about the locale, security, and assessments of needs.

Current reporting structures

Participants acknowledged that among all operational organizations -- militaries, NGOs, international and regional organizations -- the lack of donor and management encouragement accounts for much of the organizational inertia in recognizing and acting on a fundamental need for an "information culture."

Participants observed that in a complex emergency, communication -- not necessarily information sharing -- typically occurs on two levels: intraorganizationally, extending from the field to headquarters, and person-to-person, dealing with local information for local purposes. Some noted, however, that even so, information in the field is difficult to obtain and verify, and it constantly changes. Participants recognized these as conditions to be overcome or accommodated but not as sufficient rationale to cease pushing for better communications practice and networks.

With regard to most intraorganizational reporting, because communications and information management practices are usually based on database models, reports are highly structured, offering little flexibility in formats. Within their own organizations, information managers responsible for building intraorganizational "pipelines" between the field and headquarters should conduct an information-needs assessment in order to determine appropriate formats and reporting standards to reflect needs and behavior at all levels from field to headquarters.

Assessing the needs

To develop common reporting structures, participants recommended that organizations independently and collectively evaluate and determine what information should be gathered, when it should be gathered, who should pay for its collection, and who is entitled to receive it. Participants proposed that information managers work together to develop a common mission statement or common mission principles to inform and shape internal information and communications system strategic plans. From this statement, each organization would form its own set of communications and information policies to ensure that its internal policies reflected external practice.

A common policy goal would help information managers establish communications discipline among users by standardizing data dictionaries ¹, operating, application, and communications system platforms ², data formats ³, and data exchange protocols ⁴, thus transforming the data glut into transparent, accurate, and consistent information. The means of identifying donor obligations and of responding to specific policy requirements would be integrated into a common information management structure so that all agencies participating in a complex emergency would be able to use the same system.

However inflexible or proprietary intraorganizational and interorganizational communications is, participants were adamant that customary field communications, person-to-person, is the least reliable: It is erratic and not well integrated or disseminated. Infrequent and ad hoc organizational meetings, resource constraints, and, most important, constant personnel turnover typically impede the reliability of this method. To address the need for better communications between field representatives, participants suggested that humanitarian organizations designate and press each other for routine meetings to report and share information and to make group decisions.

Possible communications models

From field to headquarters to suppliers, participants described an effective communications system as one that maintains and disseminates information at all levels, as supportable (with resources and personnel), reliable, appropriate for the needs and conditions of the situation (locale and crisis), open at all levels, and user-friendly. An effective communications system should also offer a variety of interfaces and structures to meet user needs and means, ranging from personal liaisons, indigenous groupings or organizations (e.g., clans), and formal organizations (e.g., Civilian Military Operations Center) to high-tech networks.

Participants observed that an increasingly wide range of high-tech communications options for use in emergencies is available. They emphasized the utility of on-line bulletin boards and other means of reporting and distributing information to outlying regions in the operation.

Whether by group meetings or, where practicable, by electronic or cellular networks, operational organizations need a means of sharing vital information, especially as it pertains to making corporate, coordinated decisions and to monitoring compliance. Practitioners offered an example and a warning: International agreements are uniformly violated when humanitarian-relief actors do not marshal a common front for ensuring compliance. The inevitable result is the unimpeded killing of civilians and the violation of human rights.

Field staff described the important role information centers played in the complex emergencies in Somalia and in Rwanda. From these two operations, four possible communications modules emerged.

The Humanitarian Operations Center/Civilian Military Operations Center (HOC/CMOC), in Mogadishu, Somalia, offered all newcomers a place to receive information and recommendations about where and which relief projects were needed in the region. Since it was located in the UN headquarters, under the coordinator for the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, and not within the heavily secured military sector, humanitarian groups found the location easily accessible. Each of the eight other humanitarian relief sectors throughout Somalia had similar information centers. The Disaster Assistance Relief Team (DART), USAID's crisis response team, and the U.S. military provided the computers, some communications, and an organizational structure for information sharing between the various organizations. The HOC/CMOC was the single location to exchange daily information and to coordinate humanitarian and military operations; as well as specific specific distribution operations with military support (security, logistics, engineering, medical, etc.). Open sources of information deriving from long-time resident NGOs provided the military with useful situational data for carrying out a peacekeeping mission.

The inherent weakness in the CMOC structure as it existed in Somalia was that information was transmitted orally, person to person, rather than being written down and was therefore subject to human limitations, both physical and intellectual, and restricted to the field. Indigenous NGOs had limited participation and local authorities had none.

A second model is UNREO. In Rwanda, the UN Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO), the humanitarian information and coordination center in Kigali, jump-started relief efforts by offering humanitarian relief organizations the use of a satellite link to their headquarters on a pay-as-you-go basis. UNREO thereby facilitated field communication of critical information between humanitarian groups and their respective headquarters and suppliers. UNREO also expanded countrywide linkages by creating field offices that extended vital information sharing among operational groups working in outlying regions with displaced persons and refugee camps. Timely and reliable communications between humanitarian field workers and their headquarters ensured tighter decision making and better relief delivery in Rwanda than in Somalia.

Despite the well-known value of information from indigenous sources, communication with individuals at the grassroots level is often poor. Local familiarity with political and socioeconomic conditions and governance, formal and informal, can guide military and international humanitarian organizations in discerning cultural subtleties and in conducting relations with local authorities. Participants proposed that liaison arrangements between organizations and local authorities should be the starting point rather than an afterthought for good operational communications. Indigenous NGOs, where present, and local civilians should be routinely incorporated into HOC/CMOC structures.

In Rwanda, the establishment of the Integrated Operations Center (IOC)-a third possible communications module-demonstrates how internationals and locals can work together to good effect. The IOC-made up of the Rwandan government, UNAMIR, and humanitarian groups-planned, guided, and tracked movements of displaced populations to their homes by means of a shared, accurate mapping program, based on a continual flow of information from the field. Field representatives from each sector updated diskettes with new information and returned them to the IOC. IOC received, compiled, and redistributed information by diskette, thereby maintaining an information currency among all sectors of the field. Locating the IOC in the Rwandan government's Ministry of Rehabilitation strengthened the government's capacity to carry on the duties related to displaced persons and refugees.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) assumed and expanded IOC functions in the region after the immediate humanitarian crisis dissipated and UNREO radio was dismantled. This fourth communications model-UNHCR VHF regional radio network-demonstrates how one system of communication can bolster and build on another system. UNHCR established a VHF handheld radio network to link the refugee camps in Zaire with its offices in Rwanda and with other camps and offices in Burundi and Tanzania. Because the NGOs (mainly UNHCR implementing partners) had no access to the UNREO radio network, they were incorporated into the UNHCR system. With the reduction of UNDHA presence in Rwanda, the UNREO radio network was dismantled, and some of its users were absorbed into the UNHCR system. To date 1,300 users benefit from this regional VHF network of whom UNHCR staff constitute only 360. The remaining users are NGOs, the liaison group in Zaire, and some governmental services. The network was further expanded with HF Pactor, Inmarsat terminals, and VSAT links through rural telephone and PABX.

An independent "information manager"

Finally, participants expressed a need for a central clearinghouse of vital information, linking all groups in the field with headquarters and donor agencies. In response to the institutional reluctance to share information, participants proposed that a standing body (twelve to twenty major humanitarian organizations) or a single independent entity act as a neutral clearinghouse for accurate, current, and useful information. This entity would acquire, validate, and maintain operational and mission-related information for all operational humanitarian organizations and would integrate unclassified data from military and intelligence organizations. Participants referred to this information activity as "fusion" and to the agent as a "fuser."

Information management activity carried out by this entity would build links between institutions and communities and establish a culture in which information sharing was routine. The entity would be responsible for transforming "data" into "information" and communicating the information through appropriate systems for prospective users.

In summary, most participants agreed that institutionalizing a modular communications system plan, using parts of each model to accommodate specific field conditions, a methodology, and requisite personnel training would strengthen human effectiveness in operations.

Technical Standards for Information and Communication Systems

To accelerate emergency response and to avoid inefficiencies, a number of issue areas need policy attention by information specialists, individual organizations, donors, governments, and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). These issues can be broken down into three broad technical categories and two primarily policy-oriented categories:

• Creating and expanding channels of communication. Participants explored the question of which medium is best for information sharing and is available, affordable, and easy to use. Do field staff have access to the phone lines and wireless frequencies they need to communicate with one another and their headquarters? What technical or procedural mechanisms can help guarantee access to communications bandwidth? How can guaranteed bandwidth be reconciled with state- controlled channels of communications (wireless spectrum management, public telephone and telegraph providers)? How should the global disparity in communications channel allocation be addressed? Should they be addressed by market forces, or should one actor be responsible for supplying the necessary, shared bandwidth?
• Making the channels accessible to all actors. Participants considered bandwidth allocation authority ⁵, CCCITT/IEEE compliance ⁶, and traffic management ⁷ as bottleneck issues in need of urgent attention. They questioned whether the media most useful in an emergency -- land-line telephone; shortwave; VHF; packet radio; cellular, Inmarsat, and VSAT technologies; Internet gateways -- were affordable, operable, and accessible to key operational staff in the field. They raised questions regarding communications licensing and tariff regulations and their impact on affordable telecommunications access in the field and for humanitarian organizations in general.
• Ensuring that potential actors have the capacity to plug their systems into the channels. Participants stressed the need for actors to move toward broader adoption of TCP/IP as a communications protocol. They considered a move toward an "open system" solution as a means of resolving compatibility and affordability issues between information and communications systems. Furthermore, they proposed the use of a standard "Internet tool kit" to overcome barriers posed by proprietary and "legacy" systems. Participants were adamant that organizations should invest in the requisite technologies and skill sets to effectively employ emerging media and to prepare for CCCITT/ IEEE-compliant technologies.
• Ensuring that sovereign and intellectual property rights are both respected and balanced with the need to maintain a certain degree of communications security. Participants had numerous questions regarding significant peripheral ramifications of practicing information sharing. These included such questions as how sovereign rights, cultural sensitivities, and intellectual property would be handled; who owns and has access to the information and how are these rights and sensitivities would be balanced against competing needs for communications security.
• Ensuring that communications systems fulfill both local communications needs among field operators as well as "logistical" communications needs between field operators and their headquarters or donors. Systems that are useful in the field may be inadequate for communications beyond the field, and vice versa. System designers should take both sets of end users into account when they plan communications systems for future emergency interventions.

Conclusions

The following objectives for managing communications in emergency interventions emerged from breakout session recommendations:

• Create a culture of "information sharing." Convert organizational mindsets from proprietary "information holding" to "information sharing" and to organizational transparency by proposing activities that build mutual trust and mission focus. Joint training and joint assessments build familiarity, respect, and ultimately trust among cultures. Each organization must consider information as part of a continuum, linking its particular organizational mission with the operation's common mission. Information must be obtained and shared because of its inherent value to the common mission and, ultimately, to the mission of each organization.
• Identify standard information-sharing structures, which practitioners can adapt to meet the needs of particular crises. Design or designate standard information models that can be adapted to meet the needs of particular crises. Those mentioned in the conference and in the breakout sessions were the CMOC in Somalia and the UNREO (the UN information center), Integrated Operation Center (IOC), and the UNHCR regional radio network in Rwanda. Information managers should construct information systems that allow users to obtain and disseminate information expeditiously and conveniently. Preparing operational personnel prior to deployment to establish and operate these systems offers joint training opportunities. Training should include learning a standard communications process, the forms of transmission (a common language for information management systems that operates in multilingual environments), and patterns for the dissemination of information.
• Agree to a common communications mission statement. Create a common mission statement to guide information mangers in designing systems (communications structures and processes) to support organizational and operational mission needs and objectives in the field and headquarters during the operation. By requiring the use of standard formats and protocols, a communications mission statement should aid in enforcing communications discipline among users, and in turning a data glut into useful information.
• Identify a standing body that will fuse and disseminate information for the good of all. Designate an information "fuser" to act as a neutral clearinghouse for accurate, current, and useful information. This entity would transform "data" into "information" and would communicate the information through appropriate systems for prospective users. Information management activity carried out by this entity would build links between organizations, institutions, and communities and would establish a culture in which information sharing was routine.
• Urge donors to take an active role in enforcing an "information culture." To support and fund implementation of these objectives, participants proposed that major donors and relief organizations establish information sharing and communication systems guidelines for operational organizations. Guidelines, based on an information management policy and on mission statements proposed in the second objective, would set equipment standards for hardware, platforms, and applications, ensuring interoperable equipment and programs for field communications. Interorganizational and intraorganizational information management systems would be implemented to collect and to share logistical and operational data, and conventions regulating information processing and management (forms, distribution routes, validation, and frequency of information dissemination) in the field would be established. Donors should earmark resources to support adherence to these guidelines, specifically for equipment acquisition, maintenance, and training in the information sharing and communications management activities.

Next Steps

In support of the adoption or promotion of an information culture that is "people-centric" (a culture that supports the humanitarian focus of the emergency intervention), participants recommended the following immediate next steps:

• Urge operational NGOs, IOs, and governments to collect and share information about the field and actors and to collect and share current information about the locale, security, material, and personnel needs.
• Develop general mission objectives that information management designers can easily translate into systems responsive to the information needs of each operation's mission.
• Plan for pre-deployment assessment of field information requirements, including inventories of each participating organization's information assets and requirements.
• Apply "lessons learned" from past operations to improve communications in emerging crises.
• Conduct routine joint training programs with the military and representatives from civilian NGOs.
• Continue organizing conferences that stimulate interorganizational brainstorming and mutual education.

Appendix

The communications systems models proposed in the report are described in more detail in the background synopsis that follows. In preparing for the "Managing Communications" conference, practitioners from the interventions in Somalia, Rwanda, and Liberia pooled information and experiences to help create this background document as a resource for conference organizers and speakers.

The degree to which the described communications models build on one another is evident. What is just as typical, however, is that lessons learned from one intervention may be lost to another. Turnover or reduction in personnel, the primary means by which operational efficiencies are conveyed, and the lack of "after-action" analysis result in lost opportunities to capture and institutionalize effective coordination and communications models.

Documentation of "lessons learned" in doctrine, in joint training manuals, or in policy guidelines supported and required by donor agencies could bridge this experience gap. Requiring standardized information reporting and dissemination could result in efficient communications and coordination. The following background report on "lessons learned" compares favorably with the recommendations and next steps in the report from the breakout sessions.

Background Report

Lessons from peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations in Somalia, Rwanda, and Liberia suggest an adaptable information systems model to use for planning training and operations in complex emergency operations. The models involved at least three parallel, lateral networks: field actors, headquarters, and a clearing house of information for the public.

Somalia -- Unified Task Force (UNITAF)

The Humanitarian Operations Center Civilian Military Operations Center (HOC/CMOC) management structure, under UN auspices, greatly improved communications among humanitarian organizations and between them and the military.

The HOC/CMOC, the central information point in Mogadishu, served as a location for all newcomers to receive information and recommendations about where and which relief projects were needed in the region. Since it was Located in the UN headquarters, under the coordinator for the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and not within the heavily secured military sector, humanitarian groups found the office easily accessible. The Disaster Assistance Relief Team (DART), USAID's crisis response team, and the U.S. military provided the computers, communications, and organizational structure for the field groups within the HOC/CMOC structure. The HOC/CMOC, then, was the single location to exchange daily information and to coordinate humanitarian and military operations; as well as specific distribution operations with military support (security, logistics, engineering, medical, etc.). The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the U.S. funding agency for international crisis relief, received daily reports from the on-site DART team. The reports were based on information received from military and humanitarian relief groups in the field. Open sources of information deriving from long- time resident NGOs provided the military with useful situational awareness for carrying out a peacekeeping mission. Coordinated humanitarian, military, and political planning and operations accelerated humanitarian activities and helped stem the likelihood of new violence among Somali factions or civilians. UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I) and early UNITAF, the learning curve began with a lack of coordinated planning and operations on the parts of both the military and civilian organizations. Poor situational awareness and the lack of coordination caused serious difficulties in the delivery of relief supplies and in relations with the Somali factions. The hard-won communications structures established during UNITAF, unfortunately, reverted to a stovepipe separation of humanitarian, military, and political communications systems under UNOSOM II. UN Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO) In Rwanda, the UN Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO) served as a communications center, as the CMOC did in Somalia. The UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) set up the On-Site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC) in the Kigali office. There, among other technical support, a Swedish technical communications unit established a satellite uplink providing the communication infrastructure needed to begin emergency coordination. Later, to augment and to assume the communication support that UNREO had begun in the immediate crisis, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) mounted a VHF handheld radio network that linked the refugee camps in Zaire with its offices in Rwanda and with other camps and offices in Burundi and Tanzania. The UNHCR system still serves regional refugee camps and NGOs working in the area.

During the second peak of the crisis, the Integrated Operations Center (IOC) used computers and a mapping program to facilitate military, humanitarian, and security measures to return large numbers of displaced people to their home commune.

Meanwhile, in Washington, D.C., USAID's Rwanda Information Center (RIC) brought critical classified and unclassified information from the DART and the OSOCC in the field to U.S. government officials and provided an on-line public information resource of unclassified news from the region.

OSOCC was a subcomponent of UNREO. Established to support the humanitarian operation OSOCC, UNREO quickly extended services to the humanitarian community in order to jump-start relief efforts. The central command at UNREO, staffed by a team of experts, later expanded to countrywide linkages through UNREO field offices Humanitarian relief organizations could use the satellite link on a pay-as-you-go basis. This service resulted in closer communications between UN agencies and NGOs because of the latter's lack of necessary equipment. OSOCC enhanced NGO security by maintaining a 24-hour security network that operated closely with the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). UNDHA thereby facilitated critical field communication between humanitarian groups and their respective headquarters and suppliers and, in the meantime, contributed to vital information sharing among the groups in Rwanda. The timely and reliable communications between humanitarian field workers in Rwanda and their headquarters ensured tighter decision making and better relief delivery than in Somalia.

The UNHCR assumed and expanded IOC functions to the region after the immediate humanitarian crisis dissipated and UNREO radio was dismantled. UNHCR established a VHF, handheld radio network to link the refugee camps in Zaire with its offices in Rwanda and with other camps and offices in Burundi and Tanzania. Because the NGOs (mainly UNHCR implementing partners) had no access to the UNREO radio network, they were incorporated into the UNHCR system. With the reduction of the UNDHA presence in Rwanda, the UNREO radio network was dismantled, and some of its users were absorbed into the UNHCR system. To date 1,300 users benefit from this regional VHF network, of whom UNHCR staff constitute only 360. The remaining users are NGOs, the liaison group in Zaire, and some governmental services. The network was further expanded with HF Pactor, Inmarsat terminals, and VSAT links through rural telephone and PABX.

Although specific to the Rwandan crisis, the IOC expanded emergency communications systems by employing computers and a mapping program loaded into field workers' computers to expedite Operation Retour, an effort to return massive displaced populations camped in southwest Rwanda to their homes. The IOC-made up of the Rwandan government, UNAMIR, and humanitarian groups-by means of a shared, accurate mapping program, planned, guided, and tracked movements of these populations by means of a continual flow of information from the field. Field representatives from each sector updated diskette with new information and returned them to the IOC. IOC received, compiled; and redistributed information by diskettes, thereby maintaining an information currency among all sectors of the field. Locating the IOC in the Ministry of Rehabilitation strengthened government capacity to carry on the duties related to displaced persons and refugees.

Although organizations were adept at intraorganizational communications procedures, interorganizational communications dragged because of dissimilar communications equipment, platforms, frequencies, and protocols. The lack of interoperable hardware and peripherals, common standards, and protocols was the main obstacle to looped communications and to reliable and broad-based security in the field.

In Washington, D.C., USAID's Rwanda Information Center (RIC) prepared two field-generated reports. One included classified and unclassified material and was circulated among U.S. government officials (USAID, State, Defense, and other appropriate agencies or individuals). The other compiled unclassified material and public information for U.S.-based NGOs and was available on the Internet. Because of managed information through the RIC, policymakers could evaluate reports and make timely policy decisions about how to stem the crisis. The RIC's value as a public information center cannot be overemphasized. Out of that specific experience, the UNDHA, in cooperation with U.S. government, other UN agencies, and NGOs, has developed an Internet-based information clearinghouse for news updates, maps, and reports on emerging and ongoing crises, known as Relief Web.

What changed between Somalia and Rwanda?

U.S. and UN intervention policies changed because of the perceived "failure" in Somalia and because of the different natures of the crises. In Rwanda the role of the U.S. military was very limited; the role of the UN was restrained during UNAMIR 1 and expanded during UNAMIR 2. Moreover, the local conditions required different kinds of responses. In Somalia, the interaction between military and humanitarian groups was based on security and humanitarian needs; in Rwanda, they interacted to coordinate the transport of relief in the refugee operation in Zaire (U.S. Air Force) and to help in the movement of massive displaced and refugee populations (UNAMIR). Also, communications technologies and procedures had matured since Somalia to the extent that their effective employment in Rwanda demonstrated (sometimes only in theory) how they could facilitate operations in future interventions. The Rwanda experience was the first complex emergency operation that used computer-based platforms to exchange current operational information in the field, to plan and track relief deliveries between field and headquarters, to coordinate population movements by NGOs, IOs the UN, and indigenous governments; to circulate current information among U.S. agencies, and to disseminate news to the public. Even so, different platforms, protocols, frequencies, and standards continue to impede effective communications among humanitarian groups as well as within individual organizations.

Rwanda illustrated the advantage of having a single organization or structure (UNREO/OSOCC or IOC) coordinating information sharing among the myriad players. If one entity manages information as it focuses on urgent operational issues, that entity can spot gaps in relief delivery, refugee monitoring, and other areas of need. Meanwhile players can begin to recognize their respective gains by sharing pooled information. The costs of sharing information (costs associated with programmers, data entry, analysts, equipment, media replication systems) also became apparent. Wholesale adoption of information systems and requisite training continue to make this a problematic consideration for organizations with budget constraints and institutional procedures.

Liberia reinforces the lessons of Somalia

Information sharing between NGOs and peacekeepers during regularly scheduled meetings helped coordinate delivery of humanitarian relief during periods of the crisis. A difference of attitudes within these communities, however, impeded the amount and quality of the information shared. Regional peacekeepers who are thrust into new relationships with humanitarian organizations in complex emergency operations, may need to reevaluate traditional military roles (doctrines, attitudes, etc.). Communications systems are often disrupted by the intensification of the crisis and there may be no reliable backup system to maintain connectivity among the organizations. Events in Liberia illustrate the need to understand the behavior of irregular forces and how comprehensive contextual information should also be collected and shared in order to formulate an effective conflict-resolution policy. Lack of funding for communications systems will further exacerbate this situation.

Lessons

• Although the technology exists to enable comprehensive information sharing in practice, information sharing is driven by the political will and financial resources available to establish, maintain, and use communications systems in the field by military and humanitarian organizations, between field representatives and headquarters, headquarters and the donor, the donor and government, government and militaries. Although lateral communications in the field seems imperative, the lack of interoperability continues to impede communications whether by radios or computers. Each nationality has its own preferred equipment, software, and mode of usage, as do the various militaries and international and private organizations. Umbrella organizations, such as UNDHA, UNHCR, and International Telecommunications Union (ITU), should continue their efforts to standardize these differences.

To systematically develop reporting among organizations, donors should insist that grantees discharge their fiduciary responsibilities by adhering to standardized reporting mechanisms and structures operating in realtime. Reports could include project and resource locations, plotted on regional maps for easy and accurate reference by all field operations. Donors should underwrite grantee investments in the requisite technologies and training to maintain this kind of system.

 

• Parts of the construct seem to be generally accepted (for example, the HOC structure), other parts have not been commonly accepted (OSOCC's satellite link), and still others have recently become operational (Relief Web or ResponseNet as information clearinghouses). Each part, however, can be modified to manage local conditions or to serve special clients, and together they can serve as a model to help organizations plan and train personnel how to establish and maintain effective and reliable communications in complex emergency operations -- prior to deployment.

1. Predeployment planning: Better cultural and logistical awareness about the region and its inhabitants (situational awareness) could be more effectively integrated into planning deployments, operations, and exit strategies if a central information resource were commonly available on-line.
2. Operational communications structure: A HOC-like structure can serve effectively as a focal point for operational information sharing, dually chaired by domestic or foreign government agencies or civilian agencies and the leading military organization.
3. Communication from the crisis to external entities: A designated humanitarian coordinator should identify, inter alia, an organizing structure (HOC or IOC) to maintain and provide on-line information to fulfill five functions:

   a) Inform policymakers and the public about official decisions and actions by posting treaty texts, declarations, statements of resource commitments, and press releases.

   b) Collect and disseminate "structured" information on the situation (organizational contact information, resources committed to the region, situation reports).

   c) Disseminate information of special interest to agencies involved in humanitarian relief, conflict resolution and reconstruction (resource locations; regions of stability and instability or locations of particular concern such as refugee camps, assessment of infrastructure destruction).

   d) Exchange anecdotal information to enhance the value of the practical information.

4. Interorganizational and international or governmental electronic network: One coordinating entity should accept responsibility for encouraging participation in the clearinghouse and for generating useful, current, and multisourced information available in a variety of forms. This role involves "marketing" the idea, coordinating operational participants, creating incentives for their participation, training and programming, and preparing organizations to make a hand-off to indigenous and other organizations engaged in long-term development. The agency or agencies will not necessarily be the same in every situation. In some instances, it will be a government organization, the UN, an NGO, the military, or even a commercial organization. Regardless of who delivers the service, the product should serve the same function.
5. Operational authority: The designated entity must be in a position to negotiate specific agreements with indigenous, often "erstwhile" governments for the benefit of the operation. Both information and communications technologies are properties of the operation, and are negotiable factors for the public good.

Endnotes

1. Tables that explain the label, content, and function of a particular data variable.

2. Requirements for hardware and software capabilities for operators in the field. For example, a personal computer capable of ( I) simultaneously operating a spreadsheet, operating a word processor, and establishing a connection to the Internet, (2) storing and retrieving a variety of file formats, and (3) rendering maps and graphics in GIF,]PEG, EPSF, and BMP formats, an attached modem of 14.4 or better, and an attached CD-ROM 2X or better.

3. For example, for wordprocessing: .rtf, .doc, and .wp; for spreadsheet:-wks, tab-delimited, and comma-delimited; for graphics: .gif, .jpg, .eps, and .pic; for database: fixed-field, tab/comma-delimited, and .dbf; and for multimedia -- .wav, and .aiff

4. For example, UUCP, SMTP, TTY, MIME, UUENCODE, BINHEX, ZIP, ARC, STUFFIT

5. Who has the authority to assign channels in an emergency? This is most applicable in terms of wireless communications, but it is also applicable when a finite number of telephone lines must serve a rapidly expanding service sector.

6. Once standards are set, do users have equipment capable of enabling them to adhere to those standards?

7. What happens when communications works and everyone wants to talk at once?

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See the complete list of Institute reports. The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policies.