Peaceworks #11 Directory

Zaire: Predicament and Prospects

Summary

For more than five years, the people of Zaire have struggled to survive in a state on the brink of utter collapse. Amid growing economic disarray and infrastructural breakdown, standards of living have plummeted, moral and ethical standards have withered, and violence has risen. Political authority is almost hopelessly fragmented and discredited. The massive inflow and outflow of Hutu refugees from Rwanda has exacerbated Zaire's multifaceted predicament--a predicament that, for political and economic as well as humanitarian reasons, the international community cannot ignore.

But what practical steps can and should be taken by the international community, and which actors (individual governments, multilateral organizations, or NGOs) should take them? In the search for answers to these questions, and for an accurate portrait of the extent and nature of Zaire's malaise, Minority Rights Group (USA)--supported by the United States Institute of Peace and the Carnegie Corporation--initiated a project in 1995 that brought together academics, government officials, and NGO experts to consider the case of Zaire and the prospects for effective preventive diplomacy there. This two-part report presents the results of this project: part I offers a broad-ranging examination of Zaire's predicament; part II presents three suggestions for preventive action to ameliorate Zaire's problems.

To the astonishment of many observers, Zaire continues to exist. Despite the implosion of key social, political, and economic structures since the beginning of the 1990s, Zairians have developed a set of informal arrangements that enables them to survive and prevents the societal explosion one would have expected.

Belgian colonial rule created a society, but not a strong centralized state, out of a network of mobile and autonomous households. In the postcolonial period, attempts to establish the total unification of Zairian society through the cult of the Supreme Chief and acceptance of a party-state ran up against ethnic and mostly regional loyalties. In regions such as Shaba, Kasai, Kivu, and Kongo, these loyalties are still strong. Even so, ethnicity in Zaire has little to do with old-fashioned tribal realities; rather, it is essentially a modern political phenomenon that revolves around the allocation of scarce resources of power. Moreover, urbanization has attenuated the divisive impact of ethnicity (and has done so without creating as pronounced a polarization between the cities and the countryside as is sometimes claimed).

One social cleavage that is both significant and growing is the distinction between the spheres of the elite and the non-elite. The problem of inequality is not simply one of rich versus poor but of Zaire's increasing inability to redistribute wealth through the channels of patrimonial relationships. Popular resentment at this could explode into violence.

The reactions of ordinary Zairians to such societal stress have, however, been relatively peaceful to date, though they have changed over time. In a first phase, popular discontent with the Mobutu regime expressed itself through participation in "money games"; the second phase consisted of a series of revolts and looting in the early 1990s; next came a tide of messianic hope in the ability of charismatic leaders to solve Zaire's problems, followed shortly by great confusion as political parties proliferated amid a supposed "transition" to democracy. There is today widespread popular disillusion with political transition.

The most conspicuous feature of the economy of Zaire is the dichotomy between the modern or formal economy, which has completely collapsed, and the informal economy, which has created its own momentum. After more than a decade of economic growth, the economy was badly shocked in the mid-1970s by a confluence of national and international events. Stabilization programs foundered, and in the early 1990s the economy crashed: public servants went unpaid, the currency was reduced to nothing. As early as 1980 large regions had escaped government control and were organizing illegal exports on a large scale. Today the informal economy is a prominent feature of Zairian life--and one that, by helping Zairians survive, has inhibited widespread violence. Meanwhile, any hopes of restarting the modern economy and achieving macroeconomic rehabilitation depend not least on unorthodox approaches to tackling the huge national debt.

The political situation in Zaire is more complex than is indicated in Western press reports, which present Mobutu as a powerful dictator fully responsible for Zaire's political chaos. The beginning of the political transition in 1990 unleashed a general drive for power among a new generation who had previously been contained by the old guard of the MPR or had found no place in the political system. For many, political liberalization meant democracy, but above all a form of democracy that could entail a greater share of the national wealth. Hundreds of opposition parties arose, but their opposition was limited to a single objective: toppling Mobutu. The past five years have seen many alignments and realignments among members of the old and the new political classes, but no real change has occurred. So far the president's power has not been weakened by the transition in terms of his ability to play off one faction against another.

Among the elite, the first nexus of power is made up of President Mobutu and his immediate entourage. To date, Mobutu has succeeded in compelling his opponents to recognize his prominence in foreign and defense affairs. A second nexus of power is the current, and clearly unconstitutional, government of Prime Minister Kengo wa Dongo. The Kengo government, conscious of its lack of domestic support, has been trying to gain external credibility by appearing to play a managerial role in the governing of Zaire. Between these two centers of power are various quarrelsome factions and a number of charismatic figures with ethnic or regional constituencies.

Three conclusions emerge from a survey of Zairian politics. First, large-scale violence will probably not erupt because factionalism prevents the consolidation of power. Second, nationalist feelings are strong and pervasive among the political class. Third, those institutions promoted by foreign governments--democracy, the holding of free elections, and so forth--do not seem very relevant to the circumstances of Zairian political life.

Since the beginning of the transition, the Troika--the United States, Belgium, and France--have attempted to press for democracy and good governance. Their activities have not, however, achieved significant or positive diplomatic results, partly due to differences in their appraisal of Zaire's political evolution. The only common denominator among the three has been the affirmation of the necessity of democracy through a fully legitimate National Conference.

Large-scale civil strife in Zaire seems unlikely in part because Zairians have learned over the years to live beyond the reach of the state's authority and structures. Interventions by both the Kengo government and President Mobutu have also helped to quell some volatile situations.

Even so, the problem of generalized public insecurity remains critical throughout the country. Timely payment of soldiers and civil servants might well reduce the extent of bribery and physical harassment. Some local garrisons, it may be noted, have been paid by local businessmen, and a temporary reprieve in tensions has been the result. But such local expedients cannot overcome national macroeconomic and financial woes. Zaire has the resources to support only a fraction of its existing armed forces and civil service. Another urgent issue concerns the creation of a more favorable environment for the maintenance of education and health, demand for which is very strong among both urban and rural populations.

Given their strong sense of national dignity, Zairians regard outside intervention with suspicion. Thus, foreign mediators, analysts, and practitioners must appreciate and respect Zairian political culture. Mediating local and regional conflicts, which have often degenerated into "national" ones, is one of the most urgent issues in Zaire, especially in light of the continued postponement of parliamentary elections. Assisting intergroup mediation must precede any attempt at "educating" people about democracy and codes of conduct. Additionally, typical state-to-state relations between Zaire and outside governments will yield few results if they focus on the management of resources at the expense of addressing human and social concerns.

A framework for immediate action would focus on regional conflict prevention. Following an on-site expert assessment mission, an independent and informal forum should be developed--preferably under UN auspices--to identify areas where local political mediation is most urgently needed. Pilot centers should be set up to implement the recommendations of the forum and strengthen local resources.

The severe malfunctioning and corruption of the monetary system not only inhibit the recovery of the economy but also would negate the benefits of large-scale aid programs, especially those working through the government. The system of parallel currencies must be regularized and a climate of public security guaranteed for any real reform to occur. Aid agencies and governments can still effectively contribute to Zaire by extending credit and aid in proportion to the economy's capacity to absorb it, targeting small infusions especially to those small, vibrant micro-industries thriving away from the center of Zaire.

The pervasive state-sponsored--and now increasingly "privatized"--violence in Zaire is a primary impediment to real political transition, social and ethnic stability, and economic development. The reform of the army and other security forces will depend on establishing a regular and sufficient pay schedule, as well as successfully delinking militarized groups and gangs from political manipulations by various elites. Much of the privatized violence is unarmed, but given the arms flowing through the country, conditions could dramatically worsen. Indeed, the takeover of Kivu by a "rebel" army in the fall of 1996 has challenged the fragile order maintained by the armed forces of the state.

In an appendix written in early 1996, Catharine Newbury examines the Rwandan refugee crisis in the Kivu region of Zaire. Although most of the refugees have since returned home, Newbury's analysis remains valuable for the issues it identifies and the solutions it proposes to problems typical of many African refugee crises. Priority should be placed on a multipronged approach: halting the delivery of weapons to rebel forces; concrete efforts by the home government to encourage refugees to return and ensure their security; programs to enhance communication between the refugee camps and the villages and communes from which the refugees fled; mechanisms to resolve land conflicts as refugees return home; and donor assistance to fund the costs of repatriation.

Key events in Zaire's postcolonial history are chronicled, especially the political turmoil of recent years.

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