This report on Zaire is the first published result of the program on preventive diplomacy undertaken by Minority Rights Group (USA), with the support of the United States Institute of Peace and the Carnegie Corporation.
The notion of preventive diplomacy has been in the air for many years and has collected both defenders and detractors, but all would agree that it received a fresh impetus from the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his An Agenda for Peace. Mr. Boutros-Ghali, an experienced diplomat, is well aware that much good diplomacy has always been preventive, on the principle that prevention is better than a cure. An Agenda for Peace, however, calls for preventive diplomacy specifically through the United Nations. That implies action by and for the international community, a careful and constructive interpretation of the UN Charter, and the evolution of new methodologies. The charter provides a variety of ways in which diplomacy in general can be brought to bear on a problem. UN preventive diplomacy may be thought to call in particular for soundings, investigations, UN-brokered negotiations, proposals by the Secretary-General, and other discrete actions by the Secretariat and agencies. This is a delicate matter for which there are few well-established procedures. How are dangerous issues to be defused while respecting national sovereignty?
MRG (USA) does not presume to supply a blueprint; however, supported by a distinguished Advisory Board, it does believe that as an experienced non-governmental organization (NGO) it can make a worthwhile contribution to the techniques and practice of preventive diplomacy. It seeks to help in the realm of information, analysis, and preparation for those who may be called upon to respond to matters of concern to the international community.
The first case MRG (USA) considered in this light is the predicament in which Zaire finds itself. This can be investigated at several levels. There is the fallout from the enormous and unexpected influx of refugees, mainly from Rwanda, to the province of Kivu; the crisis has produced severe strains within Zaire and in relations with Rwanda, to say nothing of a horrendous humanitarian problem. There is the collapse of central government. There is the "transition process" toward more democratic political arrangements in which the United Nations and others are by agreement playing a role. There is a serious breakdown of infrastructure and there are signs of a rising level of violence. Underlying all is a profound deterioration in the standard of living for most people. In such circumstances, Zaire is open to a sudden shock calling for the deployment of massive and expensive resources by the international community.
The more one investigates the roots of the predicament, the clearer it becomes that a still larger crisis than at present exists could be very ugly--yet the more evident it is that such a crisis could be prevented. If preventive diplomacy through the United Nations is to become a reality, Zaire presents a singular challenge that cannot be ignored. And if the existing crisis in Zaire should escalate, the international community may yet be grateful for action to forestall and control its development.
It is the particular merit of Professor Jean-Claude Willame's paper "Understanding the Unending Crisis in Zaire" to illuminate the nature of Zairian life. He shows us that if Zaire has "failed" in some senses, the Zairian people are nevertheless surviving and grassroots community action is growing. This insight reveals possibilities for healing the Zairian ills that are not necessarily apparent through normal diplomatic exchanges, and it is precisely this sort of understanding that MRG (USA) seeks to elicit. Professor Willame and his colleagues on the team assembled by MRG (USA) explain the local, social, political, and economic forces that transcend the daily dysfunction of the Zairian state and in so doing indicate possible remedial actions of an unusual kind. The possibility is growing of salvation burgeoning from the grassroots rather than being handed down from the top of the political pyramid. That could prove to be a vital insight.
The experimental methodology employed in this project--research leading to a series of workshops--worked well. Professor Willame's report provided the original working paper for the workshops held during autumn 1995. These workshops involved a small number of important scholars and analysts of Zaire (and the Great Lakes region) together with policy practitioners. This bringing together of academic, NGO, and governmental experts proved mutually beneficial and led to a more effective and coordinated approach to certain Zairian problems.
The ensuing discussions produced a high degree of consensus on how to answer the question, "What precisely are the elements in the Zairian predicament that should concern the international community and could be ameliorated in a practical way by international action?" At the final session of the workshop a range of options was debated in response to the question, "Given our consensus on the situations that should concern the international community, what practical steps can and should be taken, by whom, and at what cost?"
The broad answers--plural, because it was recognized that no single key can unlock all the problems considered--are set forth in three short papers in part II of this report (and in a fourth in the appendix), each the work of a single author, written while debate was under way and revised after the final workshop. These recommendations were intended as a "framework" that could be amplified and adjusted in the light of ongoing developments.
The upsurge of fighting in Kivu, the dramatic large-scale movement of refugees, the strained relations with Rwanda, the prolonged illness of President Mobutu, the failure to launch the electoral process, and half a dozen other unwelcome developments of the autumn of 1996 confirm that the so-called "crisis waiting to happen" in Zaire has stopped waiting. What will happen and exactly when cannot be safely predicted, but it is evident that the old processes are tired and have not worked. Something new is required if a still greater crisis is to be prevented.
Action through the Troika alone (the governments of Belgium, France, and the United States) may not be effective, and the involvement of the wider international community may be required. If this is the case, one possible course of promising action might be to create a working group in New York to be chaired by the UN Secretariat and to appoint in the Great Lakes region a special representative of the Secretary-General. The working group, whose core members could be joined by others according to the agenda of individual meetings, would coordinate the activities of agencies and, to the extent appropriate, of NGOs, and would have an overview of the relations between the international community and the governments of the region. The special representative would be the main source of recommendations and the principal implementer of practical policies. The special representative, in this scheme, would have three principal objectives: (1) to preserve the integrity and sovereignty of Zaire and the other states in the region; (2) to negotiate the best achievable settlement of the refugee problem, including bringing to justice the perpetrators of genocide; and (3) to encourage the growth of civil society and democratic institutions in Zaire. The achievement of objective (1) depends crucially but not wholly on success with (2) and (3).
However, it would be a mistake to regard those latter two objectives as inseparable problems that can only be tackled jointly and simultaneously. As Professor Willame notes in his paper in part I, the disasters in Rwanda and the crisis in Zaire are not necessarily part and parcel of each other. We believe that the Rwandan (and Burundi) refugee situation demands instant action that does not depend upon the resolution of the crisis in Zaire. And vice versa. This is just as well, because the scale of the crisis in Zaire means that it has to be tackled piecemeal by a patient, sustained effort over several years.
Elections will not themselves resolve the crisis. On the contrary, there is a danger that the international community will consider that assistance with elections--an obviously worthy and expensive project--absolves it from other, longer-running and more constructive efforts. The political elites in Zaire have so conspicuously failed to make the necessary provisions for elections (for instance, the establishment of electoral rolls) that the international community should desist from giving priority to national parliamentary elections and should, as a first step, aim to assist with local elections as and where appropriate conditions exist. It would, for example, be impractical to hold any elections in Kivu province at present.
This illustrates the point that if we insist on dealing with Zairian problems only when all parts of that vast and varied country are equally ready, we may wait forever. This is certainly not how to conduct preventive diplomacy.
The top priority for the special representative of the Secretary-General should be the encouragement of civil society at the grassroots as and where it is possible to build on the spontaneous action taking place in several regions of the country. It will be up to the special representative to take appropriate soundings and to form his own views. He will, however, be wise to take seriously the proposals and the timetable suggested by Professor Willame (see part II). A program along these lines would swiftly get to grips with the basic problems and would be relatively cheap: a small, high-quality staff would suffice, and most of the early disbursements would be measured in thousands, rather than hundreds of thousands, of dollars.
The special representative would not be alone in assisting Zaire. We envisage activity by several UN agencies and also by NGOs. We place particular importance on the role of the World Bank and we stress the need for action along the lines of the suggestions by Professor Hugues Leclercq (see part II).
Apart from the development of the crises already described, the greatest threat to the national unity of Zaire is the growth in violence. Action to avoid and curb this is a sine qua non of success, and in this context we commend the observations put forward by Peter Rosenblum (in part II).
In tackling the refugee problem, the special representative would have at least two key objectives: to arrange for human rights observers, including NGOs, to monitor the situation of returned refugees in Rwanda and Burundi and report through him or her to the Secretary-General and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; and to encourage the Zairian authorities to hand over the suspected perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda to international authorities and to resettle far from the border with Rwanda those refugees genuinely unwilling to return home. Pursuing these goals will call for great perseverance on the part of the special representative. It will also call for remarkable flexibility and inventiveness, given the very fluid and unpredictable nature of the refugee crisis. Even so, certain issues will be of enduring concern and certain approaches of continuing worth. In an appendix to this report penned in early 1996, Catharine Newbury pinpoints several of these issues and approaches. Although the character of the refugee crisis in Kivu has dramatically changed since her paper was written, Dr. Newbury's analysis remains valuable for its identification of problems--and of potential solutions to those problems--typical of many African refugee crises.
Of course, MRG (USA) hopes that the international community, the communities within Zaire, and the Zairian authorities will adopt these and other recommendations set out in this report. But irrespective of this, MRG (USA) believes that all the actors and potential actors in the Zairian predicament, together with many others, notably in academia and the media, will benefit from the analysis and wisdom contained in the contributions from Professor Willame and his colleagues.
MRG (USA) thanks Professor M. Crawford Young, Professor Michael Schatzberg, and Professor Tom Callaghy for their important comments--both supportive and critical--on the report. Professor Herbert Weiss in particular gave invaluable time and advice on the report and the overall project, for which we are very much obliged. Pascal Kambale Kalume of AZADHO and currently a fellow with the International Human Rights Law Group kindly updated the chronology. The generous support of the Carnegie Corporation and the United States Institute of Peace was indispensable, and we are grateful for the practical and sympathetic encouragement of their officers. Most importantly, the kind support and encouragement of Mr. Kouyaté and his able staff at the United Nations Department of Political Affairs made this project possible in the first place. The last word in thanks and acknowledgment must go to the "team": Professor Willame, Professor Hugues Leclercq, Dr. Catharine Newbury, and Mr. Peter Rosenblum. Their excellent analysis and judgment were more than matched by their unflagging commitment to
the future prospects of Zaire.
ELIZABETH CABOT AND JOHN THOMSON
Minority Rights Group (USA)
United States Institute of Peace -- 1200 17th Street NW -- Washington, DC 20036
(202) 457-1700 (phone) -- (202) 429-6063 (fax)
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