The primary impediment to political transition in Zaire throughout most of the 1990s, and the continuing threat to local and regional development comes from violence perpetrated, tolerated, or provoked by the state. While still circumscribed, "privatized" violence in the form of ethnic or regional strife, has also become a fact of life, principally in the regions of Shaba and Kivu, and represents an increasing threat, because of the trend toward acquiring weapons and the perception that economic and political benefits can be had with little risk.
Without reform of the army, containment of the security forces, and reining in of the military and civilian investigative security apparatus, political change will be ephemeral and development unsustainable. The recent past demonstrates that while a fragile equilibrium is possible between civil society and armed forces, it cannot last in the face of political intrigue, ethnic and regional division, or simply the appearance of new profit-making opportunities.
STRUCTURE OF THE ARMED FORCES
The armed forces of Zaire--army and security apparatus--are composed of overlapping and competitive units dominated by individuals close to Mobutu; they come primarily from his own ethnic group, the Ngbandi, and neighboring groups in the region of Equateur, primarily the Ngbaka. Mobutu has been the undisputed head, a position he maintains in part by ensuring that few lines of authority converge below him.
The number of men under arms is notoriously difficult to assert. However, UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights Roberto Garréton gave these estimates:
- a regular army (FAZ) of about 60,000, half of whom belong to the Gendarmerie nationale (GDN);
- an air force and navy totaling about 5,000;
- a Civil Guard (Garde civile) of about 12,000; and
- the Special Presidential Division (DSP) of between 6,000 and 10,000.
Most army officers with significant professional training were purged in the 1970s or early 1980s. Officers lacking ethnic and regional links to the president were, with very few exceptions, executed, dismissed, or moved to inconsequential positions. Even within a single "corps" like the FAZ, loyalties vary according to relationships with the president: A regional commander may not--probably will not--have control over troops belonging to a particular elite regiment whose commander has a direct relationship to the president or one of his "barons."
The elite units and security forces are linked to barons of the regime, who are known to have used them to build economic empires. Three key figures are Kpama Baramoto of the Civil Guard, General Bolozi of the Gendarmerie, and Nzimbi Nbale Kongo of the DSP. In addition, a number of Mobutu's closest advisors, the most prominent of whom currently is Ngbanda Nzambo-ko-Atumba, are associated with the intelligence forces, which had their own strike force in the past.
THE TRANSITION PERIOD
Although official banditry was endemic before 1990, it has reached new peaks in recent years. Two rounds of army-led pillaging, in 1991 and 1993, hit almost every urban center (Bukavu being one of the few exceptions). Although it is true that the first round of pillaging was joined by a gleeful population pleased to assault big businesses, the second targeted the population itself with a vengeance not previously experienced.
While the army pillaging was overtly motivated by economic needs (few if any soldiers actually receive a regular, living wage), there has been a significant element of political manipulation behind the timing and targets. The 1993 assaults in Kinshasa, for example, were particularly aggressive against institutions of the Catholic Church at a time when the Catholic bishops and many individual priests were playing a leading role in the democracy movement. The strategic deployment or restraint of the reliable elite forces demonstrated the extent of the president's will to control the army rampage, as did his immediate announcement of an amnesty after the first round of pillaging.
The military and security forces have been used frequently in the 1990s to block specific transition initiatives, most significantly in connection with the National Conference. In addition, with the independent press that has thrived in Zaire since 1990, journalists, newspapers, and opposition politicians have been periodically targeted for attacks. Although most of the identified crime of this type is carried out by soldiers in uniform, the regime sometimes relies on secret strike forces or zealous party youth.
MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES
There have been signs during the transition of breaches of Mobutuist orthodoxy, and these have favored a democratic transition within the military and the security forces. Under Mobutuist "moderates," the civilian and military intelligence forces (SNIP and SARM, respectively) were essentially removed from the work of active political repression early in the transition. During the National Conference, a number of important military figures--including General Singa Boyenge, head of territorial security until 1990, and General Dona Mahele, army chief of staff and former head of SARM--indicated a willingness to support the transition process.
Signs of splintering have been seen within the rank and file as well. A bungled government effort, in early 1992, to implicate soldiers in a coup d'état monté redounded to the overwhelming benefit of the opposition, turning human rights lawyers into heroes in the eyes of the soldiers. Later, under the Tshisekedi government, the defense minister--himself from the Ngbaka ethnic group--reassured many soldiers. Although perhaps overconfident, the opposition government and the minister, in particular, were extremely optimistic about the possibilities of working with the army.
This process came to end, however, in early 1993, when Mobutu intervened to stop the transition process initiated by the National Conference; he removed the "moderates" from positions of authority and replaced them with hard-liners. One immediate result was the resumption of repressive political activities by the SNIP.
Despite these developments, soldiers up to the very highest levels are free agents, and seek out the best economic opportunities for themselves. For years before the transition, the perpetrators of repressive activity were rewarded with the possessions of the victim. The practice continues. When the Rwandan army fled to Kivu in August 1994, any political support for the fleeing Hutus was clearly secondary to the search for spoils. According to officials in South Kivu, in response to calls for help, generals from Kinshasa arrived, only to collect their share of vehicles and weaponry and then depart. Zairian soldiers have sold weapons to Hutus and non-Hutus alike, and have joined on each side of the battle in North Kivu. During periods of insecurity in Kinshasa, even members of the DSP rent their services to European and Zairian businessmen.
Where communities have succeeded in paying the soldiers, as in Bukavu, the worst economic disasters have been avoided. But the equilibrium is very delicate and can be upset by a new group of soldiers, a new set of demands, or a political incentive to disturb the balance.
ETHNIC AND REGIONAL VIOLENCE
Since 1990 traditional enmities have erupted into violence in two regions of the country--the copper- and cobalt-rich region of Shaba and the fertile, densely populated region of North Kivu. Neither eruption of violence was without precedent. However, the particular circumstances and timing of the violence were more a function of recent politics than of age-old feuds. The case for the direct government manipulation and control of the conflict is strongest in Shaba. There, a popular opposition politician, Kyungu wa Kumwanza, allied himself with one of the most notorious politicians of the Second Republic, Nguz Karl-i-Bond. When Nguz broke ranks with the opposition to become prime minister in 1991, Kyungu became governor of Shaba. Taking a direct, populist approach, Kyungu went to the people with the message that Shabans must take back what is theirs--in other words, drive out the people of the neighboring region of Kasai, who, admittedly, occupied most of the prestigious positions in the major regional enterprises.
Kyungu justified his alliance with Mobutu as one of pure convenience. One of the expressions of the party was "Better a dying dictator than a permanent dictatorship of Kasaians"--a reference to Tshisekedi, who is a Luba from Kasai. The administration adopted an explicit policy of regional cleansing. Following the model used by Mobutu during the Second Republic, Kyungu's party--the UFERI--established a militant and partly militarized youth wing, the JUFERI. The JUFERI increasingly took up policing functions at state institutions. Although not paid for their services, members of the JUFERI expected to receive the jobs of departing Kasaians.
The first outbreaks of violence occurred in late 1991, soon after Kyungu became governor. But immediately after Etienne Tshisekedi became prime minister in August 1992, the violence took on an entirely different scale and direction. Massive gangs of youth attacked Kasaians and forced them out of their homes. These gangs, whose attacks were systematic and well organized, appeared as if out of nowhere, accompanied by drugs and fetishes. In Likasi, where the worst violence occurred, soldiers made what appears to have been a sincere effort to suppress the gangs, but they lacked the means and the logistical support. Those troops that did have the capabilities to act effectively--the DSP and the Civil Guard--never arrived.
By March 1993 most of the Kasaians living in Shaba had left their homes for displaced persons' camps or moved to the capital of Lubumbashi. In Lubumbashi, tensions flared, but the Kasaian community was probably too large and powerful to displace.
Throughout this period Governor Kyungu continued to expand his administrative control over local television, newspapers, and radio. Like other Zairian politicians, Kyungu also used his control of local resources to enrich himself. The youth gangs apparently disappeared with the departure of the Kasaians. But the populist base, including the JUFERI, continued to grow and play an increasingly public role.
In the process, Kyungu created a power base unlike any other in modern Zaire. Although allied to President Mobutu, it was clearly separate. As a result, few were surprised when Mobutu allowed Prime Minister Kengo to remove Kyungu in 1995. Unexpectedly, the initial response of the population was calm, perhaps because of Kyungu's willingness to play by the rules of the Second Republic. Subsequently, however, political tension has increased in Shaba. The SNIP, with the support of the Civil Guard, has used an iron fist to keep order while purging Kyungu's supporters from positions of power. Many members of the UFERI have been arrested, detained, and abused.
The violence in Shaba has been almost entirely unarmed, despite the large number of weapons passing through Shaba destined for Angola and for other parts of the country, including Kivu. Apparently, however, administrative control or popular sentiment is sufficient to prevent weapons from flowing into the community. While impressive, this situation must be viewed as fragile and analyzed in light of what would happen if armed violence increases in neighboring South Kivu or if the struggle for power in the region intensifies.
The circumstances in North Kivu are somewhat different. No charismatic political leader motivated the population to rise up. Rather, a long-term controversy over citizenship took on new importance as populations jockeyed for control in eventual elections. The ethnic Rwandan population of North Kivu, known as Banyarwanda, composed of waves of immigrants over a period of more than a hundred years, had grown in some areas to outnumber other inhabitants, primarily the Hunde and Nyanga, known, inappropriately, as the "autochthonous" people. In the area of Masisi, for example, the Banyarwanda account for as much as 80 percent of the population.
Successive laws in 1971 and 1981 first acknowledged the Zairian citizenship of the Banyarwanda and then withdrew that citizenship (requiring proof of presence since 1885), but no administrative action was taken to enforce the latter measure. Although the Banyarwanda had become the most powerful economic force in the regions of Masisi and Walikali, and occupied important positions there in, for example, the Catholic Church, they did not own the land they cultivated and on which they herded. Rather, according to traditional land rights, the land belonged to the "autochthonous" leaders.
What sparked the outbreak of violence in March 1993 is unclear. There were reports of visits to Kinshasa by local politicians, on the one hand, and of secret meetings of Banyarwanda elders, on the other. Whatever the cause, in March 1993 a group of Hunde and Nyanga attacked the Banyarwanda at Ntoto market, east of Masisi. The violence that erupted in Masisi, Walikali, and Rutshuru quickly took on a character far more deadly than the gang attacks in Shaba. Within a period of weeks several thousand people were killed, villages were destroyed, and hundreds of thousands of people were displaced.
During the ensuing calm, President Mobutu dispatched a contingent of the DSP, headed by a rare non-Ngbandi officer. The DSP took up a peacekeeping role (one of the rare instances in which it has played such a part), to the general satisfaction of many in the region. In the meantime, local groups in Goma, with little external support, tried to mediate and organized community meetings. There, many people acknowledged that, while the grievances were real, they had been manipulated into violence that was unwelcome. By the time Rwandan refugees began flowing into Kivu in 1994, a delicate balance had been struck. Although the underlying political issues had not been addressed, many villagers--not, however, the traditional leaders of the "autochthonous" peoples--had returned to their villages, and NGOs and local collectivities were functioning.
This delicate balance was destroyed by the arrival of the refugees, but not, as many believe, because of the infiltration by Interhamwe and ex-FAR (Rwandan and Hutu soldiers). Rather, new acts of provocation were bolstered by the flow of arms to both sides in the conflict. Youth militias formed on all sides, primarily Hutu and Hunde. The Zairian soldiers now stationed in the region are no longer paid, and even the remaining DSP troops have joined in preying on all sides.
In South Kivu a similar ethnic balance exists. There, as well, people of Rwandan origin--primarily Tutsi and known as Banyamulenge--have lived among other ethnic groups for generations, predating even the arrival of the Banyarwanda in North Kivu. A resolution of the transition parliament in Kinshasa, however, claims that large numbers of refugees have joined them and links their fate to that of the Rwandan refugees, who were to be expelled by the end of December 1995. One of the leaders of the Mobutu faction in the HCR-PT, Anzaluni Bambe, is from the region and has reportedly been active in inciting aggression toward the Banyamulenge.
According to Banyamulenge residents of the area, the local administration has begun to inventory the belongings of the Banyamulenge for repossession after the residents' expulsion. The Banyamulenge report a heavy flow of arms, primarily from Shaba, and add that every family is encouraged to buy a Kalashnikov, which can be had for the equivalent of about $60.
CONCLUSIONS
On the surface, there exists an eerie stability to the relations between society and the armed forces in Zaire. Violence is constant--used to pursue either political or economic ends--but held within limits. There is no popular armed movement against the government and no "private" violence beyond the control of the government.
Viewed from another angle, however, what has occurred is a dangerous dissipation of authority over armed power in the state. While armed forces remain loyal to Mobutu, the motivation is little more than opportunism. Their actual source of income is banditry and pillaging, encouraged by their near-complete impunity for crimes.
Even if there were the necessary will, it is questionable whether, for example, elite forces could maintain order over the 60,000 remaining troops of the armed forces for any prolonged period. On the other hand, the armed forces as now constituted pose an insurmountable threat to Zaire's economic and political development.
Both the incitement and the relative containment of ethnically or regionally based violence are significant. Although hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced, the violence has been far less deadly and widespread than many predicted. This is in part due to the absence of armed violence and armed opposition to Mobutu, and in part due to restraint within society. But these conditions may not hold: weapons are flowing into areas such as South and North Kivu, and youth gangs are becoming accustomed to power brought by weaponry.
This analysis leads to these recommendations:
- Intensive research should be conducted to detect points of ethnic, regional, and political division susceptible to violent provocation and also to identify the means by which tensions can be reduced or avoided.
- An effort should be made to develop a strategy for military containment and restructuring in preparation for elections and long-term development.
- Specific confidence-building measures should be developed that take into account ethnic and regional sensibilities. For example, some Mobutu insiders might be replaced with officers who, while close to Mobutu, are more acceptable to the population.
ADDENDUM
The takeover of the Kivu provinces by a "rebel" army in the fall of 1996 set the conflict in Zaire on a new course, challenging the fragile order maintained by the armed forces of the state and raising the specter of Zaire's hastened disintegration. For the first time since 1978, a well-armed, foreign-backed military movement challenged the state. As in previous military confrontations, the Zairian troops were easily routed. The main resistance to the rebels appeared, in fact, to come from the former Rwandan troops (ex-FAR) based on Zairian territory. As they beat a retreat, Zairian troops ransacked towns and wreaked havoc. The city of Bukavu, the only major city to escape the pillaging of 1991 and 1993, was plundered by Zairian soldiers before they fled in late October.
The mainstay of the forces that took over Kivu is Rwandaphone, reportedly Banyamulenge from the southernmost region of South Kivu, near Uvira. They are almost exclusively Tutsis, and have roots in Zaire that extend nearly two hundred years, further than most ethnic Rwandans living in Zaire. In September 1996 a provincial official announced that the Banyamulenge would be expelled from Zaire. This threat of expulsion followed upon the actions of Hutu extremists in the refugee camps in Zaire, who began spreading anti-Tutsi propaganda, and of Hutu guerrillas, who drove most Zairian Tutsis out of the Masisi and Rutshruru regions. After Zairian soldiers started attacking Banyamulenga Tutsi in South Kivu in September and October, the well-armed rebels attacked Zairian army posts and Rwandan refugee camps, first around Uvira and Bukavu, and then in and around the northern camps surrounding Goma. The attacks on the camps routed the Hutu militias, who fled further west into Zaire. With the tight control of the militias over their fellow refugees broken, vast numbers of Hutu refugees started returning to their homes in Rwanda.
Although the Banyamulenge are a major component of the rebel forces, the real composition of the troops is not clear, particularly the level of involvement of Rwandan soldiers. The Rwandan authorities have denied the involvement of regular Rwandan troops, though they admit providing substantial assistance to the rebels. In North Kivu, which is entirely foreign to the Banyamulenge, the rebels have reportedly been joined by Hunde militias and others that were fighting against the Banyarwanda (now "cleansed" of Tutsis) and ex-FAR in Masisi, north of Goma. The rebel leaders, who have played bit parts in earlier rebellions and lack any known base of support in the country, are calling for an overthrow of Mobutu and pointedly avoid calling for the secession of Kivu.
In the short term, the takeover in the east is causing a dramatic realignment of political forces in the country. The Zairian public unified against what is perceived as a foreign invader employing local proxies. The opposition, civil society, and followers of President Mobutu have come together for the first time, rallying to the side of President Mobutu, applauding France for its willingness to intervene, and decrying the United States both for its hesitation at sending troops and for its uncritical support for Rwanda. In Kivu itself it is hard to gauge the reaction of the population. Local leaders of civil society have either fled or sought to remain out of the public eye. None is yet collaborating openly with the institutions established by the rebels.
The unity created by the rebel takeover will likely be short-lived. Even now, opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi is calling for negotiation rather than military confrontation. If the spell of nonviolence has been broken in the country, as some believe, other disaffected populations in the country may be more willing to use the arms that are so easily available in the region. Although suspicion of the rebels and their leaders makes the current assault an unlikely vehicle for a direct takeover of the state, it could be the catalyst for the spreading of violence that Zaire has thus far succeeded in avoiding.
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