At the initial sessions of the MRG (USA) workshop, four principal points emerged.
- State and political structures as such have no relevance in Zaire for the time being. The government lacks any meaningful control over basic state functions (defense, finance) and over the country at large. According to Hugues Leclercq's estimates, the government's claim that it has achieved "better mastery" over public finances is not well founded. In short, the content of state power and influence is nonexistent. The political institutions born out of the transition, specifically the new political parties and the Transition Parliament (the HCR-PT), have not succeeded in offering a viable alternative. They have all split in endless feuds and factions, unable to maintain a minimum of institutional coherence and political responsibility.
- Normal state-to-state relations have little meaning at this point. As such, members of the Troika (the United States, Belgium, and France)--which remain to some extent limited by their previous approaches (for example, the demonization and isolation of Mobutu) and by their domestic public opinion--seem unwilling to take any initiative other than provide indirect public aid to Zaire. A clear signal of the departure from state-to-state relations was given by the European Union in 1995, when it decided to channel an aid package of $100 million for local infrastructure, health, and education through the civil society in particular regions (Kasai, Kivu, and around Kinshasa).
- For the time being, holding elections, be they at the regional, local, or national level, might present a dangerous illusion. In 1994 the World Bank estimated that elections would cost at least $100 million. Recently, the minister of the interior of Zaire said that his department was prepared for elections but estimated the cost at $300 million. A European consulting firm has assessed the cost at between $250 million and $270 million.
Obviously Zaire does not have sufficient resources to engage in that process. There are serious doubts that the international community--in this case, the Troika--would be ready to mobilize even a quarter of that amount. Besides, elections might exacerbate, rather than reduce, ethnic and regional tensions, and the violence could be far more dangerous than the sort now encountered. In certain parts of the country, elections would be impossible to conduct.
- Large-scale political violence is unlikely. The more probable scenario is the continuous spread of day-to-day social violence, especially among the younger age groups, which constitute about half the population and have nothing to lose. In Shaba and North Kivu, especially, they form gangs that have been mobilized by unscrupulous and unorganized members of the political class, as well as by citizens who wish to defend themselves.
A PROPOSAL FOR REGIONAL CONFLICT PREVENTION
The current state of affairs does not mean that nothing significant can be achieved prior to the conduct of legitimate democratic elections. There is justification for believing that opportunities exist, given the appearance of a workable agreement between President Mobutu and Prime Minster Kengo, although neither man has decisive leverage in political and economic developments.
I suggest undertaking an initiative that focuses on regional conflict prevention and that seeks to ameliorate tensions before the beginning of the election process. The institutions of the political transition were asked to tackle this latter task, but they have been unable to implement a serious plan. The national authorities would be more likely to find a preventive approach acceptable if the external parties involved in the initiative refuse to take sides in the political feuds between caucuses and factions.
Such an initiative could be inaugurated with an informal, independent forum attended by
- national and regional church leaders, who have recently created their own system of coordination;
- regional entrepreneurs, particularly those maintaining their independence vis-à-vis the political class;
- some military provisional commanders acceptable to all sides;
- political bosses and elders who retain regional backing and are still able to perform the role of go-between;
- representatives of NGO coalitions (CNONGD) and established NGOs (for example, Oxfam and Médecins Sans Frontières);
- representatives of major human rights associations (VSV, Toges Noires, AZADHO, LIZADHO, CNDDH); and
- members of the intellectual and educational communities, especially those working in the new private universities.
This forum, which should be independent of both the executive power and the political class as such, could be placed in the context of the mission to be fulfilled by the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights, whose mandate has been accepted by Zaire.
The identification of the relevant actors to be associated with the forum could be partly undertaken by independent outside experts with a good knowledge of Zaire and its human resources. This phase would be critical, requiring considerable attention; the assistance of the UN agencies still operating in Zaire and of the embassies of the Troika would be extremely valuable.
Once the forum is convened and it recognizes the need to abandon the stalemate at the macroinstitutional level, it should define as precisely as possible the critical sectoral and geographical areas where local political mediation is most urgently needed. Additionally, the forum should determine the specific means and ways to be used to decrease the level of local and regional conflicts.
It is critical that the participants understand that Zaire is at a crossroads. Language used during the forum should be straightforward; there should be no misunderstandings about the role of external mediation and the responsibilities that the elite must collectively assume. Participants should be invited to adopt a positive, concrete, and realistic attitude and to eschew explicit or implicit recriminations about past events.
For symbolic reasons and subject to logistical feasibility, it would be more appropriate to hold the forum in a place other than Kinshasa.
After the forum adjourns, its members would oversee the establishment of pilot centers for the prevention of conflict at those locations chosen at the forum's first session. The forum participants would also continue to meet informally to assemble the local and regional grievances (in the form of letters, tracts, and other documents) that circulate widely in Zaire, to report on them, and to start implementing a procedure of conciliation.
Needless to say, the operation of the pilot centers would be entrusted to independent local structures responsible to the forum, while maintaining regular and even day-to-day contact with the regional authorities. At this stage, the active participation of local security agents and army officers would be required.
As the following timetable indicates, implementation of this process of regional conciliation could be achieved in less than a year:
- three to four months for preliminary investigation by independent experts
- two to three months to organize the forum
- one to two weeks for the forum, if everything goes as planned
- three to four months to operationalize two to three pilot centers.
UN-EUROPEAN PEACE CORPS
A complementary, longer-term action that could be undertaken concerns the proposal made by some members of the European Parliament for a "UN-European Peace Corps" that would promote conditions conducive to dialogue between contending parties at a grassroots level. This proposal is an attempt to implement the "Bourlanges-Martin" report adopted by the European Parliament on May 17, 1995, recommending the establishment of "a European Civil Peace Corps with the training of monitors, mediators, and specialists in conflict resolution."
The premise of the civil peace corps initiative is that military peacekeeping and large humanitarian mobilizations have yielded few substantial results so far. Although they might have succeeded in diminishing the gravity of conflicts and the level of violence, most military peacekeeping and peacemaking operations have been overrun by macropolitical and geopolitical factors over which they had no control.
Moreover, large-scale humanitarian missions have sometimes upset the precarious socioeconomic equilibrium within local communities. At times, too, local resentment against refugees has grown as international aid has poured in to address the needs of those in the refugee camps, but not those among the established population. This was the case in Kivu, where the use of dollars, rather than the Zairian currency, greatly increased after the arrival of the humanitarian organizations.
According to its proponents, a purely civilian peace corps would have the advantage, at least in theory, of being independent of any institutional machinery, and its culture would be more informal, more egalitarian, and individually oriented. It would not therefore seriously threaten national sovereignty, pride in which remains supremely important to government agencies, local military commanders, militia chiefs, and ambitious political leaders in Zaire.
In sum, mediation would be a relevant initiative in Zaire to the extent that it is conducted from beginning to end by native political brokers. Thus the prime role of a civilian peace corps or any other presence is to search for and encourage the emergence of such brokers. In 1994 the political and land conflicts that erupted in North Kivu were entirely managed by the contending ethnic groups under the aegis of local military commanders, regional authorities, and local NGOs. Although the quarrel is not yet extinguished--indeed, it has been reactivated by social and economic "bandits" attracted by the presence of Rwandan refugees in the area--such a purely endogenous mediation has undoubtedly contributed to easing local tensions.
United States Institute of Peace -- 1200 17th Street NW -- Washington, DC 20036
(202) 457-1700 (phone) -- (202) 429-6063 (fax)
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