The quiet implosion of the Zairian state (in contrast to the explosions in Somalia, Liberia, Angola, and Rwanda) suggests that large-scale civil strife--with all that implies for mass migration and large-scale humanitarian intervention--is not likely to occur, at least in the near future. One reason Zaire has not exploded is that Zairians have learned over the years to live beyond the reach of the state's authority and structures, as evidenced by the development of the popular economy. A further example: the expulsion of the Luba and other non-Katangese from Shaba did not result in the establishment of huge permanent refugee camps in Kasai and elsewhere. Some of those taking refuge near Mbujimayi have tried, successfully on occasion, to leave the camps and insert themselves in local agricultural activities or the diamond business.
Certain state interventions have also contributed to a decrease in tensions. Both the Kengo government and President Mobutu have gone to Shaba to try to persuade the governor--who had been accused of ethnic cleansing, and who was then suspended and later called back to Kinshasa for three months--to stop his appeals to civil strife and his threats to secede.
The one highly dangerous spot where chaotic conditions have required large-scale humanitarian intervention is the area around Bukavu and Goma, where more than 1.7 million Rwandan refugees have been situated. Their presence threatened to provoke a major ecological disaster while exacerbating general insecurity.
But the crisis in Zaire is not at the root of the Rwandan hecatomb. Local populations are the victim of the chaotic situation prevailing in that part of Zaire where resentment has been growing against the refugees, whose lot has been considered better than that of ordinary Kivu citizens on account of the huge external assistance organized on the refugees' behalf. Although Zairian authorities cannot solve the problem alone, the expulsion of several thousand Rwandan refugees, initiated by the Kengo government and tacitly backed by Mobutu, came as a major rebuke to the United Nations, which was accused of inflexibility and ignoring the Zairian side of the problem.
For the time being, local elites, newspapers, and NGOs do not place much trust in the effectiveness of any large international humanitarian intervention, and they worry that such an effort could further destabilize the region. In places such as North Kivu, populations have armed in order to resist the threat of a permanent settlement of Rwandan refugees, while several military incidents have taken place between Zairian soldiers and unidentified militias (Interahamwe or other) from Rwanda.
Beyond this geopolitical tension concentrated in one part of Zaire, the problem of generalized public insecurity remains critical throughout the country. Apart from the DSP and some paramilitary units, irregular or no pay is the common lot of most of the Zairian army, as it is for the civil service. The bribes and physical harassment that result have directly undermined the observance of human rights by both military personnel and the civil service throughout Zaire. This remains true despite the fact that the population avoids contact with the state as far as possible, and has learned how to retaliate against local extortion (for example, in Kinshasa or Kivu) during the transition.
Timely payment of soldiers and civil servants might well improve the situation. As mentioned earlier, the payment of some local garrisons by local businessmen bought a temporary reprieve in tensions. But such local expedients cannot overcome national macroeconomic and financial woes. Zaire simply does not have sufficient resources to support more than 50,000 to 60,000 civil servants and 10,000 to 12,000 army troops.
Not paying much of the civil service for close to a year and no longer paying the largest part of the garrisons in the interior has brought home to Zairian authorities the harsh realities of austerity. In response to this pressing issue, the government will have to match, in a coherent rather than random manner, the remaining national resources with the reasonable needs of governance.
Another urgent issue concerns the creation of a more favorable environment for the maintenance and development of two basic services: education (including higher education) and health. Demand for these services is very strong among both urban and rural populations.
According to a number of observers, Zairians are willing to invest their savings and assets in certain sectors provided that they can control the quality of the services offered. In the case of institutions of higher learning, for instance, some former state and new private educational structures function thanks to the tuition paid by the students' families.
Obviously, the pressing national issues in Zaire will need to be approached very carefully. Within the elite (both the radical opposition and the mouvance présidentielle), the NGOs, and the population at large, national dignity is not an empty concept. Whether benevolent or not, outside intervention has always been and is still regarded with strong suspicion. It is thus essential that foreign observers, analysts, and practitioners appreciate and respect the concrete contingencies and constraints of Zairian political culture.
Mediating local and regional conflicts, which have so often degenerated into "national" ones, is one of the most urgent issues in Zaire--all the more so given that presidential and parliamentary elections have been postponed until the summer of 1997. The National Electoral Commission is in disarray, however, and there are questions as to whether this schedule can be met.
In my view, assisting the learning process of intergroup mediation and conflict management must precede any attempt at "educating" people about democracy, electoral procedures, and codes of conduct. Additionally, state-to-state relations between Zaire and other countries will have trivial results if they focus on the management of resources (foreign debt, rehabilitation of infrastructure, control over public expenses, and so forth) at the expense of addressing human and social concerns.
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