A familiar image emerges from international, especially Belgian, press accounts of the political theater in Zaire. It is that of a country led by a powerful "dictator," Mobutu, who skillfully manipulates the puppets orbiting his presidency and who, of course, is fully responsible for the political chaos in the country. The rather simplistic premises of such press analyses ignore the complexity of political evolution in Zaire and thereby misinform and mislead foreign policy establishments in their appraisal of realities in that country.
KEY INTERNAL ACTORS
At the beginning of the political transition in April 1990, Zaire's political class consisted of roughly three groups. One group was composed of those linking their political careers to the former party-state, the MPR, thereby professing faith in the continuation of Mobutuism with new clothes. The second group was formed by moderate political leaders who had maintained a distance from the Mobutu regime for several years but had kept their dissatisfaction a private matter. The third was made up of radical opponents, many of whom had been in exile for years or had been punished for their refusal to formally rejoin the party-state.
When Mobutu proclaimed the end of the one-party system, he thought he could maintain dominance by advocating three Zairian parties, one for each of the groups. However, within eight months of the proclamation, there were upwards of three hundred political parties and caucuses, each of which aimed to occupy a seat at the National Conference and, more generally, to participate in the new political redistribution game.
Even the parties that received financial support from Mobutu (partis alimentaire--literally, parties "fed" by the regime) were not mere puppets of the president. In fact, the transition unleashed a general drive for power among a new generation that previously had either been contained by the old guard of the MPR or that could not find a place in the political system during a period of economic recession. For many, political liberalization meant democracy, but above all a form of democracy that could entail a greater share of the national wealth. As a Zairian press analyst aptly commented: "Power [in Zaire] is just like alcohol: it gives thirst to whoever drinks of it. When one has tasted it, one always wants to drink more of it. Moreover, unlike the lands of old democracies, where primarily the rich seek power, in the third world, power is sought to become rich. It is therefore not convictions that often dictate political behavior, but appetites."30
To be sure, opposition parties arose, but their opposition was limited to a single objective: toppling Mobutu, whose political life appeared terminal. Beyond his demonization and eventual replacement there were no social or political projects.
One outcome of the many alignments and realignments among members of the old and new political classes during the unending transition is a dividing line between those who succeeded--that is, who were co-opted into the various transitional governments and thus had access to the diminishing benefits of the state structures--and those who were excluded from power and its immediate dividends and returns.
The strength of the president's power, while clearly in decline, is geared more toward factional arbitration than maintaining some form of dictatorship. But it is precisely this capacity to skillfully play off the many discontents in a large group of incumbents that prevents the permanent polarization of members of the political class, many of whom have lost contact with their local constituencies.
Beyond the division of haves from have-nots, there are several cleavages between political factions and clans. Paradoxically, the way these groups have interrelated during the most recent government does not significantly differ from their dealings in the period before political transition.
Nexus around President Mobutu
Among the haves, the first nexus of power is made up of the president and his immediate entourage, represented not so much by regional barons as by the functional instruments of power, for example, the security services, the Civil Guard, and the Special Presidential Division (DSP).
Clustered around this prime circle are some young technocrats and older opponents, including formerly radical ones. Also included are certain people with no particular regional constituency, especially those previously considered "citizens of dubious nationality" (for example, the mulatto Seti Eyale, head of the security services, and businessman Bemba Saolona). This second cluster is more dispensable: it can be disbanded at will and at any moment by the chief of state as required by political exigencies.
So far, the president's power has not been weakened by the transition. On the contrary, President Mobutu and his entourage (a group who engage in fluctuating allegiances) have consistently pursued a twofold strategy similar to that employed during the First Republic. The first and foremost strategy is to prevent the collapse of the security and armed forces by maintaining control over certain trusted and disciplined units. The second is to keep--and even reinforce--international credibility in the closed circle of African heads of state, while attempting to restore credibility in the eyes of foreign governments, by performing the usual mediating role in regional African conflicts (for example, in Rwanda).
So far, Mobutu has succeeded in compelling his opponents to recognize his prominence in foreign and defense affairs and in attracting a loose coalition of former supporters of the MPR and former opponents of the government.
Nexus around Kengo wa Dongo
A second meaningful nexus of power is the current government, led by Prime Minister Kengo wa Dongo, which is dominated by the technocratic and political elite of the Kengo years of the mid-1980s (see table 4).
The Kengo government, however, is clearly unconstitutional. Contrary to the agreement of the entire political class in the Constitutional Act of the Transition--namely, that any government had to result from a political consensus--Kengo was elected by fewer than half (332 out of 738) of the members of the Transitional Parliament.
A further weakness is the absence of meaningful political and, importantly, regional constituencies among members of the Kengo government. Their only support comes from a tiny faction of generally younger intellectuals, high-level technocrats, and some individual members of civil society who, through informal or occasional political platforms, hope to gain rewards in return for their support. However, these political groups do not yet form a meaningful clientele.
Aware of its weaknesses, the Kengo government has been pursuing a strategy aimed at gaining external credibility--most notably in international financial and business circles--by appearing to play a managerial role in the governing of Zaire. Good governance imperatives such as those defined by the World Bank and USAID have conditioned the political behavior of the Kengo team, although there is no significant proof that the government has the means to implement them. Noteworthy measures taken by the Kengo government include the following:
- the spectacular expulsion of several dozen Lebanese businessmen, some of whom were associated with the printing of allegedly counterfeit bills under the preceding government;
- the seizure of thirty tons of banknotes that had not been registered at the Central Bank;
- the designation of new managers at the Central Bank and the removal of some high officials from such strategic posts as Customs and Hôtel des Monnaies;
- the decision to clean up the civil service by getting rid of 200,000 fictitious and real public servants out of a total of between 500,000 and 600,000;
- the willingness to launch a large privatization program in the mining sector, a program inspired by some officials at the World Bank, the African Bank of Development, and various foreign financial advisers;
- the numerous declarations of war against those contributing to the "criminalization" of the Zairian economy, including members of the radical opposition; and
- the decision to start expelling Rwandan refugees from the camps near Bukavu and Goma, a decision taken with President Mobutu's support.
The impact of these measures is not yet clear. Kengo's government still has no leverage in either the diamond sector--the only sector where resources can still be mobilized--or the popular economy, which is beyond the reach of any kind of public authority.
Opposition Factions
Besides these two centers of power, Zairian politics is also determined by the very complex play of factions that are now allowed to act in the open but prevent any real political stability from emerging. Whereas
the landscape used to be divided between the mouvance présidentielle (FPC) and the radical opposition (USORAL), factional politics have invaded practically all political parties, movements, caucuses, and loose coalitions.
Thus, within the mouvance présidentielle, a war of succession followed the death of its moderate leader, former Ambassador Lengema Dulia. A member of the old guard, Mandungu Bula Nyati, is vying with a representative of the new political generation, Kitenge Yesu, while both pretend to be close to the Mobutu entourage.
The main issue behind that struggle, positing Mobutu once again as arbitrator, is that the new generation is ready to support Kengo, while the old guard refuses to entrust the executive power of the country to a prime minister who is considered the paramount example of an "inauthentic citizen" and is judged beholden to "foreign actors."
Similar factional quarrels have appeared within the radical opposition. The UDPS leadership imploded into two camps. The first embodies truly radical opposition to Mobutu, while the second, allegedly backed by followers of Etienne Tshisekedi, agreed to open negotiations with the president in order to unseat the prime minister. The PDSC is also split into two factions: one led by supporters of a former PDSC leader who has accepted Kengo; and the second, the party's old guard, ready to compromise with Mobutu.
In the UFERI, which is supposed to represent Katangese aspirations to autonomy or independence, major splits have occurred between the national president and the regional branch of young radicals led by the local governor, who was held responsible for the "ethnic purification" in Shaba.
In short, party politics are being strongly eroded by one and only one issue: who is going to grab power, and where and when. Matters such as the rehabilitation of political legitimacy, of a viable state system, or of an acceptable modern economy do not seem to greatly preoccupy political actors.
Regional and Ethnic Constituencies
A fourth category of political actors includes those who appear to have retained the support of regional or ethnic constituencies. Many are formerly prestigious leaders and employ political symbols that are still invested with charisma. Tshisekedi belongs to this category: his messianic type of leadership gives vent to feelings widespread among the Luba diaspora. Another politician of this sort is Antoine Gizenga, who emerged as a leading "nationalist" figure of the 1963-64 rebellion in Kwilu and eastern Zaire. A third example is the current governor of Shaba, Kyungu wa Mwanza, who entertains the futile dream of Katangese independence.
But charismatic figures are not the only relevant actors in regional politics. Other local leaders (governors, district commissioners, and so forth) might emerge in the context of democratization and the collapse of central state structures. One might thus anticipate that political regionalism will be the lasting reality, consolidated in the future through elections and the backing of Mobutu, who by remaining in his native constituency (Gbadolite), appears to support regional patrons.
Mediators
A final category of political actors could be labeled "mediators." This category includes a number of independent individuals who once belonged to the moderate old guard of Mobutuism (for example, Nendaka, Bomboko) and who, at one point or another, have tried to moderate factional politics by discretely performing the role of go-between. Most have no political future and prefer to remain on the sidelines.
Three major conclusions emerge from this survey of the complex and constantly shifting political landscape. The first is rather comforting: Even though factionalism is the prime mover of politics in Zaire, large-scale political violence has not--and probably will not--erupt, precisely because every attempt at consolidating power is usually dashed by the eruption of a new counterforce.
Mobutu may claim the central mediating role in factional politics, but since figures such as Monsengwo have emerged at the National Conference, he is not the sole arbitrator. Moreover, Mobutu was forced to reopen the political monopoly; as president of the Republic he can no longer exercise despotic rule and is compelled to concede to new arrangements that suggest a more democratic face.
A second conclusion concerns the prevailing and pervading strength of nationalist feelings within the political class. Nationalism is expressed not only through the revival of ethnic identity and ethnic politics, possibly reinforced by regional and local political bosses, but also through the widespread use of the symbols of "Zairian authenticity," which have reemerged since a "non-Zairian," Kengo wa Dongo, took over the government. These nationalist themes are also supported by the major "godfathers" of Zaire.
Third, one must question the relevance of the political institutions and practices promoted by foreign governments. Democracy, the holding of free elections--yet again postponed--and even good governance do not seem to be the order of the day. Factional politics are omnipresent in Zaire, and
one may conclude that the ruling class, among them the natural incumbents of the Third Republic, are not quite ready to tackle the problem of state effectiveness and legitimacy.
KEY EXTERNAL ACTORS: THE TROIKA
Since the beginning of the transition, the governments of Belgium, France, and the United States--the "Troika"--have attempted to press for democracy and good governance in Zaire. The most important pressure has come from the U.S. State Department, which, together with World Bank officials, has insisted on consistent and fundamental political reform so that Zaire can implement the measures (chief among them, tackling the huge national debt) recommended by international financial institutions.
Initially, Belgium did not play an active part with the United States and France in exerting diplomatic pressure on the Mobutu regime: Belgian cooperation with Zaire had virtually ceased following a diplomatic crisis between the two in early 1989. Eventually, however, a process of international consultation developed between Belgium, the United States, and France, which have long-established political and economic ties to Zaire. An informal group of ambassadors from these countries has displayed some degree of unity in delivering its message to the Zairian authorities--first and foremost to President Mobutu--about the necessity of democracy.
Belgium
Within the Belgian government, whose foreign affairs policy passed into socialist hands in 1992, a strong anti-Mobutu feeling--traditional in the Flemish socialist party--has prevailed. As was bluntly stated in an official document issued by Minister of Foreign Affairs W. Claes, for discussion in the Belgian House of Representatives, Mobutu has no future at all and must be "isolated" from the international scene.
In spring 1992 this position was endorsed by a majority of the Belgian political parties, which made it clear that political dialogue was unlikely as long as Mobutu remained head of state. However, this anti-Mobutu position conflicted with decisions adopted at the National Conference, which repeatedly asked Mobutu not to leave the presidency, but to learn to share his absolute power.
Later, the Belgian foreign policy establishment was caught by its open support for the Tshisekedi government when it became obvious that (1) no political compromise was possible at the National Conference, (2) Mobutu was clearly regaining his political influence, and (3) the United States and France had rather mixed feelings, to say the least, with respect to the Tshisekedi cabinet.
The United States
The position of the United States has rested on two ideas: Zaire is no longer a strategic spot in Africa and Mobutu has been a friendly ally of the West. Moreover, during the first phase of the political transition, President Bush and part of the U.S. Congress felt that Mobutu had an inevitable role to play in the democratizing process that they thought was unfolding.
The Clinton administration came to develop a rather different attitude toward Mobutu, with some U.S. diplomats seeing him as a possible obstacle to democratization. Nevertheless, the Clinton administration took no initiatives that would have indicated a willingness to break with Mobutu. Personal relationships between Mobutu and the U.S. presidency, high-ranking officials in the State Department, and leaders in Congress remained intact.
In fact, both the Bush and Clinton administrations were partly paralyzed in their search for new credible political actors in Zaire, being highly suspicious of the radical opposition. Eventually, the Clinton administration came to accept the traditional argument that "Zaire without Mobutu could entail a Zaire engulfed in chaos."31 In the end, the designation of Kengo wa Dongo as prime minister was considered the only politically valid initiative to stabilize Zaire.
France
Despite the verbal support of the French diplomatic establishment for democratization in Africa, embodied primarily in the celebrated speech of President Mitterand at the Franco-African summit at La Baule, France's attitude toward Zaire has remained consistently ambivalent and even contradictory.
Before transition, the French establishment had at times considered Mobutu a not quite reliable African "chief."32 Since 1990, the French position has become less coherent, largely due to the dilution of the decision-making process in the realm of foreign affairs among several centers of influence. Thus, for example, Minister of Humanitarian Affairs Bernard Kouchner publicly showed his contempt for Mobutu even as close advisors to Mitterand and Minister of the Interior Charles Pasqua, a conservative politician, discretely maintained cordial relations with Mobutu's family and entourage. France, like Belgium and the United States, did not regard the Zairian radical opposition as a credible political solution--although limited circles within the socialist party disagreed.
So far, the Troika's activities have not achieved significant or positive diplomatic results, partly due to differences in their appraisal of Zaire's political evolution. The only common denominator has been the affirmation of the necessity of democracy through a fully legitimate National Conference.
OTHER ACTORS
Other state and nonstate actors and international financial pressures have also been at work during various phases of Zaire's transition. First in chronological order was the little-known visit in early November 1991 by the Nigerian representative of the president of the OAU, an attempt to start a conciliatory process between several major opponents and the FPC.
That short-lived effort was followed immediately by another bilateral African mediation, that of President Abou Diouf of Senegal. Led by his emissary, Abdoulaye Wade, it was a little more successful in that a "Common Declaration" signed by the major political leaders was issued. The statement asserted inter alia that (1) the principle of nonviolence would be "scrupulously respected" (this declaration was issued almost immediately after the looting of September and October 1991); (2) the National Conference, abruptly canceled by the looting, would be reopened; and (3) the head of the new "transitional" government would belong to the opposition.
The first two parts of the agreement were respected, but political feuds reemerged when Nguz Karl-i-Bond, who claimed to be a long-time opponent of the Mobutu regime, was designated the head of the transitional government by the president.
Another OAU attempt to mediate the political conflict, in May 1993, was cut short by the radical opposition's request for a joint UN-OAU mediation. In July the matter was settled by the designation of Algerian Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi as special emissary of the United Nations. After negotiating an agreement for a new round of talks between the contending parties in August and September 1993, Brahimi left Zaire bitterly noting "the versatility, the inconsistency, and the lack of maturity of the Zairian political class."33 He briefly returned in October to discover that his efforts had been to no avail.
Although these mediation attempts failed, they were not perhaps entirely useless. It can be argued that these efforts helped diminish the level of tension and prevented further political violence.
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