A first point to consider is whether a single Zairian society exists within a specific Zairian territory. During colonial times the existence of such a society was firmly denied. Belgium viewed its African possession as a mosaic of several hundred autonomous tribal groupings and clanic aggregates, which often maintained "traditionally" hostile relations with their neighbors. In order to govern a territory eighty times larger than Belgium--and one which had to be "dominated in order to serve," as former Governor Ryckmans used to put it--the colonial administration searched frantically for local chiefs and intermediaries responsible for well-circumscribed territorial entities, usually identified by rigid ethnic and tribal divisions.
To be sure, there was a paradox in the colonial Promethean ideology. While Belgium aimed to civilisé, christianisé, et modernisé the Congo, it could not help assuming that the colonized and (sometimes) affectionate "children" of the Belgian king were doomed to live in a state of tribal nature from which they would only slowly emerge. This perception outlasted the colonial period and explains the current and protracted frustration that exists between large segments of the Congolese, and now Zairian elites, and the Belgians.
From the early postcolonial period onward, historians and anthropologists have questioned the congruence between tribe and territory. Among others, Jan Vansina has suggested that Congolese societies were the result of a network of ethnic and tribal clusters characterized by territorial mobility. This condition was determined by the pressures of the prevailing mode of production, such as extensive agriculture or hunting and gathering.2 In contrast to other societies in Africa, in Zaire household migrations continuously fluctuated according to the basic requirements of subsistence--for example, food security, natural frontiers, relationships with neighbors, and density. Vansina also suggested that political centralization was never completely realized in the so-called kingdoms of central Africa: the prevailing sentiments for local autonomy among households prevented consolidation into strong chiefdoms.3
Colonial rule succeeded however, consciously or not, in creating a society, if not a strong centralized state, out of these multiple households. The central figures of the Belgian colonial triad--colonial administrator, missionary, and company--served to unify this society despite occasional resistance by local populations to performing their roles of "good taxpayer," "good Christian," and "good company worker."
The colonial authoritarian experiment was consolidated under a Zairian "monarch," President Mobutu Sese Seko, who imposed himself as the founding father of a Zairian nation after a "time of troubles" (1960-65). The unification of society by the elite was conducted and pursued in different ways, however: frequent political turnover at the top and middle levels of provincial, regional, and local administrations replaced the rigid pattern of colonial governance. The good MPR militant was loyal and obedient to the "Chief," just as he or she used to be to the colonial administrator.
Further consolidation of the Zairian nation arose through newly fashioned cultural artifacts in such realms as dance, music, and song. The slogan of authenticity helped create feelings of national pride and unity, even in distant parts of the country. Education, urbanization, and the development of small trade and business dramatically increased after independence and also contributed to the acceleration of social exchanges.
THE QUESTION OF TRIBAL LOYALTIES
However, total unification of Zairian society in the postcolonial period, through the cult of the Supreme Chief and obedience to a new political religion embodied in a party-state (the MPR), remained incomplete. Ethnic and mostly regional loyalties flourished at elite, sub-elite, and popular levels despite the president's ability to constantly remove political entrepreneurs from their territorial or ethnic power bases.
Shaba Region
Popular and elite allegiances to the former Katanga (now Shaba) persisted even after the first secession attempt ended in January 1963. Over the following decade Shabans viewed Zaire as comprising only those from Kinshasa, not themselves. Shaba once provided 60 percent to 80 percent of Zaire's hard currency through Gécamines, the main producer of copper and cobalt, and the Shabans' consciousness of being a main source of economic prosperity was widespread and strengthened latent feelings of regional autonomy.
It was very well known that President Mobutu, even at the peak of his strength in the late 1960s and early 1970s, continued to worry about a new secession in Shaba. The enormous Inga-Shaba power-line project was built partly to address that threat: in the event of a Katangese insurgency, Kinshasa could "press the button" and cut the supply of electricity for the mining industry.4 In 1977 and 1978, the two Shaba wars, as they came to be known, posed a direct threat of separatism and seriously endangered the viability of the political regime. The ensuing French and Belgian military intervention went beyond mere protection and evacuation of foreign expatriates.
No wonder then that the collapse of the Zairian state after 1991 revived the myths and symbols of the old Katangese secession. In 1992 most of the inhabitants who were not regarded as true Katangese citizens (largely those of Luba origin) were expelled from the mining towns where they had formed the major part of the administrative, industrial, and technical personnel since their arrival in the colonial period. The revival of Katangese secession was nevertheless unrealistic. Gécamines had virtually collapsed by 1991, and no foreign company had any real interest in its copper or cobalt ventures.
Kasai Region
Kasai, mostly Luba, ethnic "particularism" was perceived as one of the major threats to the political cohesion of Zairian society. Like Katanga, Kasai seceded from the central government in 1960-62. Since then, Luba administrative, social, and commercial elites have spread all over the Congo country to form an ethnic diaspora that has been viewed with suspicion by the rest of the political class. Meanwhile, in their stronghold of South Kasai, the Luba have taken over the second source of economic prosperity in Zaire: the diamond trade, a business whose profits they have been compelled to share with other regional barons.
As early as the 1960s, the Baluba regarded themselves as the "Jews of the Congo," and some of their most notorious leaders (for example, J. Ngalula) were called "Moise." They felt persecuted by most of the other ethnic constituencies, who disliked the privileges the Baluba allegedly garnered under the white administration. During the Second Republic they remained highly visible in politics: President Mobutu's strategy was to consistently absorb the Luba elite into the highest levels of the political hierarchy in order to better control it. Since 1978 one of the harshest opponents of the regime among the Luba elite has been Etienne Tshisekedi, later named the "Zairian Moise," who, together with ten fellow Kasaians, led a protracted struggle against Mobutu.
With the implosion of the copper and cobalt sectors and an economy that relies nowadays mostly on the legal and illegal export of diamonds, Kasaians--and thus the Baluba--are regarded with suspicion as their region has become the center of the "real" economy of the country. The fact that they are a leading force behind the main radical opposition party, the UDPS, as well as having members involved in many other smaller political groups, has antagonized most of the other ethnic and regional elites.
In almost all the regions and provinces, the Luba diaspora is implicitly accused of wanting power only for its own people. Like the Shabans, the Luba are threatened with expulsion by the "native sons." The grievances of the "Jews of Zaire" once again resonate.
Kivu Region
Somewhat milder regional loyalties in North and South Kivu have been another noteworthy political force in Zaire. Unlike the Baluba of Kasai or the Katangese, the natives of Kivu have never been especially vocal in national politics--their elite preferring to withdraw quietly from the political theater. Equally, Kivu's representatives in Kinshasa were never very active or well known, and some were even distrusted.
As the economic recession deepened, the Kivu economy, especially that of North Kivu, became increasingly oriented eastward. Local business and trade based on the illegal export of gold and coffee have always been relatively independent of the Zairian kleptocracy. The most important part of it was taken over by an entrepreneurial ethnic group, the Banande, whose sphere of expansion once reached the Kisangani area5 and who used to trade with distant regions in East Africa and the Middle East (Dubai).
Another entrepreneurial group is the Banyarwanda, many of whom came from Rwanda in the 1930s or after the political turmoil of 1959, 1963, and 1973. They acquired vast areas of grazing land in Masisi and Rutshuru and even expanded farther west into the territory of Walikale. Not considered "true" Zairians by the native population, they came into collision in the 1980s with the native agriculturists of North Kivu (the Bahunde, Batembo, and Nyanga), who now tend to associate "democracy" with the recapture of what they deem to be their own land and property and the expulsion of those they regard as foreigners.
Kongo Region
"Kongo nationalism," once an important political reference in the 1960s, has not been a substantial driving ethnic force in the Second Republic. Shortly after independence, Kongo elites loudly proclaimed their rights as the first occupants of the capital city, but have since quietly renounced the struggle for political autonomy. Entering into good relations with the Mobutu regime, they were allowed to concentrate freely in big business and trade, a position enhanced by the region's strategic location near the sea, and benefiting until recently from a relatively good road and railway system. In short, this region, which was a granary for the capital, softened its demand for purely political rewards and benefits.
More recently, however, grievances against "non-natives" who are heading certain public and state enterprises have been heard. As in Kasai, Kivu, and "Katanga," calls for autonomy are gaining strength and momentum, although the Congolese realize perfectly well that their future cannot be disassociated from Kinshasa, which remains the immediate hinterland.
In sum, ethnicity in Zaire should not be regarded as--nor associated with--"backward" struggles related to old-fashioned ethnographic tribal concepts and realities. Ethnicity is essentially a modern political phenomenon that revolves around the allocation of the scarce resources of power. It expresses itself through local and regional allegiances that are more geopolitically than historically circumscribed.
Moreover, urbanization has been instrumental in attenuating the divisive impact of ethnicity. The Zairian essayist Lye Mboka has pointed out the ambivalence of ethnic urban identities in his humorous "Letter to a Village Uncle":
Believe me, here [in Kinshasa] tribal origins sometimes lose their importance. Look at me, for example, with my unidentifiable name, I continuously change my regional affiliation according to the demands of cooperation.6 I am a native of Tshikapa, of Isiro, or of Kahemba whenever I have to talk about precious stones and business. I am a native of Equateur whenever I have to impress women. I am from Bas-Zaire, to be acknowledged and welcomed by the religious sects. But I am from Kinshasa, that is to say, sexless and with no biases whenever I have to talk about politics, giving myself the false alibi of being neutral.7
THE RELIGIOUS CLEAVAGES
Institutionalized religion is not at the root of social and political distinctions and affiliations in Zaire. President Mobutu has always taken great care to maintain a subtle equilibrium between the three main official churches: Catholic, Protestant, and Kimbanguist. Major quarrels with the Catholic Church in the 1970s led Mobutu to counter its profound influence in society and its powerful array of social services in the education and health sectors by granting protection to both the Protestant and especially to the "native" Kimbanguist Church, so deeply rooted among the Bakongo people.
However, allegiance to only one cult has always been tenuous in Zaire, and in the present crisis is likely to become more so. People are turning both to traditional institutional religions (mostly to the Catholic Church) and to the numerous sects that have always been active in the country and are believed to provide spiritual rewards and security.8
Since the onset of political transition, numerous prayer groups, exorcists, messianic and prophetic "churches," and evangelists--some of whom are foreign-born--have proliferated, especially in Kinshasa. Active in the official media (radio and television), they have received a lot of publicity in the press. These movements and individuals are popular not just among the poor: they recruit intensively among members of the presidential entourage, former clientele of MPR dignitaries, army officers, and even security agents.9
One fact remains, however: the Catholic Church is too influential an institution to be really threatened. The magnitude of its economic and social role throughout the country is demonstrated by the fact that, even after the collapse of state structures and institutions, the church remains one of the main pillars of the informal economy, as well as the primary provider of health care and education.
URBANIZATION
The spectacular growth of urbanization, especially in Kinshasa, seems to indicate a growing polarization between urban centers and the countryside. According to Joseph Boute and Léon de Saint-Moulin, the rate of urbanization rose from 8 percent in 1959 to 19 percent in 1970 and to about 28-32 percent in 1984.10 Today, 8.9 million Zairians live in cities of 100,000 or more inhabitants. Estimates are that in 2000 half of the population will live in cities, with over five million people in Kinshasa.11
As table 1 indicates, urban growth is not limited to the capital city. The population of other urban clusters such as Lubumbashi, or the main center of diamond production and export, Mbujimayi, has risen more than sevenfold from the late 1950s to the early 1990s. Thus the emphasis sometimes placed on the existence of a radical dichotomy between urban Kinshasa and the rest of the country does not seem entirely accurate.
Moreover, the French demographer Jean-Claude Bruneau argues that Zaire has actually experienced a decrease in urban growth over the last twenty years due to the severity of the economic and social crisis.12 This trend has mostly affected the big cities, while medium-sized or small towns (especially in Shaba and Kasai) continue to grow.
A second point is that the development of urbanization must be seen in the context of a large hinterland within which cities interact commercially and otherwise. Kinshasa could not survive without neighboring Bandundu and Bas-Zaire feeding the capital city during the rainy season, and without territories farther north (Equateur) supplying staple foods during the dry season. The vitality of trade in Zaire--despite the severe constraints--has constantly put cities and countryside in close contact and enhanced the circulation of goods and people.
Third, it would be a mistake to regard Zairian cities as the beneficiaries of specific revenues at the expense of the rural countryside. A familiar image, partly supplied by World Bank analyses, of an urban milieu sucking its surplus from an impoverished rural sector is not quite accurate. Before the collapse of the modern economy in 1991, the value added to agriculture, most notably cassava, which is the main staple food in Zaire, had reached 30 percent of the total economic activity, whereas that of typically urban activities (manufacturing, transport, and services) lagged well behind (see figure 1).
Finally, Kinshasa and other large cities are home primarily to a population that has largely retained its rural mentality. The top elites maintain local loyalties that are the dominant frame of reference, but the big cities otherwise are conglomerates of rural-minded inhabitants lacking fully integrated urban habits. This is still the case today, despite a high incidence of intermarriage and proximity with "alien" ethnic constituencies that have given rise to the feeling of being "Kinois" (that is, an inhabitant of Kinshasa).
Since the episodes of massive looting in September 1991 and January 1993, many people are seeking help and refuge in their neighborhoods. René Devisch, for example, speaks of the "villagization" of towns where urban citizens seek to renew values of solidarity through land cultivation or other activities related to agriculture.13
ELITE AND NON-ELITE AFFILIATION
Beyond tribal allegiances often tempered by regional ties, beyond religious affiliations (which are not necessarily conducive to political divisions), and beyond the question of rural-versus-urban identities (which, in fact, are often blurred), there is one dominant cleavage that has continued to grow with the consolidation of the Mobutu regime and that even precedes tribe, religion, and urbanity. That is the distinction between the spheres of the elite and the non-elite.
One of the main features--and a consequence--of the deterioration of the political regime in Zaire is the enlargement of the gap between the classes. This breach was initially created by a decolonization process that moved too quickly. The growing inequalities were summarized in pat images, such as a country ruled by a powerful dictator ("one of the richest men in Africa"), promulgated by part of the Belgian and international press and relayed by the "free" opposition press. Such images have contributed to an oversimplified understanding of political and social conditions in Zaire.
Although the classical measure of revenue inequalities (the Gini coefficient) is more moderate in Zaire than in Western European countries, the relatively egalitarian distribution of revenue in the agricultural and urban sectors conceals the reality of a tiny, extremely rich ruling class that absorbs more than 45 percent of the national wealth (see table 2). Thanks to Mobutu's political acumen, members of this class have basically overcome ethnic and tribal divisions, having lost touch in many instances with their constituencies.
However, it might be argued that the problem of inequality in Zaire (as well as in other sub-Saharan countries) cannot simply be defined as rich versus poor. Rather, as François-Régis Mahieu points out, a proper understanding of elite versus non-elite is related not to the acquisition of wealth but to its redistribution. In other words, what is at stake is not the immense and arrogant wealth of a tiny fraction of the population but its growing inability to redistribute wealth through the vertical and horizontal channels of patrimonial relationships.
The problem many African countries, both rich and poor, face nowadays--and particularly since the beginning of the attrition of external assistance--is the "growing pressure upon a diminishing constituency of political donors (be they external or internal)," as Mahieu puts it.
Hence, a growing confrontation between the "haves," who no longer redistribute, and the "have-nots"; hence also a growing number of people, especially urban youngsters, who no longer respect their traditional obligations toward the community from which they have progressively come to feel excluded. At this stage, not only the poor but also the relatively protected middle class have developed a real sickness. . . . According to a classical syndrome, they have too many problems and have lost the prestige and consideration they once enjoyed from their constituency and from which they now fear reprisal.14
It is precisely at this juncture that a popular explosion might take place, and one that could be exacerbated not only by the loss of income but also by the loss of status and sense of citizenry. Complicating the situation is the tremendous diminution of purchasing power, the disappearance of social services, and the threats to personal security posed by crime and police "extraction."
SOCIAL RESPONSES TO CRISIS
This leads us to the reactions of ordinary people facing a situation of societal stress in Zaire, especially in the urban environment. These reactions, which have been relatively peaceful, have changed over time.
In a first phase, popular discontent and disaffection with the Mobutu regime expressed themselves by the huge participation in money games--the so-called Bindo Promotion, the Pannier de la Ménagère, and so on--developed in Kinshasa and elsewhere from the beginning of the "transition" process.15
Launched by mid-level urban businessmen and traders, these games consisted of making deposits of money in exchange for "gifts" (first in kind, next in interest), the value of which was two to three times higher than the original deposit. In a couple of months, these games became immensely popular.
Among ordinary people who did not immediately realize that the "gifts" just equaled the rate of inflation, this unexpected wealth was said to originate from Mobutu himself, who was finally redistributing to the people from his own treasury chest. Eventually, the pouring of money into schemes came to exceed the capacity of those who had promoted the games to reimburse players: thousands received neither their gifts nor their initial deposits.
The second phase consisted of a series of revolts and looting, in Kinshasa in December 1990, in Mbujimayi in May 1991, in Kinshasa again in June 1991, then in almost all the Zairian cities between September and October 1991. At this stage, the impoverished sections of the army became directly involved; in most instances soldiers opened the way to the great pillages and acts of destruction of September and October 1991. In many cases, however, systematic looting developed in a festive atmosphere and in a sort of "organized chaos."16
Next, in the aftermath of the military and popular uprising, urban populations turned to a messianic hope induced by a charismatic type of political hero. They looked to a few personalities who had long been out of politics and were perceived as potential successors to Mobutu, who was thought to be losing his magical grip on the political system. This was the period of the much acclaimed return of leaders such as Tshisekedi and Gizenga and of the beginning of the National Conference in early 1992.
A period of extraordinary confusion followed, as more than three hundred parties registered and more than two thousand delegates participated in the National Conference. Subsequently, the quick succession of prime ministers designated by Mobutu or by the National Conference, the suspension and reopening of the National Conference, and the protracted debates on responsibility for the bankruptcy of Zaire added to the rampant political insecurity and social banditry in Kinshasa and led to the collapse of the monetary and economic system--resulting in widespread popular disillusion with political transition.
The transition did not result in a large and organized movement of civil disturbance, except for the 1991 looting. Clearly, however, political violence and abuses by ruling elites--ranging from large-scale corruption to arbitrary arrests of opponents or rivals--have spread throughout large segments of the civil society.
From life stories collected from among ordinary people in Kisangani and elsewhere, Benoit Verhaegen and Bugumil Jewsiewicki have both observed the spiral of violence, despotism, and autocracy in Zairian civil society.17 As Jewsiewicki writes:
[Social] cohesion is mostly ensured by the fear of others. Stories present a world where violence, often so insidious that the discourse of "tradition" translates into matters of witchcraft, constitutes the principal if not the only relationship between individuals. Life is the art of avoiding the worst in order to survive, in the hope of being able one day to abuse another man, or better yet, another woman. The violence that results is an end unto itself and the ambiguities that emerge confer upon state violence more than the appearance of legitimacy.18
To the extent that Zaire can still be regarded as a nation and as a single society, it is a society that is experiencing a deep "social sickness," a sickness aggravated and exacerbated by the political evolution of the country. It will take time for Zaire to heal.
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