Peaceworks #11 Directory

Zaire: Predicament and Prospects

Appendix. Rwandan Refugees in Kivu, Zaire

Catharine Newbury

In the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and the accession to power in Kigali of a government dominated by the Rwandan Patriotic Front, hundreds of thousands of Rwandans fled to Tanzania, Zaire, and other neighboring countries. As of this writing (early 1996), some two million "new caseload" Rwandan refugees are living outside the country. Most of these recent refugees are Hutu, and most are in refugee camps in Tanzania and Zaire.

Despite sometimes aggressive efforts by the UNHCR to persuade the refugees to return home, only a small proportion of them have done so. By contrast, since 1994 an estimated 750,000 "old caseload" refugees have come to Rwanda from Uganda, Burundi, Zaire, Tanzania, and other countries. Most of these are Tutsi who themselves, or whose parents, had fled the country two to three decades earlier.¹

The largest proportion of new caseload refugees from Rwanda, some 1.5 million people, are living in Zaire's Kivu province. The presence of such a huge conglomeration of refugees in this area is problematic in a number of respects. First and foremost, it is a significant human tragedy for so many people to be living in what are, for most of them, miserable conditions.

Second, the presence of these refugees in the densely populated lacustrine areas of Kivu constitutes a grave burden for local communities, heightening social tensions. Although some Kivu residents have benefited from the refugee influx, for most ordinary citizens such benefits are far outweighed by the negative political, economic, and social effects, including serious destruction of the environment and, in North Kivu, an exacerbation of ethnic tensions.

Third, for the current government in Rwanda, the refugees in Kivu represent both an embarrassment and, because there are among them soldiers from the former Rwandan army (FAR) and members of the militias, a significant security threat.

Finally, providing material support as well as medical and social services to such a large refugee population is expensive; the costs are stretching the resources and generosity of international organizations and humanitarian agencies.

In August 1995 the decision by the government of Zaire to expel Rwandan refugees by force attracted world attention, underscoring the importance and volatility of this simmering crisis. Zaire's subsequent ultimatum, naming December 31, 1995, as the deadline for repatriation of the refugees, dramatized the urgency of these concerns.

Because the refugee crisis in Kivu is constantly evolving, any analysis runs the risk of being overtaken by events. One thing is clear, however: Resolving the refugee crisis will require that a number of measures are taken on several different fronts at the same time. The problem is a regional one and the refugee crisis cannot be isolated from the problems of Zaire. Careful assessment is needed of Zaire's position on the refugee crisis and of how the Zairian leadership could be persuaded to facilitate efforts to promote orderly repatriation.

IMPERATIVES AND DILEMMAS OF REPATRIATION

Under what conditions are the refugees in Kivu (and in Tanzania and Burundi) likely to go home, and what can be done to establish those conditions? How can international organizations such as the United Nations work with governments in the Great Lakes region, humanitarian agencies, and donor countries to address the crisis and establish the basis for voluntary, peaceful repatriation?

In general, it may seem reasonable to assume that encouraging repatriation can help to defuse the crisis. Yet the situation is more complicated. How one goes about encouraging repatriation will determine whether it helps to ameliorate or serves to aggravate the situation. And any efforts in this regard must take account of the dynamics of fear among the refugees, among leaders of the current government in Kigali, and among ordinary citizens in Rwanda, both Tutsi and Hutu.

A number of studies have pointed out that many of the refugees want very much to return to Rwanda but are afraid to do so.² Hutu refugees fear that if they return, they may be arrested, accused of participation in the genocide, and thrown into prison. They also fear that they may be mistreated or harassed by the army, by civil authorities, or by people seeking vengeance for the genocide. Linked to such fears are concerns over property rights. If refugees return home to find their homes occupied by others, how can they attempt to reclaim property without running the risk of imprisonment? There have been enough cases of arbitrary arrest to make such fears credible.

In particular, the conduct of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) is hardly reassuring to refugees contemplating return. After taking power in 1994 the RPA engaged in massacres of Hutu in some regions.³ In 1995 dramatic cases of army brutality sent shock waves of fear through the camps. During the Kibeho massacre in April, at least 2,000 and perhaps as many as 8,000 persons were killed when the RPA moved to close a displaced persons' camp in southwestern Rwanda; in September more than 100 villagers and their mayor were massacred at Kanama in northwestern Rwanda.⁴ Attacks by the RPA on a refugee camp at Birava in Kivu in April 1995 and against suspected guerrillas on the island of Iwawa in Lake Kivu in November 1995 have added to refugees' fears.

The death or disappearance of what Human Rights Watch calls "a substantial number of Rwandans" has served as a further deterrent to the return of refugees from Kivu. Among the more prominent people killed were the prefect of Butare Prefecture, in March; a deputy prefect of Gitarama Prefecture (killed with his wife, two children, and a cook), in July; a deputy prefect of Gikongoro Prefecture, in early August; a judge in Butare, in late August; and a local government official in Gisenyi, in late September.⁵

Reports on conditions in the refugee camps have noted that extremists in the camps, partisans of the former government, exaggerate the frequency and nature of abuses in Rwanda, so as to frighten refugees and convince them not to return. Moreover, some leaders in the camps and former militia have used pressure and coercion to prevent refugees from returning to Rwanda. Nonetheless, some 27,000 refugees in a camp near Bukavu said they wish to return to their homes in southwestern Rwanda. As of October 1995, however, local authorities in Rwanda (Cyangugu Prefecture) were hindering rather than facilitating their return.⁶

It is important to recognize that there are groups of refugees (women's organizations prominent among them) who have attempted to marginalize or circumvent the extremists in the camps. But the comportment of the RPA and some local government officials in Rwanda has tended to confirm refugees' fears; abuses by soldiers, arbitrary arrests, and the ever-increasing prison population (58,000 in November 1995) are grim reminders that there are risks to returning. Compounding the problem are calls for vengeance on the part of some government leaders in Kigali, and a stalled justice system.⁷ Because of such uncertainties, refugees have asked for more information about conditions in Rwanda, and for escorts from UNHCR or other international agencies back to their home communes.

At the end of August 1995 a cabinet reshuffle in the Kigali government heightened fears among the refugees, because those who left the government were moderates who had opposed indiscipline in the army, criticized human rights abuses, and called for measures to combat insecurity. The prime minister and interior minister resigned, and three other ministers, including the justice minister, were dismissed.⁸

Misinformation and lack of communication between the camps and Rwanda are not necessarily the most important constraints. Just as important has been the pervasive climate of insecurity in Rwanda and an apparent lack of political will on the part of the government to promote confidence-building measures. The political conditions inside Rwanda have convinced numbers of refugees that their fears are well founded.

Meanwhile, the RPA and elements in the government in Kigali fear the threat of military attack by remnants of the FAR (the army of the former Rwandan government, loyalists to Habyarimana). They have heard reports of arms being sent to the refugees and of military training among them. Some observers believe that the extent of the military threat posed by the refugees has been exaggerated. At most, such critics say, the former FAR and militias could carry out small attacks but would be unable to mount an all-out war.

Whatever the realities on the ground, the fear of attack from outside has been used to justify a military buildup within Rwanda. Some estimates suggest the RPA grew to some 50,000 soldiers during 1995. Yet these soldiers often go unpaid, which creates a further security threat, as soldiers turn to assaults and thefts while foraging among the population. Moreover, since the arms embargo on Rwanda was lifted by the United Nations in August 1995, the RPA has been seeking to increase its arsenals.

Thus, for many reasons, every effort should be made to halt the flow of arms into Kivu and to prevent the efforts of the former FAR and militias to re-arm. At the same time, strong pressure should be brought to bear on the government in Kigali to secure a halt to armed forays into Kivu.

Just as threats from the FAR spread fear within Rwanda, certain policies and actions of the current government in Kigali seem to foster the very situation that the incumbent leaders fear. That is, the more that refugees in the camps in Zaire (or in Tanzania) become convinced that they cannot safely return to Rwanda, the more receptive they will be to appeals from hard-liners in the camps who wish to recommence the war and attempt a return to Rwanda by force. The RPF leaders, having themselves chosen to use force in 1990 to win the right to return to Rwanda, are surely aware of the potentially explosive consequences of having large refugee populations on their borders. Conversely, they cannot fail to understand that concrete gestures of reconciliation and confidence-building are needed if indeed they are serious about promoting repatriation of new caseload refugees.

In such a polarized situation, the willingness of the Zairian government to extend the deadline for repatriation beyond December 31, 1995, was a positive step. The International Tribunal in Arusha has handed down the first indictments of those to be tried for genocide. Although only eight indictments have been issued so far, this judicial activity has tremendous symbolic significance.

In November 1995, during a meeting of regional leaders in Cairo (organized by the Carter Center), the Kigali government reiterated its commitment to repatriation of refugees--a positive message. Within Rwanda, there appeared to be progress at the end of 1995 toward beginning trials for some of the prisoners accused of genocide. And there were signs that the Kigali government might be softening its previous refusal to engage in dialogue with representatives of the refugees in the camps.

It appears that the 12,000 refugees forcibly expelled by Zaire at the end of August 1995 have been successfully reintegrated to their home communes. The efforts by the Rwandan government to accommodate the returnees were encouraging. Less encouraging was the fact that the prison population continued to grow during the last quarter of 1995 at the rate of about 1,000 per week.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. UN agencies, donor governments, and organizations providing development aid should encourage the government in Kigali to take concrete measures to allay the fears of refugees.

   Refugees need to believe that they are welcome in Rwanda and that they can return safely. In this regard, local administrations in Rwanda require close attention. Each of Rwanda's eleven prefectures has several deputy prefects, who assist the prefect and carry out specified functions in finance, legal affairs, and so on. At the end of 1995 about 85 percent of these subprefects were Tutsi. The prefectures are divided into communes; there are 143 communes, each headed by a bourgmestre. Estimates indicate that more than 60 percent of the bourgmestres are Tutsi. One measure that could help to reassure refugees would be to replace those bourgmestres who are relatively new to the country, having returned to Rwanda only recently (after the genocide), with individuals who are known locally and respected by the inhabitants of the commune they are to administer.

   The Kigali government should be encouraged to move ahead as rapidly as possible in reestablishing a functional justice system. Funding has been provided, and expatriate jurists are prepared to provide assistance. Manifestation of political will on this issue would be an important confidence-building measure.

2. Obtain agreement from the Rwandan government to prolong the presence of a UN peacekeeping force.

   As of December 1995 the United Nations had negotiated an agreement with the government of Rwanda to maintain a UNAMIR presence in the country until March 1996. Still under discussion was the question of whether UN political observers would remain. Though neither the United Nations nor the Rwandan government seem inclined to maintain UNAMIR in Rwanda beyond March 1996, the withdrawal of UNAMIR is likely to retard rather than encourage refugee repatriation. The continued presence of UNAMIR would seem to be an important confidence-building measure, to provide reassurance to returning refugees and to UN and NGO personnel involved in repatriation and relief operations.

3. Promote mechanisms to facilitate communication and dialogue between refugee camps, their home communes in Rwanda, and the Rwandan government.

   The Rwandan government claims that conditions have improved and refugees should not be afraid to return. If this is true, better communication with the camps is needed so that refugees can obtain a realistic picture of the conditions back home.

4. Conduct follow-up monitoring in communes to which refugees have been repatriated.

   There are a variety of ways in which follow-up monitoring could be done: it would probably be best to use several different approaches, for example, more human rights monitors (at least two per commune), as well as monitoring by NGOs involved in humanitarian relief and by UNHCR personnel. Coordination of efforts between NGOs operating in particular communes within the camps and NGOs in counterpart communes in Rwanda should be encouraged. Churches could also be called upon to assist in facilitating follow-up and communication.

5. Promote a massive effort to provide resources to defray the costs of repatriation.

   Coordination among the United Nations Development Programme, UNICEF, other UN agencies, and humanitarian organizations will be needed to assure adequate material support for returning refugees when they arrive in their home communes. This effort will require substantial funding.

   Such support should take the form of hoes, seed, and food supplies to carry people through until the next harvest. December/January and August/September are propitious periods for repatriation, since rural cultivators are more likely to want to return home at a time when they can begin to cultivate and envisage a harvest. One problem that became evident in Rwanda during the January/February 1995 planting season is that relief organizations tended to serve mainly those areas near the principal roads; more remote communes were neglected. Mechanisms must be developed to ensure transport of supplies to remote areas.

   Some agencies have raised the possibility of providing cash payments (rather than food and seed) to returning refugees. This is inadvisable, for once the money is spent, the refugees are left with nothing. Moreover, distributing hoes, seed, and food increases the likelihood that the supplies will be used for family needs. To avoid tensions, some resources should also be made available to local residents, many of whom are desperately poor. The expense of this additional aid seems less costly than risking resentment and violence against the returnees.

6. Devote specific attention to the land issue and to ensuring women's rights to land and other property.

   Plots of land in resettlement areas must be made available to old caseload refugees, so they will cease occupying the land of newly returning caseload refugees. Tracts of land, mostly in the east, have already been identified in government plans for resettlement, but additional land will be needed in communes in many different parts of the country. As a report from Refugees International has emphasized, it is important that the Rwandan government "issue a clear land and property decree to clear up confusion and designate a local dispute resolution mechanism." Moreover, material assistance is needed for both new caseload refugees and the old caseload returnees.⁹

7. Programs to provide employment and training should be developed.

   The Rwandan government has been told by the World Bank that it must sharply limit government employment. How, then, can returning new caseload refugees with training and skills hope to find employment? Many existing jobs have already been filled with old caseload refugees. This situation requires study and attention. Rural employment is also needed to accommodate those who have too little land to ensure family survival.

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