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TOC | Summary | One | Two | Three | Four | Five | Six | Notes | About the Author Preventing Genocide in Burundi Lessons from International Diplomacy Summary Since 1993, interethnic violence between the 15 to 20 percent Tutsi minority and the 80 to 85 percent Hutu majority in Burundi has taken an estimated 150,000 lives. The continuation of the conflict helps place tens of millions of people at risk in Central Africa and erodes the international norm against genocide. Despite considerable time and effort, the world’s peacemakers have been unable to stop the bloodshed and facilitate a political settlement. An examination of the international response to the crisis furnishes valuable lessons for peacemaking in Burundi and other areas of genocidal conflict. What distinguishes the violent conflict in Burundi from so many others is the extent to which elite-led, politico-ethnic rivalry for power has become entwined with mass killing and fears of group extinction. Ethnic violence and genocide are the results not of ancient tribal hatreds but of divisive colonial policies and the post-independence struggle for power among politico-ethnic elites in a polarized and overpopulated country. It is only since 1965 that the recurrent pattern of political extremism has become firmly established. Currently, Burundi is ruled by a Tutsi-led military regime that faces significant challenges from the Hutu-led National Council for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD) insurgency and Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) political opposition as well as from various Tutsi factions. A long-term political settlement that took adequate account of Burundian history and circumstances would have three basic characteristics: (1) a form of democratic power sharing that was more majoritarian than consociational but provided significant protection for minority security and economic interests; (2) measures to address collective fears and memories of genocide by acknowledging past crimes and fixing individual responsibility for them; and (3) impartial outside military forces sufficient to control the Burundian military until it is reformed and ethnically integrated. However, as the democratization and power-sharing movements of the early 1990s indicated, a settlement is unlikely to develop without substantial international pressure and assistance. The lesson of these movements’ tragic demise is that outside carrots and sticks must be focused on obtaining the engagement of all important parties, especially the powerful extremists, in compromise political negotiations. Three recent policy initiatives illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of international peacemaking in Burundi. Beginning in late 1995, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros- Ghali appealed for UN–approved contingency planning for deployment of a humanitarian military force in Burundi should full-scale civil war and genocide develop. His initiative was generally consistent with the need for strong international pressure against violence. But it foundered, largely because of lack of adequate diplomatic support from France and the United States. The mere threat of UN humanitarian intervention had a sobering effect on Burundian government leaders and played a role in their decision to invite in regional peackeepers. But the UN’s initiative also complicated necessary efforts to engage the Burundian parties, including extremists, in the peace process—validating some French and American concerns. An alternative way forward would have been to adapt the proposal to ongoing African efforts to mount all-inclusive political negotiations. Over the past two years, seven regional African states have demonstrated an unusual degree of cohesion and determination in pushing for all-party political negotiations. However, their most significant initiative—economic sanctions against the Burundi government and mediation under the auspices of former Tanzanian President Mwalimu Julius Nyerere—have suffered from lack of sufficient Western support. On balance, the regional states have made progress, clearly edging the Burundian parties in the direction of political negotiation. European and American reservations were based on their belief that it was necessary to work through moderate political leaders and that a relaxation of sanctions would strengthen moderate forces for peace. But the Burundi government’s military- oriented policies, even after sanctions were eased, indicated that relative extremists were largely in control. This suggested the need for more rather than less outside pressure, carefully orchestrated to bring the extremists into power-sharing negotiations that could protect their essential interests. The regional effort was also hampered by deficiencies in the economic sanctions regime, particularly leakages from regional countries and inconsistencies of implementation. Even more serious was the region’s slowness in addressing the growing tensions between Nyerere and regional leader Tanzania on the one hand and the Burundi government on the other. These problems complicated the Tanzanian facilitator’s already difficult task of convening all-party negotiations. Finally, in mid-1996, the Rome-based Community of Sant’Egidio (the lay Catholic group that helped mediate an end to the civil war in Mozambique in 1994) arranged secret peace talks between the government and the CNDD insurgents. The fruits of this year-long effort—which delayed Nyerere’s all-party initiative—were disappointing, and there is reason to question some of its basic premises. In particular, the mediators and their Western supporters assumed that the CNDD would be willing to join in a mutual suspension of hostilities in exchange for agreement on just the “principles” of a settlement. They assumed that the privacy of the discussions could be preserved over a lengthy period of time, although their existence was an open secret among other important, and suspicious, political groups. And they assumed that the CNDD would tolerate the invocation of “progress” in the secret talks as justification for the public easing of sanctions against the government. In retrospect, the Sant’Egidio effort might have been better conceived as a short-term, limited effort to break down the barriers between the government and CNDD. Given the virtues and failings of recent international approaches to peacemaking in Burundi, it would be desirable to combine greater Western and UN support for regional policy choices, with greater regional consultation of external partners to gain the benefit of their broad experience and detachment. Such an approach would also be based on the recognition that it is the region’s political will and resources that will largely determine the outcome for peace in Burundi. A revised Western contribution would require a reexamination of policy perspectives rooted in past practices, bureaucratic agendas, and generic diplomatic responses. This is not likely to occur without firm political leadership and efforts by nongovernmental organizations to promote new policy approaches to the violence in Burundi. TOC | Summary | One | Two | Three | Four | Five | Six | Notes | About the Author
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