Preventing Genocide in Burundi Lessons from International Diplomacy: Peaceworks: Publications: U.S. Institute of Peace

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Preventing Genocide in Burundi Lessons from International Diplomacy

Notes

1. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Burundi, February 15, 1996, S/1996/116, par. 24.

2. U.S. Agency for International Development, Bureau for Humanitarian Response, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, “Great Lakes Complex Emergency,” Situation Report #41, August 15, 1997, p.1. Estimates of regroupments are provided in Jean Hélène, “Un an après le coup d’état: Les exécutions se poursuivent au Burundi,” Le Monde, August 12, 1997.

3. On Bosnia, see Warren Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers (New York: Times Books, 1996), especially pp. xi–xvi, 156, 209, 225–226, and 241–242; Statement of General Galvin in House Committee on Armed Services, The Policy Implications of U.S. Involvement in Bosnia: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, 103d Cong, 1st Sess, May 25 and 26, 1993, pp. 4–5; and Don Oberdorfer, “A Bloody Failure in the Balkans,” Washington Post, February 8, 1993, pp. A1, A14. For Rwanda, see Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, Study 2: Early Warning and Conflict Management (Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996). The Liberian experience is discussed by Herbert Howe, “Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peackeeping,” International Security 21 (Winter 1996–97), pp. 145–176; see also Margaret Aderinsola Vogt, “The Involvement of ECOWAS in Liberia’s Peacekeeping,” and Robert Mortimer, “ECOMOG, Liberia, and Regional Security in West Africa,” in Edmond Keller and Donald Rothchild, eds., Africa and the New International Order (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner, 1996), pp. 149–183.

4. United Nations, Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, December 9, 1948.

5. Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (New York: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 32–36.

6. René Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. xii.

7. This citation is from a recent public presentation by the foreign minister of Burundi, Luc Rukingama, who also stated, “The genocide itself has been prepared by Hutu FRODEBU leaders a long time before October 1993.” (Transcription, Great Lakes Policy Forum Special Session, July 16, 1997, Washington, D.C.) The minister is a Hutu member of a Tutsi-dominated government.

8. The foremost scholarly sources on Burundian political development include Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide; and Rwanda and Burundi (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970); Jean-Pierre Chrétien, Burundi: L’histoire retrouvée: 25 ans de métier d’historien en Afrique (Paris: Karthala, 1993); Jean-Pierre Chrétien, André Guichaoua, and Gabriel Le Jeune, La crise d’ao˜t 1988 au Burundi, Cahiers du CRA, no. 6 (Paris: Karthala, 1989); Filip Reyntjens, L’Afrique des Grands Lacs en crise: Rwanda, Burundi: 1988–1994 (Paris: Karthala, 1994); Burundi: Breaking the Cycle of Violence (London: Minority Rights Group, 1995); and “Burundi: 1972-1988, Continuité et Changement,” Cahiers du CEDAF, Novembre 1989, no. 5 (Brussels: CEDAF-ASDOC, 1989); André Guichaoua, Les crises politiques au Rwanda et au Burundi (1993–94) (Lille: Université des Sciences et Technologies, 1995); and Lisa H. Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

9. Belgian Colonial Governor Pierre Ryckmans in 1931, quoted in Chrétien, L’histoire retrouvée, p. 320 (my translation).

10. Boniface F. Kiraranganya, La vérité sur le Burundi: L’unité et la démocratie au Burundi (Sherbrooke, Quebec, Canada: Editions Naaman, 1977), p. 10.

11. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, La diplomatie pyromane: (Burundi, Rwanda, Somalie, Bosnie..) Entretiens avec Stephen Smith (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1996), p. 191 (my translation).

12. Reyntjens, Breaking the Cycle of Violence, pp. 12–13; Alison Des Forges, “Burundi: Foiled Coup or Creeping Coup?” Current History 93 (May 1994), pp. 205–208.

13. See Neil Kritz, “The Rule of Law in the Postconflict Phase: Building a Stable Peace,” in Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela All, Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1996), pp. 587–600.

14. René Lemarchand, “Managing Transition Anarchies: Rwanda, Burundi, and South Africa in Comparative Perspective, Journal of Modern African Studies vol. 32, no. 4 (December 1994), pp. 581–604.

15. Reyntjens, Breaking the Cycle of Violence, p.18–19.

16. Ould-Abdallah, La diplomatie pyromane, p. 142.

17. Reyntjens, Breaking the Cycle of Violence, pp. 18–19.

18. Conversations with UN human rights monitors are reported in Stephen R. Weissman, “Living with Genocide,” Tikkun 12 (July–August 1997), p. 53. On violence against civilians in recent years, see also Jean-Pierre Chrétien, “Burundi: The Obsession with Genocide,” Current History 95 (May 1996), pp. 206–210. On arms flows, see Arms Project of Human Rights Watch, “An Overview of: Stoking the Fires: Military Assistance and Arms Trafficking in Burundi,” (1998). Sudan’s role as a transit route for CNDD supplies was emphasized by U.S. officials.

19. Burundi’s direct role in these events is unclear, but according to diplomatic and other on-the-ground observers, it consisted of permission for Rwandan and Zairian rebel forces to cross Burundian territory and probably provision of a limited number of military or paramilitary personnel. On Rwanda’s indirect support for Burundi’s objectives in eastern Zaire, see Gérard Prunier, “The Great Lakes Crisis,” Current History 96 (May 1997), pp. 196–197.

20. For a balanced analysis of the state of insurgency, see Jean Hélène, “Un an après le coup.”

21. Cf. the argument for partition in Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” International Security 20 (Spring 1994), esp. pp. 168–169.

22. Reyntjens, Breaking the Cycle of Violence, p. 22, discusses some limits of consociationalism in Burundi. For a broader discussion of consociational democracy, see Timothy D. Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation and Ethnic Conflict (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1996).

23. Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, Study 1: Historical Perspectives: Some Explanatory Factors, especially pp. 41–58; Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), chs. 4–7; and Lemarchand, “Managing Transition Anarchies.”

24. UN Security Council, Letter Dated 29 December 1995 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1995/1068, p. 1.

25. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Burundi, February 15, 1996, S/1996/116, p. 1; and Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Burundi, August 15, 1996, S/1996/660, p. 12.

26. See United Nations, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, 3 January 1995, A/50/60– S/1995/1, pp. 6–8.

27. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Burundi, February 15, 1996.

28. For an appreciation and critique of France’s Rwanda policy, see Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, especially pp. 104–107. For a perspective on French policy toward Africa generally, see John Ravenhill, “Dependency by Default,” in John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild, eds., Africa in World Politics: Post–Cold War Challenges (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 105–112.

29. UN Security Council, Resolution 1049 (1996), March 5, 1996, S/Res/1949 (1996).

30. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Burundi, August 15, 1996, pp. 10–11; Barbara Crossette, “U.N. Asks Intervention Force as Burundi nears a Collapse,” New York Times, July 25, 1996, pp. A1, A3. UN officials detailed particular country responses, including the unpublicized offer of troops from Egypt.

31. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Burundi, October 29, 1996, S/1996/887, p. 9. UN officials detailed particular country responses.

32. See Thomas W. Lippmann, “U.S. to Back Burundi Peace,” Washington Post, March 3, 1996, p. A28; and Africa Research Bulletin, January 1–31, 1996, pp. 12125–12126.

33. On Dallaire’s view, see Government of Canada, Toward a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations, September 1995, p. 5. Regarding Liberia, see references in note 3 above. O’Hanlon’s analysis for the International Crisis Group Board was not published.

34. “Cairo Declaration on the Great Lakes Region,” November 29, 1995; “Tunis Declaration on the Great Lakes Region,” March 18, 1996, p. 7.

35. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Burundi, August 15, 1996, p. 2; Africa Research Bulletin, May 1–31, 1996, p. 12270; Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Africa, 96–1151, Central Africa, June 13, 1996, pp. 1–4.

36. “Press Communiqué of the Arusha Regional Summit on Burundi,” June 27, 1996.

37. “Joint Communiqué of the Second Arusha Regional Summit on Burundi,” July 31, 1996.

38. “Joint Communiqué of the Third Arusha Regional Summit on Burundi,” October 12, 1996.

39. “Joint Communiqué of the Fourth Arusha Summit on the Burundi Conflict,” April 16, 1997.

40. Statement of the Government of Burundi, “The reasons that justify a postponement,” August 28, 1997.

41. American Embassy, Dar es Salaam, to Secretary of State, “Dar Summit Lays Down Conditions for Renewed Peace Talks,” September 4, 1997.

42. UN Security Council, Resolution 1072 (1996), August 30, 1996, S/Res/1072 (1996).

43. This “sensitive” but unclassified Western government analysis was provided to me on a background, not for attribution basis.

44. This analysis is generally consistent with information from other newspaper and periodical sources through the summer of 1997.

45. “Accord entre le Gouvernement en place au Burundi et le Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD),” and “Procès-Verbal,” Rome, Italy, March 10, 1997.

46. See, for example, CNDD Communiqué no. 69, “Mise au point concernant les négociations,” September 27, 1996; and “Leonard Nyangoma: L’homme avec qui il faut négocier,” Africa Now (October 1996), pp. 24–27.

47. Richard A. Sollom and Darren Kew, “Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Prevention in Burundi,” in Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Vigilance and Vengeance: NGOs Preventing Ethnic Conflict in Divided Societies (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1996), pp. 252–253. See pp. 253–254 for a brief discussion of London-based International Alert’s smaller-scale but more policy-oriented network among European NGOs.

48. Lionel Rosenblatt, “The Burundi Policy Forum,” in Winston Foundation for World Peace, Tenth Annual Report 1996, p. 11.

49. Sollom and Kew, “Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Prevention in Burundi,” p. 253.

50. Letter from Andrew W. Natsios, co-chair, Interaction Disaster Response Committee, to President William J. Clinton, January 19, 1996.

51. Rosenblatt, “The Burundi Policy Forum,” pp. 11–12. Sallom and Kew, “Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Prevention in Burundi,” p. 259; interview with a U.S. official, January 21, 1998.

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