State and Soldier in Latin America:
Redefining the Military's Role in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile
Notes
Robert Olson, "Concepts for Future Defense and Military Relations with Counterparts," in Hemispheric Security in Transition: Adjusting to the Post-1995 Environment, ed. L. Erik Kjonnerod (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), 205.
Georges Fauriol, "Thinking About U.S. Defense Policy in Latin America," in Hemispheric Security in Transition: Adjusting to the Post-1995 Environment, ed. L. Erik Kjonnerod (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), 31.
Michael Desch, "What is the Mission of a Democratic Military in the Post-Cold War Era?" in Civil-Military Relations and the Consolidation of Democracy (Washington, D.C.: International Forum for Democratic Studies and the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 1995), 6-8. Douglas Johnson and Steven Metz define doctrine in the following way: "Military doctrine is the official, usually consensual, statement of what a service is and does. It is a basic guidebook."; see their article, "Civil-Military Relations in the United States: The State of the Debate," The Washington Quarterly 18, no. 1 (1995): 206.
"Hemispheric Military Leaders Pledge Increased Cooperation," in NotiSur--Latin American Political Affairs [Latin American Data Base], vol. 5, no. 29 (August 4, 1995).
Thomaz Guedes da Costa, "Post-Cold War Military Relations between the United States and Latin America," in Security, Democracy, and Development in U.S.-Latin American Relations, ed. Lars Schoultz, William C. Smith, and Augusto Varas (New Brunswick: Transaction Publications, 1994), 139-40.
Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).
"Why Have Defense Ties in the Americas?," address delivered by U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry on 26 April 1995 at the Annual Strategy Symposium, cosponsored by the United States Army Southern Command and the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, April 25-26, 1995, Miami, Florida.
David G. Bradford, "Planning for Victory in the Drug War," Military Review 74, no. 10 (October 1994): 15-24.
Guedes da Costa, "Post-Cold War Military Relations," 144.
Gabriel Marcella, "Forging New Strategic Relationships," Military Review 74, no. 10 (October 1994): 31-42.
William F. Barber and C. Neale Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966).
See J. Samuel Fitch, "Military Role Beliefs in Latin American Democracies: Context, Ideology, and Doctrine in Argentina and Ecuador" (Paper presented at the XIX International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, September 28-30, 1995, Washington, D.C.), 77.
Fitch, "Military Role Beliefs in Latin American Democracies," 78.
Felipe Agüero, "The Latin American Military: Development, Reform, and 'Nation-Building'?" in Security, Democracy, and Development in U.S.-Latin American Relations, ed. Lars Schoultz, William C. Smith, and Augusto Varas (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 244.
David Pion-Berlin, "Theories and Theory-Building in Civil-Military Relations" (Department of Political Science, University of California, Riverside, photocopy), 7.
See remarks of Andrés Fontana as reported in Rapporteur's Report of Presentations at the May 4-6, 1995 Conference, "Civil-Military Relations in Latin America" (Washington, D.C.: The Democracy Projects, 1995), 9.
See remarks of John Cope as reported in Rapporteur's Report, "Civil-Military Relations in Latin America," 10.
Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 252.
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 8.
Huntington, The Third Wave, 252.
I employ the term "professional" following Samuel P. Huntington, who emphasizes the dimensions of "expertise, responsibility, and corporateness." I do not equate "professional" with "apolitical," as is sometimes done. To define the latter in terms of the former would invalidate on methodological grounds along the argument that professionalism helps draw the military out of politics. See Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 8.
Alfred Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, Future, ed. Alfred Stepan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 47-65.
Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 80.
Even in the United States, where the armed services arguably face more war-fighting possibilities than most Latin American militaries, civilian leaders are abandoning objective control, trying to influence issues once within the domain of military autonomy and asking the institution to play a greater role in internal activities, such as antinarcotics operations, disaster relief, and infrastructure development and repair. Civil-military relations have come under strain in the process. See Michael C. Desch, "Mission Matters: The End of the Cold War and Future Civil-Military Relations" (John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, June 1995, photocopy), 19.
The preservation of ecology is also listed as a subsidiary mission. However, there is no firm indication that the armed forces are actually carrying out this mission. See "Misión Principal y Subsidiarias del Ejercito," Verde Oliva, no. 8 (November 1993): 7.
Frederic Ruiz-Ramón, "Depoliticization of Military Organizations: A Theoretical Framework, Policy Implications, and Case Studies of France, Spain, Argentina, and Nigeria" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1994), 311-18.
Deborah L. Norden, Military Rebellion in Argentina: Between Coups and Consolidation (Lincoln: The University of Nebraska Press, 1996).
William C. Smith, Authoritarianism and the Crisis of the Argentine Political Economy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 35.
Public opinion data collected in Argentina between 1992 and 1994 show persistent negative opinion of the armed forces in general. The data from 1992 report that 55 percent of Argentines surveyed believed the military's prestige had diminished over time, and 23 percent believed that the institution's prestige would continue to diminish into the future. Data collected between 1986 and 1994 reveal that positive public opinion of the armed forces, while increasing from a low of 24.6 percent in 1987 to a high of 40.2 percent in 1990, appeared to be stalled at percentages in the low to mid-30s (31.2 percent in 1991, 36.7 percent in 1992, and 36.3 percent in 1993). See Eduardo Rubilar, "Chilenos y argentinos opinan de sus FF.AA.," La Nación, October 18, 1992; "Percepciones y opiniones sobre las FF.AA. en Argentina y Chile analisis comparativo de dos estudios," Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad 7, no. 2 (April-June 1992): 30-35. See also, "Imagen publica de las fuerzas armadas," Cuaderno, no. 51 (Buenos Aires: Centro de Estudios Unión para la Nueva Mayoría, April 1994): 4-5, 16; and "Sondeos de Opinión sobre imagen de las fuerzas armadas," Cuaderno, no. 86 (Buenos Aires: Centro de Estudios Unión para la Nueva Mayoria, June 1994): 2, 4.
See Herbert Chandler Huser, "Civil-Military Relations in Argentina: The Alfonsín Years, 1983-1989" (Ph.D. diss., George Washington University, 1991); Norden, Military Rebellion in Argentina; Ruiz-Ramón, "Depoliticization of Military Organizations"; and David Pion-Berlin, "Between Confrontation and Accommodation: Military and Government Policy in Democratic Argentina," Journal of Latin American Studies 23, no. 3 (October 1991): 543-571.
Thomas Scheetz, "Military Expenditures in South America" (United Nations Disarmament Conference, Asunción, Paraguay, working paper, 1993).
See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1993-1994 (Washington, D.C.: ACDA Publications, 1994), 52.
See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures, 52.
J. Samuel Fitch, "Military Role Beliefs in Latin American Democracies." (United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., 1993, photocopy).
Apparently, Alfonsín deliberately tried to increase the status of the navy and air force at the expense of the army. In the first two years of his government, the navy's share of the total defense budget rose from 37 percent to 43.4 percent, but the army's share fell from 36.5 percent to less than 33 percent. In a similar vein, while Alfonsín cut many army programs, he allowed the air force to pursue the development of the controversial CONDOR ballistic missile program, which began in 1979. See Ruiz-Ramón, "Depoliticization of Military Organizations," 364.
Deborah L. Norden, "Between Coups and Consolidation: Military Rebellion in Post-Authoritarian Argentina" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1992), 164. (Italics mine.)
Complex generational and intraservice divisions were also at work. See Marcelo Fabián Sain, Los Levantamientos Carapintada, 1987-1991, 2 vols. (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1994); and Norden, Military Rebellion in Argentina.
The carapintadas developed an increasingly nationalist outlook in response to President Menem's neo-liberal economic and foreign policy orientation.
Pion-Berlin, "Theory and Theory-Building," 7-9.
Among other demands, the rebels wanted the government to elevate the status of the army's carapintada faction in order to address the institution's budgetary problems and to veer off or slow its course in foreign policy in general, but in foreign economic policy in particular.
See "La Ley de Seguridad Interior crea un sistema no militar," Cronista Comercial, July 30, 1990. Accompanying the Domestic Security Law was the creation of a bicameral Investigation Committee, composed of six senators and six deputies, to monitor the work of the national security and intelligence bodies. See "Guardians' guardians," Buenos Aires Herald, December 23, 1991.
"El Ejército condiciona su intervención por el tema de la seguridad interna," La Nación, January 19, 1994.
Fitch, "Military Role Beliefs in Latin American Democracies."
"Integrating Factor," Buenos Aires Herald, December 20, 1994.
"Jefe del Ejército de EE.UU. realiza visita oficial al país," Los Andes, March 24, 1992.
On the Menem administration's relations with the United States, see Anabella Busso, "Menem y Estados Unidos: Un Nuevo Rumbo en la Politica Exterior Argentina," in La Politica Exterior del Gobierno de Menem (Rosario, Argentina: Centro de Estudios en Relaciones Internacionales de Rosario, 1994), 53-109. Regarding Menem's resistance to assign drug-interdiction roles to the Argentine military, see "Descartan intervención militar en tareas de inteligencia interna," Rio Negro, March 25, 1994.
"Cooperación militar contra el cólera," La Nación, February 14, 1992.
Barber and Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power, 124-25.
Fitch, "Military Role Beliefs in Latin American Democracies," 74.
A presidential initiative in August 1994 (later passed by the legislature) eliminated conscription.
Public opinion surveys carried out after this incident suggested that only 25 percent of all Argentine citizens favored the continuation of compulsory military service. See "Rebeldes con Causas," Pagina, no. 12 (May 28, 1994). For a breakdown of opinion toward conscription based on gender, age, political affiliation, and level of education, see "Sondeo favorable a la eliminación del servicio militar obligatorio," La Nueva Provincia, October 2, 1994.
Leaders of the armed services, while they would have preferred a higher degree of consultation regarding the terms of the shift, basically accepted the decision and noted that the earlier system of compulsory military service corresponded to the "socio-cultural, economic, political, and military situation of the early years of the century, which were not the same as those of the end of the century." See "Quick-Marching the Army into the Future," Buenos Aires Herald, June 28, 1994.
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures, 52.
"Retreating to Advance," Buenos Aires Herald, September 28, 1992.
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures, 52.
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures, 52.
Two entire subsecretariats of the Ministry of Defense were devoted to the privatization and restructuring of military-controlled firms.
See "Venderán este mes bienes del Ejército," La Nación, December 3, 1991. See also "Confirman que se venderán 71 inmuebles del Ejército," La Prensa, December 3, 1991.
"Elogian el 'corage' de Menem al anular el proyecto 'Cóndor II,'" La Prensa, June 8, 1991. See also "Menem felicitado por desmantelar el Cóndor," La Voz del Interior, January 21, 1993.
"La Argentina se suma," La Razón, February 10, 1995, p. 11.
See Patrice Franko, "De Facto Demilitarization: Budget-Driven Downsizing in Latin America," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 36, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 37-74.
But there is a sense in which the military aspect of the question (i.e., changes in defense policies) have not accompanied the move toward economic integration. "La cuestión militar en la integración," Ambito Financiero, March 22, 1991.
See "Argentina Weighs Offer to Buy Falkland Islanders' Allegiance," New York Times, June 8, 1995, p. A13.
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures, 52.
"La indefensión ocupa hoy el primer plano," El Informador Público, November 5, 1993, p. 4. See also "Desde 1983 se redujo a la mitad el número de militares de alto rango," La Nación, August 16, 1993. Compared to other militaries in Latin America and Western Europe, the ratio of generals per total officials is quite small (1/160 in the Argentine army, as compared to, for example, 1/79 in the Chilean army and 1/75 in the French army).
For a statement that reflects this perception by the military, see "Predominio de imagen positiva en la opiníon pública sobre las Fuerzas Armadas." Tiempo Militar 1, no. 3 (April 9, 1993).
A March 17, 1995 interview the author conducted with Admiral Emilio Ossés, former head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Menem presidency, revealed the constraints perceived by officers on being outspoken. Admiral Ossés was "asked" to step down after expressing once too often his frustrations about low military budgets and for having said publicly that the government decided the military budget on economic factors alone. See "Ossés pidió evitar una visión exclusivamente economicista," La Nación, May 15, 1991. See also, "Almirante Ossés: no existe hipótesis de conflicto," La Nueva Provincia, September 28, 1991.
See Rosendo Fraga, La Cuestión Militar en los Noventa (Buenos Aires: Centro de Estudios Unión para la Nueva Mayoría, 1993), 187-96; and Deborah L. Norden, "Keeping the Peace, Outside and In: Argentina's United Nations Missions," International Peacekeeping 2, no. 3 (Autumn 1995): 330-49. For a military perspective on peacekeeping, see "La Argentina y las misiones de paz," Revista del Suboficial 75, no. 611 (March-April 1994).
Fraga, La Cuestión Militar en los Noventa, 195.
Norden, "Keeping the Peace," 14.
"Las misiones de paz tocaron techo," Cronista, January 25, 1994.
"Argentina en el Desfile de la Victoria," Cronista Comercial, June 11, 1991.
For a comparison of military salaries at various ranks to those of executive, legislative, and judicial officials, see "Las FF.AA. están controladas, afirmó el presidente," Rio Negro, September 23, 1994.
A special edition of the military journal Revista del Suboficial was dedicated to the question of Argentine involvement in UN peacekeeping missions. See Revista del Suboficial 75, no. 611 (March-April 1994).
Fitch, "Military Role Beliefs in Latin American Democracies," 73.
Another disadvantage of peacekeeping is that it is starting to strain financial and logistical resources. With UN deficits putting increased financial burdens on participant countries, Argentina is frequently saddled with having to pay for its contribution. In 1994 alone, Argentina spent $60 million to maintain 1,548 soldiers deployed in El Salvador, Haiti, Croatia, Israel, Cyprus, Kuwait, Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia, and the Western Sahara. "Las misiones de paz tocaron techo," Cronista, January 25, 1994.
"¿Adónde va el Ejército?" Clarín, October 16, 1994.
David Wurmser and Nancy Bearg Dyke, "The Professionalization of Peacekeeping, A Study Group Report," ed. Robert B. Oakley, Indar Jit Rikhye, and Kenneth M. Jensen (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, working paper, 1993), 8.
Civilians who have worked in the Defense Ministry report that a high degree of "de facto" military influence--in large part due to the omission of civilian policymakers--persists over issues that require a degree of technical knowledge. Author interviews with Virgilio Beltrán, former subsecretary of politics and strategy in the Menem administration, March 6, 1995; Rut Diamint, technical assistant in Subsecretariat of Politics and Strategy, March 7, 1995; and Guillermo Gasio, director of the National Defense School, March 15, 1995.
"El Presupuesto de Defensa para 1993 es superior a la suma de las partidas de Educación, Cultura, Salud y Acción Social," La Maga, January 6, 1993.
"El 80% del gasto va a los salarios," Cronista Comercial, May 12, 1991.
Thomas Scheetz, "El Marco Teórico, Político y Económico para una Reforma Militar en la Argentina," in Defensa No Provocativa: una propuesta de reforma militar para la Argentina, ed. Cnl. (R) Gustavo Caceres and Thomas Scheetz (Buenos Aires: Editorial Buenos Aires, 1995), 76-93.
Author interview with Virgilio Beltrán, former subsecretary of politics and strategy in the Menem administration, March 6, 1995.
For an elaboration on some of these ideas, see Wendy Hunter, "The Brazilian Military after the Cold War: In Search of a Mission," Studies in Comparative International Development 28, no. 4 (Winter 1994): 31-49.
See Stepan, The Military in Politics; and Peter Flynn, Brazil: A Political Analysis (Boulder Colo.: Westview Press, 1978).
For a comparison of the degree of repression in these countries, see Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 70. On public support for Brazil's military regimes, see Kurt von Mettenheim, "The Brazilian Voter in Democratic Transition, 1974-1982," Comparative Politics 23, no. 1 (October 1990): 23-44; see also Barbara Geddes and John Zaller, "Sources of Popular Support for Authoritarian Regimes," American Journal of Political Science 33, no. 2 (May 1989): 319-47.
See Wendy Hunter, "Back to the Barracks? The Military in Post-Authoritarian Brazil" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1992), chapter 3.
See Wendy Hunter, "Politicians Against Soldiers: Contesting the Military in Postauthoritarian Brazil," Comparative Politics 27, no. 4 (July 1995): 425-43, especially 436-39.
See Thomas E. Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil: 1964-1985 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 273.
Patrice M. Franko, "The U.S. and South America: Collaborators or Competitors?," in Hemispheric Security in Transition: Adjusting to the Post-1995 Environment, ed. L. Erik Kjonnerod (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1995), 196. See also Carlos H. Acuña and William C. Smith, "The Politics of Arms Production and the Arms Race among the New Democracies of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile," in Security, Democracy, and Development in U.S.-Latin American Relations, ed. Lars Schoultz, William C. Smith, and Augusto Varas (Miami: North-South Center, University of Miami, 1994), 224.
Computed from Secretaria de Planejamento e Coordenação da Presidência da República, Anuário Estatístico do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística-IBGE, 1985-1993). In computing these figures, I have corrected for the fact that this source includes the government's internal debt and social security spending in the total budget. The former increased greatly in the 1980s. The latter, previously in a special budget, began to be included in the overall government budget after 1988. Not correcting for this anomaly (that is, including these budget items) vastly exaggerates the relative decline of military spending.
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures, 55.
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures, 55.
See remarks by Thomaz Guedes da Costa as reported in Paul C. Psaila, Redefining National Security in Latin America: A Workshop Report, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Latin American Program, Working Paper 204 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1993), 9. When assessing such complaints, it should be kept in mind that the Brazilian military has spent large sums of money on the development of highly sophisticated technology. Hence, it is not surprising that it cannot cover basic operations.
Malorí José Pompermayer, "The State and the Frontier in Brazil: A Case Study of the Amazon" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1979), 89.
Henrique Paulo Bahiana, As Forças Armadas e o Desenvolvimento do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Editores Bloch, 1974), 45.
As U.S. military bases in Panama were in the process of closing, U.S. officials asked their Brazilian counterparts if they could use part of the Brazilian Amazon for jungle training. When Brazil responded negatively, the United States went to Guyana. In explaining its decision, Brazil accused the United States of having ulterior motives. See "O inimigo criado," Estado de São Paulo, August 3, 1993, p. 3; and "Desocupação do Panamá preocupa," Estado de São Paulo, August 15, 1993.
See "PCB tem tarefa para militar," Jornal do Brasil, April 22, 1989, p. 2.
Elizabeth Allen, "Calha Norte: Military Development in Brazilian Amazonia," Development and Change 23 (1992): 71-99.
On the movement of troops to the Amazon, see "A floresta verde-oliva," Istoé, April 13, 1994,
pp. 40-42.
See "Collor baixa decreto que amplia presença miliar nas regi·es de fronteira," Gazeta Mercantil, August 11, 1992. The jurisdiction of the northern command includes the states of Pará, Maranhão, Amapá, and part of Tocantins.
Michael S. Oswald, "Brazil's Amazon Protection System: Security and 'Sustainable' Development for the 1990s?" (Latin American Studies Program: University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, photocopy, 1994).
"Brasil vai á guerra," Istoé, January 19, 1994.
Daniel Zirker, "The Brazilian Military and the Amazon Region: National Security vs. the Environment?" (Paper presented at the conference, "Security in the Post-Summit Americas," University of Miami North-South Center, Fort Leslie J. McNair, Washington, D.C., March 1995), 19 (note 7).
"Governo estuda envio de tropas a Angola," Folha de São Paulo, June 15, 1993.
"EUA querem Brasil em operaç·es no Exterior," Estado de São Paulo, November 19, 1994.
Comments of Colonel Luis Carlos Guedes delivered at the conference "Confidence-Building Measures in the Southern Cone," Stimson Center/Naval War College/Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., May 25, 1995.
Acuña and Smith, "The Politics of Arms Production."
See Hunter, "Back to the Barracks?," chapter 3, for a fuller discussion on this point.
It deserves reiteration here that Latin American militaries have not completely discarded the possibility of renewed guerrilla insurgency. See "Chefes de 16 exércitos debatem 'subversão' na América Latina," Jornal do Brasil, November 9, 1993.
For three different opinions on whether the military should fight drug trafficking, see "As Forças Armadas devem combater o crime?," Folha de São Paulo, April 9, 1994.
Recent opinion polls continue to suggest that the public has more trust in the military than in either the militarized state police or the civil police. While 40 percent of those polled expressed confidence in the military, only 21 percent said they trusted the police (either category). "A Hora da Reflexão," Jornal do Brasil, June 11, 1995.
"Militares discutem sua missão com Itamar," Jornal do Brasil, January 30, 1993.
Brazil's federal system presents a major obstacle to a thorough reform of the police. The militarized state police (Policia Militar) is under the control of Brazil's still very powerful governors, for whom such reform is not a high priority.
See "Cariocas apóiam Exército na luta contra violência," Jornal do Brasil, August 23, 1994.
"Exército pronto para combater crime no Rio," Jornal do Brasil, August 23, 1994.
"Plano militar terá três prioridades," Jornal do Brasil, November 3, 1994.
"Itamar quer que militares subam morro," Folha de São Paulo, October 27, 1994.
"Reanudarán operativo militar en Rio de Janeiro," Clarin, March 27, 1995.
"Tanques não sobem morro," Veja, November 2, 1994.
"População aprova operação do Exército," Correio Braziliense, November 13, 1994.
"Comando do Exército vive fase popular," Jornal do Brasil, November 6, 1994.
"Zenildo promote investigar denúncia de tortura," Jornal de Brasília, December 1, 1994; "Exército enfrenta oposição para sair do Rio," Folha de São Paulo, December 2, 1994.
"Militares defendem 'intervenção branca' no Rio," Jornal do Brasil, October 24, 1994.
Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed. John J. Johnson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962).
"Exército: ação social com as prefeituras," O Globo, January 28, 1993.
Agüero, "The Latin American Military."
For these and other recent examples of army involvement in civic action, see "Militares prestam serviços à sociedade," Correio Braziliense, August 25, 1994, p. 6.
"Para SAE, guerra social ameaça a segurança," Folha de São Paulo, November 16, 1992.
"Exército aceita nova função social," Jornal do Brasil, February 16, 1993. See also "Exército espera com atuação social sensibilizar revisão constitucional," Jornal do Brasil, February 21, 1993.
"A Role for the Military," Latin American Weekly Report, February 4, 1993, p. 52.
For details, see Scott Mainwaring, "Democracy in Brazil and the Southern Cone: Achievements and Problems," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 37, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 113-79.
Frederick M. Nunn, The Military in Chilean History: Essays on Civil-Military Relations 1810-1973 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1976), 182, 188, 193, 242.
Confidential interview with the author.
Frederick M. Nunn, "The South American Military and (Re)Democratization: Professional Thought and Self-Perception," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 37, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 20.
Andrés Fontana, "Chile y Argentina: Percepciones Arcerca del Rol de las Fuerzas Armadas" (Buenos Aires, Fundación Simón Rodríguez, July 1992, photocopy). See also Eduardo Rubilar, "Chilenos y argentinos opinan de sus FF.AA.," La Nación, October 18, 1992.
Informative sources about the terms of Chile's negotiated transition include Mark Ensalaco, "In with the New, Out with the Old? The Democratising Impact of Constitutional Reform in Chile," Journal of Latin American Studies 26, no. 2 (May 1994): 409-29; and Brian Loveman, "¿Misión Cumplida? Civil Military Relations and the Chilean Political Transition," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 33, no. 3 (Fall 1991): 35-74.
This system, designed under the assumption that the center-left opposition coalition would have a majority and that the right would have slightly more than one-third of the vote, makes it possible for a party (alliance) commanding a little more than 33 percent of the vote to end up with one-half of all legislative seats.
See Francisco Aravena Rojas, "Chile y el gasto militar: un criterio histórico y jurídico de asignación," in Gasto Militar en América Latina: Procesos de decisiones y actores claves, ed. Francis Rojas Aravena (Santiago: Centro Internacional para el Desarrollo Económico [CINDE] and Facultad Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales [FLACSO], 1994), 239-77. See also, Guillermo Patillo, "Evolución y Estructura de Gasto de las Fuerzas Armadas de Chile, 1970-1990," Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad 7, no. 2 (April-June 1992): 1-13; and Augusto Varas and Claudio Fuentes, Defensa Nacional, Chile 1990-1994: Modernización y Desarrollo (Santiago: FLACSO, 1994).
Patillo, "Evolución y Estructura," 10, 12.
See Silvia Yermani, "CUT pide bajar gasto militar," La Nación, May 2, 1992. See also Teresa Espinoza, "Ley Reservada del Cobre debe ser eliminada, afirmó ministro Hales," La Epoca, December 20, 1992.
It should be noted, however, that this autonomy is far from absolute. Given Chile's broader democratic framework, the military is necessarily counterbalanced by competing groups. The military budget has decreased in recent years in relation to social spending. In the years between 1989 and 1992, defense expenditures steadily fell from 12.82 percent to 10.08 percent of the national budget. In the same period, the percentage of the budget devoted to social spending rose from 62.13 percent to 65.64 percent. See República de Chile, Ministerio de Hacienda, Dirección de Presupuestos, Estadísticas de Finanzas Públicas, 1989-1992 (Santiago: Ministerio de Hacienda, June 1993), 57.
"Chile's Army Stands Tall, and Casts a Shadow," New York Times, January 26, 1990, p. E4.
Nunn, The Military in Chilean History, 250-51.
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1993-1994 (London: Brassey's, 1993), 227.
Augusto Varas and Claudio Fuentes, "Servicio Militar Obligatoria," chapter 4 in Defensa Nacional, Chile 1990-1994: Modernización y Desarrollo, 164-88.
A recent public seminar sponsored by the Army attested to this persistent distrust of neighboring Bolivia, Peru, and Argentina. See Academia de Guerra, Seminario: Política de Defensa, Memorial del Ejército de Chile, no. 441, 1992.
María Irene Soto, "Los secretos del HV-3," Hoy, no. 730 (July 15-21, 1991), pp. 6-7.
For a brief but informative discussion of the major projects of each branch, see Varas and Fuentes, Defensa Nacional, 35-68. See also Claudio S. Fuentes, "Los Efectos de una Nueva Realidad Internacional en las Fuerzas Armadas de América Latina: El Caso Chileno" (Paper presented at the XVIII International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Atlanta, Georgia, March 10-12, 1994).
See "Chile Ha Sido Reticente a Enviar Personal de las FF.AA. al Extranjero," El Mercurio, February 9, 1995, p. C3; and "Esperan Aumento de Participación Chilena en Misiones de Paz," El Mercurio, January 11, 1994, pp. A1, A12.
Survey opinion data show some public support for such participation. Of all those polled in Chile, 26 percent felt it was legitimate for the armed forces to carry out functions related to order and public security. See Andrés Fontana, "Chile y Argentina." See also "Chilenos y Argentinos opinan de sus FF.AA.," La Nación, October 18, 1992.
See "Carabineros lose military status," Latin American Weekly Report, November 15, 1990, p. 11.
"No part for army in anti-terrorist unit," Latin American Regional Reports--Southern Cone, May 30, 1991, p. 6.
"FF.AA. y de Oreden No Objetan Dirección Civil para Inteligencia," El Mercurio, April 18, 1991, p. C3.
Nunn, "The South American Military and (Re)Democratization": 20.
Barber and Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power, 62, 185, 239.
Author interview with Jorge Burgos, undersecretary of the Army, Ministry of Defense, Santiago, Chile, February 7, 1995.
See "Ejército Plantea Crear Comisión Sobre 'Fronteras Interiores,'" El Mercurio, July 19, 1994, pp. A1, A12; "Pinochet Llamó a Dejar de Lado Confrontaciones," El Mercurio, August 20, 1993, pp. A1, A20. See also "La Conquista de las fronteras interiores," La Nación, July 5, 1994; and "Ejército Pide Desarrollar Nuevos Polos de Población," El Mercurio, July 11, 1994.
See the three-part series in El Diario by Jorge Martínez Busch, "El Mar Presencial: Actualidad, Desafíos y Futuro," May 28, 1991, p. 2; "El Mar Presencial: Actualidad, Desafíos y Futuro," May 29, 1991, p. 2; and "El Mar Presencial: Actualidad, Desafíos y Futuro," May 31, 1991.
James L. Zackrison and Lt. James E. Meason, "Subject: Chile's Theory of Mar Presencial" (unpublished paper, 11 November 1994).
"Admiral Gets the Chop," Latin American Regional Reports--Southern Cone, July 2, 1992, 3; "US Aircraft Not the Start of Argentina-Chile Arms Race," Latin American Regional Reports--Southern Cone, July 2, 1992, p. 8.
See Joseph Nye's concluding remarks in Civil-Military Relations and the Consolidation of Democracy (Washington, D.C.: International Forum for Democratic Studies, 1995), 20-21.
For a further elaboration of this contradiction, see Wendy Hunter, "Contradictions of Civilian Control: Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in the 1990s," Third World Quarterly 15, no. 4 (1994): 633-53.
