TOC | Introduction | One | Two | Three | Four | Five | Six | Seven | Eight | Nine | Ten | Eleven | Twelve | Notes | Contributors

Private Peacemaking USIP-Assisted Peacemaking Projects of Nonprofit Organizations

Georgian-Ossetian Joint Brainstorming

by Keith Fitzgerald

In April 1995, Professor Roger Fisher, founder and senior advisor of the Conflict Management Group (CMG), and Keith Fitzgerald, also of CMG, traveled to the Republic of Georgia to meet with the Georgian leadership and the leadership of the breakaway region of South Ossetia. After years of civil war, the sides agreed to a cease-fire in 1992 and the situation remained frozen in the years that followed. Authorities in Takhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, maintained de facto independence from Georgia while suffering years of isolation and economic stagnation. Officials in Tbilisi, capital of the newly independent former Soviet Republic of Georgia, were trying to build a state out of the ashes of their own war for independence, at the same time attempting to hold it together in the face of two civil wars–with secessionist movements in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

     When the project began, the only communication between the Georgian and Ossetian sides was in the form of partisan speeches, broadcasts, and articles, or rejected demands of one another. In the meantime, tens of thousands of refugees were unable or unwilling to return to their homes; the economic crisis continued; and the rule of law could not be relied upon.

     CMG’s preliminary diagnosis of the stalemate focused on a few elements of the conflict.

• Partisan perceptions differed greatly among Georgians and Ossetians–about the origins of the conflict, the legitimacy of each side’s authority, and so on.

• The sides were so preoccupied with substantive issues concerning sovereignty and territorial integrity that they gave little attention to the process by which they were dealing with them.

• Each side had put forward demands rather than clarifying its interests.

• Each side saw itself as reasonable in rejecting the other’s demands.

• There were no options being discussed which might have been acceptable to both sides.

• The process in place at the time was unlikely to suggest such options.

     The CMG team suggested an informal, unofficial process in which a few knowledgeable and influential people from each side would meet to generate possible options which might at some future point be recommended to leaders. CMG professionals would facilitate the meetings. The process, known as “facilitated joint brainstorming,” offered a number of improvements on the status quo, including the following.

• Influential people on both sides of the conflict would have an opportunity to meet as private persons rather than as officials, building personal relationships which would allow them to listen to each other more effectively, to speak more candidly and frequently, and to begin trusting each other.

• Participants could work to understand the perceptions and interests of the other side. This would allow members of one side to see how the other might see things differently without having to conclude that their own perceptions were “wrong.”

• Any ideas developed at the session would be those of the participants. Facilitators, unlike mediators, do not propose agreements to the parties. Sessions are normally conducted with groundrules ensuring confidentiality and non-attribution. Thus there is no incentive to claim credit or place blame for any of the ideas, which are generated rather than proposed.

• Rather than focusing exclusively on the issues which are the subject of the conflict, participants would be encouraged to consider the process by which they might deal with any challenging issues.

• The sessions would include a number of lectures on negotiation theory and several skill-building exercises designed to enhance the ability of participants to deal with ongoing conflicts.

• Participants would be invited with the explicit understanding that they speak only for themselves, and that no commitments would be requested—or even allowed—at the meeting. Participants would also be informed that ideas were to be explored without prejudice to any existing official positions. This allows participants to explore options freely without the risk that any idea might be interpreted as a concession or a commitment.

     With assurances that the session would be unofficial and without prejudice, and that no substantive commitments would be made, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze and South Ossetian leader Ludwig Chibirov asked CMG to arrange the initial meeting. The CMG team suggested that the first meeting address practical problems, such as repairing roads and railways or restoring telecommunications, without prejudice to the issue of South Ossetia’s constitutional status.

     In summer 1995, CMG conducted a seminar on international mediation for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Shortly thereafter, the Foreign Ministry agreed to provide funding for the Georgia-South Ossetia project, and CMG formed a partnership with the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) regional office for the Transcaucasus in Tbilisi and with members of the Norwegian Red Cross (collectively known as “NorTeam”). The combined resources of CMG and NRC allowed the project team to maintain a permanent presence in the region, which was particularly important because of the logistical difficulties in the Caucasus and Takhinvali’s near-total isolation. The partnership also combined the advice and facilitation skills of CMG with the practical assistance NRC offered to refugees and local populations in the region.

     The first facilitated joint brainstorming session was held in Norway in January 1996 and was seen as a breakthrough by participants and leaders on both sides of the conflict. Influential people met for the first time, and they conceived a number of joint projects and ideas for moving forward. At the end of the session, participants requested a follow-up meeting expressly to address the difficult status question.

     In May 1996, the CMG/NRC team facilitated another joint brainstorming session, also in Norway, on the status question. Participants generated ideas on the many categories of issues associated with constitutional status: division of executive, legislative, and judicial powers; human rights policies; border and security arrangements; economic and environmental policies; and so forth. They also designed a possible framework for an official bilateral negotiation process, and expressed a desire that their respective leaders meet for the first time.

     The following summer saw a number of political events in the region which had direct and indirect consequences for the project. These included the Russian presidential elections; the war in Chechnya; a meeting between Shevardnadze and Chibirov; the establishment of an official Georgian-Ossetian negotiation process; and profound political changes in Takhinvali. Although some project activity occurred during this period, the next facilitated joint brainstorming session was not held until June 1997, after the bilateral delegations held their first official meetings. The session, funded by the United States Institute of Peace and the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, was designed to focus on the possibilities for economic cooperation, the issue of refugees and repatriation, and on what people on each side might do to enhance public confidence in a process for reconciliation and the possibility of a political settlement of the status question.

     The Georgian-Ossetian facilitated joint brainstorming project has been successful for a number of reasons, the most striking the way in which the leadership of both sides is now approaching conflict. The partnership between CMG and the Norwegian Refugee Council has also been rewarding to both organizations in terms of mutual learning. In general, as an NGO peacemaking effort, the unofficial, informal process helped to establish an official bilateral process where it did not exist. It also helped to cultivate and prepare key individuals to take part. Now that an official process exists, the brainstorming project can be used to generate ideas which may be turned into decisions in the official process; it can help the sides set an agenda and prepare for official talks; and it can help participants overcome obstacles in the event that the official talks become deadlocked.

Challenges

     There are other obstacles more directly related to the situation. Unfortunately, there are always those who benefit politically and financially from chaos and conflict. Some hard-liners on both sides, particularly in the early stages of the project, saw informal cooperation as a threat to their interests. For example, because of the stalemate and South Ossetia’s de facto independence, Georgia’s northern border with the Russian Federation was unguarded on one side. This allowed organized criminal enterprises and local smuggling operations to flourish. If such groups feel threatened by foreign NGOs trying to help authorities–including law enforcement authorities–to cooperate, they sometimes attempt to frustrate those efforts, through intimidation, theft, political influence, etc.

     Other regional actors, particularly the Russian Federation and the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) have been engaged in official efforts to bring the sides together or to settle the conflict entirely. The joint brainstorming project is designed to help the parties generate useful ideas, not to make decisions, which are left to those with official authority. This is a limitation on NGO peacemaking activity, here used by design to make the brainstorming process possible. The ideas are meant to contribute to any official process, though at times it can be a challenge to coordinate such efforts–particularly when many of the participants are involved in both. Fortunately, the project team has maintained a good working relationship with the OSCE mission in Georgia, and participants routinely inform their counterparts in Moscow about the usefulness of the work done at the unofficial meetings. In addition, the project has received valuable assistance from the U.S. embassy in Tbilisi, the Georgia desk at the U.S. Department of State, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry in Oslo, and the Norwegian embassy in Moscow.

     The project on Georgian-Ossetian joint brainstorming provides a useful example of how official and unofficial–governmental and nongovernmental–peacemaking activities can be combined to maximum effect. A government (in this case the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway) is joined by an independent grantmaking institution (the U.S. Institute of Peace) to support the collaborative effort of two international NGOs (CMG and NRC) to work with senior Georgian and Ossetian officials, in an unofficial, informal capacity, in order to generate ideas which in turn are used to create and later support official efforts to manage an ethnic conflict in the Transcaucasus.

TOC | Introduction | One | Two | Three | Four | Five | Six | Seven | Eight | Nine | Ten | Eleven | Twelve | Notes | Contributors

Home  |  Jobs  |  FAQs   |  Contact Us  |  Directions  |  Privacy Policy  |  Site Map

United States Institute of Peace  --  1200 17th Street NW  -- Washington, DC 20036
(202) 457-1700 (phone)  --  (202) 429-6063 (fax)
Send Feedback