January 2006 | Peaceworks No. 54
David Albright and Corey Hinderstein
Dismantling the DPRK's Nuclear Weapons Program: A Practicable, Verifiable Plan of Action
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Summary
Verified dismantlement of the nuclear weapons program of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea (DPRK) can be accomplished successfully. Although difficulties abound in reaching an
agreement with the DPRK to achieve this goal, the methods and steps involved in the dismantlement process are well understood.
Because this goal remains vital to U.S. and international security, the United States has joined
with China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea in working toward verified denuclearization of the
Korean peninsula with the cooperation of the DPRK. These six nations have launched a series
of negotiations, called the Six-Party Talks, aimed at resolving the crisis over the DPRK's nuclear
program. These nations are also attempting to create a plan to dismantle the DPRK's program
in a manner with which all the nations can feel secure.
The states intend to implement cooperative verified dismantlement, which requires a state to
voluntarily dismantle a nuclear program in cooperation with a verification body or organization. The goal of verified dismantlement is to obtain high confidence that the program no
longer exists and that reconstitution will be difficult and likely to be detected relatively quickly
or at least long before significant quantities of banned items are produced. In this sense, the
dismantlement is called irreversible. The DPRK would conduct the actual dismantlement, and
a verification organization would verify that the dismantlement has occurred.
In the process of negotiating a verified dismantlement plan, both the DPRK and the United
States have made proposals that are unacceptable to one another due primarily to a lack of
confidence in the other's veracity. A middle ground must be found to move for ward with this
important task.
The United States originally called its proposal the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of the DPRK's nuclear program. Under this proposal, once the DPRK had
dismantled its nuclear program and permitted thorough monitoring, it could expect a range
of economic and energy benefits and security guarantees from the United States and its allies.
In its proposal, the DPRK stated its willingness to scrap its nuclear weapons program in a step-by-step approach if it first received a list of security guarantees and substantial economic and
energy benefits. However, most of the DPRK's public statements have focused on an offer to
freeze its nuclear program in return for benefits, with actual dismantlement to come later in
the process. In addition, the DPRK has rejected the complete elimination of its civil nuclear
programs and insisted on the completion of a large electricity-generating nuclear reactor, a
step strongly opposed by the United States.
In September 2005, the six parties issued a statement in which they agreed that the goal of
the Six-Party Talks is the verified denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. In that agreement,
the DPRK committed to abandon its nuclear weapons and all nuclear programs and the other
par ties agreed to actions such as giving energy aid and working toward normalization of relations. The agreement does not address many key disputed issues, such as the timing of
dismantlement and rewards, how dismantlement will be verified, the scope of programs to be
abandoned, and the future of the DPRK's civil nuclear programs. These issues will be addressed
during subsequent rounds of talks.
This report outlines an approach that attempts to address the disagreements that the United States
and the DPRK have with each other's proposals. This third proposal, called "progressive dismantlement," aims to allow a more informed discussion of the process of verified dismantlement.
The proposal involves three phases that would gradually denuclearize the Korean peninsula
and bring the DPRK into compliance with both the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and
North-South agreements. Verification would occur throughout the process, and incentives
and security guarantees would also be implemented in stages linked to the dismantlement
and verification steps.
This approach takes into account the underlying suspicions of the parties to an agreement.
U.S. officials worr y that the DPRK would cheat and hide key nuclear materials or facilities. The
DPRK leadership likely suspects the other parties' commitment to rewards and their motivations for conducting certain verification activities. The progressive dismantlement model recognizes the initial lack of trust among the parties and allows confidence building through the
successful implementation of initial cooperative steps. Verified dismantlement is more likely to
succeed in a positive and cooperative climate.
This repor t discusses the three main nuclear programs subject to dismantlement and the
procedures and actions necessar y to verif y their dismantlement. It also discusses the challenge of bringing the DPRK into compliance with the NPT. All told, then, four tasks must be
under taken:
- Task 1: Halting plutonium production, separation, storage, and waste-processing facilities.
- Task 2: Achieving verified dismantlement of any nuclear weapons and the irreversible,
verifiable dismantlement of the set of facilities involved in researching, developing, testing,
and manufacturing nuclear weapons.
- Task 3: Dismantling any uranium enrichment activities and the facilities to research, develop,
test, and make enrichment equipment, such as gas centrifuges.
- Task 4: Implementing the DPRK-IAEA safeguards agreement and bringing the DPRK into
compliance with the NPT after it rejoins the treaty.
All four tasks will require the verification organization to conduct a range of activities to
ensure that dismantlement has occurred and that sensitive items are destroyed or shipped out
of the DPRK, as well as to gain confidence in the absence of undeclared materials, equipment,
and facilities. The pace and outcome of the process will depend primarily on the DPRK's transparency and cooperation with the verification organization.
The report concludes that the best choice for a verification organization is the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supplemented by nuclear experts from the nuclear weapons
states, a plan called IAEA Plus. This approach has the advantage of using the expertise the
IAEA has gained through routine safeguards activities and experiences in Iraq, Iran, South
Africa, and Libya and the special resources and expertise of the nuclear weapons states.
The report emphasizes that the DPRK must be cooperative with and transparent to the verification organization and the other parties to any agreement. Such commitment will likely
depend on the DPRK's belief that its vital interests are ser ved by an agreement to verifiably
dismantle its nuclear weapons program. Because of the suspicions that exist between the
DPRK and the other participants in the Six-Party Talks, a goal of the negotiators should be to
find ways to gradually improve the political and security atmosphere between the DPRK and
the other parties. An improved atmosphere can ease the verification process and the task of
developing confidence that the DPRK is not hiding portions of its nuclear program.
The report shows that verification should start early in the implementation phase of any
agreement. Delays in implementing verification could make it more difficult to achieve confidence that the DPRK is dismantling its programs according to its commitments.
During the verification process, inspector rights of access will be critical. As a result, U.S. negotiators should encourage the DPRK to grant unrestricted access to sites as deemed necessary
by the verification organization, with the understanding that the DPRK can take reasonable
steps to protect vital secrets in programs that are not covered by a dismantlement agreement.
This report discusses how these concerns can be balanced under a vigorous verification plan.
The United States should modify its position on future DPRK civil nuclear programs. It has
already accepted an exemption for the use of radioisotopes in nuclear medicine and civil
industries. The continuation and expansion of such civil programs is vital to any nation and
may contribute to effective dismantlement by providing jobs for displaced nuclear scientists
and technicians. The fate of nuclear electricity generation programs is more controversial, but
any construction work on a nuclear reactor is unlikely before the DPRK has accomplished
verified dismantlement. In addition, if a power reactor is built at some future date, IAEA
inspections can provide adequate verification against potential misuse of this reactor.
Although achieving cooperative verified dismantlement has many possible pitfalls and trials,
the outcome is of the utmost importance for the security of the international community. If
the Six-Party Talks can come to an agreement, then a realistic process to denuclearize the
DPRK will be under way for the first time. All members of the Six-Party Talks should set this
goal as their highest priority.
About the Authors
David Albright, a physicist, is founder and president of the Institute for Science and
International Security (ISIS), a nonprofit, nonpartisan institution integrating technical, scientific,
and policy research aimed at stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, bringing about greater
transparency of nuclear activities worldwide, and achieving deep reductions in nuclear arse-
nals. He has published numerous assessments of secret nuclear weapons programs throughout
the world and has been cited often in the media and appeared frequently on television and
radio. He is coauthor of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories,
Capabilities, and Policies and Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle. From 1992 until 1997,
he cooperated actively with the IAEA Action Team focusing on analyses of Iraqi documents and
past procurement activities. In June 1996, he was the first nongovernmental inspector of the
Iraqi nuclear program.
Corey Hinderstein is the deputy director of ISIS. Her work includes key research and analytical contributions to state-specific proliferation assessments and case studies, including
using commercial satellite imagery as a research tool.
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