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Territorial Disputes and Their Resolution The Case of Ecuador and Peru

Notes

1. "Peru-Ecuador: Accord Said to Set First Springboard for Talks," Inter-Press Service, February 17, 1995.
2. Santiago Accord, November 1997; Brasilia Declaration, January 1998.
3. Studies include Gary Geortz and Paul F. Diehl, Territorial Changes and International Conflict. (New York: Routledge, 1992); Paul Huth, Standing Your Ground. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); S. Kocs, "Territorial Disputes and Interstate War, 1945—1987," Journal of Politics (1995); John Vasquez, The War Puzzle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); and Edward Kolodziej and I. William Zartman, "Coping with Conflict: A Global Approach" in Edward Kolodziej and Roger Kanet, eds., Coping with Conflict after the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 3—32.
4. In the 1970s, for example, when the promise of the Pastaza-Marañón basin near the border with Ecuador seemed to promise future oil revenues, the Peruvian government obligated its anticipated oil revenues for several years in advance through the purchase of military equipment to secure the territory. William L. Krieg, Ecuadoran-Peruvian Rivalry in the Upper Amazon, 2nd ed. (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1986), 251.
5. The classic sources on the history of territorial conflicts in the region are Gordon Ireland’s Boundaries, Possessions, and Conflicts in South America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938) and Boundaries, Possessions, and Conflicts in Central and North America and the Caribbean (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1941).
6. Preston James, Latin America, 3rd ed. (New York: Odyssey Press, 1959).
7. Steven R. Ratner, "Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possedetis and the Borders of New States." American Journal of International Law 90, no. 4 (1996): 590—624.
8. Ibid., 595.
9. The United States and Mexico during border clashes in 1907; Salvador in 1933; and Costa Rica, Venezuela, and the United States in 1937.
10. Equity and fairness may also be criteria for the decision. In the case of arbitration, the parties can establish other parameters for the decision in the compromis, an agreement between the parties that defines the issue to be arbitrated and the details for selecting arbitrators and establishing the arbitral tribunal.
11. At the First International Conference of American States, held in Washington DC in 1889—90, a comprehensive Plan of Arbitration was elaborated but not ratified. Wide- scale acceptance of arbitration came at the Hague Peace Conference of 1899.
12. Beth A. Simmons, "See You in ‘Court’? The Appeal to Quasi-Judicial Legal Processes in the Settlement of Territorial Disputes," in Paul F. Diehl, ed., A Roadmap to War (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, forthcoming).
13. For example, the Treaty of Berlin guaranteed the territorial integrity of Turkey in 1878; a number of treaties have included guarantee clauses regarding the neutrality of Belgium (1831, 1839, and 1867). Guarantees are also written into parts of the Locarno Pact (the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee of October 16, 1925) in which Britain, France, Belgium, and Italy guaranteed the maintenance of status-quo boundaries between Germany and Belgium and Germany and France.
14. L. Oppenheim, International Law, 2d ed., vol. 1 (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1912), 599—601.
15. EFE News Agency, Madrid, February 6, 1995. This is according to British and U.S. studies. Reports of the Peruvian National Mining and Oil Society have confirmed that there is a productive open-pit gold mine at Yanacocha, near the region in conflict. In Ecuadoran territory, the Pachicutza gold mine was discovered within the past few years and is being exploited by the Canadian company Tux Gold. Peruvian sources assert there are uranium resources, although their number and importance are still unknown. The presence of oil in the area has never been confirmed; no company has ever conducted serious oil prospecting work in the Condor Mountains range.
16. A number of proposals for definitive lines have been made over time, including those contained in the Pedemont-Mosquera Protocol (1830), the Garcia-Herrera Treaty (1890), the Mendez-Pidal Line (1908) and the Spanish Council of State Line (1909), the "Status Quo" Line (1936) and the Rio Protocol Line (1942). See Krieg, Ecuadoran-Peruvian Rivalry in the Upper Amazon, insert following p. 36.
17. Figures cited by David R. Mares, "Deterrence Bargaining in the Ecuador-Peru Enduring Rivalry: Designing Strategies around Military Weakness," Security Studies 6, no. 2 (Winter 1996/97): 99.
18. The treaty was ratified in Peru as Legislative Resolution No. 9574 of the Peruvian Congress Approving the Rio de Janeiro Protocol, February 26, 1942. The Ecuadoran congress approved the Rio Protocol 26 votes in favor, 3 against, and 5 abstentions in the Senate, and by 43 in favor, 3 against, and 3 abstentions in the House of Representatives. The only other bilateral treaty in force prior to 1942 was the Treaty of Alliance and Friendship of 1932 (the Pando-Novoa Treaty), which defined Peruvian rights with respect to Tumbes, Jaen, and Maynas, leaving a comprehensive boundary agreement for a later date.
19. Gabriel Marcella, War and Peace in the Amazon: Strategic Implications for the United States and Latin America of the 1995 Ecuador-Peru War (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, November 24, 1995).
20. Embassy of Ecuador, "The Ecuadoran-Peruvian Territorial Problem" (Washington D.C.: Embassy of Ecuador, 1995.) Despite Peru’s decisive victory in 1941, the 1942 treaty seems to have envisaged the transfer of very little territory (perhaps some 5,392 square miles net) from Ecuador to Peru, compared to the 1936 line. See also Marcella, War and Peace in the Amazon.
21. Jack Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America. (New York: Praeger, 1985), 97.
22. Eduardo Rivoldi, Commercial Attaché, Embassy of Peru, "Letter to the Editor," Journal of Commerce, April 26, 1995; see also EFE News Agency, Madrid, March 3, 1995. In March 1995, President Sixto Durán- Ballén continued to demand that the 1942 Rio Protocol must be changed, while Peru’s president continued to insist that "the clauses of the Rio Protocol are clear, and . . . bilateral treaties cannot be revised on a unilateral basis."
23. Mares, "Deterrence Bargaining," 99.
24. David Scott Palmer, "Peru’s Persistent Problems," Current History 90 (January 1990).
25. EFE News Agency, Madrid, October 8, 1991.
26. Radio Programa del Peru, January 11, 1991; translated in Summary of World Broadcasts AL/1192, September 3, 1991; Latin America Weekly Report, January 9, 1992; EFE News Agency, Madrid, October 16, 1991.
27. Radio Programa del Peru, January 10, 1992.
28. The Ecuadoran foreign minister described the incident as "a minor scuffle," and not an "unmanageable situation." Voz de los Andes (Quito), August 13, 1993.
29. Official figures are toward the low end, while "reliable sources" place estimates toward the high end; see Mares, "Deterrence Bargaining." See also Marcella, War and Peace in the Amazon, 21.
30. Glenn Weidner, "Operation Safe Border: The Ecuadoran-Peru Crisis," Joint Force Quarterly 53 (Spring 1996): 52—58.
31. Radio Programas del Peru, Lima, February 2, 1995.
32. This agreement was not without criticism in Ecuador. Former Ecuadoran president Rodrigo Borja (1988—1992) called the agreement "a step backward, which for me is unacceptable." "Ecuador, Peru Agree to End Three-Week Border War; Former President Criticizes Pact," Chicago Tribune, February 18, 1995, 16. The proposal, which Peru had supported earlier, was not previously acceptable to Ecuador. The agreement has been criticized by opposition forces in both nations as diplomatically weak.
33. Weidner, "Operation Safe Border."
34. Voz de los Andes (Quito), February 24, 1996.
35. Roger Atwood, "Peru, Ecuador to Begin Full-Scale Border Talks," Reuters, October 29, 1996. "Ecuadoran Defense Minister on Peace Process: Relations with Peru," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, "Expreso" (Guayaquil), November 4, 1996. According to Ecuadoran Defense Minister Gen. Victor Manual Bayas (ret.), Ecuador got two things from the Santiago Agreement: a tacit admission that a dispute did in fact exist; and a way to reach the Amazon (though agreement on how such access is to be obtained remains an "impasse").
36. Other third parties have played a persuasive role in accepting and complying with the cease-fire but have urged cooperation with the Guarantors. For example, Pope John Paul II sent envoy Cardinal Carlo Furno to persuade leaders to respect the cease-fire and peace agreement. The envoy also expressed support for the work of the four guarantor countries that are monitoring the cease-fire. The envoy’s visit did not amount to a full-fledged mediation mission, because only Ecuador had officially asked for the Vatican’s intervention; "Pope Sends Peace Envoy to Ecuador and Peru," Reuters, February 27, 1995. In June 1995, OAS Secretary- General Cesar Gaviria said that he was willing "to contribute to a definitive solution" to the border dispute between Ecuador and Peru, but made it clear that this offer was subject to efforts by the Guarantors; "OAS Willing to Mediate between Ecuador, Peru." Xinhua News Agency, June 6, 1995.
37. Voz de Los Andes (Quito), December 15, 1995 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter "FBIS") Daily Report/Latin America, December 18, 1995, 242.
38. Sally Bowen, "Peru Deal on MiG Jets Confirmed," Financial Times (London), November 26, 1996, 8. The order amounted to probably eighteen fighters.
39. "Arms Race to Threaten Talks." Jane’s Intelligence Review 4, no. 2 (February 1, 1997): 16.
40. Ibid.
41. According to the BBC, General Paco Moncayo confirmed in November 1997 that Ecuador is currently considering the purchase of more jet fighters; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 8, 1997 (original source: American Television, Lima, November 6, 1997) and November 12, 1997 (original source: Voz de los Andes [Quito], November 10, 1997). See also Latin America Regional Reports, Andean Group, December 9, 1997, p. 6. In addition Chile, Peru's traditional rival in the region, has announced its intention to purchase advanced fighters, particularly the U.S. F-16, the Swedish JAS-39 Grippen, or the French Mirage 2000-5; see "Some in Latin America Fear End of U.S. Ban Will Stir Arms Race," New York Times, August 3, 1997, p. 11.
42. See Marcella, War and Peace in the Amazon, 13.
43. Voz de Los Andes (Quito) in FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, April 18, 1997.
44. For Article 6, see Mares, "Deterrence Bargaining," 99. EFE News Agency, Madrid, May 2, 5, and 15, 1995. On May 2, for example, Fujimori categorically rejected the possibility of giving Ecuador a sovereign outlet to the Amazon River through Peruvian territory.
45. International Herald Tribune, January 21, 1998, p. 3.
46. Agence France-Presse, January 20, 1998.
47. Inter-Press Service, February 23, 1998.
48. See "President Alarcon Confirms Decision to Continue Peace Talks," Voz de Los Andes (Quito) in FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, June 10, 1998.
49. Lima Panamerica Television Network broadcast in FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, January 13, 1997.
50. As recently as 1992, an official map of Ecuador shows more than 100,000 square miles of Peru’s territory in the Amazon Basin as belonging to Ecuador. For a discussion of the iconography of territorial loss, see Gary S. Elbow. "Territorial Loss and National Image: The Case of Ecuador," Conference of Latin Americanist Geographers Yearbook, 1996 (Austin, Texas: Conference of Latin Americanist Geographers, 1996).
51. Summary of Lima Radio Programas del Peru Network broadcast in FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, January 14, 1997.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. On May 13, Peruvian forces captured seven Ecuadoran soldiers who were allegedly laying mines in what was claimed as Peruvian territory. Both heads of state and their foreign ministers reiterated their commitment to continue the talks and settle the dispute, and that talks should continue in the most normal and cordial way possible. For comments by Fujimori, see summary of Lima America Television Network broadcast in FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, May 16, 1997. See also the statement of Peru’s acting foreign minister Jorge Gonzalez Izquierdo on Lima Radio Programas del Peru Network, May 15, 1997; see also statements by Ecuadoran Foreign Minister Jose Ayala Lasso, EFE News Agency, Madrid, May 15, 1997. Similar statements were made by the Ecuadoran military representative to MOMEP, Voz de Los Andes (Quito), May 15, 1997.
55. See especially William P. Avery, "Origins and Consequences of the Border Dispute Between Ecuador and Peru," InterAmerican Economic Affairs 38, no. 1 (Summer 1984): 65—77. See also Ronald Bruce St. John, "Conflict in the Cordillera del Condor: The Ecuador-Peru Dispute," IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 4, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 78—85.
56. A nationwide strike was announced for February 5, and violent street demonstrations took place to protest large increases in telephone and electric bills, a 344- percent rise in the cost of cooking gas, increases in public transportation fares, and reductions in state assistance for national medical services. EFE News Agency, Madrid, in FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, January 29, 1997. Representatives of different economic sectors also called for Bucaram’s constitutional removal and the resignation of several ministers. EFE News Agency, Madrid, in FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, February 5, 1997. See also Voz de Los Andes (Quito) in FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, February 9, 1997.
57. The popular Peruvian press was evidently quite surprised at this. Lima Gestion (Internet version) in FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, February 13, 1997.
58. Inaugural address, FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, February 12, 1997; Quito Radio Network, press interview, February 16, 1997. Santa Fe de Bogota El Tiempo, February 19, 1997, Mexico City Notimex. President Alarcon, national address, February 18, 1997, Lima Expreso.
59. FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, February 17 and 18, 1997; Voz de Los Andes (Quito) in FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, April 28, 1997. La Paz TVB Television Network, April 28, 1997.
60. Voz de Los Andes (Quito) in FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, March 1, 1997.
61. Ecuador has continued to insist that "One half of Ecuador was taken by Peru through 120 years. . . ." Embassy of Ecuador, "The Ecuadoran-Peruvian Territorial Problem."
62. E. Ferrero Costa, "Peruvian Foreign Policy: Current Trends, Constraints, and Opportunities," Journal of InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs 29, no. 2 (Summer 1987): 64—65.
63. Fernando Bustamante, "Ecuador: Putting an End to the Ghosts of the Past?" Journal of InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs 34, no. 4 (Winter 1992—93): 204.
64. Ibid., 208—9.
65. "Ecuador-Peru: Citizens of Both Nations Open to Compromise," Inter Press Service, February 20, 1996.
66. Lima Radio Programas del Peru Network in FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, January 14, 1997.
67. Mares, "Deterrence Bargaining," 103, 109.
68. Ibid., 120.
69. Agence France Press, February 23, 1997, and Panama City TVN, in FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, February 9, 1997. The territorial issue probably had little to do with Bucaram’s downfall, though it may have dampened the military’s enthusiasm for supporting him in an ambiguous constitutional situation.
70. These examples are noted in Enrique Obando, "Peace Operations in the Ecuadoran-Peruvian Border: The Coordination Efforts between the Guarantors of the Rio Treaty," United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., 1996. U.S. pressure helped persuade Ecuador to renounce huge territorial claims in the Amazon Basin in 1942, at a time when the United States was eager to settle the dispute and focus on the World War.
71. In Peru, for example, some voices have warned about the Guarantors’ pressuring Peru into making territorial concessions it shouldn’t make in the name of reaching agreement. Si (Lima) in FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, April 27, 1997.
72. Mares, "Deterrence Bargaining," 115. In fact, all three previous wars between Peru and Ecuador over the past two centuries occurred in periods of partial democratization. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and War," Foreign Affairs (May/June 1995): 89, 95.
73. With reference to Peru, see "Arms Race to Threaten Talks." Jane’s Intelligence Review 4, no. 2 (February 1, 1997): 16. While Bucaram was telling the Peruvians during his January 1997 state visit that there would be no arms race, Ecuadoran Defense Minister Victor Bayas was issuing statements that Ecuador would purchase defensive weapons as needed. Voz de los Andes (Quito) in FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, January 14, 1997. The Ecuadoran military justified these purchases as merely compensating for the "enormous amount of arms" that have gone far beyond renovation of capabilities devastated by the 1995 conflict, and that they amount to reinforcement of Peru’s military position; Lima Radio Programas del Peru in FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, January 14, 1997. While defense ministers do this all the time, in Ecuador the defense minister is traditionally identified with the military , so that when he speaks he tends to do so in the name of the armed forces as well.
74. For an excellent summary of the events leading up to the signing of the Brasilia Presidential Act, particularly Ecuador and Peru’s request to the Guarantors for binding arbitration of the issues in the border dispute, see Richard Downes’s epilogue to Security Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere: Resolving the Ecuador-Peru Conflict, ed. Gabriel Marcella and Richard Downes (Bolder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, in press).
75. All figures are from the Inter- American Development Bank.
76. Mercosur’s November 11, 1997 decision to raise external tariffs from 20 to 23 percent may provide yet another reminder of the disadvantages of exclusion from integrating market agreements on the continent. Reuters World Service, Facts on File News Digest, December 18, 1997.
77. Statements by members of Peru's military were reportedly what prompted patriotic marches in October 1997 that were hostile to an accord with Ecuador. The Guardian (London), November 5, 1997, p. 17.
78. Latin America Weekly Report, February 10, 1998, p. 64.
79. Latin America Regional Reports, Andean Group, November 4, 1997, p. 3.

Contents | Key Points | Map | Foreword | One | Two | Three | Four | Appendix: The Rio Protocol | Notes | Author

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