Territorial Disputes and Their Resolution
The Case of Ecuador and Peru
Keypoints
The Peru-Ecuador case is the Western Hemisphere‘s only territorial dispute in which deadly
conflict has broken out repeatedly since World War II. Most recently, in early 1995, the two nations
fought an intense nineteen-day war along a forty-nine-mile undemarcated section of their border. The
October 1998 agreement between the two countries that settles the remaining issues in their border
dispute provides a sharp contrast to the persistent rivalry between two countries with a history of war and
seemingly perpetual border skirmishes.
More than in other areas of the world, border disputes in the Western Hemisphere have been subject
to formal legal and quasi-legal processes, such as adjudication and arbitration, in which the disputing
countries request a neutral third party to make an authoritative ruling resolving the territorial question.
There have been twenty-two such cases of legally binding third-party rulings on contested territorial
sovereignty in Latin America. Compare these numbers to one small case in continental Europe; two
among the independent states of Africa; two in the Middle East; and three in Asia, the Far East, and the
Pacific.
The Ecuador-Peru border dispute has also included extensive third-party involvement, including that
provided under the 1942 Rio Protocol, a treaty framework that ended the 1941 war between the two
countries. Soon thereafter, however, Ecuadoran leaders claimed that geographical information that had
come to their attention after the signing of the Rio Protocol rendered the agreement invalid. The 1995
border war led to some changes that bolstered the prospects for a resolution: Ecuador‘s military
made a strong showing, while Peru‘s leaders realized their country‘s flagging economy
could not sustain similar future engagements.
The Rio Protocol represents a special method of third-party dispute settlement. The treaty‘s
provisions were overseen by four "Guarantor" states (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United
States—four of the most powerful countries in the region). The Guarantors are legally obligated to
mediate—and possibly arbitrate, which they eventually did for two major remaining
impasses—all aspects of the Ecuador-Peru border dispute. As such, the Rio Protocol exemplifies
not only the variety of international dispute-settlement mechanisms, but the power of international law
through the observance of treaty obligations.
Several factors contributed to favorable prospects for a settlement of this border dispute: commitment
by the political leadership in both Ecuador and Peru, a change in popular attitudes in both countries, and
the role played by the four Guarantor nations under the Rio Protocol.
The Guarantor states‘ interest in resolving this conflict, among other reasons, was to help
foster the region‘s economic and trade integration. Both Ecuador and Peru, as well as the
Guarantor states, recognized the adverse effects of the dispute on the development of regional trade.
The Ecuador-Peru dispute also illustrates how conflict can lead to increased purchases of advanced
weapons and the corresponding opportunity cost to economic development for the parties to the dispute.
Settling borders eliminates a key irritant to relations, though it is not a guarantee of positive future
relations. Once resolution has been reached, the portion of military expenditures that previously went
toward defending the disputed territory can be used for economic development or social purposes.
Given that resolution of such conflicts often involves highly sensitive issues with strong connections
to notions of nationalism and national identity, the involvement of a third party does not guarantee
resolution or compliance. The United States and the other Guarantor nations had a stake in seeing the
Peru-Ecuador dispute resolved to promote regional political harmony and economic and trade integration,
and to decrease the likelihood of a regional competition for advanced weapons.
