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Territorial Disputes and Their Resolution The Case of Ecuador and Peru

Three — Ecuador and Peru: The Search for a Border Solution

Background

The border dispute between Ecuador and Peru had been until recently the most persistent and seemingly most resistant to resolution of any in the Western Hemisphere. The conflict arose virtually at the birth of these two nations from the Spanish Empire. It survived World War II, outlasted the Cold War, and most recently was the locus of military conflict between Peruvian and Ecuadoran forces in 1995. Yet the natural resources of the shared Condor Mountain range—gold, uranium, and oil—do not appear to be significant, and the territory, especially from the Peruvian side, is difficult to access and has only minimal infrastructure.¹⁵

     The 883-mile-long border has been in dispute intermittently since Ecuador‘s secession from Great Colombia in 1830.¹⁶ Since 1884, Peru and Ecuador have been involved in at least thirty-four episodes of bloody military confrontation over sovereignty in the Amazon.¹⁷ Major clashes broke out on the border in 1941 and continued for four months. Peru‘s military prevailed in that confrontation, and in early 1942 the two sides signed the Rio Protocol, the first mutually ratified treaty in more than a hundred years to attempt to establish the boundary.¹⁸ That agreement generally followed what was known as the "Status Quo line of 1936," which both Peru and Ecuador had agreed to, even though it meant a territorial loss to Ecuador of some five thousand square miles.¹⁹ On January 29, 1942, the governments of Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and the United States also signed the Rio Protocol, indicating their willingness to guarantee its observance and execution.

     In implementing the 1942 Rio Protocol, more than 95 percent of the border was actually demarcated, under difficult topographical conditions, except for a small section. At six points along the demarcation of the border, disagreements were referred to the Guarantor countries and were managed by Brazil, acting as the lead Guarantor. One of the areas, including the now contested Cordillera del Condor was the subject of an arbitral award authorized by the Rio Protocol and rendered by a Brazilian naval officer, Captain Braz Dias de Aguiar, in July 1945. Both countries initially accepted the award unconditionally and the Binational Demarcation Commission immediately began to demarcate the border on the basis of that ruling.

     Demarcation might have proceeded smoothly had Ecuador not contested what it asserted was new geographical information which, according to officials, had come to light as a result of aerial photography in 1946. As interpreted by Ecuador, this information disclosed a Cenepa River watershed far more extensive than that implied by the Rio Protocol. The newly elected government of Ecuadoran president Galo Plaza used this opportunity to halt demarcation in 1948. In 1960, Ecuador officially declared the award of Braz Dias de Aguiar and the Rio Protocol null and void, claiming the latter to be inexecutable due to the "new" geographic information. Ecuador also denied the treaty‘s validity, citing its imposition on Ecuador after an armed conflict.²⁰ Following its rejection of the arbitral award and the protocol, Ecuador made a conscious effort over time to link its position to analogous cases of arbitral rejection in the region: the Argentine position on the 1977 Beagle Channel arbitrations and the Venezuelan position on the 1899 Essequibo decision regarding Guyana, for example.²¹ Peru, with the concurrence of the four Guarantors (as spelled out in a diplomatic note of December 9, 1960), took the position that the treaty could not be unilaterally abrogated. From the Peruvian perspective, the 1942 Rio Protocol "ended a century-long bilateral boundary dispute by defining the border following the 1936 decision to declare the territorial status quo."²² Until negotiations reopened in 1995, Peru had denied that a territorial dispute between the two countries existed.

     The border has been the site of varying degrees of tension for the past four decades. Despite a number of cooperative agreements on the use of binational river basins and the passage of individuals and vehicles in the 1960s and 1970s, fighting broke out in 1981 (in the "Paquisha Incident") when Ecuadoran forces attempted to take over three Peruvian military posts in the Condor area. Border violence has been sporadic ever since, usually peaking around January, which coincides with the month that the Rio Protocol was signed. By one count, confrontations between the armed forces of the two countries have occurred in thirteen of the past eighteen years since the Paquisha Incident.²³ Despite Peru‘s proposals to complete demarcation of the border, no agreement had been possible as long as Ecuador rejected the Rio Protocol and Peru insisted on it as the framework for a settlement.

     By the early 1990s, prospects for settling the border dispute seemed to improve. In Peru, the newly elected Fujimori government faced serious economic problems, including cumulative inflation of two million percent over the five-year course of the previous Garcia administration (1985—90), widespread impoverishment, and continuing problems servicing the external debt, as well as internal unrest fomented by the Maoist guerrilla group Shining Path.²⁴

     Beset by a number of urgent domestic problems, the Fujimori government judged that Peru was in no position to fight a border war with its neighbor. Consequently, his administration tried to improve relations with all of Peru‘s neighbors, including Ecuador. In 1991, President Fujimori made a state visit to Ecuador, the first ever by a Peruvian chief executive. Sensing an opening to resolve the long-standing dispute that year, Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela offered to mediate within the framework of the Andean Pact.²⁵ For its part, Ecuador also proposed in that year to submit the whole problem to mediation by Pope John Paul II, who had successfully assisted the Argentines and Chileans in resolving their dispute over the Beagle Channel in the 1980s. However, the Peruvians refused to renegotiate the Rio Protocol and insisted that, pending demarcation, border matters be submitted to an expert as provided for in the agreement.²⁶

     In 1992, President Fujimori wrote a letter to his Ecuadoran counterpart, Rodrigo Borja, proposing to complete the demarcation of two small sections of the common border in exchange for an agreement to grant navigation rights to and through the Amazon River, so that Ecuador would have an outlet to the Atlantic Ocean, in accordance with Article VI of the Rio Protocol.²⁷ Peruvian proposals offering the use of port facilities on the Amazon and its tributaries in return for final border demarcation were reiterated in various forms during 1992—93, but the Ecuadoran government continued in its insistence that the Rio Protocol was invalid and demanded its revision to ensure Ecuador‘s sovereign territorial access to the Amazon. Minor military clashes broke out near the Sabanilla River in August 1993, but the dispute remained stalemated until violent conflict erupted in early 1995.²⁸

The 1995 Border War and It‘s Diplomatic Aftermath
     Mass violence between Ecuador and Peru, on a scale larger than at any other time this century, flared up on January 26, 1995, in the Cenepa Valley near the forty-nine-mile unmarked stretch of border on the Condor mountain range, 220 miles south of Quito and 590 miles north of Lima. Fighting was intense around the Tiwintza military base, which both sides claimed to be within their own territory. Although relatively brief—the major outbreak of fighting lasted only nineteen days—the conflict is estimated to have resulted in somewhere between 200 and 1,500 casualties, the loss of nine aircraft on the Peruvian side and two on Ecuador‘s, and an estimated cost to both sides of up to one billion dollars.²⁹ Despite the war‘s brief duration, its risk of escalation was thought to be significant: In a matter of days, 5,000 troops had been introduced into a fifty-five-square-mile area; six Peruvian divisions were deployed along the coastal plain, and the equivalent of four Ecuadoran brigades were brought to the immediate front. With naval fleets on alert, high-performance fighter-bombers forward- deployed, and armies from both sides engaged in combat in the Cenepa region, escalation seemed a distinct possibility in February 1995.³⁰

     Yet both sides were eager to prevent such an outcome. President Fujimori was quick to call for a demilitarized zone to be monitored by the Guarantor group, as specified in the Rio Protocol.³¹ Within a month, the conflict had been contained and agreements were in place for a cease-fire and separation of forces. On February 17, 1995 the two sides signed the Itamaraty Agreement, which was drawn up in Brazil by representatives of the four Guarantors. The agreement did not address territorial issues, but only military and cease-fire conditions. Observers from the Guarantor nations established posts near the conflict zone to verify implementation of the cease-fire.

     While neither country had made any territorial gains during the nineteen-day conflict, the war and its subsequent fatal skirmishes in March, May, and September 1995 had a fundamental impact on the resolution of the border dispute. One important consequence was that it provided an opportunity for Ecuador to take a more flexible position on its thirty-five-year opposition to the Rio Protocol. By most accounts, the Ecuadoran military had dealt a tactical blow to Peruvian forces, in sharp contrast to their engagements in 1941 and 1981. It is widely recognized, however, that the long-term balance of forces is and will remain in Peru‘s favor. This may have provided a window of opportunity for Ecuador‘s leaders to make principled rather than coerced concessions. Shortly after the cessation of hostilities, Ecuadoran officials announced their willingness to work within the Rio Protocol‘s framework to resolve the dispute. Arguably, this step was politically easier for President Sixto Durán-Ballén to take after a relatively strong military showing.³² If it is true that Ecuadoran leaders in the 1990s have sought ways to extricate themselves from the defiant position taken on the Rio Protocol, the respectable military showing in 1995 gave them an opportunity to make these concession with their dignity intact. The acceptance of the Rio framework was a significant concession that, in turn, opened the way for discussions of the underlying territorial issue.

     The conflict led to a second and related consequence: a far more active involvement in the resolution of the dispute on the part of the four Guarantor nations. Military representatives of the Guarantors were essential to implementing the cease-fire and separation of forces, which would have been extremely difficult to achieve, given the dense terrain, the highly commingled deployment, and the absence of neutral observation, coordination, and communication.33 Furthermore, the guarantor process has been central to re-establishing communications between Ecuador and Peru, at both the military and diplomatic level.

     The military chiefs of the four Guarantor countries monitored a meeting near a border garrison between high-ranking military officials from Peru and Ecuador in February 1996—the first time such officials had met face-to-face since the conflict broke out in January 1995. Also facilitated by the Guarantors was a meeting between Ecuador‘s foreign minister Galo Leoro and his Peruvian counterpart, Francisco Tudela, in Lima on January 17—18, 1996, the first contact of this kind in fifty-four years. Meeting again in late February, the foreign ministers signed two agreements: the first required their governments to list what they regarded as underlying "substantive impasses" in the peace process and to deliver them to the Guarantor nations. It also laid out a plan for reduction of forces at the Peruvian PV-2 observations post, where the conflict occurred, to be verified by MOMEP (the Peru-Ecuador military observation mission). The second agreement specified the creation of a joint military working group, which was charged with crafting a confidence-building "bilateral mechanism" between the two countries that would, among other things, make future weapons purchases more transparent.³⁴

     Also in the presence of the Guarantors, the two governments signed the Santiago Agreement, on October 29, 1996, committing them to address the remaining "impasses" surrounding the dispute. The meetings, held in Brasilia during 1997 and, once again, attended by representatives of the Guarantors, were aimed at a definitive conclusion of the underlying territorial dispute, as required by the February 1995 cease-fire agreement. Both sides made major concessions as preconditions for these talks: They would be conducted in accordance with the Rio Protocol—a prime Peruvian demand—and with the acknowledgment that a territorial dispute did in fact exist between the two countries—a central concession to the Ecuadoran position.³⁵ This shift significantly increased communications between the two countries on the central territorial issue, and signaled a strong desire to reach a definitive resolution. Such a rapprochement was achieved almost exclusively in accordance with the Rio Protocol and with substantial Guarantor involvement.³⁶

     A third consequence of the recent fighting, however, still has ominous implications for the region: its potential for contributing to a local and even regional arms race, at a time when most countries are attempting to consolidate institutional transitions to civilian rule and channel excessive military spending toward development needs. In the aftermath of the fighting, each side claimed a need to rebuild its forces to maintain previous military capabilities. In December 1995, Ecuador announced its decision to buy four Kfir fighter- bombers (Israel‘s version of the French Mirage), despite protests from Peru.³⁷ Peru, too, has begun an arms replacement program. On November 26, 1996, President Fujimori confirmed the purchase of an unspecified number of MiG-29 jet fighters from Belarus—the first Soviet-built fighters in any South American country. According to President Fujimori, the purchase was a "purely defensive measure, meant to reestablish strategic equilibrium."³⁸ Shortly after President Fujimori announced the aircraft purchase, sources inside the Peruvian Air Force reported the acquisition of fourteen Sukhoi Su-25 ground-support aircraft (and a significant quantity of sophisticated air-to-surface missiles), which analysts agree could conduct ground assaults while the MiG-29s fly high cover.³⁹ Peru‘s prime minister Alberto Pandolfi denied reports of the Su-25 acquisition and emphasized that the MiG purchase was to replace obsolete aircraft and those destroyed during the 1995 border war with Ecuador.⁴⁰ In November 1997, Ecuadoran military officials responded to Peru‘s purchases by saying they were considering the acquisition of up to 50 U.S.-made F-16 or F-18 planes, also reportedly for purely defensive purposes.⁴¹

     The acquisition of high-technology aircraft like the MiG-29 has highlighted the problem of a regional arms race ignited by disputes, like the one between Peru and Ecuador, at a time when Cold War militaries continue to downsize by disposing of their excess aircraft as profitably as possible. Moreover, the border conflict has strengthened the military‘s claim for resources in both Ecuador and Peru, at a time when new civilian governments in both countries have tried to reduce the military‘s political prominence and budget share. For example, in 1995 the Ecuadoran armed forces were slated to lose their 12—15 percent surtax on foreign oil companies‘ profits. During the 1995 border war, Ecuador‘s congress restored the oil surtax, which goes directly into the defense budget, for another fifteen years.⁴²

     To summarize, the 1995 border war between Ecuador and Peru has had three major consequences that influenced the settlement of the border dispute and, more broadly, regional stability. First, the conflict provided a window of opportunity for moderation on the part of Ecuador, whose leaders seemed to recognize that the correlation of military and diplomatic forces, at least in this case, was not in their long-term favor. Second, the conflict reactivated a concerted international effort to resolve it through the process spelled out in the Rio Protocol, and with the assistance of the Guarantor countries. Third, the conflict has raised the specter of rearmament and the remilitarization of politics in the region, with troubling consequences for both security and continued economic and political development.

What Where the Remaining Impasses?
     The major diplomatic accomplishment in the peace process was the enumeration of a list of "impasses" that were, until October 1998, unresolved demands that had to be addressed for a comprehensive border agreement to succeed. A commitment to create a list of impasses was secured in February 1996 and an agreement to discuss them was the heart of the October 1996 Santiago Agreement.

     

     Discussions on the list of substantive impasses took place in a series of meetings in April, May, and June 1997, with talks to continue until all differences were resolved. In April, discussions were held on the first two areas that were supposed to be the easiest: the Rio Napo and Lagortococha/Guepi geophysical lines, areas close to Colombia and distant from the site of the undeclared war in 1995 (which was addressed in the April and May discussions). Each side presented proposals and counterproposals, with the Guarantors making conciliatory proposals.⁴³

     Both Peru and Ecuador brought to these negotiations two fundamental impasses, originally presented as virtually non-negotiable. First, Peru insisted on complete demarcation of the border, as established by the Rio Protocol, while Ecuador continued to refer to the Protocol as partially inexecutable. Second, Ecuador insisted on "free and sovereign" access to the Marañón-Amazon, while Peru offered access through some arrangement consistent with Article VI of the Protocol, but absolutely not on the basis of Ecuador‘s "territorial sovereignty."⁴⁴

     In November 1997, Ecuador and Peru negotiated an agreement creating a timetable for addressing these and related issues. Signed on January 19, 1998, the agreement established four binational commissions—each composed of three members from Ecuador and three from Peru—to tackle the main areas of contention: commerce and navigation (on the basis of Article VI of the Rio Protocol), border integration, confidence-building measures, and on-site border demarcation. The agreement addressed elements that would potentially form the basis of an eventual resolution involving border demarcation (likely along the lines envisaged by the earlier Brazilian arbitration decision) in return for Ecuadoran access (on some basis short of sovereign control) to the Amazon River. The agreement called for the demarcation commission to be composed of geographers and legal experts charged with examining and attempting to resolve the outstanding territorial claims. Ecuador‘s lead negotiator, Edgar Teran (former ambassador to the United States), claimed that the agreement would lead to a "final solution,"⁴⁵ and Foreign Minister Jose Ayala Lasso termed the agreement "a dignified and realistic solution that satisfies the legitimate national interests" of both countries.⁴⁶ By February 1998, it appeared that Ecuador had finally accepted the border established by the 1942 Rio Protocol, making the conditions under which navigational access to the Amazon—the only, and most sensitive, remaining issue.⁴⁷

     Despite a flurry of diplomatic activity as the agreement‘s May 30, 1998 deadline approached, the two countries could not agree on the opinions of the commissions responsible for commerce and navigation and on-site border demarcation. Nonetheless, Presidents Alarcon and Fujimori expressed their determination to resolve the remaining issues quickly.⁴⁸

Contributing Factors to a Solution
     Even though the two countries were plagued with continuing disagreements over the fundamental aspects of eventually settling the underlying territorial issue, the prospects for reaching a definitive agreement on their border were probably better now than at any time this century.

     First, there had never been a higher degree of commitment demonstrated by the political leadership in each country to resolve the issue, evidenced by the unprecedented level of political contact and communication by heads of state and their foreign ministries. Fujimori‘s 1991 visit to Ecuador, as well as the nonofficial visits to Peru by Ecuadoran presidents Borja and Sixto Dur‡n-BallŽn, have greatly facilitated rapprochement. In January 1997, President Abdala Bucaram traveled to Peru for the first official state visit in 170 years.

     Bucaram‘s ill-fated presidency was especially notable for its conciliatory approach to Peru. From his inauguration speech to his historic visit, Bucaram clearly subordinated nationalist claims to broader concerns. Throughout his brief administration, Bucaram frequently summoned populist themes in the cause of settling the border dispute; for example: "Bullets cost the same as books, a rifle costs the same as a school; and a war tank costs the same as a university. One prepares for violence, the other for peace and love." Astonishingly, he even advocated before the Peruvian congress that the two governments seek "forgiveness for the teachings we gave our children."⁴⁹ Before members of the Peruvian media, Bucaram distanced himself from the "war of the maps"⁵⁰ and once again downplayed nationalist themes: "[N]ations are increasingly less represented by their symbols; that is, the flag, coats of arms, national anthems, and the military marches of our armed forces. The concept of a nation is increasingly defined by the citizen‘s power of determination and attitudes."51 Indeed, "poverty has no nationality" was a slogan used to intertwine the populist with the anti-nationalist theme.52 Populism was even enlisted to counter intransigence: "Endorsing the cause of intransigence at the expense of other people‘s lives is an offensive and [unworthy] attitude from those who do so."53 Far from the nationalism of the past, Bucaram used the most conciliatory language in recent Ecuadoran history to describe the need to resolve the border dispute. His successor abandoned the flowery rhetoric, but continued to call for "peace with dignity" and an immediate resolution of the dispute.

     The commitment on the part of the political leadership in both countries was further evidenced by continuous efforts to establish and maintain momentum on the negotiations despite a number of opportunities to derail them. For example, while tensions were rekindled in December 1995, when Ecuador announced its decision to buy Israeli Kfir fighter-bombers, Peru did not respond with claims of cease-fire agreement violations. Minor border incidents such as those in May 1997, involving accusations of mine-laying and Peruvian detention of Ecuadoran soldiers, were explicitly played down by both sides as subordinate to resolving the substantive territorial disagreement.⁵⁴

     Contrary to expectations of those who believe that national leaders have used the border issue to divert attention from domestic political and economic problems, internal crises in both countries failed to undermine discussions to resolve the border.55 Peru‘s December 1996—March 1997 hostage crisis in the Japanese embassy, in which Foreign Minister Tudela himself was held captive for the duration, only briefly delayed discussion of the substantive issues. Even more surprisingly, politicians in Ecuador refused to seize on the economic chaos, political unrest, and institutional crisis that brought down President Bucaram in February 1997 to scuttle the border-settlement efforts. In this case, a popularly elected president whose economic policies sparked a violent national strike was removed from office by congressional vote for "mental incompetence" after only six months in office, without either a setback for the border talks or disturbances at the border.56 This political crisis certainly would have been an opportunity for either the soon-to-be-deposed president, the congress, or even the military to use the territorial issue to unite the country, but none did.⁵⁷

     Rather, Fabian Alarcon Rivera, who had been president of the Ecuadoran congress and was selected by that body in February to become the interim president until August 1998, espoused an attitude toward the territorial dispute that was similar in content to that of the ousted president: He called for an immediate solution to the border situation, referring repeatedly to the necessity of a "dignified peace with Peru."⁵⁸ Accordingly, President Alarcon continued negotiating along the lines of previous governments.⁵⁹ Shortly after the first round of the Brasilia talks, Alarcon declared that the territorial problem must end and not be left to future generations.⁶⁰ Overall, despite numerous opportunities to backtrack, political leaders on both sides maintained a commitment to settle the dispute.

     A second factor favoring settlement can be found at the level of public opinion. There was a detectable change in popular attitudes toward the border dispute, especially in Ecuador, where the dispute has traditionally been felt much more deeply than in Peru. Certainly, these attitudes were influenced by government policies and public campaigns: Starting in grade school, Ecuadorans have been taught that Peru dismembered their country and that Ecuador is "an Amazon country" and always will be.⁶¹

     In the decade following the 1941 war, public opinion in Ecuador was staunchly anti- Peruvian and highly supportive of a confrontational approach to territorial issues. Velasco Iberra had just been elected president with more votes than the combined total of all his opponents when, in 1960, he declared the Rio Protocol "null and void." Massive public demonstrations erupted in favor of this position to regain sovereign access to the Amazon. There is some evidence that these attitudes persisted into the 1980s. After the 1981 Paquisha Incident, Ecuador‘s Foreign Ministry conducted a national opinion survey that reportedly confirmed the popularity of nullification and sovereign access to the Amazon. In 1983, the Ecuadoran congress reaffirmed its position on the nullity of the Rio Protocol.⁶²

     However, some evidence indicated a change in Ecuador‘s public mood regarding territorial demands. After minor incidents on the border in 1991, Ecuador‘s public opinion on the territorial issue seemed to moderate considerably, compared to that in the past. Some observers detected "a certain fatigue with the issue of Amazon claims," and a crack in the national unity that had previously stood solidly behind maximalist irredentism.⁶³ In 1991, the government began to speak openly about seeking a new national consensus through some form of plebiscite on the issue, presumably allowing for alternatives that would include departures from Ecuador‘s traditional policy position. The foreign minister suggested that it might be possible to draw up bilateral agreements that would allow Ecuador freer access to the Amazon region and enjoyment of preferential benefits in the zone occupied by Peru, to which Ecuador laid claim.⁶⁴

     Opinion polls in the 1990s suggested potential popular support for resolving the dispute. In 1992, 79 percent of Ecuadorans polled thought that a solution to the border problem could contribute to the economic development of both countries, and 55 percent thought that it would be convenient to open commerce between both countries completely. Still, 49 percent of the respondents also viewed Peru as an enemy country, suggesting a good deal of remaining suspicion and hostility.

     By 1995, surveys showed that 58 percent of the Peruvian population and 71 percent of the Ecuadoran public would accept the settling of their territorial dispute with mutual territorial concessions. ⁶⁵ It was about this time that Ecuadoran president Durán- Ballén decided that demanding the absolute nullification of the Rio Protocol was no longer advisable, a position that would have been "very difficult to accept twenty years ago." ⁶⁶ The policy shift was a major concession on the part of Ecuador, and was apparently consonant with trends in public attitudes.

     Yet no major social forces or partisan organizations in Ecuadoran society have advocated accepting less than sovereign access to the Amazon. ⁶⁷ Politicians are still likely to believe that conceding the sovereign access issue will cost them an election. ⁶⁸ Bucaram, for example, lamented from exile that his conciliatory approach in Lima, especially his call for "forgiveness," offended his supporters and contributed to his ouster. ⁶⁹ While the public may have wanted the issue resolved, the terms of settlement remained highly sensitive politically.

     The third set of conditions that have contributed positively to the resolution of the dispute have been external regional factors, prime among them the role played by the Guarantors. Representatives from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States have taken their responsibilities seriously and were apparently interested in getting the dispute resolved for good. High-level professionals who are reasonably well respected by the parties staffed the Guarantor delegations. Yet this is not to suggest that the guarantor process has been without difficulties, particularly differences in the pace at which the Guarantors ideally wanted to see the talks proceed: The Brazilians were the most willing to allow the discussions to proceed at their own pace, and the United States was the most insistent on constant progress and rapid resolution.

     Furthermore, there were particular issues on which each Guarantor was influenced by its own foreign policy, but this tendency was probably more pronounced in the past. The traditional enmity between Chile and Peru (which subsided only recently) raised issues of how foreign policy considerations affected Chile‘s positions and influence as a Guarantor. More acutely, weapons sales to the parties raised questions of Guarantor impartiality. For example, when the weapons embargo against the two antagonists was lifted in September 1995, the United States government approved Israel‘s request to sell the Kfirs (equipped with engines manufactured in the United States, thus requiring government approval) to Ecuador, causing an irate response from Peru. Most potentially damaging for the integrity of the guarantor process was the illegal sale of weapons to Ecuador by the Argentine Defense Ministry during the conflict. The sales created an international scandal and certainly affected the image of Argentina as an impartial Guarantor. ⁷⁰

     It was Brazil, however, that played the role of "lead Guarantor" in settling the Ecuador-Peru dispute. Acting as coordinator of the group, Brazil had a long tradition of mediating between the two antagonists. The original Rio Protocol was negotiated in the Brazilian capital, the arbitral function in the 1940s was carried out by a Brazilian arbiter, and the 1995 Itamaraty Accord was signed at the Brazilian Foreign Ministry. Perhaps more than any of the other guarantors, Brazil has provided long-term leadership that has been crucial to resolving the conflict. Warnings were heard from some quarters in both Ecuador and Peru that their national policies were being unduly pressured toward compromise by the guarantors; United States diplomats especially had to be sensitive to perceptions of U.S. dominance of the process. But overall, the Guarantors played a positive role, primarily in their ability to facilitate communication that would have been difficult, if not impossible, in their absence. ⁷¹

     Despite these positive factors, the resolution of the border conflict was far from certain. One issue was the role that the military in Peru and Ecuador would play in facilitating or hampering an agreement. It is true that civilians are not automatically more peaceful than the military with respect to the border issue; after all, a 1977—78 border confrontation was defused by military governments in both countries, while both the 1981 mini-war and the 1995 war occurred under democratic regimes in both countries. ⁷² But in the 1990s, military establishments in both countries have appeared to be more skeptical of a settlement than their civilian governments. These same militaries have, on occasion, pressed for arms purchases that have been difficult for the civilian governments to resist but that have also raised serious questions regarding each government‘s intention to settle the dispute peacefully. ⁷³ In addition, the continued dispute over the border gives the military establishment in each country an opportunity to make a case for continued privileges and priority funding, as is the case with the oil surtax in Ecuador. Overall, it is a gross exaggeration to suggest that the military dictates policy in either country, but it is fair to say that the prestige and influence of this institution gives it a virtual veto over the terms of any settlement it strongly opposes.

Contents | Key Points | Map | Foreword | One | Two | Three | Four | Appendix: The Rio Protocol | Notes | Author

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