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Complete List of Institute Reports Release Date: April 1999 Get Adobe PDF version of the full report |
Contents | Key Points | Map | Foreword | One | Two | Three | Four | Appendix: The Rio Protocol | Notes | Author Territorial Disputes and Their Resolution The Case of Ecuador and Peru One — Introduction As a region, Latin America has enjoyed relative political and economic success over the last decade. The post—Cold War period has seen the amelioration of ideological conflict throughout the region that exacted a high human and economic toll from the 1950s to the present decade. Virtually every country in the region is under some form of civilian and more or less democratic rule. Across the continent, there are few if any flash points of international conflict. The one issue-area that has recently contributed to militarized violence between countries in the region is a small number of unresolved territorial disputes Historically, disagreements over sovereign control of territory have cost the region dearly in both human and economic terms. Yet significant progress has been made in resolving Latin American border disputes in recent years. In 1984, Argentina and Chile settled the Beagle Channel dispute, as well as a number of smaller border disputes in the 1990s, including the Laguna del Desierto settlement through arbitration in 1994; they are now in the ratification stage of an agreement on the Ice Fields in southern Patagonia. In 1992, El Salvador and Honduras settled a century-long disagreement over adjacent territory (with the exception of one small segment) through the International Court of Justice (ICJ). At the close of the twentieth century—well after more than a century of territorial disputes, border skirmishes, and full-scale wars—questions of territorial sovereignty are either largely latent or within sight of resolution throughout Latin America. Former Peruvian foreign minister Francisco Tudela enthusiastically commented on the trend: "Once we are through with these problems, Latin America will have no inherent conflict."1 While such an assessment may be overly optimistic, it is fair to say that a very small number of territorial disputes continues to plague the region. However, these disputes constitute one of the few international points of contention with the potential to erupt into mass violence at the regional level.
Despite their political sensitivity, these issues are often well served by international legal mechanisms. Contrary to the notion of international law as ineffective in the absence of a supranational court whose decisions can be enforced through punishments that pierce the shield of sovereignty, border disputes offer an excellent way of surveying not only the variety of such mechanisms—ranging from decisions of the ICJ to the quasi-judicial methods examined in this study—but also why states adhere to the international legal principles that support them. This essay looks specifically at the border conflict between Peru and Ecuador. It is the only such case on the continent over which deadly conflict has broken out repeatedly since World War II and—despite the recent arbitrated settlement to settle the outstanding issues in the dispute—has the potential to do so again. The parties have recently concluded a settlement that is the culmination of an institutionalized process involving four regional "Guarantor" powers (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States). Significant progress on a settlement was evident at the beginning of 1998 with the acceptance by both Ecuador and Peru of a negotiating schedule and the establishment of four bilateral technical commissions charged with addressing navigation, integration, confidence building, and, most crucially, border demarcation in the disputed area.2 What factors contributed to success in resolving these issues? What challenges remain? How important has United States participation been in contributing to the peaceful resolution of this border conflict? What lessons, if any, might be applicable to other regions of the world? These are the main questions this study attempts to answer. The willingness of Peru and Ecuador to discuss and settle the substance of their territorial dispute marks an important turning point in a long history of tense bilateral relations. As the history of such disputes in Latin America will attest, the resolution of conflicting territorial claims often involves highly sensitive issues with strong connections to notions of nationalism and national identity. While there may be good reasons to resolve border disputes, there are also often strong emotion-based political barriers to doing so. For this reason, border settlements throughout Latin America often have taken decades or more to craft and implement. Discussions can move glacially. Agreement can be elusive; ratification of international agreements highly contentious. In some cases, peaceful discussions have been preceded by full-fledged war; elsewhere threats of military confrontation or minor border clashes have punctuated diplomatic talks. Nonetheless, the resolution of border uncertainty is important for a number of reasons. First, unresolved territorial disputes are an invitation to cross-border violence. Uncertainty often encourages mutually suspicious governments to fortify or otherwise militarize the disputed region, creating opportunities for armed skirmishes and wider, more lethal confrontations. Unresolved borders provide a pretense for force concentrations which—intended or not—can result in violent clashes. Throughout history, territorial disputes have contributed to violent interstate conflict worldwide and continue to be a primary cause of the kind of regional instability that has manifested itself in the post—Cold War period.3 Settling disputed borders on a mutually acceptable basis removes an important irritant to relations, though it is of course hardly a guarantee of harmonious relations. Border settlement is therefore usually important for providing the security governments require as a precondition to divert a portion of their military expenditures from the task of defending a disputed border to economic and social development, as Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori himself has often noted. Persuaded by their military establishments, governments may spend more to protect their claims to a contested border through arms than to develop the underlying value of the land.4 Finally, clearly defined jurisdiction over borders is a precondition of international economic discourse and integration. Disputed borders act as barriers to bilateral and even multilateral economic relations. Mutually accepted borders are crucial in providing the confidence that investors need to make physical investments in frontier regions, in providing the certainty that exporters need to establish cross-border trade, and even in providing the confidence governments need to invest in economically productive infrastructure (as opposed to military installations) along and across the border region. Overall, mutually accepted borders are important in providing the certainty necessary for investment and economic growth. For all these reasons—the direct human costs of violent conflict, the diversion of resources from social development to military uses, and missed opportunities for expanded trade and investment—arriving at mutually acceptable solutions to currently disputed international boundaries should be an important priority for the international community. The recent dispute between Ecuador and Peru is a sharp reminder of the costs of such festering uncertainty. The following section places this case in historical context, and examines major trends in territorial disputes and their settlement in Latin America. Contents | Key Points | Map | Foreword | One | Two | Three | Four | Appendix: The Rio Protocol | Notes | Author
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