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Contents | Key Points | Foreword | One: Introduction | Two | Three | Four | Five | Six: Conclusion | Author | Map Nagorno-Karabakh Searching for a Solution An Alternative Settlement Plan According to Aivazian, two other solutions have been proposed since 1992 in addition to the plan offered by the OSCE’s Minsk Group. The first involved the recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state and the simultaneous withdrawal of Armenian forces from all occupied territories except the Lachin corridor. However, this solution has been completely rejected by Azerbaijan and would not be supported by the international community. A second proposal involved a territorial swap between Armenia and Azerbaijan that would have united Karabakh with Armenia but also would have resulted in the loss to Armenia of some of its provinces in the south, making it unacceptable to Armenia. Another possibility, according to Aivazian, would have been a different swap—essentially of Nakhichevan for Karabakh—but this would be opposed by both Azerbaijan and the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh; it would also be opposed by Turkey, which would be separated even more from Azerbaijan. In any case, none of these proposals would be desired by the international community, because all would require border changes of some sort. Nevertheless, Aivazian maintained, the Nakhichevan–Nagorno-Karabakh swap may still contain the best strategic solution to this conflict and should be kept in mind, especially as other solutions prove to be unacceptable or unworkable.
An Alternative Plan
The Political Framework The fifth element of the political framework of this plan, Aivazian continued, would be a tripartite defense agreement among Armenia, Russia, and the United States, guaranteeing the long-term strategic security of Armenia. Anything less than this, Aivazian maintained, will not serve the security needs that Armenia requires, given its current security predicament. This security arrangement should include the provision that any attack on the Republic of Armenia will be considered an attack on the United States and Russia; the United States would not make this commitment unilaterally—nor, in any case, would it be accepted by Russia. The current security agreement between Russia and Armenia is not sufficient for a number of reasons. First, Russia remains an unpredictable state, perhaps bound for disintegration; second, after the withdrawal from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, Armenia’s geostrategic importance would diminish, causing Moscow to lose interest in its defense accord with Yerevan; and third, Russia’s financial position in the foreseeable future will remain dependent on Western loans and other support. It should be pointed out, Aivazian continued, that as part of this three-way agreement the United States would not need to engage combat troops directly, which it would be unlikely to do. American political and diplomatic backing would be enough to ensure Armenia’s security. Furthermore, this agreement would be of great geostrategic importance, in that it would be the first Russian-American military pact since World War II, possibly paving the way for greater—and much needed—Russian-American military cooperation.
Military and Legal Dimensions The proposed plan would also contain the following legal provisions, Aivazian continued. First, the NKAR would receive the right to have its own government, constitution, flag, and coat-of-arms, and could determine on its own the extent of its trade and other economic relations with Azerbaijan. However, its financial institutions would be governed by Azerbaijan’s central bank. The citizens of Azerbaijan, or at least those residing in the NKAR, would have the right to dual citizenship. Finally, the extent of the NKAR’s cooperation and coordination with the foreign policy of Azerbaijan and its defense, security, and law enforcement apparatuses would be determined according to negotiations between Stepanakert and Baku. According to Aivazian, the implementation of this settlement plan would give all parties the necessary prerequisites to ensure their security and access to economic development. Armenia would see the end of the blockade against it, enabling it to build its badly damaged economic, social, and other spheres and to benefit from the development of the Azeri oil industry. Nagorno-Karabakh would receive security guarantees, a permanent land corridor to Armenia, and de facto (though not de jure) independence. Though Nagorno-Karabakh has rejected such status, it has not as yet been offered this kind of horizontal relationship with the government of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan would preserve its territorial integrity and regain the six occupied provinces. Nakhichevan’s future security as part of Azerbaijan would also be guaranteed. In addition, Aivazian continued, Turkey would acquire Armenia as a more friendly neighbor on its border, ensuring the ease of the development of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, among other things. Russia would continue as the most influential power in Armenia, but U.S. involvement in the security pact would reassure Azerbaijan. Finally, the United States would see the realization of two of its key foreign policy goals: a safe and practical export route for Caspian oil and the consolidation of the independence and political development of both Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Reactions to the Plan Armenia’s need for security guarantees against Turkey was disputed by Molla-zade. In fact, Turkey is extremely unlikely to take any action that would risk military engagement with Russia, with which Turkey has a very good relationship. Despite some occasional nationalist rhetoric, Turkey generally has a de facto policy of staying away from Russia’s sphere of influence. Indeed, Turkey’s reluctance to become engaged militarily in any way in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute has forced Azerbaijan to change its perception of Turkey and what Turkey can or would be willing to do to help Azerbaijan. The Azeris have had to adapt their own policy toward Turkey to take into account the limits on how far Turkey will go to come to their aid. At the same time, however, Armenians can be very sure of Russia’s military guarantee; historical precedents demonstrate that Russia will be there to help them. Aivazian responded that though there are several similarities between his plan and that of the Minsk Group, there is a crucial difference: the issue of security. Security, he said, is the touchstone of the entire search for a solution. The security solutions outlined in the Minsk plan call for a small peacekeeping force, along with meager guarantees that few believe will resist even the slightest pressure. Any plan that calls for a peacekeeping mission that is only temporary—whether for one, two, or ten years—is fatally flawed, for it is what happens after that mission leaves that is most important. A temporary mission simply does not give the necessary security guarantees for either Armenia or Nagorno-Karabakh. Contents | Key Points | Foreword | One: Introduction | Two | Three | Four | Five | Six: Conclusion | Author | Map
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