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Contents | Summary | One: Introduction | Two | Three | Four | Five | Notes | Team | Visits | Map

Removing Barricades in Somalia Options for Peace and Rehabilitation

Summary

In summer 1997, a team of four Somali intellectuals and two American Africanists spent three weeks in Somalia on behalf of the United States Institute of Peace. The Somalis represented different clans and professional perspectivesÑone is a medical doctor, another an economist, another a political scientist, and the fourth a professor of literature. A Somali advisory committee supported the work of the field team, bringing comparable diversity in clan, professional specialization, and gender.1 The purpose of the visit was to assess the present circumstances and future prospects for peace and reconciliation in Somalia and to recommend how it might be appropriate for the United States, working with colleagues and institutions in Somalia and neighboring countries as well as within the larger donor community, to play a constructive role in promoting peace.

     Although most of the material for this report was gathered during the 1997 visit, the team is confident, through continuing monitoring of events in the region, that its con clusions are as relevant and valid today as they were then.

     The major causes of fragmentation in present-day Somalia are twofold. One is recent, the second centuries old. The former stems from the oppressive, capricious, and clan-based autocracy of the late dictator, Siyad Barre, who used his interpretation of clan institutions for his own ends, to oppress political opponents, create inequality, and promote conflict and violence. So great was his malevolence and abuse of power that virtually all Somalis now hold a deep-seated fear and distrust of any centralized authority. The older source of discord is the profound Somali individualism and resilience, rooted in a clan structure that, though it has sustained them in a harsh environment for centuries, makes it difficult to create and sustain a centralized state. These two powerful forces have created a setting in which Western concepts of the nation-state are unlikely to work, at least not in the next decade or so.

     With such roadblocks to defining a new state, what are the alternatives? There are no appropriate models elsewhere in Africa, perhaps nowhere. Yet international agencies keep pushing Somali groups to come together in some unitary structure, at least partly because it is easier for them to deal with a single entity than with the competing clamors of faction. The donorsÕ goals are understandable and logical. Yet it may be that the donor-driven attempts to bring unity, linking international promises of aid to unitary governance and thereby increasing the amount of spoils to compete for, actually have increased SomaliaÕs fragmentation.

     What to do? This report recommends the support and development of ten Òenabling conditions,Ó based on assumptions other than those of conventional unitary states. The conditions depart from approaches attempted over the past five years and suggest that a Somali government, at least for the next decade, may have to be based on different concepts of governance, here defined as Òdecisionmaking within a group.Ó The conditions are not necessarily new, nor do we suggest that by themselves they are sufficient to restore peace. And they are not wholly absent in SomaliaÑon the contrary, there are many instances in which they are already well developed. Taken as a whole, these enabling conditions reflect a new spirit that is building in SomaliaÑone which is prepared to accept a shorter-term modus operandi at regional levels as an efficient and necessary step toward building the national coherence that donorsÑand virtually all SomalisÑseek. We suggest that the time is ripe to take steps toward creating a decentralized sociopolitical environment in which discussions toward an interim set of local and regional agreements and understandings might continue. Within these regional understandings order can prevail, and Somalis pur sue their time-honored livelihoods. The prospect of a future state, perhaps federal or confederal, can then be considered after the modus operandi has taken effect and its short-term goals are achieved.

     This report, supported by the enabling conditions and demonstrated by suggested Òleverage pointsÓ to initiate action, argues that decentralized, local action is the primary means through which some of the barricades have been removed in Somalia, and can be the organizing principle around which permanent reform can be built. This does not pre clude some form of central governance in Somalia, but it argues that the place to begin restoring peace is with local and community-based institutions, rather than at the top.

     Enabling conditions upon which sound governance for Somalia can be built include:

  1. Local autonomy. A spirit of local autonomy pervades Somali society and ought to be enhanced and formalized.

  2. Powersharing. People seek broad-based powersharing both as an echo of the past and as a key to a more participatory future. External groups should join with local communities to reinforce quests for powersharing.

  3. Decentralization. People favor decentralization and devolution of power. Many examples have already emerged in local settings. These models should be examined for possible adaptations to other situations.

  4. Role of women. Women are playing an increasingly prominent role in Somali civil society. These initiatives have won respect among men and women alike and offer a means to build bridges between hostile clan groups. WomenÕs groups require special support and consideration for any lasting peace.

  5. Islam. An Islamic revival is evident. It reflects core values, based on Somali tradition rather than on the fundamentalist political forms seen elsewhere in the Middle East. SomaliaÕs Islamic revival promises to strengthen institutions of civil society and should be reinforced.

  6. Market economy. A free and unregulated market economy has emerged and its growth should be encouraged.

  7. Local adaptation. Somalis have been ingenious at adapting external technologies and management systems to meet needs at local levels. The spirit of innovation and creativity ought to be encouraged at regional and national levels as well.

  8. Traditional institutions. Somali culture is rich in traditional institutions evidenced in systems of land management, agricultural and grazing systems, conflict mediation, legal adjudication, and many related functions. These traditional practices are part of the support system needed to make any new settlement effective and sustainable.

  9. Free press. Somalis have a tradition of speaking frankly on any issue. At present, several informal newspapers, mostly in Mogadishu, present various perspectives on the current situation. Many of these views are highly critical of established political authority. Free speech and open debate need to continue if there is to be a lasting peace.

  10. Regional links. Relations with neighboring states are improving and need to be nurtured.

Contents | Summary | One: Introduction | Two | Three | Four | Five | Notes | Team | Visits | Map


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