Contents | Summary | One: Introduction | Two | Three | Four | Five | Notes | Team | Visits | Map

Removing Barricades in Somalia

Introduction

Somalia and the Somali people are an enigma to much of the world. How can the Somalis have journeyed to the eve of the 21st century and have no modern state Ñno laws, no government, no courts, no taxes, no social services, no trash collection, no public schools, no post office, no official currency, no means to settle defaulted business contracts, no public health system, and no police? Do they exist, as Robert Kap lanÕs ÒThe Coming AnarchyÓ would have us believe, in the depths of anarchy or even nihilism?² There are many opinions about Somali identity. Our 1997 fact-finding mission heard them all.

     Are the Somalis an entrepreneurÕs dream? Rudimentary yet efficient local banks, linked to large overseas institutions, now dominate the Mogadishu banking sector. Private phone systems in several of SomaliaÕs larger cities may be more efficient and cheaper than any phone system in Africa. Private clinics and schools are springing up all over the country, with new equipment and supplies, trained staff, and clean facilities. Several new Somali-owned airlines fly regularly into the larger cities, keeping generally reliable schedules. While some use older prop jets of questionable safety, others operate newly refurbished jets with well-maintained equipment and efficient crews.

     Joint ventures with Malaysian and Gulf business enterprises offer to rehabilitate airports and ports, institute new banking and fishing arrangements, and launch companies to export fruit and livestock to European and Asian marketsÑall at no cost to the public sector or the donor community. Are the Somalis at the forefront of Africa with their privatization enterprises, business acumen, investment strategies, and economic growth? Have they carried out structural adjustment to such an extent that such aid-giving groups as the World Bank have nothing more to tell them?

     Or are the Somalis the last of the great outlaw nations? They expelled the United States and other external militaries and the United Nations between 1993 and 1995. Crimes of violence and retribution go unpunished by any formal state authorityÑonly family and clan alliances work to maintain the uncertain balances of power among factions. The arms trade flourishes in Somalia, with automatic weapons and light assault ordnance readily available for sale in most of the larger towns. This equipment finds its way into the Somali hinterlands and probably to other parts of Africa and beyond.

     Will Somalia turn out to be the environmental nightmare that panics the entire globe? Asian and European companies are reported to be dumping toxic waste off the Somali coast because there is no formal body to take police action. Other groups plunder the Somali fishing groundsÑone of the few remaining global resources still teeming with fish. Rangelands are overgrazed with little restraint because no one is in charge of water or pasture access. Wind erosion and deforestation in some parts of the former nation are among the most severe in the world.

     Are the Somalis simply a peace-loving and innocent people who suffer the abuse of power-hungry, capricious leaders playing international agencies against one another? Is the impasse among Somali factions perpetuated by ambitious leaders who receive unpre ce dented attention in the media and expense-paid travel to peace conferences in comfortable hotels around the worldÑwho enjoy power and attention far beyond the fruits of their own labors?

     Are the Somalis harbingers of a new, decentralized, participatory, and democratic future for Africa? Are they the first to incorporate traditional law and governance into modern economic structures? Are they the leading African nation to encourage womenÕs groups and to recognize specific formal authority for women in commerce, reconciliation, and peacekeeping? Are Somalis breaking new ground in localizing planning, decisionmaking, monitoring, and accountability in water development, agriculture, credit, health services, livestock management, and export promotion?

     Probably all of those broad-brush characterizations contain elements of truth. Certainly the many voices we heard suggest that there are many Somalias. The task is to identify which voices represent the most important aspects of what is happening in Somalia and how a Somali leadership, working with external facilitators, can create an environment in which peace can return, economic growth can blossom, human rights and social equity prevail, and the productivity of SomaliaÕs cultures and natural resources be sustained.

     This narrative offers a brief excursion into the state of Somalia and Somalis in mid-1997. It explores how the situation has developed over the past few decades; what has caused the current difficulties in negotiations; what steps can be taken in the next few months and years; what enabling conditions will help restore peace; what points of leverage may help to reopen discussions; and what lessons can be learned from the Somali experience. The primary goal of this document is to consider the possibilities for peace and reconciliation and how such steps might be taken.³

Background to the Conflict

EuropeÕs partition of Africa affected the pastoral communities of Somalis more deeply than any other African ethnic group. By the beginning of the twentieth century, when the European-defined Somali borders had taken shape, there were five Somalias: one each under the control of France, Italy, and Ethiopia, and two for Britain, one ruled indirectly through Kenya. Attempts in the 1960s to unify them did not succeed. The French, Ethi o pian, and Kenyan-British segments could not join with the two larger groupingsÑItalian in the south and British in the northÑto form a new nation, and despite independence for the Republic of Somalia in 1960, the Somali nationalistsÕ dream of unity remained unfulfilled. The initial independence leaders of 1960 tried to fill it, and when they failed, became content to live with an incomplete nation. The new socialist and military regime of Siyad Barre was not. Army General Siyad seized control in an officersÕ coup on October 29, 1969, and proclaimed a new revolutionary socialist government.

     Initially, Siyad set out to build a socialist-oriented republic with the help of the Soviet Union, then SomaliaÕs closest ally. His vision was bold. The regimeÕs early initiatives included creating a written Somali language and declaring it the official national language in 1972; launching national urban (1973) and rural (1974) literacy campaigns; instituting massive crash programs, including tree planting, to combat sand dune encroachment; con structing schools, health clinics, hotels, stores, offices, and roads; and promoting womenÕs equality through a radical application of modern legislation, including controversial marriage and family laws. However, by the mid-1970s, the government had become much less popular and more dictatorial. It manifested the worst features of both personal rule and military command.

     In an attempt to regain popularity and legitimacy, Siyad cynically manipulated the sur viving elements of his version of Pan-Somali nationalism. In 1974ø75, massive drought had weakened Ethiopia and pushed Emperor Haile SelassieÕs government to a state of collapse. To liberate the Somali-speaking peoples of Ethiopia, Siyad acted. In a bold, even brilliant, military maneuver, he invaded the Ethiopian Ogaden in 1976. Then the Soviet Union, pur suing an opportunistic Cold War strategy, ruptured its long-term relations with Somalia to give full political, diplomatic, and military backing to its new Ethiopian ally, the revo lutionary leader Mengistu Haile Mariam, who had toppled the Emperor. With the help of thousands of Cuban troops operating sophisticated Russian weapons, the Ethiopians ejected the Somali army from the disputed territories.

     EthiopiaÕs victory was no small accomplishment. At independence, the Somali army had numbered 5,000; the Russians helped increase it to 20,000 and Siyad continued to build it up to 37,000 strong on the eve of the Ethiopia-Somali war. Paradoxically, after the crushing defeat in the Ogaden, Siyad continued to increase the army to a staggering 120,000 by 1982Ñthat is, somewhat larger than the army of Nigeria, a country of about 100 million. The large army became a symbol for Siyad, suggesting that even though he had failed in Ethiopia, he could still field one of the best armies in Africa. Fearing loss of power after his defeat, anticipating rebellious factions within Somalia, and with few options to strengthen his weakening political base, Siyad began a protracted and savage war against his own people.

     SiyadÕs Ethiopian invasion had been intended as the first step in reuniting the ÒoldÓ Somalia of the 18th and 19th centuries. Instead, it led to the disintegration of the new. With the Soviet departure, SiyadÕs Somalia came under the patronage of the United States and the rich Arab states. Reverting to a negative use of 19th century strategies, Siyad employed clanism to replace socialism. For example, he used his army to conduct punitive raids against so-called hostile clans; later his troops armed and encouraged the so-called loyal clans to wage wars against rebel clans. The stage was set for one of post-independence AfricaÕs most savage and senseless wars.

     Practicing a strategy of Òdivide and rule,Ó Siyad first waged war on the Majerteen, then on the Isaaq, and then on the Hawiye clans. SiyadÕs uneven persecutions forced the opposition to utilize its own clans as organized, armed forces. Beginning in 1978, the Majerteen clans rose in opposition under the banner of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF); early in 1981, northerners established the Somali National Movement (SNM) in London. They soon moved what would become highly effective military operations to the Ethiopian and Somali towns and villages close to the border with the former British Soma li land. The SSDF in the northeast and the SNM in the northwest began military raids against the regime. The primarily Isaaq SNM bore the brunt of SiyadÕs war machine, and in 1991, when the Somali government collapsed, the SNM declared the north independent, calling it the Somaliland Republic.

     Meanwhile, a group of Ogadeni soldiers and officers defected from SiyadÕs army in 1989 and formed the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM). Another group, the Hawiye-based United Somali Congress (USC), appeared in late 1989. The death of its charismatic founder Ismail Jiumale, in mid-1990, left a bitter conflict between the leader of its military wing, General Mohamed Aidid (a Hawiye of the Habar Gedir clan), and its Mogadishu ÒManifestoÓ representative, Ali Mahdi (a Hawiye of the Abgal clan).⁴ Within less than two years, the USC was able to expel the exhausted and weakened Siyad regime from Mogadishu. Yet conflict between the two USC factions led to internecine wars as soon as Siyad fled. These conflicts have continued off and on ever since. The primary problem seems to be that the USC attained victory without the benefit of a fully developed and politically mature program and organization.

     Intensification of the military battles exacerbated what normally would have been a manageable drought emergency in 1991ø92. Given the political factionalism and havoc, along with attempts to use food aid as political weapons, the drought led to severe famine. Many died, especially in the Baidoa region and Mogadishu. The inability of the donor com munity to provide food assistance in the midst of hostilities contributed to a crisis of international proportions. Intensified by the media and accelerated by the warring clan factions, the famine became unmanageable. In November 1992, President George Bush determined that U.S. military intervention was the only means to stem the famine. Operation Restore Hope was born, and the U.S. military landed on Somali beaches on Decem ber 12, 1992. The plan called for the United Nations to take over the peacekeeping role when sufficient order had been restored and the famine curbed. U.S. troops became symbols of peace and progress as they cleared roads, restored health clinics, and rebuilt communication systems. More important, they ensured that food aid would reach its targeted constituency.

     Few disagree that the first few months of 1993 were a success. While there were many small incidents of violence and isolated hijackings of food and medical supplies, the overall conduct of Operation Restore Hope went smoothly. Given this encouraging beginning, command passed in May 1993 from the U.S. military to the United Nations under the leadership of General Cevik Bir, with U.S. Admiral Jonathan Howe assuming overall control of the UN operations in Somalia.

     It is not entirely clear what happened or whose initiative led to the next steps. The UN security forces were less well equipped than the U.S. military had been, and even units of the U.S. military that remained under the new UN command were lightly armed. Despite requests from U.S. field commanders for heavy armor to back up their patrols, Washington refused. Further, the informal discussions and coordinating structures that the U.S. military-political units had maintained among the stakeholders in Mogadishu during early 1993 fell away when the United Nations took over. In June 1993, one factionÑAididÕs USC/SNAÑhad a confrontation with UN forces. AididÕs militia ambushed a lightly armed UN patrol of Pakistani soldiers in a crowded Mogadishu neighborhood next to AididÕs radio station. Twenty-four Pakistanis died in an act of brazenÑand ironicÑdefiance of the United Nations, which had assumed that the Somali militias would welcome the Pakistani troops as fellow Muslims.

     The radio station ambush immediately hardened the lines among individual Somali groups as well as between factions and the UN command. The United Nations placed a bounty on AididÕs head and launched a fruitless five-month campaign to capture him. The final blow to UNOSOM II, the UN Operation in Somalia, was the downing on October 3, 1993, of two U.S. Special Forces helicopters and the deaths of 18 U.S. military personnel and between 700 and 1,000 Somalis in the Mogadishu street encounter that followed. The five months between the May ambush and the October U.S. military humiliation irrepar ably changed the course of events in Somalia. A halfhearted attempt to keep UNOSOM II going, conflicts among the donors and within the United Nations, and changes in UN lead ership led to a profoundly dysfunctional command situation and, after more than two years of indecision and inept management, UNOSOM II withdrew in March 1995. Somalia was on its own.

Somalia since 1995

The period since the end of UNOSOM II has ushered in an unprecedented era for Somalia. It has been a time of interminable visiting missions (such as our own); a proliferation of donor efforts to stimulate peace, reconciliation, relief, or rehabilitation; and sponsorship of several regional conferences to bring all groups and interested donors together to work out details for peace. There have been major leadership changesÑafter General Aidid was killed in action in August 1996, his son Hussein Aidid took his place. The number of factions has grown as well. In 1993ø94, there were fifteen significant factions; by 1997, that number had risen to twenty-seven. Although by summer 1997 there had unquestionably been progress toward restoration of peace and stability, the formal mechanisms of a ratified peace agreement were no closer.

Contents | Summary | One: Introduction | Two | Three | Four | Five | Notes | Team | Visits | Map

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