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Removing Barricades in Somalia

Some Thoughts for the Future

Several steps need to follow if the leveraging tools are to have impact. Many efforts that are already under way require continued financial support.

     These include:

• instruction in democratic processes, civic education, voter/balloting procedures, and reconciliation activities, as currently supported by groups such as the Life and Peace Institute, the War-Torn Societies Project, ANAPAEST, UNICEF, UNESCO, and others;

• expanded support to Somali NGOs that have been spearheading much of the civic education efforts;

• more attention to converting humanitarian programs and civil society training into explicit community-based development planning and action;

• scaling up local community action plans to formulate district and regional rehabilitation and development plans;

• managing and regulating commercial entrepreneurship;

• ensuring independence of legislative action, policy, law, and court systems;

• supporting freedom of movement, including peaceful reentry of refugees, even if their homes are located in areas controlled by other clans;

• reestablishment of interpersonal relations that cut across clan lines; and

• resuscitation of local economies, with people able to reclaim their assets and to engage in their customary occupations.

     These activities are already under way in small-scale operations. Methods are known, and institutions are in place to implement them. One needs only to consider gradual expansion of this work.

     To carry out such work involves new planning, reinvigorated alliances across clan and faction lines, new policy efforts on the part of donors, and new and creative sources of funding. Our brief report therefore concludes with two new points of special importance.

United States Reengagement

The United States should reengage Somalis and Somalia. In U.S. diplomatic circles, mention of Somalia provokes embarrassment and avoidance behavior. During the five years since the withdrawal of American troops, the United States has minimized its involvement in Somalia and maintained a low profile. There has been no clear policy regarding Somalia, with an inclination to let other nations (particularly Ethiopia) take the lead. While the United States continues to finance humanitarian assistance, no longer-term strategy for peacebuilding or reconstruction has been formulated.

     This policy, largely a reaction to an intervention in Somalia that went awry, may have had some justification in the past, but the time is ripe for reassessment and for the United States to contribute to peace in Somalia. This would enable the United States to complete what it started in late 1992.

     The United States need not assume the role of peacemaker or peacekeeper. Too many states have been playing this role, including Ethiopia, Egypt, Kenya, Yemen, and Italy, all of whom seem eager to be seen as midwives of a Somali peace. While Egypt, at least recently, seems more successful than the others, Somalis suspect all these states of being driven primarily by their own national agendas. Moreover, the United Nations has been largely discredited in Somalia because of its mistakes in 1993ø95. In contrast, the United States still maintains considerable credibility; Somalis lament the current lack of U.S. interest.

     American encouragement of the peace and reconciliation process now under way could make an important contribution. Longer-term commitments to support local reconstruction and reconciliation processes are equally essential. American involvement will also encourage other donors to reengage.

Paying for Somali Rehabilitation

Most external agencies are suffering from severe cases of donor fatigue in Somalia. It is unlikely that donors will come forward with significant funding for new peace or reha bilitation initiatives until concrete and positive changes are discernible. To date, donors have defined Òconcrete progressÓ in terms of signed national agreements and formally negotiated ÒtreatiesÓ among the numerous self-proclaimed factions. While there is no reason to stop these negotiations, it seems unlikely that such signed agreements will have any lasting impact on bringing peace to Somalia. Instead, we believe that progress should be measured by the degree to which significant portions of the recommended decentralized programs are self-financed.

     The concept of self-financing of peace and reconciliation is not a conventional proposal. But Somalia is hardly a conventional situation. We believe that among SomaliaÕs single greatest problems is lack of local ÒownershipÓ of the peace process. Until national as well as local initiatives for peace are genuinely Somali-owned, externally negotiated alliances will continue to evaporate. Partial self-financing will greatly increase local ownership. The most logical sources of local revenue are the commercial entities that have been springing up. Literally millions of dollars of revenue are lost because these groups do not pay taxes. And when a few make at least token payments, the revenues do not necessarily go to construct the physical and social infrastructure required to get Somalia back on its feet.

     The absence of tax-base support has contributed to SomaliaÕs current condition of private prosperity and public squalor. With the gap of ten years since normal government services have functioned, there is a general lack of experience and commitment to public needs, and desire among the new business elite to remedy this situation is low indeed. Nor is there any encouraging sign that the new entrepreneurs will soon start paying taxes. The power of any public body to exact revenue is too limited, and the current climate that infrastructure is the responsibility of donors is too prevalent. A change of tactics is required.

     One possible solution would be a three-way funding alliance for local microprojects. One-third of the funds could continue to come from the traditional donor groupsÑUNDP, bilaterals, NGOs, and others. The second third could be leveraged as matching funds from the overseas Somali community. There are hundreds, perhaps thousands, of overseas Somalis who now send money to family, clan, and Muslim societies throughout Somalia. While these funds are important and valued, they generally only benefit narrow circles of relatives. If these funds could be focused, in part, on matching amounts for local community development funds, there would be a double value: assistance to local groups and capacity building for the community-based institutions that manage them.

     The overseas contributions would accomplish an additional goal. They would become a means to pry loose taxes from the in-country entrepreneurial eliteÑthe source of the third tranche of community development funds.

     The plan would, of necessity, start slowly. Perhaps an NGO might announce to a district or other local area that it would match community-raised funds in the amount of the three-thirds formula. Communities could also reach out to known alliesÑfamily, clan, or othersÑas well as to figures in the commercial sector. While there would be some lost energy and time at the beginning, there would also be some success.

     Once word of the matching funds began to circulate through the highly efficient Somali network, others would join in. Properly managed, such a matching fund program could accomplish six steps toward building peace in Somalia. It would:

• greatly increase community investment, literal and figurative, in the local planning and action processÑcommunity institutions could set local action plans, select indicators to monitor progress, and make changes if needed;

• strengthen financial management oversight, because pressures from overseas Somalis and the commercial sector would greatly outweigh any financial accountability com pliance that donors or NGOs could provide;

• build or restore financial responsibility among Somali community institutions because social and financial obligations would be established and enforced through traditional management systems;

• engage overseas Somalis in a development dialogueÑwhile there is extensive interest among diaspora Somalis in political agendas, there is not now a significant presence in direct development. Expansion of development support to overseas Somalis would utilize a substantially overlooked resource for Somali rehabilitation;

• set a precedent for and publicize the social obligations of commercial entrepreneurs, noting that they do have social responsibilities and that there are financially prudent ways to meet them; and

• send a message to donors that Somalis care. At present, levels of donor frustration and cynicism about the large number of false starts and failed initiatives in Somalia have led to reductions in funding and donor withdrawal.

     Perhaps most important, the three-way partnerships would bridge gaps and build alliances among groups not currently cooperating. While a new Somali financial alliance would not solve all problems, it could be an important step toward building grassroots capacities and confidence that will generate substantial local development. It would also draw into development decisionmaking and action several new groups, including the local institutions noted earlier: decentralized institutions, Islamic organizations, and womenÕs groups. Broadening participation and showing that such participation draws resources into enhancing livelihoods, we believe, is the only way to build a lasting peace in Somalia.

Contents | Summary | One: Introduction | Two | Three | Four | Five | Notes | Team | Visits | Map

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