Contents | Summary | One: Introduction | Two | Three | Four | Five | Notes | Team | Visits | Map

Removing Barricades in Somalia

Facilitating Peace

The obvious importance of these eight themes, which recurred frequently during our conversations with groups and individuals in Somalia, suggests to us that a set of Òenabling conditionsÓ for a settlement that ensures sustainable peace and productive development will include at least ten elements.

     These enabling conditions must take into account two persistent characteristics of Somali politicsÑabhorrence of centralization and fierce individualism. We do not intend to suggest that these are the only factors to be considered, nor that external groups such as our own visiting team should attempt to develop concrete proposals for a new government. Rather, they are the themes that seemed to be most pervasive during the teamÕs conversations and that need to be discussed among the stakeholders in the new Somalia.

     1. Local autonomy. A spirit of local autonomy pervades the society and ought to be enhanced and formalized.

     During the height of Somali nationalism, there was pressure for strong centralization and expansion of the state. Because of the appeal of a reunited Somalia, people found this prospect acceptable, despite the age-old Somali traditions of clan autonomy and decentralized management of natural and productive resources. The Siyad regime carried the nationalist theme to excess through highly centralized military unification and appeals to Somali patriotism and nationalism. Repression accompanied centrism, especially in the last years of the Siyad regime.

     The current theme of anti-centralization comes as a direct reaction against the excesses of SiyadÕs oppression. The opposition movements that destroyed the regime were themselves based on highly decentralized structures, relying on segmentary clan and geographic divisions of Somali society. Therefore, the new post-Siyad environment reflects the pervasive spirit of local autonomy, stressing cultural autonomy, pastoral lifestyles, and rugged individualism. With all its positives, it must be noted that decentralization will create an enormous challenge for the new vision of constitutionalism and for the maintenance of security and the provision of human services.

     The most extreme reaction to Siyad has been the assertion of the right to self- determination by some regions, particularly the creation of the Republic of Somaliland. More recently, the leaders of the Northeast Regions have declared internal autonomy as the Puntland Federal Somali Republic.

     2. Powersharing. People seek broad-based powersharing, both as an echo of the past and as a search for a more participatory future. External groups should join with local communities to reinforce quests for powersharing.

     Historically, Somali politics were based on the sharing of power among clans, families, and elders, and the tradition runs very deep. Clans would bicker and, if necessary, fight for the preservation of their land access, water rights, and grazing territory. Yet no elder believed that he could impose a military or political hegemony on the others. Instead, each sought only to preserve access to and control of the clanÕs livelihood resources, within a system of reciprocity.

     The clans were more or less equal in power and practiced a time-honored give-and-take, obeying traditional rules and agreements. In short, they shared power. We heard repeatedly during our mission about the need for separation of powers as well as checks and balances to preserve options for shared power, fluid and shifting alliances, negotiation of positions, and availability of political choices and options. The experiences of Bari region and its recently elected parliament were often brought to our attention as examples of community-based approaches that seemed promising.

     Any new model of governance must include powersharing. Yet it should be made clear that powersharing does not automatically equal clan rule. While clans are an important force in Somalia and must be included in governance structures, they are not the only constituency. Other important considerations, among others, are gender, economic role, profession, political ideology, and religion.

     3. Decentralization. People favor decentralization and devolution of power. Many examples have already emerged in local settings. These models should be examined for possible adaptations to other situations.

     We encountered everywhere a spirit favoring decentralization and devolution of power. The United Nations learned this lesson in a pragmatic way in 1992ø93. The original donor vision had imagined reestablishing some form of autonomous state. But fierce resistance to such principles pushed UNOSOM toward regional councils as decision-making units, though there are virtually no models for such a confederation system anywhere in Africa. While the EU, influenced by the writings of Ahmed Yusuf Farah and I. M. Lewis, has explored a model for decentralization on a theoretical basis, work is needed on the grassroots implications of such approaches in Somalia. A second encouraging example is a model, now in use in more than 100 Bari communities, which German Aid (GTZ) introduced in Jeded (Gardo district) in 1994. The approach involves persons in the community in structured and systematic participation to rank community priorities and create action plans. NGOs and UN units are now scaling up this model to work at the district level. A third model calls on elder councils, augmented to include sometimes overlooked constit uencies such as womenÕs groups, in local decisionmaking.

     4. Role of women. Women are playing an increasingly prominent role in Somali civil society. These initiatives have won respect among men and women alike and offer a means to build bridges between hostile clan groups. WomenÕs groups require special support and consideration for any lasting peace.

     Siyad defied Somali and Muslim tradition, treating it with disdain. He put many traditional and religious leaders on the defensive, even executing some. His early strategy was to use the womenÕs issue as an example of his progressive attitudes and practices to win kudos from the Soviet Union, proclaiming in 1975 a new Family and Marriage Law, parts of which seemed to contradict Islamic law. When a few religious leaders protested, he arrested eigh teen and executed ten. Given the animosity Siyad aroused, current leaders have tried to distance themselves from his perceived antitraditionalist behavior. For example, the elders have urged that issues such as elimination of female circumcision be addressed through an educational campaign rather than through legal sanctions.

     Many people thought that when Siyad fell there would be a return to SomaliaÕs previous positions on issues such as religion and gender. While there has been significant resumption of religious practices, there seems to be little negative fallout on womenÕs rights. The truth appears to be the opposite: Women leaders in Mogadishu have become a major force in pressuring men to stop fighting. They are speaking out on political, religious, and even economic issues. They are building alliances across clan lines in Mogadishu to foster cooperative programs in education and health, telling the men that their children have been deprived for too long.

     In the past few years, women have assumed new roles in the economy, including taking jobs in retailing, money-changing, and local distribution of imported goods. Somali women have adopted these practices as one of the few ways they can earn livelihoods for their families in the midst of the collapse of more traditional forms of agricultural and rural vocation. Given these new roles for women and womenÕs groups, such a focus on gender represents an essential and serious element to incorporate into eventual peace strategies.

     5. Islam. An Islamic revival is evident. It reflects core values based on Somali tradition rather than on the fundamentalist political forms seen elsewhere in the Middle East. SomaliaÕs Islamic revival promises to strengthen institutions of civil society and should be reinforced.

     Though womenÕs roles have persisted throughout the 1990s in nontraditional forms, religious groups seem to have resurrected some of their pre-Siyad influences. Partly as a backlash against SiyadÕs attack on Islam, many in the late 1980s had become more religious. Their motivation was to demonstrate their anger and carry out protests, yet still fall short of formal political dissension. In the 1990s, Somalis are involved in a reaffirmation of IslamÑmore people are going to mosques, women are less likely to wear Western clothes, and more people are fasting during Ramadan. There is a small minority of Somalis whose desperate struggle against the regime has led them to an extreme position, asserting that Somalia must become an Islamic state. These groups are especially strong in Gedo; they have had periods of strength in the Bari area, and they hold other pockets of strength and activity in other parts of the country. Nevertheless, at present it seems unlikely that there will be an Islamic state imposed on Somalia, though some are actively pursuing that objective.

     Regardless of the subtleties of Islam in Somalia, it is one of the few elements that virtually all Somalis support to some degree. It provides a code of moral and ethical behavior, it bolsters Somali cultural tradition by offering a system in which the rulings of elders are accepted, and it brings a tradition of continuity greatly needed in SomaliaÕs struggle to bring order out of the last decade of chaos. The presence of traditional Islamic ethics, codes, and laws of conduct offers one piece of a foundation upon which the new Somalia can be built.

     6. Market economy. A free and unregulated market economy has emerged and its growth should be encouraged.

     As described earlier, there is now a thriving free-market economy in many Somali cities. Investments during the past few years have produced a solid foundation upon which to expand. Yet there are three critical needs in the private sector. One relates to the security and transport of goods produced. Crops of maize, bananas, and grapefruit are not safe in the fields, and the security of goods in transit cannot be guaranteed. The port and airport of Mogadishu are not yet open. So improved means are needed to protect and ship goods out of the country. At present, large producers provide their own militiasÑan inefficient and sometimes volatile arrangement in which dozens of small yet well-armed private armies float through the urban and rural landscapes.

     The second problem is taxation. Successful producers need to share their income with the citizenry in the form of support for social and human services. At the moment, this is not happening and, without significant change, is almost certainly not going to happen soon. But generating public revenue is essential. If the present private sector is unable or unwilling to pay taxes, new and creative means will be needed.

     The third issue involves setting standards or acceptable terms of practice in the Somali private sector. Competition promotes efficiency and fair prices. Unregulated, it also encourages ruthless and sometimes destructive behavior and unprincipled practices. Such ills, derived from excessive competition and the dominance of an uncontrolled private sector, require regulation and monitoring.

     7. Local adaptation. Somalis have been ingenious at adapting external technologies and management systems to meet needs at local levels. The spirit of innovation and creativity ought to be encouraged at regional and national levels as well.

     Somalis have always been creative adapters. The extreme challenges of the past decade have elicited amazing technologies and systems, based mostly on the imaginative use of available resources. For example, many gasoline stations function efficiently though they are pumping with only gravity and a siphon system. Lack of electricity is not an insur mount able problem. The phone system generally works well, even though there are no wires, through high-tech satellite systems. Somali entrepreneurs have skillfully negotiated agreements with high-tech international corporations and have set precedents for new communications systems for much of Africa.

     These phone companies have carried their creativity into the banking sector, negotiating arrangements with Gulf banks and operating essentially as branch banks. Most of the local airlines also benefit from Somali entrepreneurship, which took advantage of the de mise of the Soviet Union to buy grounded Soviet planes and hire out-of-work Russian pilots. To meet their fixed expenses, the planes fly khat from Kenya or Ethiopia to several towns and cities. This core subsidy is much like the airmail contracts in other parts of the worldÑit pays the bills when passenger revenues falter. The result is a reasonably reliable infrastructure of local air service.

     Any agreement for SomaliaÕs future must consider how it can focus on and benefit from the remarkable creativity and resourcefulness of its people.

     8. Traditional institutions. Somali culture is rich in traditional institutions evidenced in its systems of land management, agricultural and grazing systems, conflict mediation, legal adjudication, and many related functions. These traditional practices are part of the support system needed to make any new settlement effective and sustainable.

     Somalis are not lacking in traditional skills and institutions concerned with peace and reconciliation. For example, many clan traditions prohibit marriage within the sub-clan. This institution is not designed to protect against inbreeding but to ensure that each clan will always have close and personal linkages and lines of communication with many other clans. In times of conflict between sub-clans, if there is a husband-wife combination that represents the two disputing groups, communications can be sent through the respective families in full assurance that the messages will be delivered and that they will be taken seriously. These links of trust between sub-clans are extremely important when disputes over water, grazing land, livestock thefts, or tree ownership arise.

     There are also traditional mechanisms by which offenders who have committed crimes against the clan are punished by their immediate families. This is achieved by clan elders meeting and then putting pressure on the offenderÕs family to keep the offending member in line, even, if the crime warrants, executing him. This approach avoids the cycle of reprisals that may arise should an external clan administer ÒunjustÓ punishmentsÑthe classic feud hazard of a tribal or clan system of justice.

     Other examples exist of the Guurti (body of clan elders) forming clan-based councils to make policy or decisions that will affect many sub-clans. The months-long 1993 meet ing in Borama that eventually set a constitution for the northwest was precisely this type of council meeting. This council included groups from three different major clansÑIsaaq, Dir, and DaroodÑin the northwest and succeeded not only in creating a constitution but in appointing the government of the newly proclaimed Somaliland Republic. In this arrange ment, the government is accountable to a multiclan council rather than to a particular clan. Other councils of elders have been just as successful in their areas, creating, for example, the Gardo Council of Elders. The institutions that have both mandates for and experience in conflict resolution have valuable and continuing responsibilities in establishing peace.

     Many people throughout Somalia assured us that these institutions are alive and well and continue to enjoy great respect. While Western constitutionalism and legal proceedings are important in any settlement, so are the traditions that people already value and honor.

     9. Free press. Somalis have a tradition of speaking frankly on any issue. At present, several informal newspapers, mostly in Mogadishu, present various perspectives on the current situation. Many of these views are highly critical of established political authority. Free speech and open debate need to continue if there is to be a lasting peace.

     There is an active, influential, bold, and generally free press in many parts of Somalia, publishing in the Somali language and criticizing virtually all those in economic, political, and military powerÑdomestic and overseas. Papers print many stories that would probably be judged libelous by standards of Europe and the United States. Yet Somalis tolerate and even encourage the criticism. The press provides a means of expressing new ideas and voicing opposition to the practices of some of the leaders.

     The journalists have become increasingly skilled and perceptive in recent years. While there has been a long tradition of keen journalistic reporting in Somalia, during SiyadÕs latter years many writers went underground, left the country, or joined the opposition.

     In the chaos of the immediate post-Siyad era, the press was weak and in some cases simply printed partisan tracts. But by the mid-1990s, a combination of computer technology and archaic mimeograph machines breathed new life and energy into the Somali press. The papers circulate widely, are consumed by several readers per copy, and are certainly widely read by those most active in commercial, political, and professional circles. The Somali press is one of the most reliable forums for exchange of political and policy ideas. It enables virtually anyone to express opinions and views. Such a vehicle of expression is not available in many parts of the world. That the press flourishes in Somalia provides a welcome opportunity to debate governance models and ways in which different sectors and constituencies view options. The press needs to be given a prominent role in the continuing debate about SomaliaÕs future.

     10. Regional links. Relations with neighboring states are improving and need to be nurtured.

     Because of pan-Somali nationalism, SomaliaÕs continuing relations with its neighbors have generally been sticky, even belligerent. Somalia supported a limited guerrilla war in northern Kenya in the late 1960s, which British troops eventually quelled. There have been several border conflicts with Ethiopia, beginning in 1964 and concluding with the full-scale war in 1976ø77. Given this legacy of Somali-Ethiopian hostility, it was little wonder that those opposed to SiyadÕs rule sought and received refuge from the Ethiopian government so they could conduct guerrilla warfare across the border. Many opposition raids were carried out from bases protected by EthiopiaÕs Dergue government. In the case of Djibouti, even though there has been no formal Somali military action, relations between the two have been perpetually unstable. Partly as a result of the collapse of the Siyad regime, recent relations have had a fresh startÑfor example, Djibouti tried to convene a Somali peace conference after SiyadÕs fall, and though the attempt failed, relations between the two remain good.

     With Kenya, renewal of trust took a few years because General Aidid had accused Kenya of assisting General Morgan and other remnants of the Siyad forces. At present, relations with Kenya are quite good, and Kenya is gaining a lucrative economic windfall from NGO and international organizations based there to manage Somali programs. Hussein Aidid relies on Nairobi as the main base of his external political and commercial transactions.

     Perhaps most remarkable has been the emergence of generally good relationships between Somalia and Ethiopia. This is why Ethiopia was able to convene, with the support of UNOSOM, several major Somali peace conferences in Addis Ababa. At present, however, there are some clouds hanging on the Somali-Ethiopian horizon. Ethiopia is angry with the Somali Islamic fundamentalists, especially those of Gedo, because of the impact they are having on the Somali-speaking region of Ethiopia. Ethiopia has therefore sent several military parties across the Somali border, at the invitation of some of the Somali clan factions, to combat the fundamentalists. This has produced a minority anti-Ethiopian sentiment among some sectors of Somali society. Despite this minor blip in external relations, for the first time in history Somalia and its neighbors enjoy generally good relations.

     There are no shortcuts and no simple solutions for Somali reconciliation. Our visit suggested that peace is possible, that the vast majority of Somalis vigorously seek it, and that clear and systematic steps to build toward it can be identified. Given the present political climate, peace will probably not come through a single agreement. Rather it may come through stages of agreements and a continuing dialogue that civil society organizations have already begunÑeldersÕ groups, womenÕs groups, community and neighborhood organizations, religious groups, interclan alliances for peace, NGOs, and the newer community-based organizations emerging in places such as Bari region.

Contents | Summary | One: Introduction | Two | Three | Four | Five | Notes | Team | Visits | Map

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