Contents | Summary | One: Introduction | Two | Three | Four | Five | Notes | Team | Visits | Map

Removing Barricades in Somalia

Prospects for Peace

The informal progress, however, should not be overlooked. Our meetings and conversations, discussions, and reports from more than 200 people we met on our mission, suggested eight fundamental, recurring issues in current Somali thinking about the prospects for peace.

     Without question, peace is the most important goal of the majority of people we met. Somalis want peace. Again and again, in interviews and meetings, people stated that the war had gone on too long, with too much suffering and loss; most agreed that the time had come to make agreements and develop governance structures to provide basic security. While there was no agreement on the shape of the peace process or its resulting structure, people said they were tired of war. Their proposals ranged from clan-managed confederations to clan-free redistricting with rotating presidents, three capital cities, and small local security forces. No one proposed a return to the preøcivil war structure. All sought increased balance or separation of powers.

     Our visit was preceded by or coincided with several externally initiated peace meetings Ñin Nairobi in October 1996; in Sodere, Ethiopia, in January 1997; in SanaÕa, Yemen, in May 1997; and in Cairo in MayøJune, 1997Ñbetween such faction leaders as Hussein Aidid, Ali Mahdi, Osman Atto, Mohamed Abshir, Abdulahi Yusuf, Abdulkadr Zobbe, and others. The people we spoke with told us that these recent conferences differed from earlier efforts. When we asked how, many cited a higher probability of implementation because of pressure from members of civil societyÑespecially womenÑand from all of the clans to come to an agreement. One immediate, positive, and frequently mentioned expectation was a more stable political environment in Mogadishu, including initiatives toward the creation of a Mogadishu joint regional authority.

An Internal Settlement

While the assistance of many external agencies and friends of Somalia is greatly appreciated, and the external talks are important, actual solutions must come from the Somali people. The details of these agreements must respond to Somali needs and be ÒownedÓ by all parties involved in the discussion as Somali solutions. On several occasions, our hosts pointed out that while ultimate blame for the violence lay with the Somalis themselves, earlier colonial and subsequent Cold War politics were major contributors to the institutional structures that led to the violence. Because external influences created major havoc in the past, there is a strong sentiment that any new structure must reflect the priorities and needs of the Somali people if it is to work.

     For example, many were quick to point out that Cold War politics created a huge army for SiyadÑ120,000 soldiers in a nation of seven to eight million people. It was the donor community that paid the salaries of a government that became increasingly detached from the people. It was global politics that contributed to the start as well as the conclusion of SiyadÕs 1976ø77 campaign in Ethiopia. And it has been donor pressure, from both governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), that offered humanitarian assistance as a step toward creating a unitary government.

     Further, the intensity of the violence and brutality of the postøcivil war period was, people said, exacerbated by outside influences. For example, during and after Operation Restore Hope, donor payments to factions to buy protection for food deliveries often went directly to purchase additional arms; the donor-driven search for Aidid also hardened lines between Somali groups and, according to several commentators, intensified and extended the violence.

Institutions Emerging in the Economic Sector

Even though no formal governance, planning, or financial management structures are currently in place, the economy is not idle. An energetic and creative spirit has prevailed in Somalia for many generations. It is reappearing in the form of a new laissez-faire posture for private initiatives. Trade between regions in Somalia is developing; exports are picking up in some of the traditional products, including livestock and bananas; hotels, restaurants, and small shops are appearing.

     Yet there is a danger in the unrestricted environment in which this growth is taking place. In Mogadishu, Bosaso, Gardo, and Garoe, for example, home and commercial construction is boomingÑbut without any plan or coordination. There is no regulation of what is happening, and the benefits of growth seem to be going to a very small percentage of the people. The potential for a new economic ruling elite, possibly as indifferent to the needs of the people as the previous political elites, is real. But even with the need for regulation, the economic changes of the past several years are undeniably impressive.

     Airlines are flyingÑthree Somali-owned carriers (Daallo, African Air International, and Kilimanjaro) fly to three different airfields near Mogadishu, bringing passengers and freight, mostly from Nairobi and Djibouti. There is a flight almost every day, more than in the 1980s when Kenya Airways and Somali Airlines each had one flight a week. Bosaso, previously without air service, has three or four flights a week, mostly from Djibouti and Dubai. In addition, all airports in Somalia receive frequent flights bringing khat from Kenya and Ethiopia.⁵

     Consumer goods are generally available. Virtually any food, clothing, or electrical good one could hope for is available in Mogadishu and sometimes in Bosaso. These include fabrics, radios, stereos, building supplies, air conditioners, tools, clothing, steel sheets and rods, batteries, cigarettes, videotapes and cameras, books and newspapers, and even computers and disks.

     Food is available. Basic foods are fully available in the major cities. While much is imported, there appeared to be no shortage, so long as one can pay. Bottled drinks (except for beer) were readily available as well. During the week we were in Bosaso, bananas were just beginning to appear from the Lower Shabelle farms in the south. While it was not exactly clear how they were being shipped, it appeared that they were coming up by truck rather than by sea.

     Financial transfers are possible. The banking sector was active, in Mogadishu especially, but also in Bosaso. Because there is no official currency, the banks play little role in formal exchanges from dollars to local shillings. Instead, they deal largely in U.S. dollars. Working mostly through telecommunications facilities, the banking transfers, loans, and letters of credit are facilitated through intermediary banks, usually in the Gulf. We learned that the banking division of Barakaat Telecommunications handles about U.S. $500,000 a month in transfers. Somali Telecommunications has banking branches in several cities in the south and handles about $300,000 in transfers per month.

     Telephone and communication systems are operating, as well as computers. Somali communications are among the most efficient and inexpensive in Africa. The technology is fully satellite-based and allows instant contact with any part of the world. Barakaat, the largest of the Somali companies, has 59 stations in Mogadishu, 400 mobile phones, and 60 satellite lines for overseas calls. It works through the U.S. communications company ITT and employs 350 people. Another firm, Somali Telecommunications, has 1,000 private phones installed in and around Mogadishu and handles about 5,000 outgoing calls daily. Rates are competitive, largely because of the intense competition among several suppliers of communications services.

     Fuel is availableÑas long as one can pay. Diesel fuel and gasoline are fully available in most cities and towns. Pumped from 55-gallon drums, the fuel powers many trucks and cars that move people and goods around the country. Fuel is also available for generating electricity from local stations maintained throughout Mogadishu and in Bosaso, all under the management of local entrepreneurs. Charges seem to be about $4.00 per month per fixture (light, radio, or fan) used, which compares favorably with other parts of Africa and Europe. In Bosaso, the power plant linked to the city ÒgovernmentÓ generates 661 mega watts per day and charges consumers U.S. $1.80 per kilowatt hour. In both Bosaso and Mogadishu, the power plants run most often from 6:00 p.m. to midnight.

Political Institutions Appearing

Organized governance is emerging though for the moment it functions only at local and regional levels, probably the only model that will be effective for at least the next few years. The continuing discussions toward a comprehensive peace agreement must include consideration of the types and scale of political institutions to be adopted. Whether the next set of discussions and possible agreements will focus only on local and regional models is not yet clear. What is clear is that any form of national institution will have only limited power and authority. The wounds and scars of the past ten years are too great at this point to think of a unified and centralized entity. It is therefore ironicÑand not very practical Ñthat many of the UN and bilateral agencies find local governance institutions of only minor interest and that centralized national institutions continue to receive the primary attention of donors and international bodies.

     Even so, there are a number of encouraging examples of progress in local governance. Limited taxes are being collected, although tax collection continues to be an enormous problem. At present, though the economies of many localities are prospering, there is little revenue coming into the public treasury. The port of Bosaso collects customs duties, though they represent only a fraction of what should be paid. Airport landing fees are also collected but, as with the ports, are incomplete and may not find their way to public expenditures. Thus while there has been progress with some tax collection, it is probably the largest single impediment to moving beyond the current subsistence level in which many Somalis find themselves. For example, while we were staying in Bosaso, the regional governor resigned because he was unable to collect taxes from some of the more influential and powerful business interests, especially at the port, because his political power base in the Bari regional parliament was insufficient to oppose the economic and military power of the sub-clan factions. And while there is no way to track diverted (rather than uncollected) funds, it is assumed that they find their way into private hands.

     Regional parliaments sit in Bari and Nugal regions; elections were scheduled for the Mudug region. There have been elections in the Northeast Region and members of parliament designated. Yet the lack of formal authority leads to situations such as the governorÕs resignation. Power in Somalia still resides in combinations of the clan-based parties and the militias. In some cases, militias work directly for the political groups and are paid on the basis of services rendered. In others, the militias work for such private entities as banks, telecommunications, or trading companies, and are loaned, when convenient for the business enterprise, to political groups, usually clan-based.

     Importantly, a collaborative committee for North and South Mogadishu is meeting on sectoral issues. The greatest impasse to creating a lasting peace has been in Mogadishu, where the famed Ògreen lineÓ delimited the zone of Ali Mahdi to the north and Aidid to the south. Yet even this line is fading and barriers disappearing. Business and womenÕs groups are cooperating across the line. A North/South Mogadishu committee, representing needs in education and health, meets periodically to discuss collaboration across zones. Business and commercial interests on both sides are also talking. While the Mogadishu airport and port are not yet open, there is still marked progress in reconciling priorities among different parts of the city.

     A police academy is open in Bosaso, with refresher courses for former police officers. A training program is under way to rebuild the old Somali police force. The Bari Parliament has empowered officers to enforce local laws. In Bosaso our group visited a training group of about 125 police officers with the mandate to enforce the laws of Bari region; a problematic task because there are no formally enacted statutes. Instead, the laws are a combination of ordinances left over from the earlier government and the Islamic sharia law. Some of the police said they were enforcing sharia, but there was little evidence to substantiate the claim. Yet despite the fragility of local statutes and lack of money to pay police, these are concrete steps toward restoring local law enforcement.

     Local government is beginning to function. Village development committees, councils of elders, and district administrative offices are starting up. For example, in Iskushuban, a District Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) Committee has grown out of a PRA training course. The district committee plans to organize basic services such as health and education, as there is little prospect that the regional government will have the resources to do so in the immediate future.

     Still, while some health providers are present in Mogadishu and BosasoÑand perhaps elsewhereÑand a few schools are open and active, there is no structure within which these institutions function. Many of the staff are working as volunteers; standards are informal and opportunities for career development nonexistent. Yet some remarkable insights into new institutional forms have emerged that suggest that social and human services can be provided in partnership with government or external sources in ways that are sustainable, productive, and equitable. In the Bari region, there is a homegrown flowering of small proj ect activity in areas of education, health, agriculture, conservation, and reforestation. More needs to be learned and understood about these efforts, especially in health, education, police, and the judiciary. Means should be considered to entice overseas and highly skilled Somalis to return home. Raising financial support from the private sector and over seas Somalis is another high priority, and methods should be considered to share what is learned with other parts of Somalia.

Somalia Still a Cohesive Society

Though torn to shreds by clan hostility, the basic Somali identity, religion, and culture remain resilient. Loyalties to the literature, poetry, and art of Somali culture remain as strong as ever, perhaps in some cases even stronger because of the recent ordeals. Identification with Islam remains strong, and commitment to regaining respect for Somalia in the Horn of Africa is as important now as it was a generation ago. Somalis have learned the bitter lesson that no clan can impose its hegemony on others and that, historically, Somalis have survived precisely through decentralized powersharing politics and systems which have emphasized checks and balances. This cultural cohesiveness forms a substantial foundation upon which to rebuild. Though the shape and structure of the new Somali society is yet to be defined, though the style of decentralization is still emerging, and though the means of maintaining the economy and resource base are yet to be agreed, the will to do so is present.

The Role of Donors

As Somalis struggle to create a polity that matches their relatively decentralized and energetic civil society, donors should consider ways to assist, facilitate, and catalyze responsible decentralization without suffocating it with inappropriate Òhelp.Ó There have been a num ber of encouraging precedents: European Community projects; jointly funded European Community, United Nations, and bilateral projects such as War-Torn Society activities; UN Development Program projects; several different NGO efforts; UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) offerings; the NGO program of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); and German AidÕs community-based assessment and action program have all made important differences in local communities.

     Future donors need to understand that earlier forms of Òaid through the centerÓ were part of the problem of the old regime and that SomaliaÕs future well-being lies in seeking balance between the center and the periphery. Unfortunately, donors, including NGOs, have very little experience with decentralized development. Major changes and restructuring of donor procedures will be required to accommodate small projects managed by local institutions. Donor efforts to train and develop local institutions are very important, and will be of value to all members of Somali society.

Signs of a New Civil Society

Somalia is a different society than it was three years ago. While major problems continue and security issues are always smoldering just below the surface of daily life, things have changed greatly. At 10:00 p.m. in Bosaso, the streets are packed with people and the tea shops filled with conversation. In a random and informal survey on a thirty-minute trek through the market, one team member did not see a single automatic weapon other than those of the security guards who still accompany almost every vehicle and patrol most residences and places of business. This is a major change from a similar trek three years ago, when two team members were in Bosaso and saw dozens of guns in the street, day and night.

     Perhaps even more striking, in Mogadishu arms were carried only by security guards and the political militia. Private citizens apparently no longer feel the need to go about armed. In another new development, a Mogadishu womenÕs group is emerging as a pow er ful force, working in collaboration with elders, to bring together competing political factions. It suggests that most of the conflicting parties have agreed that SiyadÕs ways are unacceptable and the violence of the post-Siyad era is destroying the nation and the culture. Yet at present, progress is episodic. One promising exception has been the European UnionÕs discussion seminars, which explore models of decentralization and suggest alternative modes of governance for Somalia to consider. A more systematic assessment of what is now working would be of enormous value.

Contents | Summary | One: Introduction | Two | Three | Four | Five | Notes | Team | Visits | Map

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