TOC | Key Points | Foreword | Introduction | Two | Three | Four | Five | Six | Notes | Acknowledgments | Author

Sovereignty after Empire Self-Determination Movements in the Former Soviet Union

Key Points

Introduction

The "right" to self-determination has recently reemerged as the focus of much debate, as its fulfillment—or denial—quite often results in mass violence. Such conflicts are aggravated by the uncertain position of the international community, which cannot rely on precise guidelines for assessing the right to self-determination.

     For the many ethnic minorities of the former Soviet Union, creating their own state seems to be the only hope of preserving their identity. In many cases, their struggles mean secession from and territorial disintegration of Soviet successor states, whose leaders, supported by strong nationalist currents, seek to quash such movements. Confronting an indifferent world community, self-determination movements often feel forced to take up arms.

     To prevent wars associated with self-determination, the world community will need to equip such organizations as the UN Security Council with a more sophisticated legal mechanism that would infringe upon the international legal principle of nonintervention—an issue that is still highly sensitive in some circles, despite such precedents as Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda.

     The consideration of different approaches to this difficult concept may help in the development of new criteria for legitimizing the right to self-determination. The author offers suggestions for such criteria based on case studies and the observations of political leaders and top-level foreign policy officials.

The Significance of Contemporary Nationalism

Contrary to the scenarios of global integration, nationalism has not weakened in global society, but has, in fact, gained strength. National feelings are rooted in the idea of a linguistic, religious, and psychological community based on the ancient kinship of the members of a given ethnic group.

     Only a powerful internal security apparatus could maintain the Soviet Union's facade of a multinational socialist federation, so it is not surprising that the empire disintegrated upon communism's discreditation. The Soviet republics exercised their right to secede soon after the August 1991 putsch. Holding a status below the union republics in the Soviet hierarchical system, autonomous territories were not so privileged.

The Unattainable Right to Self-Determination

At a time when ethnic groups are striving to affirm their nationhood—and their statehood in the international arena—more established states react to the principle of self-determination with extreme suspicion. Some seem to believe that today's political map of the world constitutes a final global configuration.

     Determining exactly who (or what) the right of self-determination applies to remains its most disputed aspect. In the post–World War II era, it has been more or less commonly accepted that the right to self-determination applies only to colonies, which filled the ranks of the United Nations as full-fledged states during the wave of decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s.

     It is obvious that the existing approaches to making decisions that will determine peoples' futures are inadequate. International institutions must be prepared to address such claims adequately. The failure to do so will surely transform a promising era of independence and international diversity into one of unbridled chaos and mass violence.

Hopes and Disappointments: Case Studies

The Russian Federation. From the very beginning of the post-Soviet period, problems arising from Russia's ethnic and regional diversity have influenced the country's course of economic and political reform. Its most challenging problem is trying to find a type of federation that will enable its many ethnic groups to pursue their goal of self-determination while preserving its integrity and viability as a multinational state.

     Russia was the only federation in the Soviet Union with a three-tiered hierarchy of ethnically defined autonomous formations: autonomous republics, regions, and districts, each having a different degree of autonomy from the central government. In reality, however, this complicated system did little to guarantee minority rights, let alone the right to self-determination.

     Not long after the union republics started moving away from Moscow, Russia's autonomous regions began to demand higher status and greater rights. During 1990 and 1991, all autonomous republics unilaterally declared themselves "sovereign states," deleting the word "autonomous" from their official names, while practically all autonomous regions upgraded themselves to republics.

     The first serious ethno-political crisis in the Russian Federation occurred when the Chechen republic in the North Caucasus proclaimed itself independent from Russia soon after the August 1991 coup attempt, following the example of the union republics. Chechnya's president, Dzhokhar Dudaev, was elected in October 1991 on a platform of sovereignty for the Chechen republic.

Georgia. While not formally a federation, Georgia had a complex national-administrative structure under the Soviet regime. The relatively small Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic also included two autonomous republics, Abkhazia and Adzharia, and an autonomous region, South Ossetia.

     Tensions grew in the late 1980s as the South Ossetians attempted to pursue their right to self-determination and a change in territorial status. In the fall of 1990, South Ossetia declared itself a sovereign republic within the Soviet Union, but its claims garnered little if any support from Moscow.

     The Abkhaz national movement emerged in 1978, when mass rallies were held to support a plan to secede from Georgia and join the Russian Federation. These open expressions of discontent arose over a draft of the new Abkhazian constitution. In the late 1980s, the Abkhaz national movement resurfaced, this time with renewed demands for union republic status. Although Georgians and Abkhaz clashed over the issue in 1989, the violence was sporadic.

Crimea. While the Crimea still cannot be listed among the numerous areas of violent ethno-political conflict in the Soviet successor states, it has recently become a focus of domestic and international tension, with conflicting self-determination claims voiced against a background of interstate territorial disputes and an unsettled legacy of military-political issues left over from the Soviet period.

     As the Crimean Tatars returned to their homeland from their Stalin-era relocation, the ideology of the Crimean Tatar movement shifted toward more radical demands, despite noticeable tensions between the "new" settlers and the local population. No longer content with mere ethnic minority status, the more radical Crimean Tatars claimed the right to national self-determination.

     At present, the Crimea's case for self-determination, involving secession from Ukraine, has attracted little international support, since most observers concur that contemporary secessionist claims are basically motivated by economic considerations, and the Crimea's Russian-speaking majority has not suffered any civil or human rights violations under Ukrainian rule.

Nagorno-Karabakh. During its nearly seven decades of existence as an autonomous region within Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh was populated mostly by Armenians, though the region has no common border with the Armenian republic and is, in fact, separated from it by a narrow strip of Azeri land.

     While the Armenian side emphasized the concept of self-determination—vaguely mentioned in the Soviet constitution—the Azeri side stressed the constitutional prohibition against changing republican borders without the approval of the republic(s) affected by the change.

     As violence mounted against ethnic Armenians in Azerbaijan, the number of Armenian refugees flowing into Armenia and other Soviet republics steadily rose. However, by late 1988, the cycle of violence and retaliation in the Armenian-Azeri conflict was complete, as thousands of Azeris were forced to flee from Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. The policy of ethnic cleansing had become "bilateral."

     While the prospects for peaceful settlement of the conflict seem increasingly remote, what appears to be a permanent cease-fire was finally established in May 1994. Yet the lull appears tenuous.

Self-Determination through Secession: Typical Stages of Conflict. A precondition of the struggle for self-determination typically involves a minority ethnic group's perception that its autonomy within the framework of a multinational state—or even its very existence—is endangered.

     The next stage of self-determination conflicts involves spontaneous grassroots resistance movements and their local activists, who are soon recognized as national leaders. The central government typically characterizes these leaders as antiregime elements who could possibly direct a "fifth column" connected with a sympathetic third country.

     Simultaneously, the self-determination struggle acquires its ideological base through the formulation of national goals and the identification of obstacles to their achievement. Both sides in the dispute produce evidence to prove their historical right to the ethnic territory in question.

     Central government officials at the local level find themselves replaced by indigenous, charismatic leaders, sometimes through legitimate elections. Simultaneously, the group forms new political parties openly or underground. At first, these political organizations demonstrate a democratic orientation.

     After the creation of state bodies, the group seeking self-determination develops contacts with foreign powers and tries to enter multilateral discussions to mobilize international support. Sometimes these institutions are created in exile and then transplanted to their own ethnic territory.

     The next stage is the intensification of "the war of laws," usually in the form of decrees and constitutions issued by the separatist group's representative body. The primacy of central or local laws in the disputed territory thus becomes the fundamental issue in the conflict.

     Feeling pressure from its own nationalists and striving to preserve the integrity of the state, the central government disbands local bodies of self-governance, deprives them of autonomy, or introduces its own direct rule with heavy reliance on military force. The leaders of self-determination movements are forced into exile, underground, or to parts of the region inaccessible to the central government's control.

     Spontaneous resistance movements prepare to resume the struggle through the use of force. The region's political organizations are radicalized and nationalist movements in sympathetic "Big Brother" countries gain strength, making it increasingly difficult for these countries' government officials to maintain a neutral position.

     Organized ethnic clashes and pogroms begin to plague the region and the surrounding area. Finally, war slogans fill the mass media on both sides of the struggle as the situation escalates to full-scale military conflict.

Approaches of Decision Makers: Interviews. On the principle of nonintervention, Margaret Thatcher basically rejects—with one exception—the idea that intervention in a country's internal affairs could improve the situation. Sam Nunn takes a similarly pragmatic approach by suggesting that U.S. intervention should be avoided, since the country cannot act as a global policeman. Mikhail Gorbachev believes that a country that ignores norms of human rights also gives up its voice in the international system and thus loses its claim to sovereignty. Jack Matlock calls for the international community to take a proactive stance in settling conflicts.

     Answering the question of judging self-determination claims, Thatcher says the nation-state must remain the decision-making unit of international society. Nunn contends that the size and "viability" of units seeking separate political and territorial status are important factors in determining nationhood. Matlock believes that the right to self-determination cannot be absolute, but that the international community must establish better human rights standards. Gorbachev argues that self-determination claims can best be addressed within the larger context of a more cooperative international environment.

Criteria for Self-Determination. Using a set of univers ally recognized requirements would help avert both the chaos of changing borders in areas of conflict and the attempts to settle issues of self-determination by violence. Only the entire set of criteria together would likely pass a test of moral legitimacy, but rarely do all these criteria apply in any one situation.

     Intolerability. The legal formulation of a claim for self-determination should be based, first of all, on the "intolerability of existence" for a population of any territory, including those under the rule of a state with sovereignty over their territory.

     Historical Right. Another criterion should be based on the "historical right" to a territory—a right that is the least capable of definition among all the criteria under consideration for assessing the legitimacy of self-determination movements.

     Ethnic Composition of the Population. Unlike the multinational democracy of the United States, among the peoples of Europe, Asia, and Africa there are still seemingly insurmountable prejudices of "blood and belonging," in spite of the spread of "global culture."

     Expression of the People's Will. While criteria for assessing self-determination claims should take into account the territory's ethnic composition, a certain priority must be accorded to the democratic principle of the expression of the entire population's will.

     Responsibility for Consequences. Under these criteria, self-determination movements will have more time to prepare themselves for assuming the burden of charting their own political and economic future.

Conclusion

These criteria must be reconciled with the international legal principle of nonintervention. Post-Soviet self-determination movements that can no longer be called "internal matters" suggest a new class of political entities whose distinct features could allow the application of internationally accepted norms and procedures to satisfy their claims.

     In these cases, intervention need not pose a threat to an existing state's sovereignty. In fact, interventions by the United Nations and other international organizations are the most appropriate ways to settle, or at least effect a compromise over, the conflicting political and territorial claims of self-determination movements and the states that oppose them.

TOC | Key Points | Foreword | Introduction | Two | Three | Four | Five | Six | Notes | Acknowledgments | Author

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