Sovereignty after Empire
Self-Determination Movements in the Former Soviet Union
Approaches of Decision Makers
The author conducted the following interviews in 1994. The questions revolved around two central issues in this study: the conditions under which the principle of nonintervention in internal affairs could be violated for the prevention of wider conflict, and the acceptable criteria for peoples to claim the right to self-determination.
The following prominent decision makers kindly agreed to participate in these interviews:
Mikhail Gorbachev, former general secretary of the Communist Party of the USSR (1985–1991) and president of the USSR (1990–1991). He now serves as president of the Gorbachev Foundation and president of the International Green Cross.
Jack Matlock, a fellow at Princeton University's Institute for Advanced Studies. He has twice served as the U.S. Ambassador to the USSR, finishing his last posting in 1991.
Sam Nunn, the former senior senator from the state of Georgia in the U.S. Senate, who served as chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Lady Margaret Thatcher, a Conservative member of the House of Lords in the British Parliament, who served as prime minister from 1979 to 1990.
QUESTION 1:
The Principle of Nonintervention
Is it necessary, from your point of view, to reconsider the internationally recognized principle of "nonintervention," given existing threats to international peace? Can you conceive of any situation that would increase the likelihood of action by the international community?
The respondents' opinions on this topic range from complete acceptance to complete rejection of the notion of nonintervention. Their opinions depend to a large extent on their perspective on national sovereignty, as can be expected, but they also depend significantly on their assessment of practical political questions. For example, "Will this intervention work?" seems to be at least as important a consideration as "Is this intervention justified?" Perhaps such a perspective is to be expected from this group, all of whom are distinguished as pragmatic politicians, but perhaps it also reflects the difficulty of imposing a comprehensive theoretical framework on the wide range of political scenarios in the world today.
Margaret Thatcher basically rejects the idea that intervention in a country's internal affairs could improve the situation. Yet she argues that the intervention in Iraq on behalf of the Kurdish minority, made possible by the United Nations' sanction and the immediate presence of UN troops, was justified by Iraq's overt flouting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Sam Nunn takes a similarly pragmatic approach when he suggests that intervention should be avoided because the United States cannot handle the task of policing the entire globe. He also suggests that the U.S. government work toward avoiding the need for intervention in the future through more active diplomacy.
Mikhail Gorbachev agrees with the proposition that national sovereignty makes sense only within an international system, so that a country that ignores norms of human rights also gives up its voice in the international system and thus loses its claim to sovereignty. He also argues that the idea of absolute sovereignty never existed in the first place.
Jack Matlock would like to see the international community take a proactive stance in settling conflicts, but he puts great responsibility on the intellectuals within countries and the political mood they create.
MARGARET THATCHER: Well now, point number one: We have all signed the [Universal Declaration of Human Rights]. I say we should all uphold the [Declaration]. It was never upheld in Stalin's day, in Brezhnev's day, it is not upheld in Iraq, it may not be upheld in other countries. Why we were able to do something about the Kurds was because Saddam Hussein had flouted every principle by marching into another country, and the whole United Nations [had] the right to put sanctions upon [Iraq]. And they then started to treat their Kurds badly, but [the allied coalition forces] were still really under the auspices of the United Nations because we hadn't [yet] gotten a peace settlement at all; so we were able to do something because we had our troops there. . . .
And [the UN] therefore gave us the authority to do something about that, because there was the [Iraqi] army which we had [allowed to withdraw and which turned around and] attack[ed] their own people. . . . We put total sanctions, although they don't always work. But that was the reason we were able to do it there. But I'm afraid there are terrible things we weren't able to do anything about. For example, in Cambodia, where Pol Pot just virtually murdered quite a lot of people, as indeed [also] happened in the collectivization in Russia. . . .
But, so far, there is no way in which we can go in with an army and say, "You're ignoring human rights!" But what you can do is [impose] sanctions. . . . So I think that will continue, but we do give much more publicity to it now. You see, you can tell what's going on much more from satellites now. And so, it is the publicity and trading arrangements which become the important thing, although if you want to make a people more prosperous you don't want to put constraints on trade, usually because that's a way to help them out of their difficulties.
SAM NUNN: [The UN and U.S. intervention in Iraq] was a new precedent in terms of protecting the Kurds, but it also grew out of a direct international action to make sure that Iraq was forced to leave Kuwait. That was a unique set of circumstances and I don't think that precedent is going to hold in terms of many interventions around the world in what [are] primarily civil wars and wars between ethnic groups. It is extremely difficult to deal with, and we've seen that from Bosnia, we've seen that from the UN intervention in Somalia, [and] there are probably fifteen to twenty other inner-country conflicts going on around the world now, and frankly world resources are not sufficient to deal with those problems; the United Nations is not sufficient. I think we're going to have to be much more active in diplomacy, and not use the military in areas that do not lend themselves to military solutions.
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV: As for today's global realities, the more for future realities, the existence of states, their security, and even their survival depend upon the world situation in general. Now it is impossible to separate the existence and development of any state from that of the whole world.
In such a situation, we should also revise the principles of sovereignty; obviously a substantial part of sovereignty should be addressed to the world community. Strictly speaking, a number of steps in this direction were already made; it is enough [to mention] a general recognition of human rights, which should be collectively protected, a recognition of a necessity of unified ecological norms.
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It would be of great importance to strengthen the international jurisdictional basis for the solution of local conflicts. In particular, the notion of sovereignty should be revised. There never was such a thing as absolute sovereignty, all the more in our time of growing interactions between the states.
Of course, we don't recommend full refusal of sovereignty or its limitations, which could damage the natural aspirations of each people to keep and defend its identity. However, we should take into account our accumulated experience and devise a system that could deal with gross violations of human rights, including rights of national minorities and ethnic groups.
The basis of human rights is a ubiquitous sovereignty which, according to [UN Secretary-General] Boutros-Ghali, belongs to the whole of humanity and allows everybody to participate in the solution of problems that are of interest to the whole world. The concept of such ubiquitous sovereignty becomes more and more popular, but it still lacks a juridical basis and of course the recognition and support of the world community.
JACK MATLOCK: I think it would be desirable for the international community to develop further international law and international practice in this regard. I believe that it is dangerous to continue to rely on individual countries, or even groups of countries, to intervene in situations of this sort.
I would say, first of all, that military intervention should be absolutely the last resort and normally should not be employed by outsiders; it is a very dangerous instrument. It's also one very difficult for a democratic country to apply, because no country wants its soldiers exposed to danger in places that are distant and are not directly related to that country's own life and interest. So this is a difficult question.
The problem now, as I see it, is that we do not have a sufficient structure of international law, and we do not have a consensus on what grounds intervention would be possible. I would like to see us develop procedures whereby the world community can influence a situation early on by matters less than military intervention, by giving encouragement to the right behavior, discouragement to the other.
A lot of this has to be done unofficially, not by governments. And I would say that the intellectuals in every country have a very great responsibility. Those that teach exclusive nationalism of their groups—even worse, hatred of others—are betraying that responsibility. And I think this has happened, clearly, in a number of cases. And even though they may be themselves nonviolent and may not preach violence, they are creating conditions that demagogues can use with the people. So it seems to me, we have to deal with that problem, and many others.
QUESTION 2:
Judging Self-Determination
The persistent will to achieve self-determination, expressed through referenda or the decisions of local representative bodies, cannot be ignored by the international community; to do so only increases the probability of violence being used as an instrument to express discontent. What kind of criteria should be considered as the inter national community weighs its options for preventing violence in the name of self-determination?
More so than with the first question, the respondents were unable to give a clear answer to this question. This fact alone indicates that the issue of self-determination is particularly thorny; the numerous examples that the respondents refer to in discussing the topic demonstrate this complexity still further. Each example comes from a unique historical situation and casts its own perspective on the entire subject, but even the same example can be used to support two opposite conclusions. The discussions below do not suggest any clear answers, but they do raise many other equally profound questions.
Margaret Thatcher declares that the nation-state must remain the unit of international society in which all decisions are made. While she admits the pos sibility of changing borders, she insists that such changes should occur only through a careful process of negotiation and mutual agreement. For her, the preservation of world order is paramount. Sam Nunn addresses the issue of what size units should be considered separate political and territorial entities, suggesting that ethnic groups must learn to work together within a larger political entity.
Jack Matlock believes that the right to self-determination cannot be absolute, but he also contends that the international community needs to establish better standards for human rights around the world. If such rigorous standards can be established, groups will have less need to fight for their ethnic self-determination. He believes that the standards worked out by the OSCE provide a good framework for establishing the right to self-determination, but, like Margaret Thatcher, he advises extreme caution when considering changing existing borders.
Mikhail Gorbachev believes that the issue of self-determination can best be addressed within the larger context of a more cooperative international environment. He suggests that the general democratization of international relations and the denial of undue influence to any one group will contribute to the easing of ethnic tensions, but he warns against allowing "hyperethnism" to threaten the stability of existing borders and states.
MARGARET THATCHER: Let's start with Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was put together by international treaty after World War I. When the big empires, the German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, broke up, you were left with a lot of units, and they took those units and out of about seven of them they made Yugoslavia—the Southern Slavs—but they were very, very different people, although they were all Southern Slavs. They were different, so they had different religions, they had different histories, some of them had been natural enemies, and I'm afraid the Serbs always were expansionists. And so when [Yugoslavia] was put together there was a right to secede for those nations that formed a part of the big Yugoslavia. And so when Croatia said it wanted to secede, Slovenia did, and then Bosnia did. Yes, they had a right to secede . . . and therefore the United Nations recognized them.
After the failed coup in the Soviet Union . . . we saw what we could not have foreseen, that the fifteen republics wanted their own independence. Now of course the Baltic states were entitled to it; the others wanted their own independence. But each of them, you know, has considerable minorities in them. Now you cannot take each little minority and say, "Right, you could be independent," because we would have so many small states, and each within its minority would have some more minorities.
So [we must always keep] to the actual nation-state, as drawn, and if there are any changes they could only be by discussion and negotiation. We do that because the moment we change that, we shall all be in very considerable difficulty. I think Stalin made about a hundred changes in the borders of the Soviet Union.
But you take the existing [borders]. If there is to be any change, then it would have to be by agreement between the adjacent states. But in [the former Soviet Union], in particular, you take Kazakstan: You are very, very mixed [in terms of population], but they are all now citizens of Kazakstan. And don't forget, most of them will live happily together.
It's only when you get troublemakers, real troublemakers who are out for their own power, who'll rouse people [by saying] "We want to go elsewhere," or when you get another nation-state say[ing], "We would like to have that minority attached to us," like [Nazi] Germany, like Serbia. But you see, once you start to do that, there's no order left in the world. . . .
GS: When Germany reunified it was another case of self-determination, from my point of view. What kind of moral legitimacy, or criteria for moral legitimacy, can be accepted?
MT: The whole of the country of East Germany voted to unify with West Germany. . . . It was the whole country voting for that. I think it would be very, very difficult if without negotiation you suddenly had a minority saying we want to go and belong to another country. There wouldn't be any order left in it. . . . Where would we all be? And you really must keep world order.
GS: Do you accept this final decision about the future of Ulster?
MT: Ulster voted to stay with the United Kingdom. When it became Home Rule for Ireland, the six counties in the north refused to go into the new Republic of Ireland. . . . They're actually people with a very different background. And we said so long as those six counties . . . vote to stay with the United Kingdom they will have the right to do that; [they will] have that constitutional guarantee. They are part of the United Kingdom. . . . This is part of the constitutional settlement when Ireland got Home Rule: . . . so long as the majority of voters stay with the United Kingdom, and it's an absolute secret ballot, . . . we will respect that and uphold it. And let me say, in the last war we should all have been in much more difficulty if we hadn't had the ports from Northern Ireland. You see southern Ireland was neutral; the Republic of Ireland was neutral. . . .
SAM NUNN: Well, self-determination grew out of the original aspirations and hopes of Woodrow Wilson way back after World War I, and there is much to commend that general philosophy. Certainly, we want people to be able to vote and exercise their own choice of leadership and their own direction. The question is what size units. I think you have to have a certain viability or promise or potential of viability as a nation, both in terms of a nation that can protect its own borders, a nation that can be able to maintain some viable economy, a nation that has at least got the potential of being strong enough to accord minorities within its borders basic human rights. I think all of those things go into self-determination, and I do not believe there's one formula that tells us how to determine whether a country should be recognized.
Frankly, I think there was too quick a recognition of the former republics of Yugoslavia before we had set down any criteria. That wasn't the cause perhaps of the breakup and the war, but it certainly was a contributing factor. So I think we have to use what I would call a common-sense judgment of when a group of people band together and claim to be a nation, whether that really is something the international [community] wants to recognize.
If you take it to its own conclusion, which would be an absurd conclusion, any three or four people could declare themselves a nation. You could get down to families thinking they're nations, and ethnic groups who could think they're nations. With all the ethnic groups in the world, it seems to me that if we divide nations simply on [the basis of] ethnic groups, the conflicts we have now are going to be only the tip of the iceberg.
We've got to have nations where ethnic groups work together. The United States faces that; we've got to work together with ethnic groups. We're probably one of the most diverse countries in the world, [and] Russia is a very diverse country. But all of us have to use basic courtesy, common sense, and sensitivity in dealing with ethnic differences. I think the world is going to be more diverse, countries are going to be more diverse, and solutions are going to be more complex.
JACK MATLOCK: One has to understand that self-determination, while it is an important principle, is not an exclusive principle. It is like majority rule, which is an essential part of democracy, but is not an absolute principle. In a developed democracy, as I would define it, a majority does not have the right to trample on the rights of a minority. It's not a democracy if that can happen—it becomes a tyranny; and you can have a tyranny of the majority.
So, there are many principles that have to be qualified, and self-determination is one of these. Now, for example, I think one of the reasons the international community is very cautious is that there are times in history when clearly it was against the interests of all groups, all countries, for certain areas to practice self-determination in the literal sense.
I am sure the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia wanted to be part of Nazi Germany in 1938. They were mistaken to do so, but that gave Hitler the opportunity to extinguish Czechoslovakia as a state. . . . The end result was not only the defeat of Nazi Germany, but the fact that none of the Germans who lived in the Sudetenland live there now. They were expelled by the Czechs, who said . . . they cannot be loyal members of the Czech state.
. . . Another problem is the Palestinians and Israel. Because there, the Palestinian leadership for many [years] had as its aim the extinguishing of the Israeli state. No state can make a compromise with someone who wants to destroy it. You make compromises with people when you can compromise. If the position is uncompromising, you cannot. And this, I think, was the main thing blocking self-determination of Palestinians before the Oslo agreements.
I think the answer, if there's going to be one, is that we have to develop better international standards for respect for human rights. If a state respects the full human and civil rights of the people in that state, there will be, in the long run, no good excuse to pull away from that state. A state should not be based exclusively on a nationality. It needs a civil society, which is based on something else. It may well be predominantly of a given language group, or nationality, but it should protect everybody in its midst. And if it does that, the chances are we won't have people trying to pull away. I believe you cannot have a principle that simply says that wherever there's a majority of people, they can under all conditions decide to create a state for their group alone.
It's physically impossible, too, in many areas of the world. [In] most areas of the world, people are mixed. You can't draw lines between them. And so, we really have to develop societies where people can live together, and in mutual respect. You don't have to love each other, but you have to respect each other and respect the rights of the other people.
Now, in the immediate term, when countries begin to fall apart, I think a lot of the outside world tends to stand aside until they are faced with a fait accompli. And if a group has really pulled apart, really is independent, then they recognize it. Until it has, there is a tendency not to.
And I think that the [Organization for] Security and Cooperation in Europe has developed general principles . . . which are valid. They may be incomplete. Perhaps they need further elaboration. But basically, the principle is that borders should not be changed except by peaceful means and mutual agreement.
Yes. Borders can be changed. They are at times. . . . In our own United States history, the Philippines did not like their status. They were given independence. Then they decided they didn't want our bases. So, we left.
Some of these things were not easy to do. . . . There was territory with Mexico along the border at [one] time that Mexico thought was theirs. And we negotiated and were willing to give up some. We didn't consider every inch sort of sacred ground.
Of course, if people are living there on disputed territory, then their opinion matters a great deal. We generally applauded Great Britain's defense of the Falkland Islands because it was clear that the people living there did not want to be part of Argentina, even though it was close to Argentina.
What the people who live in an area predominantly want is a very important factor. But it is sometimes not the decisive factor. And if there is an answer, it is that fully democratic states usually don't face this problem in extreme form.
Now, we'll have to see what happens in Canada. If French Canada decides to separate, I'm sure there will be no bloodshed. And then it will happen. It will be unfortunate, as when a couple divorces. But they will decide that. My guess is they will decide to stay as part of Canada, because they do have full rights.
In the final analysis, a state makes a mistake if, over the long run, it persists in trying to hold territory where residents don't want to be part of it. This becomes a problem for that state. But in the short run, people need to be very cautious about trying to change borders. It is wrong to try to change them by violence or by intimidation, because this creates much more dangerous problems.
GS: I predict great tensions in the situation connected with the Crimean problem, especially after the recent elections. If Ukraine will start some embargo actions—or even violent actions, which is very improbable—against Crimea, what could be the reaction of the West? Will it be considered only as an internal affair of Ukraine? Or mutual relations between Russia and Ukraine? Or an international issue?
JM: Whether it's an international issue will depend on what happens precisely. If Ukrainian policy is viewed by the world community as grossly coercive, it could become an international issue.
. . . My guess is that most foreign countries initially would have some difficulty speaking about it publicly. My guess is that most with relations with Ukraine would strongly urge them not to react in that fashion. That would clearly, in my opinion, be counterproductive.
. . . Now that Ukraine has granted autonomy, if it is respected, I would certainly advise the Crimeans to try to make it work. Certainly, they should assert their rights peacefully. Buy why change administrations now?
I understand all of the historical factors. But the fact is, the most serious thing you can get yourself in is trying to change jurisdiction, change territory between states. This too often leads to wars, and sometimes serious ones. This is not something to do lightly.
At the moment, my judgment—from a distance, of course—is that the Ukrainian government has been willing to allow a great measure of autonomy in Crimea. And I just wonder what would be gained by challenging the current status. But I certainly agree that the Kiev authorities should not react to the local political process in ways that are coercive.
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV: We should also find a new way to understand and formulate the rights of nations for self-determination. An unrestrained breakdown of the states according to the ethnic principles, supported by aspirations for so-called "ethnic purity," would lead to a remaking of borders of various states and regions on such a scale that it would gave birth to [innumerable] conflicts and would make a united world policy practically impossible.
Some people may be tempted by international and ethnic conflicts to reconsider the existing spheres of influence. The tragic breakdown of the former Yugoslavia can serve as an example. Similar processes can also be seen in the former Soviet Union.
As an antidote for such developments we can recommend further democratization of international relations and a very simple rule: to refuse any attempts to build a new world order according to interests of any single state or a group of states. Unfortunately there is no shortage of such ideas. We hear and see them now everywhere.
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What shall we expect considering our experience of solving international conflicts during the last few years?
As for the states where tensions of a national-ethnic nature already exist or may appear, the political and religious leaders of these are mainly responsible for a peaceful solution to the tension. In no case may the leaders be too late, fall behind the progress of the situation. Here a large part should be played by national laws, which should exclude any violation of human rights, including rights of national minorities and ethnic groups. However, the corresponding norms of international law also play no less a part. There is a shortage of such norms. The [OSCE] has started but not finished their elaboration.
Clearly, the recognition and guarantee of all rights of national minorities should in no case provoke disintegration of existing states and the remaking of state borders on a large scale.
Such a phenomenon as "hyperethnism" now becomes more and more popular. Under hyperethnism we understand the aspirations of certain ethnic groups to guarantee their rights by means of creating their own independent states. I think that this problem could be solved with the aid of principles of federalization in their broadest sense and of national-cultural autonomy.
