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TOC | Summary | Foreword | Two | Three | Four | Five | Notes | About the Author Summary Despite Asia’s current financial crisis, China’s rapid economic growth raises the question of whether or not it will emerge as a dominant regional power, or even a hegemonic world power, in the twenty-first century. For many in the West and in China’s neighboring countries, this prospect is very troublesome. Their worries are based on a variety of observations and deliberations, three of which are the most consistently and frequently cited:
The “China threat” scenario leads to all kinds of policy prescriptions, emphasizing the need either to “constrain” or to “contain” China. These prescriptions, though varying from case to case, typically argue for the strengthening of U.S. military capabilities in general and its military presence in Asia in particular. A closer analysis, however, reveals that the problems generated by China’s emergence as a prominent world power should be defined as a “China challenge,” with which both the Chinese people and the rest of the world must cope through mutual understanding and cooperation, rather than a China threat, against which the rest of the world must form a strategy in a well-planned collective effort. After its establishment in 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) emerged as a revolutionary country on the world scene. During the twenty-seven years of Mao’s reign (1949–76), the PRC constantly challenged the legitimacy of the existing international order, which it believed to be the result of Western domination and thus inimical to revolutionary China. Underlying the PRC’s revolutionary external behavior is a profound “victim mentality.” During modern times, the Chinese perception of their nation’s position in the world was continuously informed by the conviction that it was the political incursion, economic exploitation, and military aggression by foreign imperialist countries that had undermined the historical glory of the Chinese civilization and humiliated the Chinese nation. As a result, a victim mentality gradually dominated the Chinese conceptualization of its relations with the outside world. Mao’s China, despite its history of using force, was not an expansionist power. Mao and his fellow Chinese leaders seemed to have been unafraid of using force in dealing with foreign policy crises that they believed threatened the PRC’s vital interests. What they hoped to achieve was not the expansion of China’s political and military control of foreign territory or resources, but the spread of the revolution’s influence to other “hearts and minds” around the world. China today is no longer a revolutionary country. But China is not a real “insider” in the international community either. Indeed, foreign policy is the least criticized endeavor in post-Mao China, yet many of the principles underlying Mao’s revolutionary foreign policy, and the victim mentality that serves as their animus, remain the key elements influencing the PRC’s external behavior today. A fundamental difference exists between the notions of “China threat” and “China challenge”: the former completely ignores how the Chinese people perceive the problems facing their nation’s development, whereas the latter regards these problems as both Chinese and international in their essence. Quite simply, the adoption of a “China challenge” approach requires an understanding of the problems raised by China’s development from a Chinese perspective. At the end of the twentieth century, China is at a crucial historical juncture. Deng Xiaoping’s reform-and-opening process has fundamentally changed China’s isolated international status, but the final outcome of this process is by no means certain. The hope that China will transform into a land of prosperity and modernity (including the adoption of democratic political institutions) remains very promising. Yet the Chinese, especially the intellectuals, have been frustrated by the negative effects of the reform-and-opening process and fear that the Chinese state and society may disintegrate from the pressure of change. Because of the comprehensiveness of the reform-and-opening process, the Chinese communist state is facing a profound legitimacy crisis. China is not likely to become a fundamental threat to international peace and security as perceived by the advocates of the “China threat” thesis. If the reform-and-opening process finally brings economic prosperity, social stability, and democracy to China, it will simultaneously transform China into a real “insider” of the international community, willing to observe a broader range of international legal norms and regulations. Then again, if China fails to hold up under the extraordinary pressure brought about by total state and societal transformation and disintegrates as a result, it will be too weak to pose a threat. How should the United States cope with the “China challenge”? While there are no easy answers to this question, the first and most important step is for Washington to formulate a long-term and consistent overall strategy toward China, beginning by constructing a U.S.-Chinese agenda for relations that is dominated by positive bilateral issues. How far into the future should this long-range vision look? Based on the anticipated results of some crucial developments in the People’s Republic, such a vision should span at least fifteen to twenty years. China is experiencing the greatest transformation—political, economic, social, and cultural—in its history, which imposes tremendous challenges for the Chinese people and causes profound frustrations for China’s intellectuals. The triumph of this transformation process may open the way for China to emerge as an equal member and genuine “insider” of the international community. The failure of the process, by contrast, may lead to a disintegrated China, creating all kinds of security, environmental, and other serious problems for the Asia-Pacific region and the world as a whole. The United States has no reason to fear China’s rise as a strong and prosperous country. Rather, Washington should make the support of China’s modernization efforts a long-range, high-priority goal in its post–Cold War global strategy. TOC | Summary | Foreword | Two | Three | Four | Five | Notes | About the Author Home | Jobs | FAQs | Contact Us | Directions | Privacy Policy | Site Map United States Institute of Peace -- 1200 17th Street NW -- Washington, DC 20036
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