The Silver Bullet: India-Pakistan Normalization

May 23, 2011

If one were asked to identify the top two or three developments that could promote sustained stability in Pakistan, and even peace in South Asia, all of them would be directly or indirectly linked to India-Pakistan normalization. Despite what has happened in Afghanistan since 9/11, including the backlash within Pakistan, it is my considered view that the road to a stable Pakistan, ultimately travels through New Delhi. There was even a prolonged window after 9/11 when reassuring Pakistan vis-à-vis India, especially its presence in Afghanistan, could have reflected in more conciliatory Pakistani policies in Afghanistan. That window is closed now.

Nonetheless, a proactive U.S. stance in nudging the two sides towards normalization is advisable, not only for Pakistan’s stability but also for the sake of optimizing the Indo-U.S. alliance. Until India and Pakistan draw their daggers, India’s ascendance to the global stage will remain constrained. Washington finds itself in an extremely awkward situation as a third party. In Islamabad, the U.S. is now popularly viewed as having shifted camps, leaning towards India as a long term partner and maintaining tactical ties with Pakistan for the time being. While Washington always reacts to this sentiment by negating this structural shift, the fact is that the shift is real and a positive one from an American point of view. Rather than being defensive, this fact should be acknowledged and instead, Washington’s leverage with both South Asian countries ought to be used to keep the two sides at the negotiating table.

Three avenues for U.S. facilitation stand out:

• Terrorism from Pakistan-based militants has become the single most important sticking point in bilateral ties. Anti-India militant organizations no longer require active Pakistani state support to operate but matters are made worse by the state’s seeming indifference, as is reflected in its handling of the Mumbai attack suspects. While pushing Pakistan to launch a forceful offensive against Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in the Pakistani heartland of Punjab can backfire, Pakistan will have to show extreme political will and sincerity in its law enforcement measures against groups like LeT to make its efforts credible. Simultaneously, the two sides will have to show resolve to work together in defeating this menace. The existing ‘joint terrorism mechanism’ provides the most obvious mechanism to do so.
• Kashmir still remains the ultimate game changer. The motivations for anti-India terrorism, all directly or indirectly link up with Kashmir. There was unprecedented progress on the issue during the India-Pakistan peace process between 2003-2007; both sides had, at the time, a fair understanding of the broad contours of the solution. Political hurdles in both countries aside, the leaderships have repeatedly expressed their desire to move forward on Kashmir. If it cannot actively facilitate, the U.S. can certainly ensure that bilateral negotiations on the issue do not break down. One could point to a number of moments in the past where a more proactive U.S. role could have been pivotal. The most recent example is 2007-08 when after making substantial progress, the dialogue on Kashmir hit a roadblock. Had Washington been more involved all along, it may well have been able to step in and prevent the process from being derailed completely. As the bilateral dialogue resumes, U.S. vigilance would be advisable.
• Facilitating a fundamentally transformed economic relationship is another hitherto ignored avenue. Pakistan’s traditional stance that trade and investment will follow resolution of Kashmir has been inherently counterproductive and has stifled regional development. Should a freer trade and investment regime be instituted between the two countries, the extent of economic and human interdependence it is expected to create will by itself make the security-dominated narrative in Pakistan difficult to uphold. Washington could use its diplomatic offices to nudge both sides towards greater liberalization and, to overcome Pakistani hesitance, consider monetary incentives to Pakistan to offset some of the initial losses due to the inflow of Indian goods. It could also contemplate industrial investment packages to help expand and upgrade specific Pakistani industries capable of exporting to India. Some of the funding authorized under the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act can be used for this purpose.
• Finally, the U.S. should also be cognizant of the unintended consequences of its regional policies. De-hyphenation of the India-Pakistan relationship along with a civil nuclear deal to India created a sense of discrimination – of being boxed in – in Pakistan. Pakistan went on a nuclear build-up spree and viewed this as the only long term guarantee against growing Indian might. The Indo-U.S. deal also pushed Pakistan to seek a deal from China. The dynamic of Indian military modernization, periodic terrorist attacks from Pakistan, and Pakistan’s nuclear build up will also make escalation control in South Asian crises a much greater challenge. Again, reassuring Pakistan by setting preconditions for initiation of talks on a nuclear deal and finding ways to bring Pakistan and India into the legal ambit of the non-proliferation regime, with all its responsibilities, may be beneficial in this regard.

More from USIP

• Assessing U.S. Policy and Its Limits in Pakistan
  Moeed Yusuf testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 5, 2011.