Disputes over land in Afghanistan have become one of the key drivers of conflict and criminal violence. Both formal and informal mechanisms for land dispute resolution are weak. The legal framework fails to recognize the reality of informal or customary ownership arrangements. The current land law, revised in 2008, is a fraught one—to establish ownership a person must already have formal documents proving ownership, and if ownership by an individual cannot be proved, title defaults to the state. However, formal documentation is scarce: no more than 20 percent of land is titled. This report discusses a new approach to addressing the problem and offers recommendations for reform.

Summary

  • Land disputes are a primary driver of conflict in Afghanistan. Population pressures, rapid urbanization, displacement and resettlement, and rising land value have increased competi-tion for land since 2002.
  • When disputes over land arise, they fester and multiply because both the formal and informal mechanisms for land conflict resolution and enforcement are weak.
  • Community-based dispute resolution historically mediated land disputes, but the two decades of conflict and instability following the 1979 coup weakened community social structures. Socioeconomic changes and the ongoing insurgency and displacement since 2002 have further destabilized traditional mechanisms.
  • State mechanisms are even less able to sustainably settle disputes given their limited presence, poor enforcement capability, bad reputation (due to corruption and land grabbing), and the widespread lack of authentic title deeds.
  • In the 1960s and 1970s, the Afghan state tried to formalize land ownership, but the effort was limited and primarily urban. Most of the documentation created has since been destroyed, lost, or deliberately falsified. No more than 20 percent of land in Afghanistan is accurately titled.
  • USIP conducted a pilot project from fall 2013 to spring 2014 seeking to increase formal registration of land that had gone through community dispute resolution. The legal frame-work was a substantial hurdle. The limited means for recognizing communal and pasture lands and customary ownership under Afghan law are at odds with the reality of most land ownership in Afghanistan.
  • The current Land Management Law creates a fundamental catch-22: To establish ownership a person must already have formal documents proving ownership. Given the pervasive lack of formal documentation, this creates inherent disincentives for citizens to register lands and gives rise to an inherent conflict between the state and most landowners in Afghanistan.

About the Report

The vast majority of land in Afghanistan is untitled and unregistered, further complicating the Afghan state’s ability to help sustainably resolve land disputes. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and the Afghanistan Land Authority sought to address this problem by testing a new model of engaging community dispute resolution in formal land registration. This report examines the lessons learned from the pilot and proposes recommendations for reform.

About the Authors

Erica Gaston is a human rights lawyer with seven years’ experience in research and programming in Afghanistan on human rights and justice promotion. A senior program officer in USIP’s Governance Law and Society Center from 2012 to 2014, Gaston designed research and program interventions to promote the rule of law in Afghanistan. Lillian Dang, a senior program officer based in USIP’s Afghanistan country office, oversees rule of law research and programming. She has field-based rule of law, good governance, and human rights programming experience in India, Cambodia, Timor-Leste, and the Philippines.


Related Research & Analysis

Understanding the Implications of the Taliban’s Opium Ban in Afghanistan

Understanding the Implications of the Taliban’s Opium Ban in Afghanistan

Thursday, December 12, 2024

The Taliban’s opium ban, coupled with Afghan farmers’ replacement of poppy largely with low-value wheat, is likely to worsen dissatisfaction and political tensions. The Taliban’s persistence in enforcing the ban has been notable, especially in 2024. If the ban remains in place, it would demonstrate the regime’s strength but also worsen rural poverty, increase dissatisfaction among landholders and spur political instability. This will likely lead to increased humanitarian needs and more pressures for outmigration to nearby countries and beyond, both of which are of interest to the U.S. and other Western countries. Conversely, if the ban weakens in response to pressures and resistance, a revival of widespread poppy cultivation could undermine the regime’s authority. Aid alone will not offset the economic shock of the ban, nor stimulate the long-term growth needed to effectively combat the opium problem.

Type: Analysis

How Afghanistan’s Economy Can Survive Shrinking Shipments of U.N. Cash Aid

How Afghanistan’s Economy Can Survive Shrinking Shipments of U.N. Cash Aid

Thursday, November 14, 2024

Afghanistan’s precarious economy is facing a new set of multidimensional risks as humanitarian aid — delivered in massive shipments of U.S. cash dollars — shrinks rapidly amid competing demands from other crises around the world. The dollar inflows, moved under U.N. auspices, have helped stabilize the Afghan economy, cover its mammoth trade deficit, and inject monetary liquidity into commerce. With much smaller cash infusions, in line with a general reduction in aid, the suffering of Afghanistan’s poverty-stricken population is likely to increase.

Type: Analysis

View All Research & Analysis